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42. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
43. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
44. Russia-China Defense Cooperation
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
45. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers
- Author:
- Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
46. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
47. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction
- Author:
- Andrew Metrick
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
48. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China
- Author:
- Emily Kilcrease
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
49. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
50. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order
- Author:
- Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
- Political Geography:
- China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America
51. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program
- Author:
- Bonnie S. Glaser
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
52. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad
- Author:
- Kelly M. McFarland
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North America, and United States of America
53. R2P Monitor, Issue 67, 1 December 2023
- Author:
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 67 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso
54. R2P Monitor, Issue 66, 1 September 2023
- Author:
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 66 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Haiti, South Sudan and Yemen.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso
55. R2P Monitor, Issue 65, 1 June 2023
- Author:
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 65 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan and Yemen.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso
56. R2P Monitor, Issue 64, 1 March 2023
- Author:
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
- Abstract:
- R2P Monitor is a quarterly bulletin applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 64 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Mozambique, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Niger, and Burkina Faso
57. Strategic Competition in the Financial Gray Zone
- Author:
- Heather A Conley, James Andrew Lewis, Eugenia Lostri, and Donatienne Ruy
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Over the past 10 years, the U.S. government has slowly reoriented its foreign and security policy from the fight against global terrorism toward strategic competition with Russia and China. This reorientation has been accompanied by a new examination of how strategic competition will impact the integrity and future stability of the U.S. economy and financial system. One of the most important elements of strategic competition is sub-threshold warfare (also called asymmetric, hybrid, or gray zone warfare), wherein strategic competitors seek to shape the geostrategic environment in their favor, from information operations to economic warfare—which includes such tools as illicit finance and strategic corruption. Strategic competitors present a clear economic and financial threat to the United States when they operate in the emerging financial gray zone, in which malign actors can take advantage of the U.S. financial system to further their aims and disarm the country internally. The U.S. government, along with its allies, has only begun to acknowledge the sweeping nature of the financial gray zone and to reposition itself to compete within it. Because adversaries exploit the seams between the internal and external policies and authorities, Washington must have greater insights into a complex operating system and better integrate data across the many relevant agencies—in a way, connecting the financial dots. As it develops this comprehensive picture, the U.S. government should develop stronger defensive and offensive policy tools to counter this emerging threat.
- Topic:
- Economics, Finance, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
58. The Two Technospheres Western-Chinese Technology Decoupling: Implications for Cybersecurity
- Author:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Decoupling of digital innovation, systems, and data flows between Western nations and China is a growing global issue with high potential to destabilize the digital world. Through a series of workshops and an analysis of existing efforts, the Multilateral Cyber Action Committee (MCAC) has provided an assessment on the current status of technology decoupling and the growing divergence of the Western and Chinese technospheres. The report provides a set of recommendations for action to mitigate the growing cybersecurity risks posed by technology decoupling.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and North America
59. Europe and the Geopolitics of 5G Walking a Technological Tightrope
- Author:
- Julien Nocetti
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The acute Sino-American tensions which started in 2018 have been coupled with controversies around 5G technology, exemplified by the spotlight placed on Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei and the security risks associated with its use. For Europe, the 5G challenge at the international level is drawing a very complex landscape. Just like artificial intelligence, 5G materializes a very strong geopolitical sensitivity around the control of critical technologies. 5G is indeed critical because of its expected quasi-ubiquitous use, the gradual shift towards network technologies based entirely on software, and the potential strengthening of already dominant players (including digital platforms via cloud services). The United States-China rivalry is limiting the European Union’s room for action, against a backdrop of security considerations and low levels of investment. The continent’s various players (the European Commission, the main European powers, private players such as Nokia and Ericsson) have not adopted a uniform stance, reflecting an entanglement of technological dependencies on China and the United States. Meanwhile, the issue of semiconductors, symbolizing both the technological decline and the renewal of the EU’s ambitions, is fully integrated into the development of 5G. These chips constitute the "muscle" of the system and trigger new geo-economic challenges in which Europe must still find its place.
- Topic:
- European Union, Internet, 5G, Telecommunications, and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
60. Convince and Coerce: U.S. Interference in Technology Exchanges Between its Allies and China
- Author:
- Mathilde Velliet
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The tough-on-China policy adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations has – and will increasingly have – important consequences for Washington’s allies, both on their infrastructure choices (5G, submarine cables...) and on their technological exchanges with China. Indeed, the U.S. objective of slowing down China’s technological development has been translated into multiple policies, primarily targeting China but also – directly or indirectly – U.S. partners. On the one hand, Washington deploys a range of coercive and incentive tools to prevent its allies from adopting certain technologies, supplied by Chinese companies and « untrusted » by American authorities (in terms of cyber, data or infrastructure security). Case studies of U.S. efforts against the deployment of Huawei’s 5G or Hengtong Group’s undersea cables reveal a similar strategy, combining direct diplomatic pressure, a threat awareness campaign, and financial incentives. On the other hand, in line with the United States’ historical use of the extraterritoriality of its law and its position as an economic superpower to influence its allies’ decisions, Washington seeks to restrict transfers of critical technologies from allies to China. As the main manufacturers (along with the United States) of these technologies, American allies are increasingly constrained by these legal and diplomatic restrictions, which target one of their main trading partners and tend to extend beyond strictly military or cutting-edge technologies. For example, in order to limit sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, U.S. authorities are combining changes to the American export control regime with diplomatic efforts (bilaterally and multilaterally) to persuade allies to align their own export policies with those of the United States. While the Biden administration appears to be placing greater emphasis on cooperative and incentive approaches, it seems likely that the multidimensional U.S. strategy serving these two objectives will continue, and even be strengthened. Among allies (and especially in Europe), this trend has raised awareness of the security challenges posed by certain Chinese suppliers, but also of the risks associated with the growing coercive practices of the great powers.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, Semiconductors, and Submarine Cable
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America