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1. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

2. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Chinese Information and Influence Warfare in Asia and the Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly provocative and reckless activities in and around disputed zones such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea constitute only one means through which Beijing seeks to change key aspects of the regional order and compel others to “accept its interests.” However, the Chinese Communist Party and PLA are already decades into China’s information and influence war, which is designed to either weaken the will and capabilities of the United States and its allies should military conflict break out or, even better, eliminate the need for China to use military force to achieve its primary objectives (i.e., to “win without fighting”). In this context, the PLA is several steps ahead of the West; whereas Western analysts observe that the PLA is operating in the “grey zone,” the PLA is instead redefining and expanding this grey zone by manipulating how other countries think about it. With respect to this so-called grey zone, a cost-benefit analysis encompassing both objective and subjective elements typically determines an entity’s decision to respond with military force. For example, crafting narratives about the PLA’s military superiority, elite capture, ability to foment disunity within a target country, or normalization of coercion raises the West’s threshold of what provocations demand a military response—thereby expanding the grey zone within which the PLA and CCP are allowed to operate. Thus, Beijing is well ahead of the US and its allies in conceptualizing and operationalizing the use of military actions other than (kinetic) war to achieve political or strategic objectives. Finally, Asia and the Pacific constitute both the primary and most suitable region within which the Chinese can conduct information and influence warfare. These sub-regions’ unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics render them especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. This policy memo describes the key objectives, strategies, and tactics of Chinese information and influence warfare developed and refined for use in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the areas of highest interest for the US, Australia, and their allies. Offering Singapore, Thailand, and the Solomon Islands as three pertinent case studies, the memo also lays the groundwork for an examination of effective US and allied counters to Beijing’s activities in these contexts, which follow-up reports in this series will present.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, Territorial Disputes, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Economic Cracks in the Great Wall of China: Is China's Current Economic Model Sustainable?

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. This report explores the long-term structural and short-term economic problems in contemporary China, and in particular considers whether the Xi Jinping regime can avoid a financial crisis and effectively manage a transition to a stable new equilibrium. Structural issues include a looming downturn in the population and in the workforce; associated problems with an underdeveloped and underfinanced social safety and welfare net; income and regional inequality; environmental degradation; and domestic shortages of raw materials, agricultural production, and energy resources. The acute economic problems analyzed in the paper are a real estate bubble, the accumulation of dangerous levels of debt, dependence on external markets and financing, a difficult transition to a more consumer-oriented and less investment-driven economy, a crackdown on dynamic digital and financial sectors, a return to dominance of low-productivity state-owned enterprises and manufacturing firms, and weak governance from an increasingly authoritarian and unaccountable regime. Many of these acute issues result from Xi’s changes in policy since 2013. Xi’s turn toward greater economic self-reliance while maintaining mercantilist trade relations signals an effective decoupling from the US and allied economies. Some historical examples of bubble economies and financial crises are discussed as possible analogies to the current situation in China. One conclusion is that the Middle Kingdom will see a much slower-growing economy, which makes addressing the structural issues much more difficult. Inability or lack of determination to address the large array of issues may also undermine the political legitimacy of the current regime, which has been buttressed since 1978 by a rapid growth model based on debt, real estate, and investment, including infrastructure. The concluding section of this report offers policy tools that the United States and its allies could deploy to induce China to be a more responsible stakeholder in the world economy and a more reliable contributor to global sustainability. The tools considered in the study include trade policy and export controls, expanded oversight of foreign investment (both direct and portfolio investment), cooperation with allies on China policy, and defense-related sanctions. The paper also suggests that deployment of these tools could be a factor in weakening China’s economy as well as a means to convince its leadership to pursue less mercantilist and authoritarian global strategies, which are harmful to the US economy and to global stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Finance, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. The Diminishing Path to Growth: Can Xi Jinping Avoid Crisis during China's Economic Transition

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Starting as a poverty-stricken agricultural society under rigid socialist rule, the country has grown steadily and rapidly to become the second largest economy in the world and carved out a growth path whose strength and longevity is historically unprecedented. As the 21st century has unfolded, the PRC has become a near peer competitor to the United States and other developed countries in terms of economic and political power. It is deploying this power in multiple ways that explicitly challenge US leadership in both the economic and global political spheres. If the PRC manages to maintain recent growth rates of around 6 percent per year, it will soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy and enhance its ability to challenge the global US leadership position, which has been a pillar of stability since World War II. The US and its allies had hoped that the PRC would become a responsible stakeholder in a liberal international order, but these hopes have been undermined in recent years by China’s increasingly apparent mercantilist economic policies, its aggressive expansion of political power, the resurgent dominance of state-owned enterprises, and the ever-more evident suppression of political liberties and traditional cultures in its sphere of influence. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. A number of trends suggest weaknesses in the traditional economic and political structures that have propelled growth in China: growing private and public sector debt, adversely shifting demography, the return to prioritizing state-run enterprises over private firms, the continued reliance on an export-oriented economic system, growing weaknesses in the financial system, dependence on external commodity and technology suppliers, persistent economic and geographic inequality, and continued reliance on external financing. Recent economic data show that bankruptcies are growing, returns on investment are shrinking, and capital controls are contributing to unrealistic valuations of internal capital stock and housing stock. Additionally, regulations are stifling innovative sectors of the economy, and opaque and unregulated consumer financing products are undermining central bank monetary policy and contributing to over-leveraged balance sheets among consumers and small businesses. Consumer purchasing power that is consistently too weak to absorb domestic production, along with incentives to increase that production, has resulted in sustained trade surpluses that create a closed loop of increased investment in manufacturing and the need for growing markets. More recently, US-led efforts to deny China access to certain high-technology products and materials have underscored Chinese vulnerabilities in key sectors like telecommunications and semiconductors. This dynamic results in trade tensions with developing countries and in economically questionable investment in the developing world. These tensions, along with the undermining of developing world markets through subsidized PRC production, are increasingly causing costly disruptions in trade flows and placing pressure on the state banking system, which is the source of most external financing. If the mounting problems with the current Chinese economic model result in material slowing of growth or even sustained recession in the PRC, this would have substantial impact on the United States and its allies in two important ways. First, given that the PRC is the second largest (or in some measures the largest) economy in the world and has been an engine of growth for economies in Europe and the rest of Asia, slower growth or recession in China would likely lead to a global slowdown or recession. Second, because growth has immense political salience in the PRC—it justifies the authoritarian system of governance—a significant slowdown or recession could lead to political instability. Given Chinese nationalist rhetoric and revanchist ambitions toward Taiwan, political instability could in turn motivate risky military activities that escalate into confrontations with democratic, market-oriented countries. From the perspective of the United States, a slowdown could exacerbate the already serious trade and economic tensions, especially if nationalist forces in China sought to cast the US as the scapegoat for its internal problems. In sum, a better understanding of the weaknesses within the PRC growth model and its potential frailties would allow policymakers to craft targeted tools when needed to support US policy objectives, either economic or political, and to deter PRC aggression or the undermining of US economic interests. Policy tools such as trade tariffs, export controls, and limitations on direct investments and access to US financial markets could have material impact on Chinese performance. A more robust understanding of the impact of these tools would help the United States and its allies craft overall strategies to meet the Chinese economic and political challenge. Even while operating in a time frame longer than twelve months, many financial analysts have begun to describe the unfolding economic challenges in the PRC. The general public, including political opinion leaders and government analysts, have not generally understood the extent of the danger of economic crisis in China. Instead, the common assumption is that growth in the PRC, albeit a continuing economic threat to the US economy, is not in danger of faltering. This white paper takes a different view, exploring the structural weaknesses characterizing the current Chinese economic model and the recent policy changes initiated by President Xi Jinping. Its working assumption is that the combination of these two factors will result in a material weakening of the dynamic growth China has enjoyed since Deng Xiaoping set his country on a more Western-style growth path in the late 1970s. At a minimum, various factors will slow growth to levels more characteristic of modern developed economies; and at the extreme these factors may possibly lead to negative growth and weakening of the political strength that underpins the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Economic Growth, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

9. Resilient Aerial Refueling: Safeguarding the US Military’s Global Reach

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US military’s aerial refueling enterprise is a critical component of its ability to project power globally in defense of American interests. As the US military adopts new concepts to enhance its lethality and gain decision advantage, aerial refueling is increasingly necessary to enable a more distributed and dynamic force. However, with an aging inventory of tanker aircraft and stiff budgetary headwinds, it is an open question whether the US Air Force is capable of fielding the aerial refueling force that the nation needs. This study assesses the current and programmed US aerial refueling enterprise and has found that it likely would be unable to support US strategy and operational concepts at scale against peer adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. However, the US military could address these shortfalls and improve the operational resilience of its aerial refueling enterprise by adopting new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. Fear and Insecurity: Addressing North Korean Threat Perceptions

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Diplomacy with North Korea must factor in an understanding of the Kim regime’s fears and insecurity. Pyongyang’s military actions and negotiating gambits jeopardize the United States, South Korea, and other nations’ vital interests and policy goals. Accordingly, the study of North Korean threat perceptions—how Kim Jong-un thinks about the utility of force and about threats to his regime—is essential for averting strategic surprise and buttressing diplomacy. National security strategy should be systematic, a deliberate calculation about national capabilities to achieve crucial objectives. It should be infused with an understanding of other actors, both friend and foe. A coherent national security strategy begins with clear and realistic written objectives. If aims are vague, it will be difficult to concentrate resources and mobilize others around a common cause. Similarly, if a nation’s goals are too ambitious and surpass the prospects or means for success, then the national security strategy represents wishful thinking and will likewise be difficult to carry out. What is needed is a serious attempt to grapple with the world as it exists and to harmonize a nation’s crucial ends with existing means.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and National Security
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America