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1061. A New Estimate of China’s Military Expenditure

Author:
Nan Tian and Fei Su
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
China publishes a national defence budget each year. In 2019 it reached 1.2 trillion yuan (US$175 billion). However, this figure does not account for all of China’s military spending. To provide a more accurate representation of China’s spending, SIPRI’s estimate—based on an analysis made in 1999—includes other items in addition to the official defence budget. Given China’s accelerating military modernization and reforms in recent years, the existing estimate of China’s military spending deserves a reassessment. This SIPRI report provides a comprehensive new analysis of the financial resources China dedicates to military purposes. Using publicly available sources in both English and Chinese, the report presents a new estimate of Chinese military expenditure. The new estimate—1660 billion yuan ($240 billion) in 2019—is around 142 billion yuan ($21 billion) less than the old SIPRI estimate. Although the new approach to estimating Chinese military expenditure improves on the old method, limited public transparency in budgeting on specific categories is still a cause of concern. Future research should focus on publicly available Chinese-language sources as there is still scope to improve the precision of the new estimate.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, and Transparency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

1062. Supporting Small Arms and Light Weapons Controls through Development Assistance: The Case of sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Giovanna Maletta and Lucile Robin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has had a negative impact on conflict, security and development. In order to help states to address the multifaceted challenges posed by the proliferation of these weapons, some states as well as regional and international organizations have established a series of funding instruments and assistance programmes that support or provide SALW control-related assistance. In view of the recognized linkages between SALW proliferation, security and development, official development assistance (ODA) has progressively become an eligible source of funding in this field. However, there remains limited clarity on which assistance activities have been supported through development spending. A comprehensive assessment of the use of ODA to support SALW control-related assistance could help donors, policymakers and interested stakeholders to understand how assistance policies have adjusted to the recognition of the link between conventional arms control and sustainable development made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Focusing on SALW control-related assistance provided in sub-Saharan Africa as a case study and comparing information included in separate data sets compiled by SIPRI and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, this report attempts to provide information on which relevant activities have been supported through ODA in this region. It shows that only a limited number of donors have used ODA to support SALW control-related assistance and that they have different practices in the way they report on the use of these funds. It also outlines the challenges that make mapping this assistance a particularly difficult exercise.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, and Development Assistance
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

1063. Promoting China–European Union Cooperation on Green and Sustainable Finance

Author:
Ian Anthony, Jingdong Yuan, and Sun Xia
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Energy transition is an essential element of the global effort to meet the objectives set out in the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change. China and the European Union (EU) have agreed to work together to help deliver the financing needed to achieve energy transition, but more is needed. To promote China–EU co-operation, this SIPRI Policy Brief recommends: (a) exploring a dedicated China–EU green finance initiative; (b) presenting a joint China–EU proposal on clear definitions and standards of sustainable green financing to the International Partnership on Sustainable Finance; (c) generating a joint curriculum to train staff in multilateral development banks, private investment banks, insurance companies and green banks; (d) pursuing joint finance for projects that find private capital difficult to attract; and (e) deploying independent evaluation teams to scrutinize how rating systems are applied in energy transition projects.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Finance, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

1064. Out of Many, One: Erdoğan and the Convergence of Turkish Worldviews

Author:
Blaise Misztal
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For at least his first decade at Turkey’s helm, if not longer, subsequent US administrations regarded Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an important partner. More recently, the pendulum has swung the other way; Erdoğan has emerged as a bipartisan bête noir in Washington. President Biden has called Erdoğan an “autocrat”; Secretary of State Antony Blinken referred to Turkey as a “so-called strategic partner,” and large majorities from both parties in Congress have voted to sanction Turkey until it reverses its purchase of Russian weaponry. The image of Turkey that US policymakers appear to be operating with is, as one columnist summed it up, that “Turkey’s president does what he does because he gets away with it.” In other words, Erdoğan is in full control of Turkey’s foreign policy, and, having opened a gulf between the two allies, Washington’s options are to either compel a change in his behavior or suspend its partnership with Turkey until the end of his rule. Much like the earlier, now discarded, belief in Erdoğan’s comity, this view, too, deserves to be challenged.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

1065. Pakistan’s Destabilization Playbook: Khalistan Separatist Activism Within the US

Author:
Aparna Pande, Husain Haqqani, C Christine Fair, Michael Rubin, Seth Oldmixon, and Clay Westrope
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hudson Institute’s South and Central Asia Program assembled a group of South Asia experts to evaluate the fifty-five interlinked Kashmiri and Khalistani groups currently operating within the United States and the possibility that these groups receive funding, support, and military training from Pakistan, have ties to militant and terrorist groups in India, and could detrimentally impact US foreign policy in South Asia. The activities of Khalistani groups located in North America should be investigated, within the limits prescribed by law, to prevent a reoccurrence of the violence orchestrated by the Khalistan movement in the 1980s. During that period, along with numerous attacks on civilians, the Khalistan movement was linked to the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 from Montreal to London that left 329 dead and the failed bombing of an Air India jet in Tokyo on the same day. The US government has shown reluctance to act on intelligence from India concerning Pakistan-supported Khalistan militancy, largely due to Pakistan’s role as the artery providing logistical support to the US military mission in Afghanistan following 9/11. Compounding the issue, China has blocked the designation of Pakistan-based terrorists under the United States’ terrorist-designation process within the United Nations Security Council.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Political Activism, Separatism, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and United States of America

1066. Visions of Order in the Indo-Pacific: Strengthening Alliance-Based Security Cooperation

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China’s increasing challenges to the existing Indo-Pacific order have compelled the region’s democracies to undergo strategic changes through the policies of individual governments, bilateral alliance-based cooperation, and multilateral efforts. This study examines the Indo-Pacific region’s shifting policies as defined by the key policy documents of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. While the perspectives on regional order held by Indo-Pacific democracies vary from country to country, collectively they reflect a commitment to the rule of law, democracy, freedom, human rights, and a market economy. This study focuses on three lines of effort: diplomacy and defense, infrastructure and development, and economics and trade. The Quad partnership presents an opportunity to demonstrate US leadership and a commitment to the values and principles shared by Indo-Pacific democracies. In the immediate term, the success of the Quad will require building an effective regional response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the long-term, committed engagement to the region’s critical needs – connectivity, both high-quality physical and digital infrastructure; climate change, and supply chain resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

1067. Powering Innovation: A Strategic Approach to America’s Advanced Battery Technology

Author:
Nadia Schadlow, Arthur Herman, and Brayden Helwig
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Changing consumer preferences and government policies point toward widespread future adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Advanced lithium batteries are the primary power source for EVs. Unfortunately, China dominates today’s battery supply chain, from the extraction and processing of critical minerals like lithium to the production, packaging, and recycling of battery cells. In today’s era of great power competition, control of the supply chains for advanced technologies such as lithium batteries will have a direct impact on national power. Advanced battery technology will go a long way toward determining economic leadership in the EV market. The automobile industry is one of America’s largest manufacturing sectors and accounts for some 3% of US GDP. But EVs and advanced batteries also have important military applications. EVs will function as mobile energy nodes on the battlefield, providing power for unmanned systems, communication links, electromagnetic warfare systems and more. These capabilities will help the US military conduct more decentralized operations in contested regions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, and Batteries
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1068. Modernizing the Nuclear Triad: Decline or Renewal?

Author:
Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr.
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States is planning to modernize its strategic nuclear deterrent for the first time since the Cold War ended over thirty years ago. The deterrent comprises three main components, or “legs”: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), distributed in hardened silos throughout the northern Midwest; fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) operating from two bases, one on each coast; and long-range bombers positioned at three air bases in the continental United States. These three legs are known collectively as the triad. This study analyzes the United States’ plans for modernizing the land, sea and airborne legs comprising its strategic nuclear force triad. This force has been charged primarily with deterring a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and security partners (“extended deterrence”), and mitigating the consequences should deterrence fail.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

1069. Resilient Aerial Refueling: Safeguarding the US Military’s Global Reach

Author:
Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US military’s aerial refueling enterprise is a critical component of its ability to project power globally in defense of American interests. As the US military adopts new concepts to enhance its lethality and gain decision advantage, aerial refueling is increasingly necessary to enable a more distributed and dynamic force. However, with an aging inventory of tanker aircraft and stiff budgetary headwinds, it is an open question whether the US Air Force is capable of fielding the aerial refueling force that the nation needs. This study assesses the current and programmed US aerial refueling enterprise and has found that it likely would be unable to support US strategy and operational concepts at scale against peer adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. However, the US military could address these shortfalls and improve the operational resilience of its aerial refueling enterprise by adopting new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

1070. Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development Sites Requiring IAEA Inspections

Author:
David Block
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons experts David Albright and Sarah Burkhard of the Institute for Science and International Security provide a meticulously researched analysis of Iran’s nuclear development activities in their new book, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons. Based on their rare and extensive access to 300 tons of documents in Iran’s Atomic Archives, they reveal several previously unknown aspects of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including a unique advanced indigenous design for a nuclear weapon just 55cm in diameter requiring less than 25kg of weapons grade uranium; a crash program designed to test and complete five ballistic capable nuclear weapons; as well a substantial site infrastructure for the enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing and testing of nuclear weapons cores and triggers. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chair Rafael Grossi, in a March 23 interview with Newsweek, said Iran must come clean about past undeclared nuclear activity, including recent findings of undeclared uranium, if there is any possibility to revive the 2015 nuclear deal, or JCPOA. Grossi added that “detailed and technical discussions” are needed to address the issue of Iran’s past undeclared work — including ascertaining the location of Iran’s undeclared stockpile of enriched uranium — which the world’s nuclear watchdog explained is “totally connected” to the future of the deal. Underscoring the urgency of Grossi’s point, following the IAEA Board of Governors June 10 meeting and reports on Iran’s NPT & JCPOA non-compliance, the Group of Seven nations (G7) issued a communique reiterating a joint commitment to “ensuring that Iran will never develop a nuclear weapon…ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme…and to ensure full and timely cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.” The statement was met with unusual outrage and defiance by Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani, who warned that Iran can expand its nuclear program “on any day, at any hour” to increase uranium enrichment beyond the current level of 63 percent, which is already sufficiently enriched to fuel a nuclear weapon. Given the importance of Iran fully addressing its undeclared nuclear activity, this table identifies the locations of Amad and post-Amad facilities in various states, including razed, shut down, repurposed, or possibly still active, which is relevant to the IAEA’s efforts to determine the origin of undeclared nuclear materials, fate of undeclared facilities and activities, the completeness of Iran’s nuclear declaration, and whether nuclear weapons efforts have ended or in fact are ongoing. Such a determination requires IAEA visits to key sites in the Amad and post-Amad programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East