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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Content Type Research Paper

1. Grim Prospect: Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East

Author:
Eva M. Lisowski
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inspect civilian nuclear materials and activities to deter military diversions. To decide the frequency of inspections and inspection criteria, the IAEA set its safeguard standards with the objective of assuring “timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.” The two nuclear weapon designs developed and detonated during World War II were the “gun-type” and “implosion” designs. Because implosion device technology requires much less fissile material than guntype technology, the IAEA significant quantity6 (SQ) values were determined based on the fissile material requirements of nuclear implosion devices like the plutonium-based “Fat Man” detonated over Nagasaki in 1945. Utilizing implosion designs perfected in the late 1940s, however, the explosive yields achieved in 1945 can be produced with much less fissile material. Table 1 lists the fissile material requirements of contemporary nuclear weapon technology. “Low Technical Capability” in Table 1 refers to the Mark III implosion device set off at Nagasaki. “Medium Technical Capability” refers to implosion designs perfected in the late 1940s and “High Technical Capability” in Table 1 refers to the implosion technologies the United States perfected in the 1950s.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Middle East

2. China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Although much has been said about the fusion of China’s civilian and military sectors, no detailed, unclassified analysis has been done of how Beijing’s “peaceful” nuclear efforts might be exploited to make more nuclear warheads. Even the U.S. Department of Energy’s own explanations of the export restrictions it imposed on “advanced” nuclear exports to China failed to discuss this. This volume is dedicated to clarifying just what the connection could be. Much of it focuses on China’s advanced fast breeder reactor program and its related plutonium recycling efforts. As explained in this volume’s first chapter, “How Many Nuclear Warheads China Might Acquire by 2030,” the least burdensome way for China to achieve nuclear weapons parity with the United States is simply to use the weaponsgrade plutonium that its planned “peaceful” fast breeder reactor and reprocessing programs will produce to make primaries for the two-stage thermonuclear weapons designs they already have perfected. By exploiting this weapons plutonium and the highly enriched uranium and tritium that China can easily access or make, Beijing by 2030 could conservatively assemble an arsenal of 1,270 warheads (nearly as many as the US currently has deployed on its intercontinental missiles).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
United States and China

3. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

4. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

5. Exploring post-INF arms control in the Asia-Pacific: China’s role in the challenges ahead

Author:
Bates Gill
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the demise of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, much attention has focused on the Asia-Pacific as the locus for a new missile-fuelled arms competition, especially between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Much speculation has also centred on the prospects of avoiding the most dangerous elements of that competition through arms control or other risk-reduction measures. There are good reasons for these concerns. Since the 1990s China has invested enormous resources in the development and deployment of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Today China fields one of the world’s largest and most diverse arrays of ballistic-missile systems, including both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. Critically, these missile systems have become an increasingly central feature in the strategic and operational thinking of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and will likely remain so for the decades ahead. At present, Beijing sees little to no value in reductions to these systems. On the contrary, they are valuable for the very reasons Washington and other regional capitals would like to see them limited: they pose a credible deterrent and warfighting threat in and around China’s periphery, not only against the United States, but also against US allies and others in the region such as India. For the United States, China’s steady missile build-up has been a long-standing concern. When the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF – citing Russia’s non-compliance with the treaty – it also cited China’s deployment of intermediate-range missile systems and their threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific as an ancillary reason for quitting the agreement. Since 2019, the United States has initiated weapons-development programmes with an eye to deploying its own suite of intermediate missiles to the region in order to range Chinese targets, in addition to other offensive and defensive systems to counter Chinese missile threats. Coming in the larger context of deteriorating diplomatic, security and economic relations between Beijing and Washington, these developments are only a small part of an intensifying competition between the two powers.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

7. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia

8. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

9. Ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East: the current landscape and options for arms control

Author:
Hassan Elbahtimy
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East. Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address. While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

10. Challenges to NATO's Nuclear Strategy

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In 2022, NATO will present its new Strategic Concept. Since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was published, NATO and the world have changed significantly. At the time, NATO was primarily engaged in crisis management, including in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept enabled the Alliance to further expand – conceptually and geographically – its out-of-area activities, together with the core tasks of cooperative security. Eleven years later, the dominant paradigm of international politics is great power competition: in other words, countries like Russia and China are competing with the West strategically, economically, militarily, and in terms of values. Many things have remained constant, however: one is the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Since 2010, Allies have continued to affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, notwithstanding the Alliance’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America