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1192. Border Regulation Begins with Stronger Capacity at Official Points of Entry
- Author:
- Todd Rosenblum
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- After the Trump Administration cutbacks, Congress should invest in the U.S. southern border to benefit trade, stop bad actors, and humanely process people with real asylum claims. Managing vehicular, rail, and people throughput at border crossings is an enormous challenge, but one not being met. U.S. inspectors do not properly screen more than a small percentage of incoming commercial and personal vehicles making this the primary means for narco-trafficking into the United States. Investing more in screening capacity at the official land Points of Entry with Mexico will reduce crime, illegal drug importation, guns going southbound, strengthen regulation and order essential for safe trade and opportunity, and make for a safer environment for those seeking legal entry into the United States. Congress has steadily appropriated new funds for more border screening capacity, but additional investment in screening capacity is still needed to make up for Trump Administration cutbacks. President Biden’s U.S. Citizens Act of 2021 has a range of helpful proposals to make us safer and keep commerce moving. Congress should mandate better measures to evaluate actual screening effectiveness. Congress also should conduct stronger oversight to address shortcomings in the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) acquisition plans to make sure border inspectors spend the money more effectively and field the right capability in a timely fashion. There is a range of reforms we must make across immigration and border regulation to better serve our nation and those seeking to come here. Immigration and border enforcement have strayed from our values as a country and urgently need reform. Our legal immigration system both in asylum and visa-based needs clear modernization. Millions who have known no home but America deserve citizenship. Enforcement alone also will not solve our problems, but we must improve all aspects of American immigration and our border.
- Topic:
- Migration, Immigration, Law Enforcement, Borders, Illegal Trade, and Commercialization
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
1193. UN-IFI Cooperation during Peacekeeping Drawdowns: Opportunities for Mutual Support
- Author:
- Paige Arthur
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation
- Abstract:
- As increasing political and budgetary pressures have come to bear on UN peace operations in recent years, more attention has been paid to ensuring that drawdowns are undertaken in a way that sustains the gains of a mission’s presence. This policy briefing highlights a number of missed opportunities and argues for greater collaboration between the UN, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ahead of a mission’s departure to build greater synergies between the country’s political and economic pathways. The brief begins by summarizing the economic challenges related to UN transitions, including diving deeper into the debate on whether or not these transitions create a “financial cliff”—in particular, in relation to official development assistance and foreign direct investment. We then describe three key opportunities for the UN, the Bank, and the IMF to leverage their respective mandates and comparative advantages during mission drawdowns, seizing the moment around transitions to support a country’s pathway to peace in ways that also lessen its economic burdens and supports key reforms. These opportunities include: Generating better alignment and planning between the three institutions in transition moments, with a focus on maintaining and strengthening peacebuilding gains while also seeking to unlock broader economic opportunities; Collaborating across areas of expertise to assess budgetary and resourcing gaps that may prove crippling to a country’s emergence from fragility, if not addressed; Activating levers for additional peacebuilding financing and to support reform, from the UN’s PBC and multi-partner trust funds, to IMF support to improve access to financial markets, to the sensitive use of the World Bank’s new FCV envelopes in IDA19 . The brief is based on desk research as well as interviews with a small number UN, World Bank, and IMF representatives involved in the transition process in Timor-Leste, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, as well as the expected transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- Topic:
- Politics, United Nations, Reform, Multilateralism, Peace, and IMF
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
1194. Despite Political Tension, Americans and Russians See Cooperation as Essential
- Author:
- Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Chicago Council on Global Affairs
- Abstract:
- A joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center survey shows few Russians or Americans expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or in the next 10 years, although both publics see the merits of collaboration. According to a January–February 2021 joint survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow, neither Russians nor Americans expect the new US administration to prompt a reset in bilateral relations. While many Russians have yet to form an opinion of US President Joseph Biden, few in either country expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or even in the next 10 years. Despite this anticipated stasis, both publics acknowledge the importance of bilateral cooperation on a number of long-term foreign policy issues.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
1195. A CO2-Border Adjustment Mechanism as a Building Block of a Climate Club
- Author:
- Felix Bierbrauer, Gabriel Felbermayr, Axel Ockenfels, Klaus M. Schmidt, and Jens Sudekum
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- The EU steps up its efforts to curb its territorial CO2-emissions. It is planning to introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to level the playing field and to raise own resources. The authors point out that unilateral European climate policy action, whether shored up with a CBAM or not, can only play a limited role in reducing global CO2-emissions. A EU-CBAM cannot stop indirect leakage, it has ambiguous effects on other countries’ mitigation efforts, and it poses the risk of conflicts with trade partners. They propose that the EU, together with the US and other like-minded countries, should push hard to establish a climate club with a common minimum price of CO2 and a common CBAM applied to third countries. Such a framework would incentivize other countries to join while limiting leakage and reducing the risk of trade policy disputes.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Environment, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- Europe
1196. Decoupling Europe
- Author:
- Gabriel Felbermayr, Steffen Gans, Hendrik Mahlkow, and Alexander Sandkamp
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerability of international value chains in the face of global shocks. This has triggered a political discussion regarding a possible reshoring of vulnerable supply chains back home. The aim is to reduce dependencies on foreign suppliers and thus improve crisis resilience of the domestic economy. The debate is also rooted in the growing dependence on Asian suppliers and the colliding political and ideological systems between China and the West. Unilateral decoupling of the EU from China (a doubling of trade costs) would reduce real income in the EU on average by 0.8 percent. In terms of GDP in 2019, this equals a permanent loss in real income of 131.4 bn EUR. Should China retaliate, real income would fall by 1.0 percent (170.3 bn EUR). With its extremely interconnected economy, real income in Germany would even decline by 1.4 percent (48.4 bn EUR). China would also lose from such a trade war, with real income declining by 1.3 percent. Should the EU increase its trade barriers against all its non-European trading partners, real income in the Union would fall by 3.5 percent or 584.3 bn EUR in case of a unilateral increase and by 5.3 percent or 873.1 bn EUR in case the rest of the world responds by also raising trade barriers.
- Topic:
- Economics, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Economic Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe
1197. Fog in Channel? The Impact of Brexit on EU and UK Foreign Affairs
- Author:
- Amelia Hadfield and Nicholas Wright
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- The UK’s rejection of any institutionalised relationship with the EU in foreign, security and defence policy (FSDP) is arguably the most noteworthy feature of the post-Brexit dispensation. In a stark reversal in early 2020, the British government abandoned pledges made in the 2019 Political Declaration to ‘establish structured consultation and regular thematic dialogues [that] could contribute to the attainment of common objectives’, including on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (1). This gap was intensified by the absence of any reference to foreign affairs in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) or the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) (2). Indeed, the IR essentially ignores the EU, referring only to British ambitions to remain a lead European defence actor, with a focus on multilateral venues (notably the UN and NATO), bilateral relations and ad hoc groupings. In short, an EU-sized hole now exists in British foreign policy thinking. This matters in London and across Europe. While in the EU, the UK exercised significant influence and leadership in FSDP, its EU membership magnifying its global capacities. In leaving, Sir Simon Fraser, formerly permanent under-secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), warned that Brexit represented ‘the biggest shock to [the UK’s] method of international influencing and the biggest structural change to our place in the world since the end of World War Two’ (3). From the EU’s perspective, as observed by High Representative Josep Borrell, ‘with Brexit, nothing gets easier and a lot gets more complicated. How much more complicated depends on the choices that both sides will make’ (4). The choices thus far indicate a rejection of ‘old obligations’ (5) and an essentially transactional relationship that will be ‘structurally adversarial for the foreseeable future’ (6). Nonetheless, Brexit also gives both the UK and the EU a once-in-a-generation opportunity to rethink and reconfigure their approaches to foreign affairs and how they navigate a profoundly changed regional context. To understand the scale of this undertaking, we offer an innovative thematic analysis focused on four ‘Rs’: reputation, responsibility, resources and relevance. Each ‘R’ represents a core element of both sides’ respective foreign policies, offering insights into possible international roles and goals. The four ‘Rs’ also help us identify the main risks and opportunities Brexit encompasses, providing a conceptual symmetry as to how the choices of both the EU and UK might align and impact each other.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
1198. The Future Africans Want: When Optimism Is Power
- Author:
- E. Gyimah-Boadi and Joseph Asunka
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- The middle of a pandemic that has stopped the world in its tracks may seem like a surprising time to focus our attention on Africa’s future. Covid-19 has triggered lockdowns and school closures, caused job losses, postponed elections (1) and forced us to fix our gaze on the here and now: on staying healthy today, on putting food on the table today, on protecting people’s rights and dignity today. However, a shock like this pandemic also creates an imperative for strategic foresight. As Africa prepares for a post-Covid world, we must take stock of people’s lived experiences and expectations if we are to build back better. What are Africans’ aspirations for their lives and those of their children? How are they thinking about the future and what can they do to shape it? What assets are citizens willing to invest to further their collective ambitions, and how can governments and development actors best harness them? This policy Brief taps into Afrobarometer (2) survey data to map people’s aspirations for the next decade and their willingness to take action to achieve their goals (detailed information on Afrobarometer surveys and methods can be found in endnote 2). Rather than using abstract scenarios or models to build a vision of the future, we asked people directly where they want to go and how they think they can get there (3). Our analysis is grounded in the perspectives of ordinary citizens, their views on the interactions they have with their governments and their reports of the actions they take to participate in policy processes and influence their governments, defined as ‘citizen engagement’. The responses to the surveys show that Africans’ aspirations go well beyond economic and social security: they evince a desire for self-sufficiency and autonomy as well as democratic, accountable and responsive governance. Citizens are largely ready and willing to take action and even to put their own financial resources into the pot in order to realise their ambitions. Examples abound of citizens joining together to do everything: from fighting corruption in the management of local natural resources in Ghana (4), to initiating local awareness-raising and relief campaigns in response to Covid-19 in Cameroon, Kenya, South Africa and South Sudan. (5) Yet too often, governments resist and fail to listen to citizen voices, respond to popular expectations and build the governance systems their people demand. This leaves an enormous resource— the energy and will of millions of citizens — untapped, a luxury that African governments cannot afford as they look to the future and consider how to achieve the ambitious targets of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. If they are to make effective use of their people’s assets, decision-makers will need to increasingly engage with their publics by opening doors to information sharing and real collaboration. By expanding the space for African voice and agency in all arenas, from problem-solving to policymaking, the power of citizen actions can be unleashed across the continent. In this opening Brief of the Imagine Africa series, we consider what Africans want their future to look like 10 years down the road and then review current trends in what they say they are getting. The growing gap between ambition and reality discussed in the second and third sections highlights the need for changes in how governments and citizens interact. The fourth section showcases what African citizens can bring to the table in terms of resources, energy, activism and engagement, but also reveals that African governments are not always receptive to these inputs. We conclude with a discussion of what African decision-makers and international supporters can do to more effectively leverage the power of citizen action and engagement.
- Topic:
- Development, Domestic Policy, COVID-19, and Future
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa
1199. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence
- Author:
- Daniel Fiott
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- Europe
1200. China's Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Ambitions: The First-mover Advantage
- Author:
- Alice Ekman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Union Institute for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- China was initially cautious in the development and application of blockchain technology. Among the technology’s best-known attributes are the relative anonymity and immutability of the information, as every blockchain transaction has a digital record and signature that can be identified, validated, stored and shared. This technology could therefore become a double-edged sword for the Communist Party of China (CPC), as it goes against the government’s efforts to censor content it considers sensitive and, in more general terms, efforts to assert its cyber-sovereignty. However, after at first observing the emergence of blockchain technology with concern, China’s central government has increasingly seen it as an opportunity, as has been the case with most emerging technologies. Since the launch of the 13th five-year plan in 2016 and the release of the first White Paper on Blockchain Technology and Application Development by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology the same year, the CPC has increasingly considered that blockchain could become an economic, political and geopolitical asset for the country, if ‘guided’ well. China has continued to shape its positioning on and conceptualisation of blockchain technology on a regular basis over the last 5 years: the China Blockchain Industry White Paper (1) was published in 2018, another White Paper entitled Blockchain Technology Application in Judicial Evidence Storage was published in 2019 (2) and the 14th five-year plan (2021–2025), released in March 2021, also refers to blockchain and cryptocurrency (see timeline diagram on page 7) (3). China’s unique approach to blockchain is conditioned precisely by this paradox, stemming from the decentralised nature of the technology and the highly centralised nature of the Chinese political system. While blockchain technology is essentially decentralised, regulations in China have aimed to guarantee state control over its development and application. As part of this dual policy, which is analysed in the first part of the Brief, the Chinese government has launched its own digital currency – the digital yuan. At the same time, it dislikes bitcoin, which relies on a truly decentralised type of blockchain. Although blockchain is best known for being the technology behind cryptocurrency, the Chinese government’s approach towards blockchain is very comprehensive, going far beyond cryptocurrencies. It promotes application of the technology in a variety of fields, ranging from energy conservation to urban management and law enforcement, and has strong ambitions to become the world leader in the field. In October 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping, speaking at a study session for members of the Politburo, declared that he wanted the country to be a ‘rule-maker’ on blockchain, suggesting that this technology will increasingly become a key arena in the country’s race against the United States for technological supremacy (4). Blockchain has become a fast-growing sector in China over the last two years. But is China likely to succeed in the global promotion of an alternative form of blockchain? This Brief answers this question by analysing the development of different applications at national level, before and during the Covid-19 pandemic, but also the emergence of international cooperation on blockchain and cryptocurrency.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Cryptocurrencies, and Blockchain
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia