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81. Transforming European Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Colin Wall, and Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Europe, which has taken decisive steps to assist Ukraine and shore up European security and defense. Yet this moment could be short-lived if not followed by a sustained, collective effort to transform and rationalize European defense. Without this, additional European defense spending may be wasted and the continent will continue to rely on the United States for its defense. European nations should fully leverage the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other multilateral formats to overcome fragmentation and avoid a piecemeal approach to defense. By doing so, they can invest together in modern capabilities, build a strong, resilient, and open industrial base, and think creatively to pool and share forces. Importantly, the United States has a crucial role in providing both practical and political support to achieve this shared goal of a stronger and more capable European defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

82. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:
Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

83. U.S.–China Relations in the Tank: A Handbook for an Era of Persistent Confrontation

Author:
Michael J. Mazarr
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Michael J. Mazarr argues that amid escalating U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers are gravely underprepared to manage the episodic crises that form an inevitable part of great power rivalry. Effective crisis response can not only prevent escalation, but also strengthen U.S. strategic advantage within the larger rivalry. Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Mazarr distills six principles to guide crisis management among U.S. policymakers navigating an increasingly crisis-prone U.S.-China relationship.
Topic:
Security, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. A Green Wave?

Author:
Jessica Drun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

85. “Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China

Author:
Jude Blanchette and Gerard Dipippo
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions. When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

86. The First Space-Cyber War and the Need for New Regimes and Policies

Author:
Eytan Tepper
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Many dubbed the Gulf War of 1991 the “first space war” due to the US Armed Forces’ extensive use of satellites. The cyberwar in Ukraine, although it is mostly playing out in the shadows, may be remembered as the first space-cyber war. This policy brief makes the case that states should adopt national policies to defend against threats to space-based assets and applications, such as communications satellites, that are both vital to national security and economic security and increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. It is time to explore and identify principles for responsible space-cyber behaviour that would represent a broad multilateral consensus. Identifying these principles may not prevent space-cyber hostilities but could provide “rules of the game.” States would also benefit from encouraging a space-cyber security industry that, beyond protecting against space-cyber threats, has the potential to be a significant growth engine.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Space, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

87. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific: Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The “new scramble for the Pacific” is characterized by a race for the control of maritime space and resources, oscillating between ocean grabbing and ocean commoning. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific. Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation Download 0.96 Mo This tendency can be seen in the endemic nature of Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing (estimated in 2016 as 10% of the overall catch in the Pacific Islands Countries – PICs), but also in the multiplication of large Marine Protected Areas (MPAs): delimited areas in which certain human activities such as fishing are restricted to conserve resources (the Pacific hosts the majority of the world’s MPAs). The European Union (EU), as the biggest importer of fish (which imports half of its tuna from the Pacific) and a leader in biodiversity protection, has a key stake in ensuring a sustainable management of these resources. Moreover, Europe has territories in the Pacific (French New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis & Futuna) with large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that are difficult to monitor and protect in the face of diverse challenges: foreign intrusions, IUU fishing, narcotrafficking and interstate tensions. Hence, ocean governance is one of the seven priority areas of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. MPAs have been the favorite scheme to manage the maritime space and protect biodiversity & marine resources. Large or small, they can offer minimal or total protection by limiting certain human practices. A loosely defined framework, MPAs allow for a greater control over a designated territory. As such, it is a truly geopolitical object, and is not immune to controversy. This said, MPAs are a key tool for biodiversity conservation, and a vital scheme to achieve the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’s call to protect at least 30% of the planet – land and sea – by 2030 (the 30x30 initiative). To be useful and successful, MPAs or other protection schemes need to be considered efficient and fair – hence legitimate. This requires adequate access to scientific data to ensure the process is knowledge-driven and to gauge the effectiveness of the protection measures. Local communities, their economic needs and their traditional knowledge of the ocean, should be taken into account at each stage. Moreover, surveillance should be ensured to deter illegal activities and enforce protection measures. This briefing argues that building two-way bridges between experts, decision-makers and populations in Europe and the Pacific Islands will be extremely beneficial to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of ocean governance schemes. The Pacific needs scientific data that Europe can offer. Europe can greatly benefit from understanding the Pacific Islanders’ needs and learn from local customary practices to protect resources in a more relevant and democratic manner. This participatory, multi-scaled approach would provide new paths towards more efficient resource protection schemes in Europe, too, taking into consideration tools that may not have conservation as an objective, but are effectively sustaining biodiversity. This briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar “Are Marine Protected Areas a relevant tool for the Pacific?” organized by Ifri’s Pacific Islands Program on June 21, 2022. Contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, Governance, European Union, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
France, Pacific Ocean, and Oceania

88. France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live Up to Pacific Challenges

Author:
Jérémy Bachelier and Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Back in September 2021, the announcement of AUKUS – the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) was a shock to Paris. Not only it meant the brutal conclusion of a submarine deal signed in 2016, but it also provoked a major breach of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners – shedding crude light on the divergences of approaches regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge. This initiative, intended to be a coordinated response to the Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific, called into question France’s strategic positioning in the region. One year after, however, AUKUS does not seem to have marked a major turning point regarding the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Pacific. After an immediate aftershock, France's bilateral relations with Washington, Canberra and to an extent London gradually recovered. Political and strategic discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the recent visits of the Australian Prime minister and minister of Defense in France and numerous bilateral calls at the end of Summer between French and Australian political and military leaders have pointed to a positive dynamic for an improved strategic cooperation in the region. Rather than prompting a radical change in the France's Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS highlighted a fault line between the strategic/political rhetoric level and the operational level of defense cooperation regarding the French engagement in this region. The multiple maritime security and climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands region require France to cooperate closely with its regional partners, starting with Australia, and continue to promote effective multilateralism. In addition, the growing risks of high-intensity conflicts in the vicinity of the Pacific Islands region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea, require for France to speed up the strengthening of its interoperability with its regional allies in the coming years and probably to decide on the role it would like to - and be able to - concretely support its own interest and allies.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, AUKUS, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Australia, United States of America, Pacific Ocean, and Pacific Islands

89. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

90. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

91. German-US Relations and the Security of the Baltic States

Author:
Marko Mihkelson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fourth brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, we turn our attention to the meaning of Germany’s bilateral relationships. Here, Marko Mihkelson examines the German-US relationship. The health of this relationship is vital for Baltic security, but it has sometimes been turbulent. Berlin’s refusal to support Washington’s invasion of Iraq caused a deep and long-lasting fracture. More recently, their relations have been troubled by Donald Trump’s attacks on Germany, especially over defence spending and the trade imbalance, and by energy politics. To the surprise and disappointment of the Baltic states, President Biden, looking to restore US-German relations, cancelled the Trump administration sanctions that had prevented the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. With Russia again threatening Ukraine, what to do with Nord Stream 2 is now a question for Germany’s new chancellor. Meanwhile, there is little to suggest that Berlin will meet Washington’s expectations for improving defence spending any time soon and diverging US and German policies towards China present fresh challenges to their relationship. It Is vital that Germany recognises, when it deals bilaterally with the US, that it is unavoidably acting as a representative of its European allies too.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, United States of America, and Baltic States

92. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

93. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:
Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

95. Baltic States’ Expectations Regarding Germany’s Role in Baltic Security

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS is introducing a series of policy briefs “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States”. In the first brief, introducing the series, Toms Rostoks sets out in broad terms what Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would like Germany to contribute to Baltic security and assesses the prospects for achieving this. Germany plays a major role in the security of the Baltic region and, especially, of the Baltic states. Although the Baltic states would favour Germany taking an even more prominent role, there are obstacles to this due to its very different views on issues such as military power, Russia and European defence integration. Germany’s military power is, by policy choice, limited. Its willingness to use that power, even for the purposes of deterring Russia, is still more limited. More broadly, Germany seems to assume that the worst excesses of Russia’s behaviour can be tamed through dialogue and interdependence. European defence cooperation, however, offers an opportunity for Germany to build a stronger military without raising concerns about its actions. In the long term, the Baltic states expect Germany to play a robust role in the region and to more efficiently counter Russia’s policy, but in the short-term their objective would be to ensure that Germany’s commitments to their security do not decrease.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

96. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:
Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

97. Post-shipment On-site Inspections and Stockpile Management Assistance: Bridging Gaps

Author:
Giovanna Maletta and Mike Lewis
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Post-shipment on-site inspections and international assistance in physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) have different scopes and objectives. On-site inspections allow exporting states to check exported military materiel to ensure that the importer is complying with its commitments, while PSSM assistance aims to improve states’ weapons and ammunition management systems. However, both instruments allow foreign specialists to visit a state’s weapons and ammunition storage facilities and enable information gathering to assess their integrity and identify possible diversion risks. This SIPRI Policy Brief highlights how building informal linkages between these instruments, especially with regard to states and actors that conduct inspections and are involved in funding or implementing PSSM assistance, could contribute towards establishing more comprehensive forms of post-shipment cooperation. In addition, applying lessons learned from PSSM assistance in terms of gaining access to states’ facilities, cooperating with the beneficiary importing states, and identifying limitations and opportunities associated with the use of tracking technologies could help to address some of the challenges encountered when conducting on-site inspections. PSSM assistance programmes could also include modules to raise awareness about on-site inspections and be a source of expertise that could assist states when implementing these controls.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Peace, and Ammunition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. Liberty’s Doom? Artificial Intelligence in Middle Eastern Security

Author:
Kristina Kausch
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The surge of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled technologies has triggered global debates on the potential risks and opportunities of the use of these technologies to enhance societies’ prosperity, security and well-being while ensuring human control and safeguarding fundamental rights. In the area of security, AI has the potential of making key sectors, such as predictive policing, counter-terrorism or border management more efficient, just and humane. At the same time, the risks inherent to AI in the security sector have raised numerous concerns regarding surveillance and data protection, human rights and civil liberties, or the prospect of an arms race in autonomous weapons systems, which have overshadowed debates on opportunities. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region presents particular challenges in this equation. On the one hand, the region’s myriad security challenges could greatly benefit from a booster in security-related problem-solving efficiency. On the other, ethical and legal considerations gain particular weight in a region largely governed by authoritarian rulers and with a weak rule of law, as these conditions prevent thorough AI governance and the necessary checks and balances to avoid authoritarian abuse of the ample opportunities presented by AI. This collection attempts to approach the questions and dilemmas raised by AI in Middle Eastern security through a European policy lens. Zooming in on AI in border management, surveillance, defence and regulation, exploring both risks and opportunities of this set of technologies for the fragile security of the MENA region, each chapter draws conclusions for future European Union (EU) policy and cooperation with MENA partners on AI.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Middle East

99. Al-Shabab in Mozambique: Taking Stock of an Insurgency Under Cover

Author:
Tom Van Rentergem
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Since the first attack in October 2017, Mozambique has been confronted with an extremist insurgency called Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Al-Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabab in Somalia). The alleged Jihadists targeted the Mozambican coastline and have carried out indiscriminate attacks in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, with the capture of coastal towns Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021 being important markers for the insurgents. The intense five-year conflict has resulted in 4,000 people dead and 800,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), roughly half of the province. The identity of the insurgents has become subject for debate among policy makers and researchers, raising questions about whether the group is primarily a local insurgency or whether there are tangible links to Jihadism in other areas of Africa and the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

100. Protecting Civilians From Those Who Should Protect Them

Author:
Delina Goxho
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As violent attacks targeting civilians in the Sahel region of West Africa are mounting, allegations of abuses perpetrated by Sahelian armed forces share the news with attacks committed by non-state armed groups. This brief analyses the main shortcomings within the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with regard to ensuring meaningful Protection of Civilians (PoC) from their own security and defence forces. It finds that formal, structural measures to address state security forces’ abuse of civilians is lacking in all three states, although some promising initiatives to build trust between security forces and civilians have been held on a local level. On a regional level, the OHCHR-mandated Human Rights Compliance Framework, which has partially been adopted by regional force Force Conjointe – G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), represents an example of a mechanism that could ensure better protection of civilians both for the region, and on a national level. However, the advent of Russian paramilitary group Wagner in Mali and the most recent massacre of civilians in Moura is challenging all optimistic forecasting.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Africa