Content Type: Policy Brief / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Terrorism

1. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:: Nate Sibley
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2. Exploiting a "Vast Jihad Arena": The Islamic State Takes Territory in Mali

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin and Sarah Cahn
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region. In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, North Africa, and Mali

3. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:: Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

4. What should the EU do about violent extremism?

Author:: Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Despite a recent spike in concern about a resurgence in great power conflict, addressing terrorism and violent extremism has driven the foreign policy debate in the collective West for the better part of two decades since 9/11. In the European Union, these concerns most prominently emerged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) that identified terrorism and “violent religious extremism” originating in the EU’s neighbourhood and caused by weak institutions, conflict, and state failure as a primary concern. The crux of the matter, however, is how this increased attention translates in policy terms. In other words, is the EU’s chosen CT-P/CVE policy mix balanced and fit for purpose? First, the EU’s CT-P/CVE action can hardly be framed according to a binary security versus democracy logic because of the significant emphasis placed by the EU on socio-economic development to address the structural causes of violent extremism. Second, despite the EU’s developmental focus, the language of good governance and peacebuilding, as well as funding for these areas, are key elements missing from the EU’s engagement. In order to remedy the many upstream and downstream diplomatic trade-offs that EU policymakers face in tackling violent extremism, the EU must begin to frame CT-P/CVE as part of its wider endeavour to support sustainable peace. It can do this by formulating an EU Agenda for Peace that once again underlines the EU’s commitment to promoting inclusive governance, community resilience, and social justice.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe

5. Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the Impact of the Terrorist Designation

Author:: Agathe Sarfati and Phoebe Donnelly
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Peace Institute
Abstract:: The concept and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have evolved as DDR-related activities have increasingly occurred in environments where armed conflict is ongoing, no peace agreement has been signed, and armed groups designated as terrorist organizations (AGDTOs) are operating. In parallel, reintegration has increasingly been discussed in the UN counterterrorism architecture through the concept of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (PRR). The changing context has raised challenges related to reintegration, especially reintegration of former members of AGDTOs. This policy paper analyzes the risks faced by individuals taking part in reintegration processes and by the communities they are reintegrating into. In particular, it analyzes how the designation of an armed group as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council or by a state impacts these risks while acknowledging that these risks largely depend on the broader context. The paper examines three case studies of current reintegration processes: (1) the process for reincorporating former combatants from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP); (2) the defector program for former members of al-Shabaab in Somalia; and (3) the reintegration process for individuals associated with Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper concludes by recommending several steps the UN could take to help ensure that reintegration processes address protection risks, especially for former members of AGDTOs: Tailor reintegration programs to the context, not to whether a group is labeled as a terrorist organization; Design reintegration programs to be gender-sensitive and human rights–compliant; Ensure that PRR and DDR programs are complementary and adopt the Integrated DDR Standards module on AGDTOs; and Keep reintegration and counterterrorism goals distinct.
Topic:: Terrorism, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Civilians, and Protection
Political Geography:: Africa and Colombia

6. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:: Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:: Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

7. Pushed to Extremes: Domestic Terrorism amid Polarization and Protest

Author:: Catrina Doxsee, Seth G. Jones, Jared Thompson, Grace Hwang, and Kateryna Halstead
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There has been a significant rise in the number of domestic terrorist attacks and plots at demonstrations in the United States, according to new CSIS data. The result is escalating violence in U.S. cities between extremists from opposing sides, a major break from historical trends. In 2021, over half of all domestic terrorist incidents occurred in the context of metropolitan demonstrations. In addition, the most frequent targets of attacks were government, military, and law enforcement agencies, who are increasingly at the center of domestic terrorism by extremists of all ideologies.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Polarization, and Domestic Terrorism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

8. Al-Shabab in Mozambique: Taking Stock of an Insurgency Under Cover

Author:: Tom Van Rentergem
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Since the first attack in October 2017, Mozambique has been confronted with an extremist insurgency called Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Al-Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabab in Somalia). The alleged Jihadists targeted the Mozambican coastline and have carried out indiscriminate attacks in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, with the capture of coastal towns Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021 being important markers for the insurgents. The intense five-year conflict has resulted in 4,000 people dead and 800,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), roughly half of the province. The identity of the insurgents has become subject for debate among policy makers and researchers, raising questions about whether the group is primarily a local insurgency or whether there are tangible links to Jihadism in other areas of Africa and the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Africa and Mozambique

9. Protecting Civilians From Those Who Should Protect Them

Author:: Delina Goxho
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: As violent attacks targeting civilians in the Sahel region of West Africa are mounting, allegations of abuses perpetrated by Sahelian armed forces share the news with attacks committed by non-state armed groups. This brief analyses the main shortcomings within the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with regard to ensuring meaningful Protection of Civilians (PoC) from their own security and defence forces. It finds that formal, structural measures to address state security forces’ abuse of civilians is lacking in all three states, although some promising initiatives to build trust between security forces and civilians have been held on a local level. On a regional level, the OHCHR-mandated Human Rights Compliance Framework, which has partially been adopted by regional force Force Conjointe – G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), represents an example of a mechanism that could ensure better protection of civilians both for the region, and on a national level. However, the advent of Russian paramilitary group Wagner in Mali and the most recent massacre of civilians in Moura is challenging all optimistic forecasting.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Civilians
Political Geography:: Africa

10. Rhetoric Meets Reality in Jawlani’s Push for Self-Sufficiency

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: As a key UN vote approaches, Washington should push Turkey to help promote a diverse, balanced economy in HTS-controlled northwest Syria. On July 10, a United Nations vote will decide the future of the cross-border aid mechanism for northwest Syria, an area run by the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The mechanism—which facilitates aid to northwest Syria via Turkey without having to go through Damascus—faces the prospect of nonrenewal for the first time since it was created in 2014, as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A failure to renew the mechanism would exacerbate an already daunting humanitarian situation in northwest Syria, where some three-fourths of the population consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs). While aid will likely continue on a far more limited basis if Russia vetoes the mechanism, from a U.S. perspective a more self-reliant HTS-run territory requiring less international assistance would actually be far preferable to a situation in which aid renewal remains subject to periodic dramas. Over the past roughly six years, HTS has transformed itself from an al-Qaeda branch into something resembling a typical regional state governing body, with the group engaging in human rights violations and embracing inflammatory rhetoric. To begin with, it has focused increasingly on developing local institutions and the economy. The group’s strides in governance have been facilitated, in part, by the March 2020 Turkey-Russia ceasefire agreement, which more or less froze the conflict line. Since then, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani has reiterated the value he places on self-sufficiency and constructing a new polity and society that does not rely on outside help. If HTS and its civilian-led Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) actually followed through on Jawlani’s ideas, locals could find other avenues to support themselves. Yet one must acknowledge at this point that HTS has not matched its lofty rhetoric with efforts to develop indigenous capabilities. Instead, it has worked hard to monopolize economic power.
Topic:: Politics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

11. Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of Kabul

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The group’s international profile has risen substantially with help from China, Turkey, and other states, but Western leaders should curtail their engagement so long as Kabul keeps gaslighting them about its al-Qaeda ties. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized its “Islamic Emirate.” Yet while no country has officially recognized the new government established after the group recaptured Kabul one year ago, the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration. In March, for example, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called for international recognition of the Islamic Emirate, while his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov argued that it should be granted a seat at the United Nations. Just how extensive is this diplomatic momentum? And how might it be affected by the July 31 targeted killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was reportedly being sheltered in Kabul by Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani?
Topic:: Diplomacy, Terrorism, Reform, Taliban, Democracy, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

12. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

13. Policy Journal by Women of Color: WCAPS Pipeline Fellows Publication

Author:: Adenikè Adegbidi, Beza Gebremariam, Caroline Mendoza, Clémence Kouamé, and Desiree Raymond
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:: The WCAPS Pipeline Fellowship Program provides an opportunity for college and university students, as well as young adults and early career professionals, to develop a broad understanding of the different dimensions of peace, security, and foreign policy through engagement with WCAPS members, to include young, mid-career and senior level women and men. Oftentimes, the WCAPS Pipeline Fellowship program serves as an introduction to these career paths for young women of color and allows them to seamlessly integrate into the WCAPS community and beyond, thus creating the pipeline we aimed for. The program started locally in Washington D.C. and has since expanded to include participants from across the globe. This most recent cohort had participants from four continents. This dynamic group of women learned about a variety of topics to include Redefining National Security (RNS), emotional intelligence, Women Peace and Security (WPS), and international law as it relates to peacebuilding. WCAPS is very proud to present the policy papers these young women wrote, following months of rigorous research, coordination, and collaboration.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Migration, Race, Terrorism, United Nations, Water, Peacekeeping, Women, Food Security, Refugees, Conflict, Representation, Peace, Gender, and Femicide
Political Geography:: Latin America and Global Focus

14. Violent Extremist and Terrorist Threats: Examining Ghana’s Preparedness

Author:: Mawusi Yaw Dumenu
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:: The growing spate of violent extremism and terrorism in the sub-region spells doom for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 16 which focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Ghana is now the only country among the earlier mentioned coastal states that has not suffered from any violent extremist and terrorist violence. This notwithstanding, there have been several alarming incidents involving extremist attacks that have occurred in close proximity to Ghana’s borders.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:: Africa and Ghana

15. How the Islamic State Sees the Future: Why the end of times does not mean the end

Author:: Florence Gaub
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: One would not exactly think of the Islamic State (IS) as a future-oriented organisation: it uses medieval-sounding language and barbaric methods and preaches an archaic lifestyle. In reality, however, it is very much a forward-looking organisation with clear ideas not just on what the future will bring, but on what it should bring. In fact, it is this attitude towards the future that has not only enabled its past successes, but also allowed the organisation to persist and endure since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq – and, most importantly, what will determine its next steps and ambition. Understanding how IS conceives its own future will enable law enforcement authorities to take the necessary precautions ahead of time. This Brief first outlines why it is crucial to understand how the future as an organising principle shapes the strategy and posture of terrorist organisations, and shows that terrorist organisations lacking such a concept will lose traction faster than those that do. It goes on to examine IS’s future concept pre-and post-loss of its territory and to elaborate why it was and is an attractive future. Lastly, it seeks to anticipate the future trajectory IS will take based on its articulation of an eschatological vision of the future.
Topic:: Terrorism, Islamic State, and Future
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Syria

16. Salafi-Jihadism in Africa: A winning strategy

Author:: Giovanni Faleg and Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Violent extremism keeps spreading in Africa, showing notable resilience despite years of counter-extremism and prevention efforts by governments and international actors*. In addition to killing thousands, it costs the affected regions an estimated $97 billion in lost informal economic activity each year. Today, armed actors engaging in violent extremism in the continent are mainly affiliated with Islamist militant groups and organisations and particularly Salafi-jihadist ideology. Recent data indicates a dangerous expansion of Salafi-jihadist armed groups — often simply labelled as violent extremist or terrorist organisations — beyond the traditional hotspots in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa to West Africa’s coastal states and Central and Southern Africa. The proliferation of militants linked to the Islamic State (IS) in particular and the infighting and complex ties among groups affiliated to different jihadist networks are raising growing alarm among observers. The worrying trend is reflected in the increase of acts of violence designated as terrorism. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), sub-Saharan Africa was the second region in the world affected by deadly terrorism in 2019, superseding the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for a second consecutive year. Whereas globally the lethality of terrorism is somewhat decreasing, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing a contrasting trend. Burkina Faso experienced the largest increase in terrorism in the world in 2019 with nearly 600 people killed in terrorist attacks. Terrorism was assessed to have increased significantly also in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Niger, among others. Seven out of the ten countries most impacted by terrorist violence in 2019 are located in the region. Similar developments continued in 2020. What makes Salafi-jihadist groups appear ‘invincible’? This Conflict Series Brief analyses how Salafi-jihadism spreads across Africa and explores its potential future trajectories. The first section of the Brief analyses the broader picture emerging from recent extremism-affiliated armed violence trends in the region. The second section analyses three aspects making these extremist groups particularly resilient and facilitating their spread in the continent. Based on the findings, the third section demonstrates the dangers of such adaptability, using two foresight scenarios for 2025. Finally, the concluding section outlines the main policy implications: what needs to change to prevent violent extremism from derailing Africa’s Agenda 2063 ?
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Salafism, Conflict, Islamism, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Africa and Sahel

17. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:: Olivier Roy
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

18. When jihadists broker peace: Natural resource conflicts as weapons of war in Mali’s protracted crisis

Author:: Boubacar Ba and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Following Mali’s coup d’état of 18 August 2020, the transitional government is yet to present a roadmap for peace in central Mali outlining a new strategy for dialogue with armed non-state actors. To support this process, it is important that Mali’s international donors identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue with all parties to conflicts. Recommendations: Immediate de-escalation of conflicts is needed through disarmament of militias and rebuilding of trust between local communities and Mali’s armed forces, with a strong focus on protecting civilians. Mali needs a national, comprehensive strategy for how to include jihadists and local militias in dialogue, reconciliation and dispute resolution. International donors need to identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue between all parties to conflicts. Long-term solutions regulating equal access to natural resources for different population groups are key.
Topic:: Agriculture, Climate Change, Democratization, Environment, Terrorism, Water, Food, Non State Actors, Governance, Fragile States, Investment, Peace, and Land Rights
Political Geography:: Africa and Mali

19. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto

Author:: Abdul Sayed
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The changing narratives and operations of al-Qaeda and its Pakistani ally, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in recent years indicate that the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan will not end with a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 or thereafter (The News, March 1). Recent speeches by the TTP emir, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, to a coalition of senior TTP commanders on the future goals of the war in Pakistan is not the only piece of evidence signifying that this war will continue (Umar Media, August 18, 2020; Umar Media, December 15, 2020). Rather, history also shows this war still has a long way to go. Pakistani Islamists are widely believed to have originally supported al-Qaeda’s war against the Pakistani state due to post-9/11 changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy, which supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that expelled the Taliban regime from Kabul. However, the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan is deeply rooted in the pre-9/11 complexities of Pakistani politics, which culminated in Islamists enabling al-Qaeda operations within Pakistan immediately after 9/11. The war against the Pakistani government is so deeply entrenched that it will remain a challenge for the country even if the widely accepted jihad against the U.S. “infidel occupier” in Afghanistan and its allies, including Pakistan, is no longer a factor.
Topic:: Terrorism, Islamism, Jihad, and Benazir Bhutto
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

20. Turkey Enters Tunisia’s Weapons Market With Combat-Proven Arms: A Technical and Strategic Assessment

Author:: Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In late 2020, Turkey finally secured a lucrative arms sale package to Tunisia after a long period of negotiations. The $150 million portfolio, which attracted key players of the Turkish defense technological and industrial base, such as Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) and British Motor Corporation (BMC), will mean more than only defense revenues for Turkey (TRT Haber, December 24, 2020). It will additionally mark Turkish weaponry’s entrance into the Tunisian market against the backdrop of Ankara’s geopolitical quests in North Africa, which has become a geopolitical flashpoint encompassing various forms of militancy, transnational terrorism, and proxy warfare.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Weapons, Drones, Arms Trade, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Turkey, North Africa, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

21. Boko Haram’s Pan-Nigerian Affiliate System after the Kankara Kidnapping: A Microcosm of Islamic State’s ‘External Provinces’

Author:: Jacob Zenn
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 11, 2020, around 300 male students were kidnapped from a Kankara, Katsina State school in northwestern Nigeria (TheCable, December 13, 2020). The attack was inconsistent with typical northwestern Nigeria banditry operations involving smaller-scale kidnapping and extortion, pillaging, and assassination of local political enemies that have escalated in northwestern Nigerian in recent years. The attack was, however, consistent with the past activities of the Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau. Shekau’s faction is responsible for the mass killing of male students in their dormitories in 2013 and the Chibok kidnapping of more than 200 female students in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria in 2014. Furthermore, the Kankara kidnapping reflected Boko Haram’s “affiliate system” because the attack was conducted by Boko Haram’s northwestern Nigerian “affiliate” in the Katsina-Niger-Zamfara state axis, which is comprised primarily of bandits (“Niger” refers to Niger State, Nigeria, not the Republic of Niger).
Topic:: Terrorism, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

22. Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh’s Female Members Further Islamic State’s Recruitment and Propaganda

Author:: Animesh Roul
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB), which was responsible for the deadly July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in Dhaka claimed by Islamic State (IS), has effectively nurtured and nourished a strong network of female jihadists in the country (refworld.org, November 15, 2016). These women members have proven to be a largely unseen, but potent force behind the group’s resilience. They have spearheaded recruitment and propaganda campaigns and even surprised security forces with a suicide bombing on December 26, 2016 in Ashkona area of the capital Dhaka (The Independent, December 26, 2016).
Topic:: Terrorism, Non State Actors, Women, Islamic State, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Bangladesh and South Asia

23. The Evolving Rivalry: The future of the relationship between Taliban and ISKP in Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The ISIS Amaq news agency on September 19 announced on its Telegram channel that the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP claim responsibility for three bombings in Jalalabad in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province. The Taliban accused the organization of carrying out a fourth attack in the Afghan capital Kabul. The developments come amid concerns in the West that the next terrorist threat from Afghanistan is this particular militant group.
Topic:: Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and South Asia

24. Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach

Author:: Martha Crenshaw
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The 2011 civil war in Syria attracted thousands of fighters from at least seventy countries to join the Islamic State. Al-Shabaab carried out large-scale attacks on civilian targets in Uganda and Kenya as retribution for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In this report, Martha Crenshaw considers the extent to which civil war and foreign military intervention function as a rationale for transnational terrorism, and how understanding the connections between terrorism, civil war, and weak governance can help the United States and its allies mount an appropriate response.
Topic:: Terrorism, War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, Transnational Actors, Peace, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:: Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Middle East, Syria, Somalia, and United States of America

25. 2020 Thematic Brief: Preventing and Countering Terrorism

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: The Trump Administration’s stated strategies to prevent and counter terrorism have largely continued the approach of the Obama Administration. However, this approach is at odds with the president’s own rhetoric and actions, which make us less safe in the long term. President Trump has verbally attacked and abandoned key allies and partners in the fight against terrorism, including the Kurds in Syria, while embracing counterproductive policies that will make it easier for terrorists to rebuild. At the same time, President Trump has largely ignored the far-right extremism that has spiked under his presidency. Even worse, he has retweeted statements that come from people associated with hate groups. Right-wing extremists, and in particular white supremacists, have caused more deaths than international terrorists in recent years.1They feel they have an ally in President Trump because he has largely refused to condemn them. During the recent protests for racial justice, he completely ignored the threat of right-wing extremists accused of killing Americans and plotting attacks against the military, while at the same time he was inflating other extremist threats.23And he blamed both sides in Charlottesville. To be clear, one side was neo-Nazis and other white supremacists. The United States needs a smart and tough approach to terrorism and extremism that includes: Prioritizing the threat of domestic extremism and dedicating resources to prevent and counter it, including by providing support to organizations working on these issues, cutting off financial flows, evaluating whether further designations of foreign right-wing organizations are warranted, and addressing extremism in the US military;4 Preventing the spread of all forms of violent extremism by addressing the root causes globally and reducing the effectiveness of recruitment efforts; Protecting the American homeland by preventing terrorist attacks and disrupting terrorist networks in the United States; and Eliminating terrorist safe havens abroad and building up the capacity of partner nations to fight terrorism on their own turf.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

26. Inside Extreme Left Wing Antifascist & Anarchist Group ‘The Set’

Author:: Julia Sweet
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: TRAC: Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
Abstract:: According to the authorities, The Set group planned to conduct revolts and terror attacks during the World Cup of 2018 and had plotted attacks to occur prior to the presidential election. Allegedly, its members plotted attacks on traffic police patrols, Post Office buildings, facilities of “United Russia” political party, etc. The Set’s main goal was the destabilization of the Russian state.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Anarchism, Political Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Russia

27. Al-Shabaab Attacks Spike, as COVID-19 Grips the World

Author:: Sunguta West
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Al-Shabaab’s recent attack targeting Somalia’s head of the military is the latest indication of the Islamist militant group’s growing confidence in its battle for control of the war-torn country in the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa, has been waging a deadly insurgency in the country for 14 years. Its weapons of choice have ranged from improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), to deploying suicide bombers to target security forces, public installations, and government officials. Its war is largely asymmetrical, where it also relies on hit and run attacks, assassinations, and grenade attacks.
Topic:: Terrorism, Islamism, Al Shabaab, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

28. Islamic State’s South African Fighters in Mozambique: The Thulsie Twins Case

Author:: Christian Jokinen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On October 2, South Africa’s state prosecutor successfully opposed bail for the “Thulsie twins” in their prolonged trial on terrorism offenses (Daily Maverick, October 2). The alleged offenses and corresponding court case highlight South Africa’s growing concern about South African-origin foreign fighters and the deteriorating security situation in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.
Topic:: Terrorism, Non State Actors, Islamic State, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:: South Africa and Mozambique

29. The Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Government’s Sinjar Agreement: Consequences for U.S., Turkish, and Iranian Influence and Rebel Rivalries

Author:: Rami Jameel
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On October 9, the Iraqi government headed by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) signed the “Sinjar Agreement” to normalize the situation in the war-torn district of Sinjar in northern Iraq. The agreement stated that only Iraqi federal forces should operate in Sinjar and all other armed groups must leave the town. It also gave the KRG a say on establishing a new local government, including appointing a new mayor, and planning and running reconstruction efforts in Sinjar, including related budgetary matters (Rudaw, October 10).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Kurds, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and United States of America

30. Terrorism: Two Faces of Women

Author:: Lea-Grace B. Salcedo
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: Societal support for both terrorist groups and state-led counterterrorism efforts is dependent upon the extent to which the populace believes that these organizations reflect the societies in which they operate. The composition of the society as well as the society’s ability to address grievances and meet the expectations of the populace are of key importance when it comes to the integration of women into both types of organizations. In the past, women have primarily played support roles to men but increasingly, especially in recent years, they have also served in nontraditional roles in both terrorist organizations and the security sector.
Topic:: Security, Gender Issues, Terrorism, Women, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Should I stay or should I go? Security considerations for members leaving al-Shabaab in Somalia

Author:: Ingvild Magnaes Gjelsvik
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Somali jihadi organization al-Shabaab, yet again featured in the news internationally when they attacked a business and hotel complex in Nairobi 15 January this year. This is not the first time the group carries out largescale attacks outside the Somali boarders. Other examples are the Garissa University College attack in 2015, the mass shooting at Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in 2013 and the Kampala attacks in 2010. However, the majority of the atrocities committed by al-Shabaab take place in South Central Somalia. The Global Terrorism Index 2018 ranked Somalia as number 6 on its list of countries most impacted by terrorism in 2017.1 Al-Shabaab was behind the deadliest terrorist attack in 2017 worldwide, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck, killing 587 people in Mogadishu. Although al-Shabaab has had several military setbacks the last few years, the group still poses a significant threat to security and stability in the region. As the name al-Shabaab (‘the youth’) indicates, young people predominate in the group. This means that thousands of individuals spend parts of their youth in al- Shabaab. The question then arises: how to best assist the ones who want to leave the group?
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violence, and Al Shabaab
Political Geography:: Africa and Somalia

32. Women of the Alt-Right: An Intersectional Study of Far-Right Extremism, Gender, & Identity in the United States

Author:: Sarah Kenny
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: The alt-right, an expression of far-right violent extremism, presents a security risk to citizens in the United States and around the world. As globalization, mass immigration, and multiculturalism flourish, various collectives of fearful individuals and populist politicians will continue to embrace ethnonationalist worldviews and employ violent means to enforce them. To combat this security risk, it is essential to acknowledge that women make significant contributions to the altright and violent extremism. Women can no longer be misrepresented and excluded from efforts to prevent and counter this form of violent extremism. Exclusion has proven both disingenuous and dangerous along the road to realizing a comprehensive threat analysis and strategy.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, Women, Domestic Politics, Gender Based Violence, and Far Right
Political Geography:: United States

33. We Need to Distinguish Between Local and Globalist Foreign Fighters

Author:: Maja Touzari Greenwood
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The broad definition of the term ‘foreign fighter’ causes operational problems for risk assessments. It is therefore important for security officials to identify significant variations by classifying actors into major categories. RECOMMENDATIONS ■When assessing the risk of continued security threats from foreign fighters, it is crucial to distinguish strategically between foreign fighters who join local rebel groups and those who join globalist groups. ■Ways should be provided for foreign fighters who have joined local rebel groups to ‘opt out’ and return home after the end of fighting in order to discourage them from becoming globalist foreign fighters and to stem potential flows of foreign fighters to new theatres of conflict.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Fragile States
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

34. Boko Haram and the African Union's Attitude Towards Terrorism

Author:: Michael Asiedu
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:: This paper attempts to capture the African Union’s attitude towards terrorism in a relatively lesser extent to the activities of Boko Haram. In so doing, a brief background is coined together with this introductory section. This is followed by sub-sections which shall explore the following, Boko Haram’s territorial capture, Boko Haram’s status as a terrorist group and what encompasses terrorism. Subsequently, AU’s evolving attitude towards terrorism will be traced in addition to how it has set its agenda against terrorism. The AU’s counter-terrorism activities in the context of Boko Haram will be assessed with its role in the prevention and combat of terrorism in Africa analyzed. The AU’s challenges as far as terrorism is concerned will also be highlighted with suggestions on possible alternatives as well as concluding thoughts.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Boko Haram, and African Union
Political Geography:: Africa and Nigeria

35. The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Right-wing extremism in the United States appears to be growing. The number of terrorist attacks by far-right perpetrators rose over the past decade, more than quadrupling between 2016 and 2017. The recent pipe bombs and the October 27, 2018, synagogue attack in Pittsburgh are symptomatic of this trend. U.S. federal and local agencies need to quickly double down to counter this threat. There has also been a rise in far-right attacks in Europe, jumping 43 percent between 2016 and 2017.
Topic:: Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Domestic Politics, and Far Right
Political Geography:: United States

36. The Prison Terrorism Nexus: Recommendations for Policymakers

Author:: James Howcroft
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:: Among the many challenges in the fight against terrorism today is the issue of terrorists within prisons. Cross-pollination of terrorist and criminal networks and, in particular, the radicalization and recruitment of ordinary criminal offenders present significant and growing threats to security. What can countries do to manage and reduce these threats? To discuss these issues and exchange best practices, the Marshall Center hosted a Global Counter-Terrorism Alumni Community of Interest (COI) workshop from 29-31 August, 2017. Six alumni from the Americas, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, as well as French and U.S. subject matter experts, shared their countries’ national experiences. This served as a catalyst for discussion among sixty-five counter-terrorism (CT) professionals from forty-six countries. The following recommendations are the product of these discussions. 1. Include prisons in national CT strategies and develop an action plan to counter radicalization in prisons. COI participants identified insufficient political will and attention to the issue of prison radicalization as a key challenge. Inclusion of prisons within national CT strategies may help to focus attention on the issue while clarifying the roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies. It is also essential to develop research-based action plans for the management of terrorist offenders in prison in order to reduce the level of risk and prevent further radicalization.
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Global Focus

37. Securing Punjab’s social & cultural diversity

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes the deliberations of the first of six provincial-level policy dialogues on counter-violent extremism in Punjab. The first policy dialogue focused on the cultural, religious and social diversity in Punjab with a view to explore how far that had been used or could be used to counter violent extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Culture, Violent Extremism, Diversity, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

38. Social harmony and equal citizenship

Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes the deliberations of the second of six provincial-level policy dialogues on social harmony and equal citizenship in Punjab. The second policy dialogue focused on social harmony and equal citizenship in the context of countering violent extremism in Punjab.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Citizenship, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

39. Safe charity: giving to the right hands

Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes key deliberations of the third provincial-level policy dialogue on counter-violent extremism in Punjab. Held in the provincial capital Lahore, the dialogue discussed how to ensure that charity reaches the right hands, besides exploring the role of social welfare organizations in Punjab.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Charity, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

40. Promoting the culture of dialogue in Punjab

Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes the findings of the fourth provincial dialogue forum held in Lahore, which explored the role of “dialogue” in Punjab to counter extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Dialogue, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

41. Intellectual and scholarly trends on countering violent extremism in Punjab

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes key deliberations of the fifth of six provincial-level policy dialogues on counter-violent extremism in Punjab. The policy dialogue series is part of the efforts by PIPS to analyse the security and conflict-related issues in Pakistan, with a view to finding practical ways and means to counter violent extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Intellectual History, Scholarships, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

42. Role of Punjab’s literary and cultural institutions in countering extremism

Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes key deliberations of the last of six provincial-level policy dialogues on counter-violent extremism in Punjab organized by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). The policy dialogue series was part of the efforts by PIPS to analyze the security and conflict-related issues in Pakistan, with a view to identifying practical ways and means to counter violent extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Culture, Violent Extremism, Literature, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Punjab

43. Religious Thought and Conflict

Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the finding of the first working group on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE). The group deliberated the mechanism for shaping religion-based narratives against extremists’ violent ideologies. The theme of the group was suggested in the PIPS-proposed CVE model presented in 2016. The group debated what could be done to reduce the appeal of militants who quote their interpretations of religious texts, traditions and precedents from Islamic history to propagate their violent ideologies and justify their actions. It also shared the key contours of the new narrative that counters those held and promoted by the extremists.
Topic:: Religion, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Intellectual History, Conflict, Militant Islam, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

44. Reintegration of Militants

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the second working group on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), which deliberated upon the mechanism for reintegrating militants willing to shun violence and/or denounce the practice of takfeer(declaring fellow Muslims out of creed of Islam)
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Militant Islam, Reintegration, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

45. National Dialogue and Social Contract

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the third working group on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), which deliberatedupon the need for holding national dialogue(s) to address critical politico-philosophical issues in the country, especially those producing and/or supporting extremism, and whether a revised social contract could provide answers.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Philosophy, Social Contract, Dialogue, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

46. Implementing National Action Plan

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the fourth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), which discussed the implementation mechanism of National Action Plan (NAP), the country’s counter-terror plan announced in January 2015.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

47. Constitution, Citizenship and Governance

Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the fifth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE). The meeting explored to what extent is extremism linked to the provision of constitutional rights and physical services provided by the state. Focus was made of how the concept of citizenship is absorbed by people, and how governance is carried out on the ground.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Governance, Violent Extremism, Constitution, Citizenship, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

48. Youth Engagement Program

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This policy brief summarizes the findings of the sixth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE). The meeting, which was part of a PIPS-led exercise to strategize response options to CVE in Pakistan, explored how youth can be engaged beforehand so that they are not radicalized in the future.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Youth, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

49. Media Engagement Programs

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the seventh working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), which explored how media can be engaged in CVE programs so that it neither glorifies extremists nor propagates radicalizing messages.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Communications, Violent Extremism, Media, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

50. Cultural Diversity and Pluralism

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the eighth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), which examined the spaces for cultural diversity and pluralism in Pakistan and their link to extremism and CVE discourses. Cultural diversity is anathema to an extremist body. One of the first acts of militants has been attacking symbols of cultural diversity.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Culture, Violent Extremism, Pluralism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

51. Education reforms

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the ninth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), exploring how education in Pakistan can be reformed to curb extremist tendencies.
Topic:: Security, Education, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

52. Internal security and challenges

Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: This brief summarizes the findings of the tenth working group’s meeting on Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE), exploring how to address internal security challenges including those emanating from extremism.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

53. A Conservative’s Prescriptive Policy Checklist: U.S. Foreign Policies in the Next Four Years to Shape a New World Order

Author:: Robert D. Blackwill
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As Donald Trump prepares to enter the presidency, many observers at home and abroad seek to anticipate the outlines of his foreign policy. This essay has a different purpose. Based on the rigorous definition of vital U.S. national interests that follows immediately below, [1] it proposes a prescriptive checklist of U.S. policy steps that would strengthen the domestic base of American external actions; reinforce the U.S. alliance systems in Asia and Europe; meet the Chinese and Russian challenges, while improving the quality of diplomatic exchanges with Beijing and Moscow; reshape U.S. trade policy; gradually pivot from the Middle East to Asia (but not from Europe); maintain the nuclear agreement with Iran; and confront international terrorism more aggressively, but with minimal U.S. boots on the ground in ungoverned areas and without nation building. This list attempts to take into account the President-elect’s public statements on foreign policy, but does not assume that all of them will be manifested after January 20. It rests squarely on the application of the Nixon/Kissinger national interest driven conceptual framework that refined American foreign policy five decades ago to current U.S. challenges and opportunities.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, Terrorism, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

54. Three Generations of Jihadism in Iraqi Kurdistan

Author:: Adel Bakawan
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Iraqi Kurdistan, previously known as a secure and stable region amidst the chaotic and shaken Middle East, was struck by a wave of attacks in 2016. Between September and December of that year, there were five recorded terrorist operations led by 249 Kurdish jihadists rallied by the Islamic State (ISIS) or Daesh, of which 47 were killed and 43 were arrested by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In fact, Iraqi Kurdistan, with a population of five million inhabitants, has supplied ISIS with 2,000 jihadists. Since the launch of the Mosul offensive on 17th October 2016, Kurdistan has been preparing itself, like many other countries in the region and a number of European countries, to face its worst nightmare: the Kurdish jihadists’ return to the country. Although a series of threats weigh upon the leaders of the KRG, such as social and economic crises, political division between rival parties; Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the prospect of a new civil war, and the intervention of neighbouring countries – the return of the Kurds of Daesh is currently the most troublesome.
Topic:: Terrorism and International Security
Political Geography:: Middle East

55. Women in Jihadist Organizations: Victims or Terrorists

Author:: Hamoon Khelghat-Doost
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: Many scholarly works on women in jihadi organizations emphasize women’s lack of agency. Authors of these works argue women have fallen victim to these male-dominated organizations and thus have lost control over their actions. However, certain groups of women in some jihadi organizations—for example, Islamic State (or IS), Jaish al-Fatah, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham—enjoy a degree of agency within the scope of their duties. This policy brief examines the extent to which women in jihadi organizations have agency—that is, to which extent they are able to make independent decisions. Understanding the conditions under which women have agency, allows policymakers to recognize the diversity of roles and contributions of women within jihadi organizations and design appropriate policy responses.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Islam, Terrorism, Women, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

56. Women, Gender, and Terrorism Policies and Programming

Author:: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jeannette Gaudry
Publication Date:: 01-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: In recent years, policymakers and international actors have begun to recognize the important role of women and women’s organizations in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). In October 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2242, which linked the women, peace and security (WPS) and the P/CVE agendas and called for synergies between efforts aimed at countering violent extremism and those furthering the WPS agenda. In 2016, the US government incorporated P/CVE in its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security. The idea that women can be powerful allies in the fight against violent extremism is based primarily on two interrelated observations. First, women often function at the heart of their communities and are thus best placed to recognize early warning signs of radicalization. Effective P/CVE programs will capitalize on this. Second, a community that hopes to address extremism effectively must include the broadest possible range of perspectives in its programming. Because society, economies, and war affect them in gender-specific ways, women bring different perspectives to discussions and plans affecting security. That said, women-centric P/CVE programming is in its infancy. An initial review of these programs points to five main problems, which are explored in this policy brief.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, United Nations, Counter-terrorism, and Women
Political Geography:: United States and Global Focus

57. Women, Gender and Terrorism: Understanding Cultural and Organizational Differences

Author:: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jeannette Gaudry
Publication Date:: 04-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: As the idea that women can and should play pivotal roles in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) gains greater traction, decision makers and scholars must keep striving toward a more nuanced understanding of the historical, cultural, and gendered contexts that enable extremist movements and organizations to grow.
Topic:: Political Violence, Gender Issues, Terrorism, Culture, Women, Violence, and Political Movements
Political Geography:: Global Focus

58. Violent Extremism in Africa: Public Opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn

Author:: Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:: 06-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Afrobarometer
Abstract:: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies’ social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns – the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE.1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism’s impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and Horn of Africa

59. Terror overseas: understanding China’s evolving counter-terror strategy

Author:: Mathieu Duchâtel
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: International terrorism has emerged in recent years as a direct threat to Chinese nationals living overseas. As China's footprint becomes increasingly global its exposure to the risk of terror attacks has increased too. China’s approach to international terrorism is becoming militarised. This trend has the potential to accelerate if Chinese nationals are victims of new attacks overseas. Although China is an active and responsible player in the UN with clearly expressed priorities and an interest in protecting its citizens overseas, it is not taking a strong role in leading and shaping the UN’s counter-terrorism agenda. The EU should take stock of the ongoing transformation of China’s approach to explore a modest upgrade of its current policy of cautious engagement. When engaging with China the EU should make clear that an overly politicised approach will be an obstacle to cooperation, and be upfront in setting the conditions of cooperation. The EU should not underestimate what China has to offer but shouldn't make big compromises either.
Topic:: Terrorism and International Security
Political Geography:: China

60. European defence core groups

Author:: Margriet Drent, Anne Bakker, and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:: 11-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The why, what & how of permanent structured cooperation The deteriorating security situation around Europe and the burgeoning messages from Washington that Europe has to take more responsibility for its own security call for a step change in European defence cooperation. So far, progress has been too slow. This policy brief argues that permanent structured cooperation (Pesco) offers the option to take a more ambitious and more productive route by member states willing to move forward more quickly, set more demanding objectives and commit themselves more strongly. This would end the well-known ‘voluntary basis’ which has often been used as an excuse for doing little or nothing at all.
Topic:: International Relations, Terrorism, International Security, International Affairs, and Political and institutional effectiveness
Political Geography:: America and European Union

61. Women, Gender and Terrorism: Gendered Aspects of Radicalization and Recruitment

Author:: Jeannette Gaudry
Publication Date:: 09-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: The rise of groups like ISIS has galvanized the expansion of the global terrorism problem. While ISIS is hardly the first extremist organization to attract women and to use gendered tactics for recruitment, its formation and growth has paralleled the explosion of social media, bringing unprecedented attention to the problem. As scholars and policymakers attempt to develop coherent responses to the threats that groups like ISIS pose, three critical issues need to be addressed. (1) What drives individuals to join extremist groups, and are these drivers different for men or women? (2) What are common methods of recruitment, and do they differ by gender? (3) Have states and international institutions integrated gender perspectives in their responses to radicalization and extremist violence? Do these approaches empower women to resist recruitment? Without an integrated dialogue between the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and counterterrorism communities, the answers to these questions will remain incomplete and policy responses may fall short.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Women, Radicalization, Violence, and Political Movements
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

62. Women, Gender and Terrorism: The Missing Links

Author:: Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown
Publication Date:: 08-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:: In March 2016, WIIS launched the Women, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism program. With the generous support of the Embassy of Liechtenstein in Washington, D.C., WIIS will facilitate a series of expert roundtables to explore the role of women in terrorist and violent extremist organizations, including the gendered dimensions of radicalization. These round tables will provide a forum for bringing together an international group of experts and policymakers from the counter-terrorism and Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) communities. Key takeaways and recommendations of expert roundtables will be captured and disseminated in the form of policy briefs. The first Policy Brief draws on the first roundtable discussion, held on March 20, 2016. This roundtable featured four noted experts: Ms. Sanam Anderlini, Co-founder and Executive Director of the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN); Dr. Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP); Dr. Paul Pillar, former official of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and now a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Lorenzo Vidino, Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University’s Center for Cyber and Homeland Security.
Topic:: Security, Gender Issues, Terrorism, Women, Radicalization, Violence, and Peace
Political Geography:: Middle East and Global Focus

63. Judgement Day for ISIL and What It Would Mean for Canada

Author:: Dave Murray
Publication Date:: 10-2016
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University
Abstract:: Despite the carnage wrought by ISIL around the world, the days appear numbered for its caliphate in Syria and Iraq. We are likely talking the shorter to medium term at most. ISIL faces intense military pressure on all fronts. It continues to lose territory and its leadership figures are being targeted and killed. Increasingly ISIL faces significant challenges in replenishing its losses due to efforts by Turkey and most nations internationally to block the flow of foreign fighters into the caliphate. As leadership figures are eliminated, internal factionalism will create serious stresses and vulnerabilities. The forces aligned against ISIL are powerful, despite conflicting agendas. Add to this reports of financial problems, including a strained ability to pay its militants, and the result is a picture of an entity on a downward trajectory. This in no way means that the caliphate or its extremist message will die easily or that we are nearing an end to the scourge of ISIL inspired terrorism – only that its ability to sustain itself territorially has limits. If one accepts the above assessment, now is the time to consider what this will mean. Now is the time for thinking and planning directed at dealing with the eventual collapse of a self-proclaimed state in which countless thousands have been radicalized, traumatized, received military and terrorists training, let alone the reality of child soldiers and intense psychological scarring caused by ISIL.
Topic:: Terrorism, Radicalization, Islamic State, Conflict, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Canada, Syria, and United States of America

64. Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia

Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Growing numbers of Central Asian citizens, male and female, are travelling to the Middle East to fight or otherwise support the Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIL or ISIS). Prompted in part by political marginalisation and bleak economic prospects that characterise their post-Soviet region, 2,000-4,000 have in the past three years turned their back on their secular states to seek a radical alternative. IS beckons not only to those who seek combat experience, but also to those who envision a more devout, purposeful, fundamentalist religious life. This presents a complex problem to the governments of Central Asia. They are tempted to exploit the phenomenon to crack down on dissent. The more promising solution, however, requires addressing multiple political and administrative failures, revising discriminatory laws and policies, implementing outreach programs for both men and women and creating jobs at home for disadvantaged youths, as well as ensuring better coordination between security services.
Topic:: Islam, Religion, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:: Central Asia, Middle East, and Asia

65. Nidaa Tounes Rift Exacerbates Government Crisis

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Nidaa Tounes, a party born post-Tunisian revolution, is currently experiencing internal rifts, which in turn is having an impact on the country’s secular-Islamist ruling government’s ability to move forward. This rift became especially obvious after the party’s founder and leader, Beji Caid Essebsi, won the presidency and consequently resigned as party leader according to Tunisia’s constitutional law. This position paper examines key actors and roots of the party’s rift, how this rift has impacted state institutions and future scenarios for the governing coalition.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Democratization, Terrorism, and Popular Revolt
Political Geography:: Tunisia

66. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State in Libya

Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The Islamic State has been moving aggressively to exploit the chaos of Libya since last summer, with profound risks for the Mediterranean region and beyond Libya is a perfect breeding ground for an expanded Islamic State, with large amounts of heavy weaponry, systemic lawlessness, a divided population, and sustained armed conflict The group has formed three active and capable groups in Libya-in Tripoli, Fezzan, and Barqa-all of which have conducted deadly attacks in recent months The phenomenon of Islamic State affiliates-beginning in the summer of 2014, before which the group was entirely focused on Iraq and Syria-is actually in the tradition of its arch-rival al-Qaeda the presence and power of the Islamic State in Libya will likely increase as conditions in Syria and Iraq deteriorate for the group, and conditions in Libya continue to worsen.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Iraq, Libya, and Syria

67. TSG IntelBrief: Responding to the Islamic State

Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The Islamic State's murder of Jordanian hostage Lt Moaz al-Kasasbeh was both a message to the group's fighters that it can counter the coalition's relentless airstrikes as well as an offensive move designed to provoke a high-profile overreaction The air campaign against the Islamic State has been relentless while at the same time has receded from the headlines-a double blow to the group in that it suffers the losses but doesn't benefit from the attendant spectacle The drawn-out 'negotiations' over this past month-while the hostage was already dead-were likely intended to sow division and tension in Jordan, and draw attention to the issue as long as possible before the gruesome finale While Jordan is understandably enraged and will have to strike back, the most effective response might be an escalation that continues to kill the group's fighters away from the headlines.
Topic:: Security, Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arabia

68. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State and Savagery

Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: Like a page out of the 2004 extremist manifesto "Management of Savagery," the Islamic State has tried to goad the international community into near-sighted reactions without long-term approaches by highlighting the barbarity of its executions of hostages This tactic has thus far failed to ignite the overreaction (outside of press reporting) of Western powers, leaving the group without an important recruitment and incitement tool The Islamic State needs consistent replenishment of fear to overcome its inherently terrible local governance, and so it depends on shocking savagery to serve as both its recruitment magnet and opposition suppression As the group encounters less and less Westerners, given the danger of their presence in the region, it will find increasingly fewer ways to incite the 'us-versus-them' battle it needs to survive.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arabia

69. Hizballah, Iran, and Israel: Out of the Shadows

Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: While the threat of an immediate escalation between Israel and Hizballah appears to have subsided after deadly tit-for-tat attacks, the trend lines suggest greater conflict ahead In an important and ominous speech on January 30, Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah created, in effect, one long front against Israel that now includes Syria and the Golan Heights as well as Lebanon, increasing the potential for conflict with Israel Iran is no longer moving in the shadows but rather is openly coordinating strategy with its proxy Hizballah as the two seek to strengthen and expand 'the resistance' against Israel All parties involved have specific reasons to avoid a near-term conflict-the upcoming Israeli elections, ongoing Iranian nuclear negotiations, Hizballah's commitments in Syria-but shifting regional power dynamics will only increase the likelihood of serious fighting between them.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

70. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State's Hostage Strategy

Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The still-unresolved hostage situation involving Jordan, Japan, and the Islamic State is unlike any of the group's previous kidnappings Jordan is in a precarious position, as it seeks the release of one of its citizens-a national hero who comes from a prominent tribe-while not wanting to free one of the perpetrators of the worst terrorist attack in the country's history By demanding the release of failed suicide-bomber Sajida al-Rishawi from Jordanian custody, the Islamic State is trying to elevate itself to the status of negotiating nation-state, and weaken and embarrass a vital member of the coalition seeking its destruction In a striking difference with previous Islamic State hostage situations, current circumstances provide a chance for the group to bolster its standing in the vital Iraqi province of al-Anbar-where al-Rishawi is from-and perhaps slightly lessen tribal pressure on the group The issue is causing tensions between the Iraqi-born leadership of the Islamic State, who want to make the exchange, and a small faction of primarily Saudi fighters, who want to execute the Jordanian pilot for bombing the group.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Japan, Middle East, Arab Countries, and Jordan

71. Boko Haram and Escalating Regional Terror

Publication Date:: 06-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: • A multinational joint task force consisting of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger has driven Boko Haram from key territorial strongholds in northeastern Nigeria; on June 18, the Chadian military conducted airstrikes against six Boko Haram bases in Nigeria • But the terror group continues to launch deadly, near-daily attacks throughout the region—including on June 15 with twin suicide bombings in Chad—using guerrilla tactics rather than conventional warfare • Nigeria’s newly-inaugurated president, Muhammadu Buhari, has moved quickly to support regional counter-Boko Haram efforts, insisting on Nigerian leadership in the task force and pledging $100 million in financial support • Despite the nascent successes of the joint task force, Islamic State gains in North Africa and, in particular, Libya, could impact the flow of weapons and fighters into Nigeria; Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March of this year.
Topic:: Development, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:: Africa

72. Afghan Youth and Extremists

Author:: Belquis Ahmadi
Publication Date:: 08-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Four decades of political instability, violent conflict, and socioeconomic crisis has had a devastating impact on Afghanistan and its citizens. As this Peace Brief explains, understanding the process of radicalization and the drivers of violent extremism is vital to designing effective counterstrategies.
Topic:: Political Violence, Terrorism, and Youth Culture
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

73. Reimagining Pakistan’s Militia Policy

Author:: Yelena Biberman
Publication Date:: 04-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Abstract:: If ever a turning point seemed inevitable in Pakistan's militia policy, it was in the aftermath of the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed 152 people, 133 of them children, in the bloodiest terrorist attack in Pakistan's history. The carnage sparked an unprecedented national dialogue about the costs and contradictions of the Pakistani political and military establishment's reliance on violent proxies, such as the Afghan Taliban (from which the TTP originates), for security. Why does Pakistan continue to differentiate between "good" and "bad" militias in the face of the Peshawar massacre? What are the costs of playing the good-bad militia game? What can be done to end Pakistan's dependency on armed nonstate groups? In "Reimagining Pakistan's Militia Policy," Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Skidmore College and US-Pakistan Program Exchange Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, argues that Pakistan's unwillingness to crack down on all terrorist groups is more a product of cold calculation than ideological shortsightedness. Understanding Pakistan's close relationship with militias requires recognizing the strategic logic through which many states outsource violence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Pakistan

74. Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation

Author:: Faysal Itani
Publication Date:: 04-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Since August 2014, the US-led air campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has successfully inflicted casualties on ISIS and weakened its oil revenues. However, the same efforts have also accelerated the rise of the Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate, and the near-collapse of nationalist rebel forces. In "Defeating the Jihadists in Syria: Competition before Confrontation," Faysal Itani of the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East details the unintended consequences of the coalition air campaign and proposes a revised US strategy. He argues that the United States can effectively assist nationalist insurgents to defeat ISIS and the Nusra Front by enabling them to compete with and contain these groups before ultimately confronting them. Itani writes that the US-led campaign thus far and the train-and-equip initiative set to begin next month undermine and weaken nationalist rebel forces. He criticizes these efforts for failing to provide sufficient support to the rebel forces, while directing them to target ISIS instead of the regime. Meanwhile, the Nusra Front and other jihadist organizations have greater resources and have been effective in targeting the Assad regime. As such, nationalist rebel forces and local populations have increasingly aligned with the Nusra Front and even tolerate ISIS in order to protect themselves against regime violence, criminality, and chaos. Itani's proposed US strategy offers a practical and workable response to the rise of jihadists groups in Syria; this revised strategy seeks to support rebel forces to compete with the Nusra Front for popular support and to take control of the insurgency, contain ISIS, and build capacity for an eventual offensive against the jihadists. This approach will build on positive results in southern Syria by significantly increasing direct financial and material support and training for vetted nationalist groups that have already shown significant success. Simultaneously, in the north the campaign can provide sufficient material support to nationalist forces while expanding coalition air strikes to target ISIS's frontlines, allowing the nationalist insurgency to defend and govern territory. Only once nationalist insurgent forces have successfully competed with the Nusra Front and contained ISIS can they confront and ultimately defeat the jihadist groups in Syria.
Topic:: Politics, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:: Iraq and Syria

75. Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan

Author:: Selina Adam Khan
Publication Date:: 09-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The December 2014 terrorist attack in Peshawar that killed 132 schoolchildren forced Pakistan to acknowledge the extent of its ongoing problem with radical Islamist militancy. Islamabad, however, has yet to implement a comprehensive deradicalization strategy. In January 2015, it took a formal step in this direction with its twenty-point National Action Plan in response to the Peshawar attack—a step, but only a first step. If deradicalization is to meet with any success in Pakistan, the national narrative itself needs to change.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Political Violence, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

76. Regional Security through Inclusive Reform in the Maghreb and the Sahel

Author:: Querine Hanlon and Joyce Kasee
Publication Date:: 12-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Throughout the Maghreb and the Sahel, governments are struggling to manage a security environment fundamentally transformed by the Arab Spring. Within this region, the efforts of governments to secure their territories and civil society organizations to create accountable and transparent security institutions have proceeded almost wholly divorced from each other. This Peace Brief shares key insights from the engagement between official and civil society actors both within and across borders to address these gaps, makes the case for working regionally to address the twin challenges of security and reform, and highlights how community-security partnerships offer one approach to advancing the region’s security and reform agenda.
Topic:: Security, Democratization, Islam, Terrorism, and Popular Revolt
Political Geography:: Arab Countries and North Africa

77. ISIS War Game III: The Final Phase

Author:: Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:: 12-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: September 2015 marked the one-year anniversary of President Barack Obama's speech outlining the administration's strategy to "degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Yet, ISIS celebrated in June its own first-year anniversary of setting up a state by conducting three nearly simultaneous terrorist operations in three different countries—France, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Just this past month, ISIS also shocked the world with its attacks in Paris and Beirut and its downing of a Russian airliner in Egypt, killing more than 400 people combined and injuring hundreds more. While nobody expected the destruction of a resilient and agile foe such as ISIS within a couple of years, it is deeply troubling that the coalition is having such a hard time even disrupting its activities.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, War, Counterinsurgency, Fragile/Failed State, and ISIS
Political Geography:: Middle East

78. An Intensified Approach to Combatting the Islamic State

Author:: Michele Flournoy and Richard Fontaine
Publication Date:: 08-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In the 11 months since President Barack Obama committed the United States to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), the group has expanded its international reach, metastasized to form offshoots across multiple regions, and increased its perceived momentum. Although U.S. government officials cite a reduction in the overall size of the group’s sanctuary in Iraq and Syria and the killing of thousands of ISIS fighters, the fall of Ramadi and much of Anbar province to the Islamic State served as a wakeup call that current efforts to counter ISIS are not adequate to the task.2 Meanwhile, the threat posed by the terrorist group to Americans at home and abroad appears to be growing as ISIS-inspired individuals conduct attacks targeting Westerners around the globe, including here in the United States.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Security, Civil War, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arab Countries

79. Creating Spaces for Effective CVE Approaches

Author:: Georgia Holmer
Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Countering violent extremism efforts strive to prevent at-risk individuals from being recruited into or joining extremist groups. Identifying who is at risk and who poses a threat, however, is a complicated inquiry. In Kenya, as in many other places experiencing violent extremism, the young, the undecided, the coerced and others might—if properly guided—move away from rather than toward violence. Many at risk of becoming involved in violent extremist groups are too quickly categorized as an enemy and given no opportunity to move in a different direction. Empathy is critical both to learning why individuals are vulnerable to engaging in violent extremism and to creating the space and willingness in a community to help those at risk.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Kenya and Somalia

80. Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home

Publication Date:: 09-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: One year after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Al–Shabaab is more entrenched and a graver threat to Kenya. But the deeper danger is less in the long established terrorist cells that perpetrated the act–horrific as it was–and more in managing and healing the rising communal tensions and historic divides that Al- Shabaab violence has deliberately agitated, most recently in Lamu county. To prevent extremists from further articulating local grievances with global jihad, the Kenyan government–including county governments most affected-opposition politicians and Kenyan Muslim leaders, must work together to address historical grievances of marginalisation among Muslim communities in Nairobi, the coast and the north east, and institutional discrimination at a national level, as well as ensuring that counter-terrorism operations are better targeted at the perpetrators and do not persecute wider ethnic and faith communities they have purposefully infiltrated.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:: Kenya

81. TSG IntelBrief: Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Growing Threat

Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The number of foreign fighters is high, 12,000 and counting, and the spread of countries they come from covers much of the globe. Two recent events involving foreign fighters show the radicalizing influence of the war. With the support to bolster Syria's more secular rebel forces at times inconsistent and tepid, the lack of an alternative has accelerated a natural gravitation towards extremist elements. It will be hard to know which returnees pose a threat, and harder still to deal with them. Given that the number of foreign fighters already exceeds those that went to Afghanistan, government resources will be severely strained to monitor all returnees and will have to rely on the help of local communities.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Middle East, and Syria

82. TSG IntelBrief: Boko Haram Takes, Holds Territory

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: Like its putative Islamic State counterparts in Iraq and Syria, the Nigerian terror group Boko Haram has in recent weeks accomplished an alarming expansion of its territorial control The downing of a Nigerian fighter jet-and the videotaped beheading of its pilot-also suggest a quantum leap in the group's offensive and propaganda capabilities The Nigerian state's attempts to counter the Boko Haram narrative through positive public relations have yet to yield positive results The government's latest claim of killing the militants' leader, Abubakar Shekau, remains unsubstantiated, thus creating another public relations challenge for Nigerian security officials.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Africa

83. TSG IntelBrief: : Foreign Fighters from North Africa in Syria and Iraq

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: No region has seen more of its people travel to fight in Syria than North Africa; more than 3,000 Tunisians have traveled there as of last April, and more than 1,500 Moroccans This is a repeat of a decade ago when large numbers of North Africans traveled to Iraq to fight there as well, in proportions far above those of neighboring countries A significant number of recent North African fighters have conducted suicide bombings in both Iraq and Syria, highlighting that the deadly ideological message of the so-called Islamic State (IS) and other extremist groups is finding purchase in North Africa The reasons for this export of extremists include incomplete political reforms that have failed to redress serious societal issues, persistent high youth unemployment, and a failure to cope with the apparent high levels of disaffection, despair, and anger that drive people to choose violent extremism.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, North Africa, and Syria

84. TSG IntelBrief:: The Bomb-Proof Finances of the Islamic State

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: Attacking the finances of the so-called Islamic State (IS) with limited collateral damage will be orders of magnitude more difficult than attacking its military factions The group has thoroughly embedded itself into local and regional economies in Syria and Iraq, and damaging its finances while not devastating civilian populations will be as difficult as it is necessary IS oil revenues might be the easiest to disrupt but such action comes with significant collateral economic damage, while taxes, tolls, extortion, and food sales generate more income while remaining highly resistant to external forces In the areas under its control, IS has been providing social services as well as delivering levels of fuel, electricity, and food to populations utterly without recourse, meaning the group needs to be replaced and not simply removed.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arabia

85. TSG IntelBrief: Turkey Steps In: A Good Thing?

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The Turkish parliament's vote to authorize the deployment of military forces in Syria and Iraq provided a legal and official framework for such action It may appear to be a positive step in degrading and destroying the putative Islamic State (IS), however, the parliament in its vote used the broader term "terrorist organizations," thus the landscape for Turkey, Syria-Iraq, and regional states and interests remains exceptionally complex Though there is nearly universal and implacable opposition to IS among all actors in Syria and Iraq, Turkey's future role-depending on steps taken-could aggravate tensions not only with Arab Gulf states and Kurdish elements in Syria and Iraq, but Iran, Russia, and the Iraqi government Turkey's desire to create a buffer zone on the Syrian side of its common border remains one of the most sensitive issues Amid reports of increased IS pressure on Kobani, Kurdish PKK has insinuated Turkey will be to blame-not IS-for creating conditions for the refugee crisis, and threatens to resume opposition activity in Turkey. The Turkish parliament's vote Thursday to authorize use of its army and military facilities in the fight against the so-called Islamic State (IS) may appear at first look to be a positive step for the broader coalition. The measures-to be determined-are in addition to any financial, diplomatic, humanitarian, and support activities for the anti-IS coalition. However, parliament's vote did not entail Turkey's officially joining the coalition. After the recent deal-details yet to be revealed-to bring home over 40 hostages IS had taken from Turkey's consulate in Mosul, Iraq, in June 2014, pressure increased for Turkey to take military steps in the anti-IS fight. A factor increasing the possibility of military action is Turkish special operations forces' guarding the tomb of Suleyman Shah, a Turkish enclave in Syria reported to be increasingly surrounded by IS. Though there is almost universal animus toward IS in the region, there is also nearly uniform resistance to Turkey's perceived unilateral military involvement in Syria and Iraq, outside the framework of the anti-IS coalition. Turkey's next moves may cause more conflict than benefit in the anti-IS fight. Indeed, the political landscape for Turkey's moves at home and abroad remains extraordinarily complex.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

86. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State: An Accident of History

Publication Date:: 11-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The following IntelBrief is excerpted from The Soufan Group's recent long-form report on The Islamic State, which takes an in-depth look at the extremist group's operations across Iraq and Syria. From late 2011 up to today, The Islamic State has shown itself both tactically and strategically adept. After years of surviving as a persistently violent criminal/terrorist gang able to mount multiple synchronized attacks in urban areas in Iraq but little more, it achieved unparalleled gains when the collapse of government in northern and eastern Syria allowed it to expand across the border. At the same time, the sectarian approach of then-Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki had made the Sunni minority in Iraq ready to support any group that appeared to have the potential to reverse its increasing marginalization. It's accurate to say the group would still exist-but in nothing like its current form-had only one of those two catastrophes-Syria and Maliki-occurred; that both played out as they did made what has happened seem an almost inevitable accident of history.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

87. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State: A Monopoly on Messaging

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The deliberate targeting and killing of journalists by The Islamic State (IS) and the resulting lack of outside reporting has created a nearly information-free zone for the group to fill with its own messaging. The group's embrace of the decentralized nature of social media has allowed its many thousands of cyber-supporters to create and operate their own ministries of propaganda. Abu Mohammad al-Adnani is the official spokesman for the group, but the notion of an official spokesman does not really apply to IS in the way it has applied to al Qaeda; the crowdsourcing of messages negates the need for a single point of contact.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Communications, Mass Media, and Insurgency
Political Geography:: Iraq, North Africa, and Syria

88. TSG IntelBrief: Ordered Chaos: The Structure of The Islamic State

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: For a group that feeds on chaos, The Islamic State (IS) itself is rigidly structured and organized. The growing bureaucratic and administrative demands on IS as it attempts to govern the areas it controls-while under increasing military pressure-will stress the group and its structure like never before. The group benefits from ruling over populations that have little experience in effective government services, meaning that the very conditions that helped fuel IS's rise now give it wide latitude to deliver sub-par services for at least the near-term without risking revolt, at least for reasons of shoddy governance. From the caliph-level down to the district level, the group has a repetitive three-office ruling structure that provides easy-to-understand lanes of responsibility and authority, which is vital for a growing organization whose sole membership requirement is belief in its cause.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:: Iraq and Syria

89. TSG IntelBrief: Removing The Islamic State from Local Economies

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: Like a tumor, the Islamic State (IS) feeds off the vitality of its unwilling hosts, sustaining itself from the economies of the areas it controls Efforts to deprive IS of its million-dollar-a-day revenue will be as difficult as it will be vital, since the group takes a percentage of local economic activity; hurting those economies to deprive IS of money will be counter-productive The coalition efforts to defeat IS militarily must be sufficient enough to thwart its advances while remaining targeted enough to ensure the vulnerable population doesn't unite with IS in collective suffering Destroying mobile oil refineries is an effective use of air power to deny IS more finances but it will prove less effective against destroying the percentage IS takes from everyday transactions that it calls taxes In short, the solution is to remove IS from the money, not the other way around, which only will only weaken and radicalize already struggling populations.
Topic:: Economics, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Iraq and Syria

90. TSG IntelBrief: From Bucca to Kobani: The Hybrid Ideology of the Islamic State

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The reshaping of what is now the Islamic State (IS) began among the detainee populations in military prisons such as Camp Bucca in Iraq, where violent extremists and former regime personalities forged mutual interests over years of confinement IS is now a chimera of Ba'athist and takfiri ideologies, with the organizational skills of the former helping channel the motivational fervor of the latter It is more than a marriage of convenience between the two seemingly at-odds groups; the former Ba'athists among the group and the religious ideologues now have visions of a return to Sunni glory that merges Usama bin Ladin with Saddam Hussein While at smaller unit levels there will be conflict between the two halves of the whole-as witnessed in the fighting between IS and the Naqshbandi Army after the fall of Mosul-the former regime officers who are now senior leaders in IS appear fully committed to the ideals and goals of the group, a result of a thorough radicalization that has extended from imprisonment years ago up to now These prison-hardened fighters were so important to IS that they undertook a year-long campaign (2012-2013) called "Breaking the Walls" to free what would prove to be the last pieces needed for expansion.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arabia

91. TSG IntelBrief: The Logic of Foreign Fighters as Suicide Bombers

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: While there is understandable concern that an unknown percentage of foreign fighters fighting for the so-called Islamic State (IS) might return to their home countries intent on continuing the fight, IS appears intent on using them in suicide attacks in both Iraq and Syria IS goes to great length to publicize the foreign fighters who die in suicide attacks, which greatly enhances the group in the eyes of unstable people looking for martyrdom, creating a feedback loop of death A recent statement by IS showed that 80% of the suicide attacks in Iraq between September and early October were committed by foreign fighters; this continues a trend of IS using their foreign fighters in suicide attacks while Iraqi fighters take on the role of traditional soldiers Along with Saudi nationals, who conducted 60% of the suicide attacks referenced above, fighters from North Africa consistently feature prominently in IS suicide attacks, which closely matches the suicide bombing statistics from the 2003 Iraq war, though now there are more suicide operatives from western Europe
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arabia

92. TSG IntelBrief: Lack of Trust Hinders Second Sunni Awakening

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: Coalition airstrikes are intended to blunt the momentum of the self-declared Islamic State (IS) and provide time for a popular Sunni uprising that might never happen given the understandable lack of trust among all sides The Sunni Awakening that helped diminish the precursor group to IS in 2006-2009 is the successful outlier in Iraq's history of tragic uprisings; and it will not likely be replicated since the conditions that allowed it to succeed no longer exist To that end, one of the foundational assumptions of the effort to dismantle IS-that the Sunni tribes will soon rise up and oppose IS in a second Awakening-is built on uncertain ground Sunni tribal leaders realize there won't be anything near 2007-levels of support (material, financial, training) if they oppose IS en masse, and after gaining next to nothing politically after the first Awakening, there is no trust in a different outcome for any second Awakening Reports of a failed Sunni uprising in eastern Syria are additional disincentives for both Syrian and Iraqi Sunni populations to fight IS, and additional incentive to wait and see what external factors will emerge to change the status quo.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arab Countries

93. TSG IntelBrief: The Fight the Islamic State Really Wants: Iraqi Shi'a

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: With apparent heavy losses in Kobani, Syria, the so-called Islamic State (IS) is stepping up efforts to ignite the one fight it wants above all: a full sectarian war with Iraq's Shi'a population IS will likely accept serious losses, as long as it can claim to be the Sunni extremist vanguard in the fight against the Shi'a; this means the group will focus on high-profile and high-casualty attacks against Shi'a symbols and populations With the February 2006 bombing the 'Golden Mosque' in Samarra, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi finally got the fight he was looking for against the Shi'a and in doing so moved the IS precursor group AQI further up the list of the most feared and capable Iraqi extremist groups The new government of Prime Minister Haydar al-Abadi will be pressured to overreact to IS attacks and to let loose the Shi'a militia that battled with both Sunni extremists and innocents alike eight years ago; a heavy-handed sectarian response will be a disaster for the country, even if it is asking a great deal for those being attacked to show restraint.
Topic:: Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:: Arab Countries

94. TSG IntelBrief: Jordan and the War Next Door

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: In neighboring Iraq, over 1,100 Jordanians are believed to be fighting for the so-called Islamic State (IS) according to Jordanian former Prime Minister Maruf al-Bakhit, with another 200 having already died fighting Although that's only 0.0203% of Jordan's 6.4 million population, and enough for serious concern, it's testament to Jordanian society that with the constant fighting next door such a small percentage have taken up arms for IS After the 2005 Amman bombings, al Qaeda in Iraq (the precursor to IS) was widely despised in Jordan; now nine years later, over a thousand Jordanians are fighting for the same group In his October 18, 2014 remarks, Bakhit stated that there were between 2,000-4,000 Jordanians who adhere to the violent takfiri ideology most famously espoused by the late Jordanian Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi Along with the fear of a radicalized population after a decade of war raging across two of its borders is the fear of what happens next in Iraq and Syria According to Bakhit, a partitioned Iraq is too problematic to work despite its obvious appeal amid the current fighting, with resources unevenly distributed across the country and Baghdad far too mixed for one side to claim.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:: Middle East and Arab Countries

95. TSG IntelBrief: The Islamic State and the Divided Opposition

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Soufan Group
Abstract:: The self-declared Islamic State (IS)'s strategy of exploiting and exacerbating divisions among its opponents ranks as one of its greatest weapons, and one of the coalition's greatest weaknesses Turkey's airstrikes against the Kurdistan Workers' Party in southeast Turkey are the latest example-and perhaps most damaging in the near-term-of opponents of IS fighting each other instead of the group IS was sustained during its weakest period (2008-2010) in part by exploiting real tensions between various groups-Sunni vs Shi'a, Sunni vs Sunni, Sunni vs Kurd, etc-that prevented an "everybody vs IS" opposition that remains the only way to defeat the group IS will continue to create/exacerbate/leverage the differences between the US and Turkey, Saudi Arabia/UAE and Qatar, the Kurds and various parties, so much so that focus is more on tactically keeping the coalition together and less on strategically strangling IS.
Topic:: Islam, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Arab Countries, and Kurdistan

96. A Blueprint for a Comprehensive US Counterterrorism Strategy in Yemen

Author:: Danya Greenfield and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the explosion of violent conflicts from Tripoli to Gaza, the Middle East is looking more unstable and unpredictable than ever. While the focus in Washington is centered on jihadist extremists in Iraq and Syria at present, the threat from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against the United States continues. Top al-Qaeda leadership in Yemen is hailing the territorial gains of ISIS in Iraq, and some al-Qaeda operatives are imitating ISIS' techniques such as public slaughters of those deemed infidels, prompting fears of cooperation between two of the most active Islamist militant networks. Recent aggression by the Houthi movement, a Zaydi Shia rebel militia, against state institutions and tribal opponents has opened a new front of instability and security vacuum that AQAP is all too ready to exploit. Inattention to the interconnected nature of tribal conflict, terrorist activity, poor governance, economic grievances and citizen discontent is proving to be a dangerous combination for both Yemen and the United States. The Yemeni context may seem far from the current focus on Baghdad and Damascus, but getting the US strategy right in Yemen will have consequences for regional stability and core US interests throughout the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Economics, Terrorism, Foreign Aid, Labor Issues, and Reform
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Arabia, and Syria

97. La Tunisie des frontières (II) : terrorisme et polarisation régionale

Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Depuis le soulèvement populaire de décembre-janvier 2010-2011, la Tunisie surmonte avec succès ses crises politiques, mais le pays semble moins disposé à absorber le choc d'attaques jihadistes plus importantes. Malgré le dialogue national qui a fortement réduit les tensions et a fait débuter l'année 2014 sur une touche optimiste, l'inquiétude grandit de nouveau. Cette appréhension peut s'expliquer par la montée des violences à la frontière algérienne, le chaos libyen et l'avancée de l'islamisme radical au Moyen-Orient, mais également par le discours antiterroriste ambiant. Caisse de résonnance des conflits qui agitent la région, le pays a besoin d'aborder la question terroriste de manière sereine et dépolitisée, malgré les enjeuxinternationaux. La lutte contre le terrorisme et la lutte contre le crime organisé sont indissociables. Le gouvernement gagnerait ainsi à accompagner ses mesures sécuritaires par des mesures économiques et sociales destinées à ramener les populations frontalières dans le giron de l'Etat.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:: Arabia

98. Pakistan's Resurgent Sectarian War

Author:: Arif Rafiq
Publication Date:: 11-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandi and Shia Muslims in Pakistan has escalated in recent years. Most of this violence is perpetrated by local networks, but the sectarian phenomenon also has important ties to regional security dynamics and transnational terrorist networks. Despite sporadic state crackdowns, Pakistan's leading Sunni Deobandi sectarian militant groups have been able to maintain a persistent presence thanks in part to reluctance among mainstream Pakistani military and political leaders to directly confront groups that are sometimes seen as serving utilitarian political interests. Despite this negligence, Sunni Deobandi militants have also established linkages with terrorist groups that target the Pakistani state, such as al-Qaeda and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Rising conflict in the greater Middle East over the past five years has strengthened the sectarian political narrative in Pakistan and emboldened sectarian militant networks on both sides of the conflict.
Topic:: Political Violence, Islam, Religion, Terrorism, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:: Pakistan

99. The Shape of the Cyber Danger

Author:: Lucas Kello
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: There is little consensus among scholars and practitioners on how to confront or even characterize the contemporary cyber threat. The range of conceivable cyber conflict is poorly understood by strategic thinkers, and it is unclear how conventional security mechanisms, such as deterrence and collective defense, apply to this phenomenon. The cyber revolution's strategic quandaries need urgent resolution.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and Military Strategy

100. Revisiting Chicago: The Critical Need To Maintain Support For Afghanistan's National Security Forces Post-2014

Author:: William A. Byrd
Publication Date:: 06-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Two years ago, the Chicago international summit agreed on long-term targets for the size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and committed to continued international financial support until 2024. Since then, the ANSF have taken over lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security and have by most accounts performed well, taking substantial casualties but holding their own against the Taliban. However, the ANSF still rely heavily on U.S. financial and logistical support and military "enablers" in such roles as air support, medevac and reconnaissance. The Afghan government's failure to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States during the past eight months has coincided with, and undoubtedly contributed to, declining political support for the international engagement in Afghanistan. Not only has U.S. civilian aid in the current fiscal year been halved, but the White House recently announced a complete U.S. troop pull-out by the end of 2016, except for "normal levels" to protect the U.S. Embassy and oversee military assistance. That is close to a "zero option," albeit in 2016 and not 2014. The announcement raises serious questions about the staying power of international security funding (which would amount to billions of dollars per year into the early 2020s if the Chicago commitments hold); management of security assistance; provision of logistical support and enablers; whether Afghanistan's domestic revenues will grow fast enough to meet its own ANSF funding commitments; and timing of any future ANSF reductions in relation to possible negotiations with the Taliban insurgency. The ANSF (especially the Afghan National Army, or ANA) was largely a creation of the United States, which has advocated for and endorsed its current size and cost. It would be irresponsible to create such a force and then turn around and undermine it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:: Afghanistan and Chicago

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS