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1. Brace yourself: How the 2024 US presidential election could affect Europe

Author:
Célia Belin, Majda Ruge, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A profound debate is taking place among US political parties about America’s future foreign policy orientation. Democrats and Republicans are aligned on some issues, such as the strategic rivalry with China, protecting domestic manufacturing, and access to strategic technologies. But the parties also disagree on subjects of crucial importance to Europeans such as climate action, the war in Ukraine, and the United States’ relationship with its allies. Within both the Democratic and Republican parties, three tribes exert influence over party foreign policy and will shape the stance of future administrations. On America’s global posture and military presence abroad, the parties are split between those who believe in limited international US engagement, others who argue for prioritising the Indo-Pacific, and advocates of continued US global leadership or even primacy. Europeans must not simply hope they can accommodate potentially dramatic shifts in US policy in the coming years, but should instead take steps now to enhance and protect their own position in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Urgent Messages: Assessing the influence of the US-France-Saudi statement on Lebanon holding timely elections

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The foreign ministers of the United States, France and Saudi Arabia, on September 21, issued a joint statement expressing their support for Lebanon. In the statement issued after representatives of the three countries met on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, expressed their continuing support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, security, and stability. They stressed upon the importance of holding timely elections in compliance with the constitution to choose a new president and form a new government capable of implementing the structural and economic reforms, urgently needed to address Lebanon’s political and economic crises, specifically those reforms needed to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. In the statement, the three countries further expressed willingness to work jointly with Lebanon to support the implementation of these fundamental reform measures, which are critical to the country’s future prosperity, stability, and security. The three countries acknowledged the critical role the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Internal Security Forces – as the legitimate defenders of Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal stability – continue to play in protecting the Lebanese people in a time of unprecedented crisis. They affirmed the need for the Lebanese government to implement the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions 1559, 1680, 1701, 2650, and other relevant international resolutions, including those issued by the Arab League, and commit to the Taif Agreement which enables the preservation of national unity and civil peace in Lebanon.
Topic:
Reform, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, France, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and United States of America

3. Voting Rights Issue Briefs

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
Two-thirds of eligible voters participated in the 2020 election, which represented the highest turnout in a national election since 1900, before women had the right to vote. More than 159 million Americans voted, the largest total voter turnout in our history and the first time more than 140 million individuals participated in an election. Turnout rose among all racial and ethnic groups, and for the first time a majority of Americans under the age of 30 cast ballots. This historic level of participation is more remarkable given that the election took place in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Voting, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. The 2021 Iranian Presidential Election A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Albert B. Wolf
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Whoever wins, the result will intimate deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future. The Washington Institute has been sponsoring a series of discussions about sudden succession in the Middle East. Each session focuses on scenarios that might unfold if a specific ruler or leader departed the scene tomorrow. Questions include these: Would the sudden change lead to different policies? Would it affect the stability of the respective countries involved, or the region as a whole? What would be the impact on U.S. interests? Would the manner of a leader’s departure make a difference? The discussions also probe how the U.S. government might adjust to the new situation or influence outcomes. This essay, thirteenth in the series, assesses the situation in Iran, where a June election will determine the successor to President Hassan Rouhani. An IRGC-backed candidate such as Majlis speaker Muhammad Baqer Qalibaf or former defense minister Hossein Dehghan could ultimately prevail—but a history of election surprises in the Islamic Republic suggests no outcome is certain. Whoever wins, the result will offer clues about deeper trends in Iranian society, such as public support for the regime and the Supreme Leader’s intentions for the country’s future.
Topic:
International Relations, Government, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

5. Spies and Money: Legal Defenses Against Foreign Interference in Political Campaigns

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In recent years, U.S. government officials have normalized a damaging notion: that soliciting or participating in foreign interference in a U.S. election will not be prosecuted. Foreign governments from Beijing to Moscow and elsewhere are watching closely, and unless Congress and the new administration act quickly to close loopholes in the current U.S. legal framework governing political campaigns, every major U.S. election could be undermined by foreign interference that is not prohibited by U.S. law. A new legal framework around political campaigns is sorely needed—one that provides a proactive and holistic approach to foreign interference rooted in the need to protect U.S. national security.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
United States of America

6. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

7. How To Retain Election Officials To Secure Future Elections

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2020 presidential election was called the most secure in U.S. history, largely due to efforts to protect the nation’s different physical and cyber infrastructure. This was a triumph considering the physical, cyber, and even human assets that make up the election infrastructure have been and continue to be susceptible to threats. In 2020, many states adopted measures to mitigate threats to physical and cyber election assets like voting equipment, ballots, and facilities, as well as computer services and databases that store voter information. For example, states with close results in the 2020 presidential race had paper records of each vote, which gave them the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary. Other measures such as pre-election testing, state and federal certification of voting equipment, and increased collaboration between election officials and their security partners helped provide additional assurance that the 2020 election results were legitimate. Unfortunately, analogous measures were not in place to protect many of the people—from state and local election administrators to poll workers and vendor staff—who administered the elections. Due in large part to the incendiary rhetoric from former President Donald Trump and his followers, many election officials were threatened and harassed, and such behavior shows no signs of abating. Instead of taking steps to address this problem, many states have passed or are considering passing laws that could make this problem worse. Georgia’s new law removed the Georgia’s secretary of state—who rejected Donald Trump’s effort’s to overturn the state’s 2020 results—from decision-making power on the state election board and turned control of the board over to a politicized, less knowledgeable body: the state legislature. Iowa’s new law threatens election officials with criminal prosecution for failing to follow new voting rules. And Florida recently adopted a rule that subjects its local election officials to a civil penalty of $25,000 if a drop box at an early voting site is left accessible for the return of ballots outside of early voting hours. The unrelenting targeting of administrators—along with unfunded election mandates, threats, burn out, and fatigue—has pushed many election officials to leave or consider leaving their positions. According to a recent Democracy Fund/Reed College Survey of Local Election Officials, approximately one-third of chief local election officials will be eligible to retire before the 2024 election, including more than half of those in the largest jurisdictions, which each serve more than 250,000 registered voters. Considering what many of these election officials and their staffs endured during the 2020 election cycle, and continue to experience, it would be unwise to simply wait and hope that they decide to hang on. Instead, every effort should be made to create an environment that is as conducive as possible for retaining these unsung heroes of the 2020 elections. The ability of the United States to conduct future secure elections may well depend on it. This paper focuses on measures state and local governments can take in concert with their election offices to help retain as many of their high-performing election officials as possible. State and local governments should have support from the federal government and Congress to help address this national security issue, but if the fight over funding the 2020 election is any indication, they should begin taking steps to address this problem now. Below are ten suggestions for how state and local governments can retain their high-performing election officials. None is a “silver bullet,” not all of them will be relevant for each state and local government unit, and some governments have already taken many of these steps. But in addressing election official retention solutions, these suggestions provide remedies for some of the thorniest problems that election officials encounter.
Topic:
Politics, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. US-Turkey Relations Hanging by a Thread: Trump’s Re-Election

Author:
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
As the American elections are about to take place, many in Turkey brace for the outcome. After countless disputes between the United States and Turkey during the 2010’s, coupled with growing divergence of Turkish foreign policy, two allies’ relationship has been deceptively good for the last two years. This was not due to a meaningful rapprochement, but to Erdogan’s well-executed personal diplomacy with Trump which has proved beneficial for Turkey in many cases. Yet, this superficial rapprochement is challenged by the prospects of a Biden presidency. Biden, whose remarks are far from affable towards Erdogan and who has even pledged to support Turkish opposition, is very likely to demand Turkey to recommit to its alliance with the West. Hence, we may soon see a Turkey at a serious crossroads: either Turkey will turn its face to West once again, or it will further alienate from the West.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

9. As Israel’s Kingmaker Gets Off the Fence, Gantz Gets a Boost

Author:
David Makovksy
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Although Benny Gantz’s party lost the head-to-head battle, Avigdor Liberman’s favorable influence on the coalition math has left the general in a stronger position—and taken some diplomatic weight off the Trump administration’s shoulders. Israel’s third round of elections last week seemed inconclusive at first, but the deadlock may now be broken. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did better this time than in September’s round two, but his gains were insufficient to form a new government. Potential kingmaker Avigdor Liberman jettisoned his previous idea of getting the two top parties to join forces; instead, personal antipathy and policy differences have led him to definitely state that he will not join any government Netanyahu leads. Thus, while centrist Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz may have options to shape a new government, Netanyahu has no pathway on his own. In theory, the center-left bloc has the requisite number of seats for a bare majority in the 120-member Knesset, since anti-Netanyahu forces won 62 seats. In reality, the situation is more complex.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, and Elections
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

10. Reading Trump in Tehran

Author:
Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A week after Donald Trump was elected president in November 2016, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei played coy, remarking, “I have no judgment on the American election...[Both parties have been] naughty toward us.” Of course, his true reaction was far more complex. On one hand, he saw in the president-elect—who had spoken much of disentangling U.S. forces from the Middle East—a prospect of decreased military pressure on his country. On the other, he heard Trump’s raw vitriol directed at Iran’s leadership and the nuclear deal crafted by President Obama. The eventual U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA demonstrated that the new president could back up his talk with punishing action. In this close analysis of statements by Khamenei and other Iranian leaders, former seminarian Mehdi Khalaji lays out the regime’s current views on President Trump and the United States. He shows that even after the American assassination of Qods Force chief Qasem Soleimani, Iranian leaders could be open to negotiating with Washington if they believe the regime’s existence depends on it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Donald Trump and the battle of the two percent: How will the US election impact on the conflicts over defence spending within NATO?

Author:
Mikkel Runge Olesen
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
US pressure on its NATO allies to increase defence spending is likely to continue, especially if Trump wins the US presidential election. Denmark can look to Germany to anticipate how pressure from the US will play itself out. RECOMMENDATIONS: Denmark should carefully monitor defence spending in other European countries, particularly in Germany, to be able to anticipate increased US pressure on itself. As an active contributor to international operations abroad, Denmark should continue to emphasize the efficiency of its defence spending as a factor of importance in NATO, but not expect it to be able to deflect US criticism fully, especially if Trump wins a second term. Denmark should proactively seek to prioritize defence spending in areas where US and Danish national interests coincide the most, as they do in the Arctic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and United States of America

12. Reviving the revolutionaries: How Trump’s maximum pressure is shifting Iran’s domestic politics

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Europeans wish to persuade Iran to compromise on strategic issues – but, unless they understand the dynamics of domestic Iranian politics, they will not get far. Three main power blocs compete to influence Iran’s supreme leader, including the ‘modernisers’, who were instrumental in building the case internally for the nuclear deal. The US ‘maximum pressure’ campaign has placed them on the back foot. Improving the economy remains the most pressing issue in Iran. Without a Western economic offer, the other two power blocs – the conservative ‘Principlists’ and IRGC-linked ‘securocrats’ – will continue their recent ascendancy and press for a confrontational ‘maximum resistance’ response. Immediately after the US presidential election, Europeans should embark on shuttle diplomacy with Washington and Tehran to agree an interim deal on the nuclear issue. This could also strengthen modernisers ahead of Iran’s own presidential race in 2021.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. Final Week Cybersecurity Considerations: Top Takeaways

Author:
Belfer Center
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This election has already faced threats from cyber adversaries seeking to influence its outcome. The joint CISA-FBI alert confirming Russian state-sponsored activity targeting government networks on October 22 builds on other advisories around potential cyberattacks on election systems ahead of the election, including advisories of DDOS attacks against election infrastructure. Making unplanned or last-minute changes ahead of election day can introduce serious risks, especially given the short window to test changes. Here are some considerations as you work to address and prepare to counter potential cyber threats.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

14. 2020 Election: Achieving a Safe, Accessible, and Credible Election during COVID-19

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
The 2020 general election is already underway, with absentee ballots being mailed out and collected in some states. And what seemed worryingly possible in the spring is now inevitable: the COVID-19 pandemic will be an important factor in the conduct of this fall’s election. Every community must address the public health threat and facilitate safe participation. Policymakers, election officials, and business leaders must ensure that voters need not choose between exercising their franchise and protecting their health, and that the election itself does not further spread COVID-19.1 The Committee for Economic Development of The Conference Board (CED) strongly believes that transparent, fair, and accessible elections are fundamental to the confidence of US citizens in their government and its leadership, and to the long-term health of the US economy. In May, June, and July, CED called on Congress to provide states with funding to conduct a safe, accessible, and credible election in the midst of a pandemic. With the election in progress, and Election Day less than two months away, the states and local communities, with or without federal support—including leaders in the business community—must act to meet those goals. As explained in this Solutions Brief, there is still time to protect voters and poll workers and maintain trust in the conduct and outcome of elections. Fortunately, effective measures are already in force in pockets of the country, with states and election officials needing only to replicate the best preparations and practices nationwide. This brief outlines recommendations policymakers should adopt to improve operations in their jurisdictions. Given the public health challenges involved, business leaders will also play a critical role in protecting their employees, customers, and communities during a successful election. To the extent possible, business leaders should take the concrete steps outlined in the brief to assist in the election effort.
Topic:
Elections, Economy, Business, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. What to Expect: The Biden Health Care Program

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
During the primary campaign, Biden engaged in a lively debate over the future of the US health care system with the other Democratic contenders. No candidate for the Democratic nomination expressed satisfaction with the current system; the differences among the candidates centered on the degree of change that they advocated. The dissatisfactions of all of the candidates included the cost of and access to care, as well as the quality of care that Americans receive. Several of candidate Biden’s opponents advocated a fundamental shift to a “Medicare for All” program, which would abolish private insurance outright and instead put every American onto an administered-price, fee-for-service system like today’s traditional Medicare, with broad coverage of services (adding vision, dental and long-term care coverage) and no (or very low) deductibles and copayments. (Even the current popular Medicare Advantage program would be abolished, and all of its senior enrollees would be forced onto Medicare for All.) Then in the general election campaign, President Donald Trump tried to associate former Vice President Biden with the Medicare for All proposal, but the Vice President countered aggressively that he had campaigned and won against Medicare for All in the primaries.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16. Coronavirus Policy Under a Biden Administration

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
now appears almost certain that former Vice President Joe Biden will assume the office of President on January 20 of next year. The President-elect today announced the membership of a new thirteenmember advisory board of non-governmental experts to develop recommendations so that they can be implemented by his new Administration, further emphasizing that this is the priority focus of his transition. This memo, covering the handling of the coronavirus pandemic, is the first in a series of short pieces to explain what you can expect from the new Administration. Candidate Biden’s campaign laid out in considerable detail a five-point program (counting the number of major headings in the document; some news outlets specified six) for how he would attack the pandemic, which was claimed to be sharply different from the practices under the Trump Administration. President-elect Biden yesterday stood up his new transition website, with what is now characterized as a seven-point plan, which is shorter (a little more than one-seventh the word count) and less-detailed than the campaign document. And the President-elect today announced the membership of a new thirteen-member advisory board of non-governmental experts to develop these recommendations so that they can be implemented by his new Administration.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Elections, Public Health, COVID-19, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

17. Varied Reactions in Syria to Biden Victory

Author:
Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
This snapshot of reactions should inform leadership in Washington to focus on increasing its commitment to supporting allies and punishing adversaries. While Syrians all closely watched the U.S. elections, there was no single, homogeneous view among them about the outcome of a Biden victory versus a Trump one. Many Syrians’ views differ depending on their geographic location and the entity that governs their region in the fractured country. Given this fractured public reaction, a better understanding of Syria’s future in relation to the new U.S. administration requires analysis of Syrian reactions from four different blocs: the regime in Damascus, the Kurdish bloc east of the Euphrates, Islamist militias in northwestern Syria, and ISIS.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Elections, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

18. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

19. Prospects for European and U.S. Policy toward Iran

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai and Edgar P. Tam
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s views on Iran have centered on dismantling the landmark nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015. He made it clear early on that he believed he could negotiate a better deal with Iran that would not compromise the interests of the United States as much and that would also address far more issues of concern to its partners in the Middle East. However, to date the Trump administration has not come any closer to achieving this goal. Instead, the United States and Iran have come close to war. Although European countries share objectives on Iran with the United States—for instance, limiting Iran’s ballistic-missile activities and seeking its return to compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA—they disagree strongly with President Trump’s approach to achieving these. His approach has made Washington the proverbial bull in a china shop for U.S allies in Europe, forcing them to put on hold long-desired objectives such as expanding economic ties with Iran and bringing it closer into a community of responsible stakeholders. Therefore, the result of the U.S. presidential election will have a significant impact on Europe’s relations with the United States when it comes to dealing with Iran. There are several ways in which a Trump reelection could affect Europe’s calculations. A second Trump administration that maintains a hard-line policy toward Iran would lead Europe to double down on encouraging Iran to negotiate by offering incentives as a demonstration of its good faith to Washington. Alternatively, no longer having to think about his reelection, Trump may pursue a less hard-line approach to secure negotiations, thus solidifying his presidential legacy. Germany and France in particular might seek additional leverage to temper and perhaps even counter Trump’s hard-line Iran policy to limit what they view as the damage caused by his administration. For its part, the United Kingdom may align more with the United States, causing a rupture in European unity. However, a “hybrid” scenario is most likely, in which Europe would continue its attempts to be perceived as independent while seeking a greater role in leading a quiet international effort to get Iran back in compliance with the JCPOA and at the negotiating table. If Joe Biden becomes president, he would return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran returned to compliance—which Europe also wants—while trying to negotiate additional commitments from Tehran on other areas of concern, such as missile testing and U.S. hostages. If this plan is complicated by the Trump administration’s pursuit of a unilateral sanctions snapback before it leaves office, however, a Biden administration may find itself facing a scenario in which there is no JCPOA to rejoin. This could be further complicated by a withdrawal by Iran from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has threatened to do. Even if there is a change in U.S. administration, European countries would still have to overcome differences among themselves on many aspects of Iran policy. A post-Brexit Europe may see the United Kingdom more aligned with U.S. objectives than European ones and acting more as an occasional “+1” to a remaining E2 of France and Germany. European countries also disagree on how to approach Iran’s malign activities, such as terrorism—with Germany having outlawed all of Hezbollah’s activities while the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries distinguish between the organization’s ostensibly political arm and its militant wing. These intra-European divisions, despite the European Union trying to establish a united front, make it easier for Iran’s propaganda efforts to sow division among European countries and in the transatlantic relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and United States of America

20. October Surprise: Simulating a Foreign Interference Crisis on the Eve of the 2020 Election

Author:
Nathan Kohlenberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States, like many other democracies, faces concerted and sophisticated operations aimed at disrupting, delegitimizing, and in some cases altering the outcomes of its elections. While foreign interference operations are not bound by election cycles, elections constitute a unique window of increased vulnerability. To better understand how well U.S. institutions have adapted since the 2016 election, the Alliance for Securing Democracy conducted a table-top exercise to assess potential gaps in policies and practices by government, social media platforms, and campaigns. The exercise also considered the options, challenges, and trade-offs that politicians, policymakers, and corporate officers might face in the days leading up to the 2020 election. The exercise was conducted virtually in July 2020 with a bipartisan group of 14 experts representing senior government, political organizing, and technology industry leaders. The results were clear: information sharing stalled, lines of communication were lacking, and distrust was rampant. Parochial interests and the mitigation of personal and organizational risk often took priority over national interests. Meanwhile, many leaders struggled to gather the information they needed to commit to a course of action. Although a simulation can never capture the complexity of the systems and relationships it aims to approximate, this exercise underscores that there is work to be done to improve resilience in all three sectors analyzed: the U.S. government, professional politics, and the technology sector. Many shortcomings were immediately apparent to the experts who participated, while others became evident in the after-action analysis. Working with the participants and other experts on election interference, we have summarized in this report a number of lessons learned from the exercise in order to spotlight recent progress and remaining challenges. Our simulation strongly suggested that current policies and structures are insufficient to facilitate the cooperation between stakeholders that would be necessary to mitigate a sophisticated information operation targeting the election. In particular, our participants concluded that response mechanisms remained troublingly dependent on the personal integrity of decisionmakers in Washington and Silicon Valley, and current government and social media policies are insufficiently precise and unambiguous to provide clear guidance in many situations, especially as relate to privacy and First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, the particular course of the exercise and approaches taken by the participants also shed light on what can be done to build greater responsiveness into the range of public and private institutions responsible for ensuring the integrity of our elections.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
United States of America

21. 2020 Thematic Brief: Trump Investigations

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Trump’s governing style deviates dramatically from the approaches followed by his predecessors. His propensity to ask for foreign interference in American elections, lack of transparency, erratic decision making, political retaliation, and potential self-dealing has led to over 300 House congressional hearings and more than 900 oversight letters into his actions.It has also resulted in federal criminal investigations into Trump associates, and criminal and civil investigations in New York state, where the Trump Organization is headquartered
Topic:
Elections, Justice, Foreign Interference, Election Interference, and Investigations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

22. Les médias conservateurs dans la campagne de 2020 : un soutien unanime au président ?

Author:
Sébastien Mort
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
From the 1920s to the 1980s, the American press followed strict discursive practices based on objectivity and fairness. Starting in the 1930s, the country's political center of gravity was on the liberal side and there were few overtly conservative media. From the 1980s onwards, the vast deregulation effort undertaken by the Reagan administration paved the way for the emergence of a powerful conservative media ecosystem. Hosted by strong personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, conservative radio talk-shows were broadcast by a large number of local AM radio stations. Created in 1996, the Fox News channel gained massive traction in the 2000s. Many information websites close to the far right have gradually joined this environment.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Media, Conservatism, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

23. Algeria’s Election Is a Make-or-Break Moment

Author:
Sarah Feuer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The vote’s outcome will not have much legitimacy in the eyes of the people, so Washington should focus on urging all parties to lay the groundwork for longer-term reforms aimed at breaking the political deadlock. On December 12, nearly ten months after demonstrators across the country took to the streets in protest of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika running for a fifth term, Algeria will elect his successor. Calling itself “Hirak,” the remarkably peaceful protest movement perceived Bouteflika’s candidacy as a provocation, since he had scarcely appeared in public after suffering a stroke in 2013. And though he rescinded his candidacy in April, the Hirak began calling for more radical changes, including an end to the power structures that have ruled the country since its independence from France in 1962. In response, army chief of staff Ahmed Gaid Salah stepped in to assert control over the political process, despite the parliament’s selection of an interim president. In addition to arresting activists and putting some of his establishment rivals on trial, he pressed for an election to be held by year’s end. The political situation has since devolved into a confrontation between the Hirak and the army. With no candidate representing the protestors, this week’s vote will be a decisive test for the future of both sides.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Reform, and Elections
Political Geography:
Algeria, North Africa, and United States of America

24. A Long Way To Go: Analyzing Facebook, Twitter, and Google’s Efforts to Combat Foreign Interference

Author:
Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Two years after the Russian government manipulated social media to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, online information platforms continue to serve as mediums for such operations, including the 2018 midterm elections. Under intense public criticism and congressional scrutiny, the three most prominent online information platforms – Facebook, Twitter, and Google – have taken steps to address vulnerabilities and to protect their users against information operations by actors linked to authoritarian regimes. However, given the ongoing nature of online authoritarian interference, the steps taken by these companies continue to fall short. This report reviews and analyzes the steps taken by online information platforms to better defend against foreign interference since 2016, adopting the framing of the Senate Intelligence Committee by focusing on the largest and most influential online information platforms of Facebook, Twitter, and Google. The platforms’ efforts to combat foreign interference have focused primarily on three key lines of effort: preventing or suppressing inauthentic behavior, improving political advertising transparency, and investing in forward-looking partnerships. Measures to limit user interaction with inauthentic behavior include content removal, labeling, and algorithmic changes. The platforms have also taken steps to improve advertising through policies to publicize advertiser information and improve verification standards for those hoping to publish political advertisements. Investments in forward-looking measures have included internal initiatives to critically assess vulnerabilities and external partnerships with civil society, academia, and fact-checking organizations. They have also led to increased transparency about the behavior and content of accounts linked to the Russian operation against the 2016 and 2018 elections, as well as other nation-state operations targeting Americans. Though all of these steps are important, ongoing vulnerabilities demand more urgent action by the platforms to secure the online information space against foreign manipulation, while ensuring American’s ability to engage freely in robust speech and debate.
Topic:
Elections, Partnerships, Social Media, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

25. Ten Legislative Proposals to Defend America against Foreign Influence Operations

Author:
David Salvo and Brittany Beaulieu
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s February 16 indictment of the Internet Research Agency, along with 13 key individuals and two related entities, was another reminder for Americans of the coordinated attack mounted on our country’s democracy. In addition to the use of information operations outlined in the indictment, the U.S. intelligence community has documented Russia’s use of hacks on campaign related entities, with stolen information weaponized and released via Wikileaks and other outlets, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has confirmed that at least 21 states had parts of their electoral infrastructure probed in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election. The Internet Research Agency purchased political advertisements and sponsored organic content on social media platforms aimed at amplifying socially divisive issues. This content reached over a hundred million Americans, and the trend of exacerbating social divisions has continued on Twitter, in particular, over the past year and a half. Meanwhile, Russia and China are investing in advanced technology companies in the United States, acquiring both technical know-how and vast amounts of data that could facilitate the targeting of Americans. Director of National Intelligence Coats recently testified, “There should be no doubt that Russia perceives its past efforts as successful and views the 2018 midterm elections as a potential target for Russian influence operations.” And other governments like China are learning lessons from Russia’s success. Americans were caught off guard by Russia’s actions, but now that we know the breadth and scope of their malign influence operations, we must plug vulnerabilities that Russia and other foreign actors will continue to exploit if we are to defend our democracy against foreign interference. Yet, more than a year after the 2016 presidential election, and with midterm elections looming on the horizon, Congress and the Trump administration have not taken any clear action to increase U.S. defenses against the foreign interference threat. Many Americans remain unwilling to even admit that this interference occurred and many members of Congress have decided to use this issue for partisan attacks instead of uniting to secure our democracy. There are important steps we can, and must, take to defend our institutions against adversaries who seek to undermine them. Many of Russia’s tactics have exploited vulnerabilities in our societies and technologies, and loopholes in our laws. Some of the steps necessary to defend ourselves will involve long-term work to reduce polarization. Others will require clear action by the Executive Branch — including strategic messaging to ensure Americans are united against the threat we face, and steps to both deter and raise the costs on such actions. Congress does not have to wait for action by the Trump administration. Many of these steps are ones that Congress has the power to take. And particularly in the face of President Trump’s failure to lead an effort to counter this threat, Congress must step up and take steps within its power to patch the holes that congressional investigations and the intelligence and law enforcement communities have revealed. The good news is a number of legislative steps have already been proposed in both chambers on a bipartisan basis to improve the United States’ ability to defend against and deter these external threats, and there are other measures that could be added to those to close gaps in our defenses. These steps would close loopholes in current law and strengthen our institutional capacity to defend against foreign influence campaigns. We believe these are common sense steps that every member of Congress — on both sides of the aisle — should support.
Topic:
National Security, Elections, Internet, Legislation, Foreign Interference, and Influence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. Why Americans Should Care About Russian Hacking

Author:
Michael Fuchs, Carolyn Kenney, Anna Perina, and Francesca Van Doorn
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election was an attack on the American people, threatening the integrity and legitimacy of the democratic process, as well as the outcome of the election. And yet, the Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian activity in the election found that this was but the most recent and aggressive expression to date of a longstanding Russian desire to sow chaos and instability in the United States. Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election should be a wake-up call to every American about the diverse ways in which Russian malicious cyberactivity could affect every aspect of their lives.1 The so-called information warfare campaign ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the election is part-and-parcel of a longstanding and multi-faceted Russian intelligence strategy that “blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyberactivity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’” in order to cripple its adversaries.2 The election is not the first time Russian cyberactors have been successful. Over the past decade, Russian hacking groups—many of which are backed by the government—have successfully deployed a technology-based strategy to infiltrate, tamper with, and steal sensitive information across government, military, banking, and communications systems in the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

27. The Incoming Trump Administration

Author:
Eric Lerhe
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University
Abstract:
The election of President Trump provoked considerable disarray. His pre-election warning that states not meeting NATO defence spending targets might be denied US protection has resulted in a member of the Bundestag’s Committee of Foreign Affairs arguing for a non-US nuclear deterrent. Lithuania’s Foreign Minister warned of a Russian provocation against the Baltic states timed to occur prior to the President-elect taking office. Trump's parallel calls for greater Korean and Japanese military contributions, including his readiness to accept their nuclear self-arming, had the Tokyobased Diplomat predicting region-wide mayhem ranging from the greater potential for climatebased conflict to the increased probability of China opening hostilities with Taiwan. That at least one election declaration – a commitment to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership – may have stemmed from an astonishing lack of understanding was also of concern: in debate with US Senator Paul Ryan, the President-elect seemed to be criticizing the TPP in part because he thought China was included. Closer to home, Trump’s threat to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement provoked calls within Canada to counter this by increasing its own defence spending to the 2% of GDP NATO target and scrapping supply management.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

28. What does a second Obama term mean for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkan region?

Author:
Heidi Hullinger
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
The 2012 US presidential elections had Europe on its toes, hoping that US citizens chose a candidate that would surely win if the rest of the world had a vote. But Bosnians had little to go on, they’ve only known Obama to be the hands off sort, leaving the region to the expertise of Biden and Clinton and their deputies. It is hard for Bosnians to know what the election results would mean if Romney were elected. The European Union was largely absent from presidential discussions, so why would the Balkan region and enlargement countries be a topic of discussion? Regional policy has been an exercise in cooperation with the European Union, taking a backseat to the Accession process and contributing with aid and missions that focus on assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina in fulfilling NATO accession conditions. As a result, the US gets to play good cop, while the EU works, so far fruitlessly, to tackle corruption, constitutional reform and other hot button topics that cast the EU as bad cop. The appointment of the next US Secretary of State is the latest topic of conversation making headlines in the US. However, US-Bosnian relations and their engagement in the region is unlikely to see any major changes. Either way, the US may decide that it better serve Bosnians and its constituents at home by losing the good cop act and put tangible pressure on politicians.
Topic:
NATO, Elections, European Union, Barack Obama, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Balkans, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina