Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Russia

101. Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: The Effect of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Ioannis N. Grigoriadis
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Turkey’s position in a “post-Western world” is widely debated as Asia emerges as the world’s new demographic and economic focal point. Turkey’s drive for strategic autonomy is crucial to all considerations of Eurasianism as a result of the rise of emerging powers worldwide and the transition to a multipolar international system. The emergence of a revisionist Russia, threatening to destroy the global order in place since the end of the Cold War, sent out a powerful warning to its neighbors, including Turkey. Russian-Turkish relations have not been shaped by shared identity, interest and threat perceptions; instead, they have remained largely instrumental and driven by necessity. The Turkish government cannot afford consistency in its discourse on Turkey as the “protector of the oppressed” when it comes to defending Uyghur rights against the Chinese regime. Ukraine and the West’s response to Russian aggression refuted Turkish Eurasianist claims that Ukraine was “helpless” and that the West had entered a “serious and irreversible decline”.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

102. The Ukraine Crisis: There Is Still Room for Diplomacy

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Confronting each other over the future of Ukraine, NATO and Russia are engaged in complicated diplomatic bargaining over security, power and the limits of the transatlantic alliance in Europe. Diplomacy can work toward a peaceful resolution of the Ukraine crisis, in spite of the heated public rhetoric. The US and the EU share a common objective in preventing a war in the short term and reaching an understanding with Russia in the longer term. The EU may not be at the negotiating table, but it is still actively involved in the diplomatic discussions. It plays an important role via deterrence and diplomacy in several fora, while France is steadily upgrading its geopolitical standing and pursuing a modus vivendi with Russia. Greece is closely monitoring the Ukrainian crisis and supports all de-escalation efforts. The presence of Greek diaspora communities in Ukraine is an important factor. So are Turkey’s efforts to assume a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia with a view to upgrading its own NATO standing.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

103. NATO and Societal Resilience: All Hands on Deck in an Age of War

Author:: Edward Hunter Christie and Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Prior to 2022, NATO and the European Union were already moving toward more comprehensive approaches to resilience. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine heightens the need for such work, with a sharper focus on scenarios of armed attack. In view of decisions taken at NATO’s recent Madrid summit and the evolution of EU legislation, all alliance members will benefit from close liaison work and reciprocal briefings between relevant NATO and European Commission officials as well as through the NATO Resilience Committee and the European Critical Entities Resilience Group. Three new functions should be added to the NATO baseline requirements: payment systems, psychological defense, and continuity of data and infrastructure software. The forthcoming membership of Finland and Sweden will provide NATO with particularly valuable national best practices, notably in terms of coherence, robustness, quality of cooperation across government and society, and engagement with the population.
Topic:: NATO, Resilience, Society, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

104. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Liana Fix and Steven Keil
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

105. NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security

Author:: Merle Maigre
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years, ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO, which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace.
Topic:: NATO, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

106. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:: Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

107. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action

Author:: Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

108. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:: Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:: War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

109. How Russia Fights

Author:: Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

110. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:: Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

111. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

112. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

113. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

114. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

115. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption

Author:: Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

116. A (E)U-turn from Nord Stream 2 towards a European Strategic Gas Reserve

Author:: Daniel Gros
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: The EU does not have an army. It thus cannot defend Ukraine from a Russian invasion, but it can at least put itself in a situation in which it does not depend on gas deliveries from a potential aggressor, a dependence that many argue would only become more severe with the formal opening of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline connecting Russia with Germany. Diminishing Europe’s dependence on Russian gas requires the creation of a credible European Strategic Gas Reserve for emergency situations. This cannot be achieved overnight but some first practical steps can be taken quickly and, importantly, cheaply. Such action, which should be spearheaded at the European level, would send a powerful signal that the EU is indeed willing to act and put its money where its mouth is, namely in the defence of its core values and strategic interests.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Nord Stream 2, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Germany

117. Sanction-proof or sanction-hit

Author:: Tinatin Akhvlediani and Willem Pieter De Groen
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: After President Vladimir Putin madly went ahead with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that sanctions will no longer have a deterring effect on the outbreak of war. However, imposing sanctions can still make this war very costly for Putin and perhaps make him and his inner circle reconsider continuation of the war and find a negotiated solution. The EU, together with its allies, has shown impressive unity in imposing severe sanctions against Russia, yet some options remain open for the EU to further exploit its economic leverage over Putin’s regime. This Policy Insight reviews the EU’s imposed sanctions against Russia and looks at the possibilities to increase their effectiveness, drawing upon lessons learned in the past.
Topic:: Sanctions, European Union, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

118. Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union

Author:: Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Veronika Movchan, and Artem Remizov
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: This paper responds to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s request on 28 February 2022 for his country to accede to membership of the European Union. The European Council meeting at Versailles on 10-11 March endorsed the Council’s invitation to the European Commission to produce an Opinion on this request. The present paper is our Opinion on the position that we would like to see the Commission take. Since it comes at a time when Ukraine is being attacked in Russia’s genocidal war of choice, two quite different matters have to be addressed: first the fundamental political issues at stake for the whole of Europe, and second, the more technical modalities of the accession process.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

119. Turkey’s Eurasian ambitions at a time of geopolitical uncertainty

Author:: Sinem Adar
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly salient weaknesses in its war against Ukraine have unsettled what was a delicate balance in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey is trying to reap the benefits of this unsettled situation by further intensifying cooperation with a region that it has long considered kin to itself due to linguistic and cultural affinities. These efforts dovetail with rehabilitation attempts of an ever-worsening Turkish economy in the face of an upcoming election in 2023 of historical decisiveness. Beyond these immediate triggers, lurking underneath Ankara’s renewed interest in the region is the post-Cold War strategic ambition to position Turkey as a logistics and energy hub connecting Europe and Asia. Yet skepticism within Europe over Ankara’s strategic orientation at a time of intense geopolitical confrontation and competition abounds. As such, it is necessary to soberly think about Turkey’s place within an emerging Eurasian space and the costs and benefits of engaging with Turkey.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

120. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:: Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

121. Pugwash note on the situation in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: We note with great concern the worsening situation in the ongoing conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The annexation of areas currently controlled by Russian military will exacerbate tensions as Ukraine seems determined to recover the occupied regions and is supported by several NATO countries. The situation is quite complex as armed hostilities continue unabated, and opposing security perceptions by the parties involved do not appear easily reconcilable. Despite the fact that prospects for a ceasefire look dim under this current situation, a ceasefire is a necessary step towards stopping this dangerous conflict which, while it is heavily affecting Ukraine, is also a very destabilizing element that threatens international security.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Global Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

122. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

123. How to make the EU Energy Platform an effective emergency tool

Author:: Walter Boltz, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Uncertainty about the supply of Russian natural gas is causing extremely high and volatile European gas and electricity prices. European Union countries may struggle to import sufficient volumes of natural gas at reasonable prices. During the summer, the imperatives are to fill storage sites sufficiently in a coordinated manner and to organise sufficient import volumes to replace a substantial share of gas that might no longer come from Russia. Coordination is essential to ensure that disruptions during difficult winter months do not lead to a break-up of the EU internal gas market with potentially serious political repercussions. One part of the EU response is establishment of an EU Energy Platform for the purchase of gas, LNG and hydrogen. This aims to pool demand to leverage the bloc’s economic clout, international outreach to reliable partners and efficient use of existing infrastructure. EU leaders have backed the plan but it has not yet been translated into a feasible scheme. The platform should be developed into an effective emergency tool to safeguard gas supply in case Russian flows stop. We detail two complementary proposals to achieve this. First, there should be EU-wide auctioning of remuneration for filling storage sites in specific regions. Companies would remain responsible for all stages of the value chain, benefitting from remuneration and in return offering the market operator some control over how this gas is released during winter months. Second, EU demand for additional LNG quantities, and the sourcing of this on international markets, should be coordinated through a platform, creating a transparent market for these volumes. These mechanisms would resolve the prevention paradox and prevent free-riding. If EU countries buy gas jointly, they will find it much easier to let markets allocate scarce volumes across borders in case of a complete stop to Russian supplies. . This would reduce the risk of energy market fragmentation, as well as the subsequent energy security, economic and political impacts of a shock that would hit member states very differently.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

124. 2022, Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis: Or is it?

Author:: Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The year 2022 is proving to be a difficult one for China and for President Xi Jinping. Choices like Xi’s embrace of Russia and the zero-COVID policy have prompted sporadic outbursts from the Chinese public and a backlash abroad. Unsurprisingly, this has spawned speculation that Xi is facing political difficulties at home that could hamstring or even disrupt his plan to remain China’s top leader after the 20th Party Congress later this year. Despite the real challenges Xi and the party have faced in 2022, however, this paper will argue that such narratives rest on a series of faulty assumptions about the impetus for Xi’s consolidation of power, the presence of powerful opposition voices within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system, and the judgment that Xi’s policy approach amounts to a series of blunders that may help his critics as they try to diminish him at the party congress.
Topic:: Economy, Domestic Politics, Olympics, Xi Jinping, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

125. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

126. On a Collision Course: Russia’s Dangerous Game in Ukraine

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: While Russia demands a written guarantee that Ukraine will not be offered NATO membership, Western countries are warning it of dire consequences if it launches a war on Ukraine. The balance of power between the two parties, Russia and the West, may remain on the verge of collapse, leaving Ukraine unstable and Ukrainian leadership unable to control the entire country.
Topic:: NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

127. The End of the Post-Cold War Era: Russia's Adventure in Ukraine Reshapes the Entire World Order

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Whether Russian adventure in Ukraine proves to be a success or a failure, the integration of Russia into Europe has come to a halt. Europe will face division once again, albeit along lines that differ greatly from those of the Cold War.
Topic:: NATO, Integration, Post Cold War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

128. War in Ukraine enters its second month: serious implications and far-reaching changes

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in its second month witnessed several developments, including the failure of the Russian forces to achieve a quick and decisive military victory and the Russian leadership's reduction of its primary objectives.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

129. Ukraine: Toward a Prolonged War of Attrition Fuelling Great Power Competition

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Russia and China no longer need to play by the rules of the Euro-American international order. It is therefore likely that in this uncertain period of flux, the major four powers will vie to win friends and allies, giving second-tier powers like Turkey and India more influence if they can ably manage their foreign relations and avoid unnecessary alignment with any of the four major powers.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

130. If Russia Uses Migration as a Weapon, Europeans Should Respond In Kind

Author:: Alia Fakhry, Roderick Parkes, and András Rácz
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Around 442,000 people have so far fled Ukraine – not just to the EU, but also to neighbors like Moldova. This is a humanitarian issue, and should not be conflated with “migrant instrumentalization” (MI), whereby a state pushes people across a border to coerce the EU to change position. Yet Russia is likely to employ MI in this way, especially if it moves deep into Western Ukraine. Drawing on an in-depth study, we show how the EU can meet this specific threat.
Topic:: Security, Migration, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Ukraine

131. Designing a Geo-Economic Policy for Europe

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Geo-economic policies have become an increasingly important feature of international politics – and not just since the war in Ukraine. The EU has proposed an economic anti-coercion tool to deter third-party coercion. This policy brief analyses the risks and benefits as well as the challenges related to the EU’s proposed deterrence policy based on a review of the academic literature on coercion and the effectiveness of economic sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Coercion, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

132. Sea Change for Europe’s Security Order: Three Future Scenarios

Author:: Christian Mölling, Tyson Barker, David Hagebölling, Afra Herr, and Kai Kornhuber
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The war of aggression that Russia launched against Ukraine in February has destroyed the European security order. The German government has defined this moment as a sea change (Zeitenwende) for its foreign and security policy. It still must envisage and shape a new order. Key factors are whether Europe will be united in strategic policy areas, and how Russia will position itself.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe

133. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

134. Using Information to Influence the Russian War in Ukraine

Author:: Valentin Weber
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Future scenarios for the war in Ukraine explore how the use of information could affect the cohesion of Russia and of the West in the medium term. The four possible variations of Russian/Western cohesion – high/high, low/high, high/low, low/low – indicate how each side would define the outcome of the conflict. These possible outcomes, in turn, generate lessons about how a liberal West might use information to tip the scales on an autocratic Russia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digitization, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

135. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:: Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

136. Avoiding the Dangers of a Protracted Conflict in Ukraine

Author:: Anatol Lieven, Sarang Shidore, and Marcus Stanley
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A protracted conflict in Ukraine looks increasingly plausible. Russia continues to launch attacks on military and civilian targets, and the United States and its partners are increasing shipments of arms to the Zelensky government. Washington is reportedly making plans to support long-term guerrilla warfare against Russian forces, should Kyiv fall. The current path toward a protracted war in Ukraine is highly undesirable and is laden with grave risks to the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and the international community. Such risks include: • a high cost in Ukrainian lives and suffering and the destruction of Ukraine — its infrastructure, institutions, and social fabric; • radicalization of Ukrainian society and a consequent civil war; • escalation to a great-power war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and pitting NATO against Russia, thereby threatening U.S. national security; • a weakening of NATO’s cohesion; • a prolonged global recession that strikes the U.S. as hard as it will any other nation. The United States and its allies should avoid these destructive outcomes by prioritizing support for the Ukrainian government to achieve a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement will result in a more secure outcome for Ukraine, the United States, the European allies, and the rest of the world. While the details of such a settlement lie beyond this brief’s scope, the progress of Ukrainian–Russian talks indicates that a settlement providing for meaningful sovereignty and independence for Ukraine is possible. Avoiding a protracted conflict also implies that the United States should not adopt maximalist objectives, such as regime change in Moscow or the complete and decisive defeat of Russia. It should instead deploy sanctions to build up Ukraine’s negotiating leverage.
Topic:: NATO, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

137. The Lobbying Battle Before the War: Russian and Ukrainian Influence in the U.S.

Author:: Ben Freeman
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fateful decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine has united much of the world in condemnation of this unprovoked assault on a sovereign nation. In Ukraine, the war has already caused rampant destruction, the deaths of thousands of civilians, and the displacement of millions, while tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides of the conflict have been killed or wounded. The U.S. has imposed crippling sanctions on Russia’s energy and financial sectors while providing tens of billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine. • Behind the headlines of these U.S. foreign policy decisions lies a major, but little-discussed, factor in foreign policy: lobbying. Nearly every action the government has taken regarding Russia and Ukraine has been the object of considerable attempts at influence by U.S.-based lobbyists for Ukraine and Russia. Based on an exhaustive analysis of all Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) documents filed by organizations registered to work on behalf of Ukrainian and Russian clients in 2021, this brief offers a number of key findings, including: ° Nine organizations were registered under FARA to work on behalf of Russian clients in 2021, while 11 were working for Ukrainian clients. ° Those organizations reported making just 21 contacts on behalf of their Russian clients and 13,541 contacts on behalf of their Ukrainian clients. ° Russian clients paid over $42 million to firms representing them, (although $38 million of this went to Russian state media), while Ukrainian clients paid just over $2 million to the firms working on their behalf. ° Ukrainian lobbying efforts add up to more than four times the amount of work the Saudi lobby (among the largest foreign lobbies in Washington) and other prominent groups have reported in any year—due in large part to a notable gap in transparency. ° The pro-Ukraine lobby appears to have achieved far more contacts than the pro-Russia lobby with less money spent, an anomaly that could be explained by the pro-Russia lobby using a less transparent statute—the LDA—for reporting its lobbying efforts and the greater zeal shown by some pro-Ukraine lobbyists.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Influence, Lobbying, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

138. NATO’s Tunnel Vision

Author:: George Beebe
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Despite Russia’s violent rejection of a NATO-centric Europe, the United States should still pursue its vision of a continent that will one day be “peaceful, whole, and free.” The alternative is a blood-soaked division of the continent, constantly prone to escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. The United States needs to adopt a different approach to achieving its vision, as follows: • The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine’s independence as a neutral state outside NATO. • If Europe is to be whole, NATO cannot serve as its overarching security arm. NATO should focus on defense of its existing members, not expanding its ranks or operating out of area, including against China. • Over time, our goal should be evolution toward a U.N. Security Council-type arrangement in Europe that includes both NATO and non-NATO members. The price of admission for Russia must be good faith compliance with the terms of a settlement in Ukraine. • If Europe is to be free, we must recognize that a stable security environment in Europe is a prerequisite for the ex-Soviet states gradually becoming more liberal. The best means of ensuring that Europe is free is by revitalizing democracy within the West itself.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

139. Managed Competition: A U.S. Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World

Author:: George Beebe
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated pre-existing momentum toward a multipolar global order. In response, the Biden administration effectively rallied NATO and ensured that Russian forces cannot resubjugate Ukraine. But it has not anchored its tactical moves in a broader strategy to safeguard America’s most critical interests. As a result, we are fast headed toward a two-front geopolitical faceoff in which a belligerent Russia and a rising China are cooperating closely with each other against the United States. In a world in which power is shifting from the West toward the East and Global South, the United States is enmeshed in a proxy war with the world’s largest nuclear power, and Americans face mounting political and social challenges at home, a dangerous gap has emerged between Washington’s global ambitions and its ability to achieve them. The United States had a large margin for strategic error during its era of post-Cold War global primacy, when it faced no significant great power challengers. It has no such cushion today. America needs to rethink its grand strategy. This should involve the following elements: • Recognize that attempts to isolate and weaken Russia and China are likely to fail. The combination of Russia’s vast natural resources and China’s economic heft and centrality to global commerce present a challenge far different from what we faced during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union posed a military and ideological threat but was economically feeble. • Avoid promoting regime change or otherwise undermining political and economic stability in Russia and China, which could have serious blowback effects in the United States. The United States’ economic health is to a great degree dependent on that of China. Information technology has made us vulnerable to external subversion at a time when American society is dangerously divided and mistrustful of key institutions. • Instead, pursue a strategy of managed competition, in which our rivals are not only counterbalanced by American power and alliances, but also are constrained by agreed rules of the game that are tailored to an era in which advances in precision weaponry, cyber technology, and artificial intelligence pose significant new threats to stability. • Be more selective about where the United States should focus its involvement. As a seapower dependent on trade and robust international partnerships, the United States must remain engaged with the world. But Washington can no longer afford to squander its resources on quixotic democratization crusades or on policing regions that are not central to America’s own well-being. Greater burden sharing by allies and partners is essential. • Aim to gain a breathing spell abroad so that we can focus on healing our domestic wounds and advancing prosperity at home. This also means that the United States should avoid framing its global challenges in terms of an existential battle between democracy and authoritarianism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

140. Assessment of the role of Caspian Basin in reducing of EU's oil dependence in the light of Russian Ukraine War

Author:: CESD Research Team
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: In the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, European Union (EU) agreed to ban the overwhelming majority of Russian oil imports. Since the beginning of the invasion, the West decided to make Moscow pay economically for its aggression. Nevertheless, the decision aimed at the energy sector was quite challenging since the bloc relies on Russia for 25% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Imports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Caspian Sea

141. How to Maintain International Unity on Ukraine (Part II)

Author:: Sarah Cliffe, Hanny Megally, Karina Gerlach, Faiza Shaheen, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: This piece is the second part to our analysis published in early April on what it would take to maintain international unity on Ukraine. In the first analysis, we noted the large number of countries that abstained from or voted against the resolution suspending Russia’s membership in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, including nine out of the ten most populous countries in the world.
Topic:: United Nations, Conflict, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

142. Development Competition is Heating Up: China’s Global Development Initiative and the G7 Partnership for Infrastructure and Global Alliance on Food Security

Author:: Sarah Cliffe and Karina Gerlach
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: Economic development issues are becoming increasingly geopolitical, as the form and importance of today’s agreement in Turkey on grain exports between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates. While today’s crucial agreement and the war of food security narratives between Russia and the West rightly grab the latest headlines, outside of the media spotlight development competition is also heating up between China and the West.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Food Security, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, and Ukraine

143. The Ukraine Example: Circumstances Matter for Effective Security Assistance

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: US aid would not have been nearly as effective without Ukraine’s efforts to improve its military prior to the 2022 Russian invasion. US security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion in February 2022 has been substantial, but was not sufficient to guarantee Ukraine’s initial military success in the war. Data reveals that US security assistance to Ukraine, which mainly consisted of nonproliferation-related aid before 2014, increased after Russia’s invasion of Crimea that year. However, Ukraine’s failures against Russia in Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine were largely due to an undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained Ukrainian military. Ukraine’s focus on remedying these problems, along with increased combat experience, principally drove Ukrainian military improvements by 2022. These internal changes, as well as Russia’s poor military organization and force employment in the first phase of its 2022 invasion, are essential for understanding the contributions of US equipment and weapons to Ukrainian military successes. These lessons are instructive not only for US security assistance to Ukraine, but also for the many other settings where US security assistance is a prominent policy tool.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

144. Memo on an "Economic Article 5" to Counter Authoritarian Coercion

Author:: Ivo H. Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The world's democracies need a way to fight back against coercive economic actions by authoritarian governments, argue Ivo Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Increasingly, authoritarian countries are using economic coercion against democracies. In recent years, China’s economic coercion of Lithuania and Australia stands out as a prominent example. Russia uses economic levers to achieve geopolitical aims, notably by weaponizing its natural resources. The aim of such coercion is to bend the will of democratic countries. This is a test for the free world. In response, we propose an Economic Article 5 among democracies to counter authoritarian coercion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Economy, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

145. The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine

Author:: Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine could mark a watershed for European security. There has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united around three key ideas. Firstly, they believe it is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally. Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crisis, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular. Europeans disagree on which are the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. The crisis will likely test Europeans’ readiness to defend the European security order.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

146. Health of nations: How Europe can fight future pandemics

Author:: Anthony Dworkin
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: As the crisis phase of covid-19 recedes, there is a chance to improve international cooperation on global health – but also a danger that competing reform proposals will lead to inaction. The EU can best support reform of pandemic preparedness and response if it takes account of the concerns of different global powers. The union should combine a push for reform of and increased funding for the WHO with support for a new fund for health emergencies, overseen by a representative group of countries. The EU should promote a new global compact on health, matching countries’ commitment to surveillance and reporting of pathogens with support for stronger healthcare systems and greater equity in the allocation of countermeasures. The EU-Africa relationship offers a chance to pioneer such an approach, but the EU will need to go further in this than it has so far. The EU should promote African vaccine manufacturing, including by pressing European pharmaceutical companies to transfer knowledge and technology to Africa.
Topic:: Health, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Europe, India, and United States of America

147. Principled pragmatism: Europe’s place in a multipolar Middle East

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A multipolar Middle East is emerging as the US “right-sizes” its posture in the region – and as regional states and external powers, including Russia and China, become more assertive. Russia’s war on Ukraine is accelerating these dynamics, while also provoking destabilising price shocks and underscoring the region’s importance to energy markets. The Middle East’s geopolitical shifts pose huge challenges to Europe, but multipolarity could create space to promote European interests more effectively. A coherent European approach should be guided by principled pragmatism: acknowledging the region as it is rather than as Europeans want it to be, while staying focused on the principles needed to secure longer-term stability. Europeans need to enhance transatlantic complementarity and stop ceding leverage to their Middle Eastern partners. While they compete for influence with Russia and China, they should maintain room for coordination with both countries. Europe should tap into the opportunities created by stabilisation support, green energy, and economic diversification – areas that could provide an edge over China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Multipolarity, Strategic Interests, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

148. A question of balance: India and Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: European officials are frustrated at India’s apparent fence-sitting over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Yet, for Indian policymakers, maintaining a workable relationship with Russia is central to counterbalancing Chinese hegemony in their shared neighbourhood. India also depends significantly on Russia for arms supplies, including advanced systems that help it keep pace with China. Despite this, India has for some time been slowly decoupling from Russia and strengthening its relations with the West, especially the US. Europeans should be aware of how India defines its own strategic positioning, and support India where possible as they negotiate the tricky issues relating to the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Arms Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and India

149. The next war: How Russian hybrid aggression could threaten Moldova

Author:: Dumitru Minzarari
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia could target Moldova by embarking on a limited-scope but overt military invasion; or by pursuing more covert hybrid aggression scenarios. The three most plausible Russian aggression scenarios are: a military action launched from Transnistria; a local, elite-focused rebellion similar to Russia’s exploits in Donbas in 2014, likely centring on the Moldovan region of Gagauzia; and popular unrest stoked by Russia and containing violent elements. The EU and Moldova underestimate the risk of one or more of these happening. The EU’s preferred “resilience” approach to hybrid threats lacks an active component that can effectively respond to, and repel, Russian aggression. Moldova should draw on Western support to implement an “active resilience” policy to better confront and undermine Russian actions. The EU should set up a CSDP mission in Moldova comprising both civilian and military components that helps the Moldovan authorities plan and conduct security threat assessments and protect against military and hybrid risks.
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Hybrid Threats, and Invasion
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Moldova

150. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:: Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

151. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:: Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

152. Byting back: The EU’s digital alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:: Carla Hobbs and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: China’s and Russia’s growing presence in Latin America and the Caribbean undermines democracy and Western influence in the region, along with the international rules-based order. The EU is responding to this threat by attempting to strengthen its relationships with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The bloc is attempting to build on their affinity for European values and rights, as well their preference for sustainable and inclusive development. Cooperation on digital technologies should be a priority in the effort, given the region’s need for greater connectivity. The Spanish presidency of the EU should lead the formation of a Digital Alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean at a summit scheduled for 2023. The EU can make this alliance work by focusing on connectivity investments, cyber-security, and rights to support Latin American countries’ digital transitions. The alliance will also require a long-term vision within the EU, commitments from member states, leadership by several Latin American countries, and public-private investment partnerships.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Alliance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Latin America

153. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:: International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

154. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:: Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: “Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

155. World food crisis: between withdrawal and responsibility, Europe must choose

Author:: Emmanuelle Ducros
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The profound destructuring of world food markets as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine is forcing all of the world's agricultural powers to question their place on the world stage of satiety - or hunger. This is primarily the case in Europe.
Topic:: Food, Hunger, Armed Conflict, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

156. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:: Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

157. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:: Luis Simon
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

158. International Legal Options for Prevention and Justice in Ukraine

Author:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: This March 2022 Fact Sheet presents international legal options for international criminal justice and prevention in Ukraine.
Topic:: United Nations, Accountability, Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Universal Jurisdiction
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

159. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:: Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

160. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:: Cori Fleser
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

161. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:: John R. Deni
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

162. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine

Author:: Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

163. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

164. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:: European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

165. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:: Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

166. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:: Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:: Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

167. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:: Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

168. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:: Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

169. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:: Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

170. Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa

Author:: Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the 2010s, Russia gradually returned to the African continent, where the Soviet Union was an influential actor for decades. The culmination of Russia’s public reorientation to Africa so far has been the high profile Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In his opening address to the Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted how “representatives of all 54 African states and leading regional organizations are gathered here. This is indeed the first meeting of such a scale, and this is a convincing testament to the mutual desire to develop contacts in all directions, to strengthen the multifaceted partnership”. Russia has many interests in Africa. One fundamental interest relates to the international distribution of power. As a self-defined great power with an ambition to extend its influence still further beyond its immediate regional setting, Russia is almost compelled to attempt to gain a stronger presence in Africa. Both trade and the exploration of energy and minerals support this ambition, but its other tools include economic support (including by writing off debt), military support (for instance through the provision of training assistance or even the deployment of troops), as well as political support (for instance by using Russia’s weight as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to publicly defend regimes under pressure or even to prevent the passing of critical statements or the introduction of sanctions). To illustrate, in January 2022, the Russian delegation to the United Nations strongly opposed the introduction of new sanctions against the interim government in Mali, noting that “we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems”. Other interests relate to trade (with a turnover of USD 20bn in 2020) and to the exploration of natural resources. Within the field of trade, Russian arms exports stand out. In the years 2016-2020, Russian arms exports to African states accounted for 18 per cent of all Russian arms exports, a 23 per cent increase over the period of 2011-2015. By contrast, Russia’s share of the global arms market decreased by 22 per cent in the decade of 2011-2020. This latter development is a clear sign of a very competitive market, and it suggests that emerging markets, such as Africa, will become increasingly important to Russian arms producers. The main importers are Egypt, Algeria, and Angola (where Russian producers supply 41 per cent, 69 per cent, and 64 per cent, respectively, of national imports).
Topic:: Wagner Group, Military, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Denmark

171. The impacts of the pandemic on investment flows in BRICS countries: a preliminary analysis based on UNCTAD global investment reports

Author:: Ana Garcia, Rafaela Mello, Victor Fernandes, Maria Eduarda Lopes, João Carmino, and Felipe Queiroz
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: In 2020, with the advent of the pandemic, the lockdown and social isolation actions implemented by governments in order to contain the contagion of the virus had an impact on the economies, reducing the speed of execution of existing investment projects and hindering the prospect of new ones. In this sense, the flow of direct investments around the world fell by 35% in 2020, reaching US$ 1 trillion, compared to US$ 1.5 trillion in the previous year, according to UNCTAD. Based on this observation, the present research aims to understand the main trends around the investment flow related to the BRICS countries, in order to assess how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted the dynamics of investments in the world, and especially, in emerging economies. To this end, the reports produced by UNCTAD from 2019 to 2022 regarding global investment flows were analyzed, in order to understand how the scenario was before the pandemic and what dynamics were underway before the health crisis, but it also allowed to understand what transformations occurred with the course of the pandemic, in addition to signaling paths and trends for the future.
Topic:: Economy, Investment, COVID-19, BRICS, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

172. Geoeconomics of Polarisation: Can BRICS eclipse western global economic power?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The 14th BRICS summit concluded on June 24 amid Western sanctions on Russia and rising tension between China and the US over Taiwan. The two-day event took place via video and was hosted by Beijing.
Topic:: Economy, BRICS, Polarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, and United States of America

173. The Russian Role! The domestic and regional dimensions of the military coup in Burkina Faso

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In January 24, 2022, members of the army in Burkina Faso announced their seizure of power and the dismissal of Burkinabé President Roch Marc Kaboré. One of the officers who seized power delivered a statement on state television, signed by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Head of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), announcing the overthrow of the government, thus joining Burkina Faso to Mali and Guinea, in the third military coup in West Africa in just eight months.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, France, and Burkina Faso

174. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

175. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:: Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

176. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:: Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:: Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

177. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:: Isabella Martin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

178. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

179. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:: Régis Genté
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

180. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:: Kadri Liik
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

181. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:: Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:: Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

182. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition

Author:: Raimondo Lanza
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Italy’s new far-right government has been widely perceived as the potential weak spot of the anti-Kremlin European front following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: traditionally pro-Putin politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi are back in power. Yet, after Mario Draghi’s hawkish Euro-Atlantic government fell in July and Giorgia Meloni was looking forward to a probable victory, she immediately sided with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in a firm condemnation of Russia. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition Download 0.66 Mo Key takeways: Italy’s good relations with Putin’s Russia have not been the prerogative of a specific party. Political, economic and energy ties developed significantly with center-left and center-right governments alike. In line with most far-right parties in the EU, Salvini’s Northern League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy developed an appreciation for Putin’s neo-conservative regime while criticizing the EU and NATO for damaging Italy’s entente with Moscow. A potential reconciliation with Moscow goes against Italy’s national interest at this point. Russia accounts for only 1.5% of Italy’s exports against its Western partners’80%. Besides, the EU’s interconnected gas market requires a coordinated plan to overcome the energy crisis. Finally, the reconquest of Kherson by Ukraine in November makes support for the Kremlin political suicide. Meloni’s sudden pro-NATO shift has taken much of her electorate by surprise, while support for Ukraine is low in the country. Coalition allies Salvini and Berlusconi are ready to take advantage of this gap to weaken Meloni’s leadership. This is typical of Italy’s fragile parliamentary democracy. To avoid further disappointing her electorate, Meloni is rapidly satisfying other demands of theirs, on issues such as migration, family values and tax policies.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Right-Wing Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Italy

183. Russian policy towards Central Asia 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Sphere of influence shrinking?

Author:: Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia views Central Asia as its sphere of influence and attempts to keep the five post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in its geopolitical orbit. Central Asian countries’ dependency on Russia is decreasing, albeit at a different pace in different policy spheres and geographical areas. This variation depends upon factors ranging from Moscow’s priorities, the presence and capability of Russia and other actors, and Central Asian domestic issues. Russia’s policy in Central Asia is rooted in bilateral relations, but from the early 2000s onwards, Moscow has sought to integrate the region’s states into multilateral organizations that it leads, primarily in the spheres of economy and security. Russian influence in the region is greatest in the security sphere and, due to the rise of China, smallest in the economic sector. People-to-people contacts remain strong as a result of the common Soviet past and current migration flows. Central Asian countries share Russia’s authoritarian outlook on politics. Russia remains a powerful player in Central Asia, but Moscow’s lack of a forward-looking strategy and its current great-power posturing threaten its dominance in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Post-Soviet Space, and Influence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

184. Russia’s quest for digital competitiveness: The role of private businesses in securing state interests

Author:: Andrey Indukaev
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian leadership prioritizes digital technology for the country’s security and international standing, but also for its economic and technological success and development. These diverse goals are closely intertwined within the logic of geoeconomic competition. The Russian authorities have increased their involvement in the ICT sector over the years and this has led to the hybridization of business and state logic of action at all levels. While the state has an upper hand in the relationship, this does not exclude the possibility of mutually beneficial partnerships. Moscow-based start-up NtechLab’s close collaboration with the city of Moscow is a case in point. For private businesses, the Russian state’s proximity is a mixed blessing that creates business development opportunities but also major risks. These risks limit Russia’s capacity to make digital technology the driver of modernization of its economy.
Topic:: Business, Private Sector, Strategic Interests, and Digitalization
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

185. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

186. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:: John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

187. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:: Dima Course
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

188. Greece, Russia and the EU: The Way Forward

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: The visit of PM Mitsotakis to Sochi could open a new chapter in Greek-Russian relations as bilateral deals are in the pipeline. The Greek position is firm and unchanging: a normalization of EU-Russian relations would be in Europe’s best interests. The Greek government might be prepared to help bring about a new EU-Russia dialogue. The strengthening of Greek-American relations will not prevent Greece from employing a multidimensional foreign policy, vis-à-vis Russia, too. Stronger Greek-Russian relations could send a message to Turkey that some of its regional policies are alienating other actors. Greek-Russian relations enjoy greater historical depth than Turkish-Russian relations. While its strategic commitment to NATO and the EU remains steadfast, Greece is a valuable partner for Russia. Greece is in the process of diversifying its sources of natural gas imports, but considers Russia a critical market.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Imports
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Greece

189. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:: Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:: Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

190. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

191. Despite Political Tension, Americans and Russians See Cooperation as Essential

Author:: Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: A joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center survey shows few Russians or Americans expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or in the next 10 years, although both publics see the merits of collaboration. According to a January–February 2021 joint survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow, neither Russians nor Americans expect the new US administration to prompt a reset in bilateral relations. While many Russians have yet to form an opinion of US President Joseph Biden, few in either country expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or even in the next 10 years. Despite this anticipated stasis, both publics acknowledge the importance of bilateral cooperation on a number of long-term foreign policy issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:: Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

192. Melting Ice, Frozen Heart: Russia’s posture on climate change and decarbonisation

Author:: Stanislav Secrieru and Federica Prandin
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: In the span of two decades, in its relations with Russia the EU has moved from ambitious endeavours to build Common Spaces and foster the Partnership for Modernisation to a more minimalist and defensive approach, epitomised by the dictum ‘to push back, to contain and to engage’ (1). There is no shortage of ideas on how to operationalise the first two aspects of this strategy, but the third one is more problematic. As global warming and the need for comprehensive decarbonisation efforts have risen to the top of the EU’s agenda, fighting climate change has re-emerged as one of the prospective areas for positive selective interaction with Russia. Global warming knows no borders and requires transnational solutions, thus for its own sake if nothing else Russia should be interested in expanding such cooperation too. This Brief proposes to test this assumption by addressing the following questions: what is Russia’s profile as a polluter? How strong is the impact of climate change in Russia? What shapes the Kremlin’s perceptions and responses? Is there room for genuine cooperation today between Russia and the EU on climate issues? If not, what factors could change Russia’s attitudes and actions in the near and distant future?
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

193. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:: András Rácz
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

194. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:: Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

195. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:: Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

196. Russia Meets Climate Change: The Domestic Politicization of Environmental Issues and External Pressure to Decarbonize

Author:: Jussi Lassila and Marco Siddi
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s role in international climate policy is central. Russia is the fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide and has vast potential for developing renewable energy. However, its fossil fuel-based economy and the legitimacy it creates for the Kremlin make climate action inherently difficult. Thanks to the growing politicization of environmental issues, the relevance of climate change may increase in the Russian public debate. The effects of climate change, such as melting permafrost and the Siberian forest fires, could catalyze this process. Climate-sceptical populism may sometimes feature in the rhetoric of the political elite, but its proliferation in society is unlikely. Most Russians are concerned about climate change, even if less so than Western Europeans. However, Russia’s decision-making on climate policy is highly centralized, with little or no input from civil society actors. The energy transition in Europe can eventually deprive Russia of its main market for fossil fuel exports, but it also creates new prospects for cooperation in green energy development.
Topic:: Civil Society, Climate Change, Environment, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

197. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

198. Russia’s Corona Diplomacy and Geoeconomic Competition: A Sputnik Moment?

Author:: Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian science, technology and innovation (STI) system is geared towards global geoeconomic competitiveness and is based on three S’s: state control, sovereignty and self-sufficiency. State-sponsored biotechnological innovation is a component in Russia’s geoeconomic strategy: in the case of Sputnik V, Russia’s commercial and strategic objectives are intertwined. The Russian state’s close involvement in development, marketing and propagating Sputnik V – as well as its readiness to skip standard practices in order to make headway with the product – create well-founded distrust towards it in Western markets. In the emerging and developing markets, Sputnik V suffers from insufficient manufacturing capacity. In many countries, only a fraction of promised doses have been delivered, and setting up local manufacturing capacity outside the EAEU takes time. The European states should pay more attention to linkages between Russian innovation policies and its foreign, security and military policies. For Russia, these are not separate silos but build upon and support each other.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

199. Internet and Media Repression in Russia: Avoiding the Complicity of Western Actors

Author:: Veera Laine and Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Media control has been a key part of Vladimir Putin’s exercise of power. Recently, however, the repression of freedom of expression has taken both a quantitative and a qualitative turn for the worse. The political leadership now perceives independent media as a threat in itself, and is applying comprehensive control over media outlets and even individual journalists. In particular, declarations about the media and journalists being ʻforeign agentsʼ have increased sharply. Such repression drives journalists and the media to leave the country. Internet-enabled journalism from exile has duly become an important part of independent media. The growing importance of the internet, largely connected to Western platforms, and the diminishing role of state-run television in the face of multiple popular grievances, are key reasons for the regimeʼs accelerated repression. Under these difficult circumstances, the readiness of internet giants to censor political content on the basis of their commercial interests further restricts the information space in Russia, and therefore needs to be resisted.
Topic:: Mass Media, Media, Internet, Social Media, Freedom of Expression, Repression, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

200. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:: Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS