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1. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:
NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Toughening Financial Sanctions on Russia: Enforcing Energy Sanctions and Reducing Shadow Reserves Effectively

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Benjamin Hilgenstock, and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Financial sanctions are key in enforcing restrictions on Russian energy exports – in particular the G7/EU oil price cap regime –, due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions. While the energy sanctions regime is having an impact on export earnings and budget revenues, evidence for potentially widespread violations is also emerging. Moreover, favorable external dynamics have allowed Russia to accumulate substantial assets abroad – “shadow reserves” –, which need to be kept out of reach of the regime.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

4. Coping with Technology Sanctions in the Russian Financial Sector

Author:
Alexandra Prokopenko
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

5. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

6. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

7. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

8. The Future of European Security

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:
European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

10. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine