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Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 3 Years

1. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:
Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:
Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

2. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Judging Putin

Author:
Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:
International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

5. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:
Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

6. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

7. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

8. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID-19 Response in Russia

Author:
Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has called for provision of public goods and services that require a high state capacity, including producing and distributing vaccines, enforcing mask mandates, limiting potential super‐​spreader events, and so on. The rationale for public intervention was that private actions, such as getting vaccinated, wearing masks, and avoiding large gatherings, have benefits to broader society, so they are likely to be undersupplied by individuals on their own. In these circumstances, one might expect the power of the state coercing others into compliance to be beneficial. Are authoritarian leaders, less constrained by institutions and less accountable to voters, better equipped to deal with health emergencies?
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Repression, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

10. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

11. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:
Guido Torres
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

12. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

13. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
Topic:
Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

14. A Surprising Shift: Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Engagement, Al-Shabaab, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Somalia, and United States of America

15. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

17. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

18. European Mercenaries: Will Congo use Wagner in its conflict with Rwanda?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Tensions broke out between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in January 2023 after an exchange of accusations of non-compliance with their peace agreement signed in the Angolan capital Luanda in November 2022. The development came after Kinshasa announced that it uses private military firms to counter growing security threats. Kigali regarded this move as a declaration of war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Wagner Group, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda

19. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:
NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. Russia’s War Economy

Author:
András Rácz, Ole Spillner, and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia’s economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Leveraging Islam and Internal Conflict: Strategies and Consequences in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Miriam Katherine Heß
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Assessment of the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; the inner-Chechen conflict; and Chechen fighters on both sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine reveals how internal conflicts become crucial for international structures and how transnational dynamics – such as foreign fighter flows – pose challenges to the interplay of national and international law. By anticipating the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine beyond the Zeitenwende in Germany and Europe, policy-makers will increase readiness and preparedness for the ongoing but also post-war period.
Topic:
Islam, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Central Asia

23. Toughening Financial Sanctions on Russia: Enforcing Energy Sanctions and Reducing Shadow Reserves Effectively

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Benjamin Hilgenstock, and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Financial sanctions are key in enforcing restrictions on Russian energy exports – in particular the G7/EU oil price cap regime –, due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions. While the energy sanctions regime is having an impact on export earnings and budget revenues, evidence for potentially widespread violations is also emerging. Moreover, favorable external dynamics have allowed Russia to accumulate substantial assets abroad – “shadow reserves” –, which need to be kept out of reach of the regime.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

24. Coping with Technology Sanctions in the Russian Financial Sector

Author:
Alexandra Prokopenko
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

25. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

26. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:
Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

27. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

28. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:
Ben Freeman
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

29. The Future of European Security

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:
European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:
Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

31. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:
Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

32. Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts

Author:
Katja Creutz
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered debates and initiatives on how to address crimes under international law committed in and against Ukraine, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. A single institution capable of dealing with all international crimes is nonetheless lacking. Tens of thousands of alleged war crimes have been reported and documented, part of which the Ukrainian courts themselves are handling. The massive caseload requires international assistance, in addition to which the ICC is also investigating alleged war crimes. The international community is divided in regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression. As the ICC lacks jurisdiction with respect to this crime in this particular situation, European states are advancing a special ad hoc tribunal. Nonetheless, the majority of countries globally, particularly in the Global South, find it hard to support the initiative. The discussion on the best way to proceed with regard to addressing the crime of aggression committed by Russia is ongoing. Many problematic issues are being debated, ranging from political desirability to the issue of head of state immunities.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, United Nations, War Crimes, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

33. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:
Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

34. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security

Author:
Timo R. Stewart
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
Topic:
Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

35. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

36. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

37. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

39. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:
Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:
Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Defence Spending

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:
NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

44. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

45. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:
Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:
Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

47. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:
Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

48. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

49. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

50. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

51. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:
Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

52. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:
Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

53. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:
Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

56. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:
Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

57. Democratic defence: How Italy can lead the fight against Russian disinformation

Author:
Gabriele Carrer, Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
New research for ECFR suggests pro-Russia and pro-China narratives are present in online and traditional forms of discourse in Italy. It finds that forms of anomalous activity spiked just ahead of the country’s 2022 general election. Despite the shock to Italian foreign policy caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine, economic ties between the countries remain. Moreover, the political environment in Italy remains conducive to Russian influence, with the leaders of four of the five largest parties in parliament prone to echoing talking points favourable to Moscow or advocating for “peace” while suggesting the withdrawal of military support to Ukraine. Italy has been slow to put in place the structures needed to combat foreign influence. The new governing coalition appeared to place little value on tackling the problem, but it has now started to build on the more considerable progress made under former prime minister Mario Draghi. Italy should seize opportunities to strengthen the battle against disinformation, such as: encouraging the next European Commission to incorporate this task into its mandate; and placing the topic in Rome’s forthcoming G7 presidency programme.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

58. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

59. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:
Joanna Hosa
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic

60. Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public

Author:
Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is a test of Europe’s values of openness, freedom, solidarity, and individual responsibility. According to ECFR’s research, European sentiment is strong in the EU today; the public holds positive attitudes towards the EU and Europe; and most governments are dedicated to European cooperation. European citizens and governments have shown unprecedented support for Ukraine, but European leaders face various dilemmas about how to handle Russian culture, disinformation, and people in the context of the war – and their responses to these challenges have consequences for European sentiment. Their approach can either reassert European values, helping to sustain European unity and support for Ukraine. Or it can undermine these values, presenting the EU as weak and hypocritical, and eroding Europeans’ confidence in the EU and solidarity with Ukraine. Rather than follow their protective instincts, European governments should display confidence in liberalism and in the European civil society which, over the past year, has demonstrated its resilience.
Topic:
Culture, Public Opinion, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

62. Turkey’s Growing Ukrainian and Russian Communities

Author:
Sude Akgundogdu and Collin Trissel
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since the 1990s, Turkey has become a major destination for tourists and migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and other former Soviet states. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine set into motion an even greater wave of migrants from both countries. Those fleeing the crisis have used myriad channels to enter and remain in Turkey, from obtaining “golden visas” to applying for protection. Going forward, their presence could have a sizable effect on future socioeconomic ties between the three countries.
Topic:
Economics, Migration, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

63. “Russia’s war in Eastern Europe is a central threat to the international architecture”

Author:
Luca Niculescu
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
n the short, medium and long term, what dangers does Russia's attack on Ukraine pose to the European Union? Is there a different perception of these dangers/threats in Eastern Europe? The Russian aggression in Ukraine, which began more than three months ago, has come at a complex time at both European and global level. Dealing with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic already required a great deal of effort, imagination and mobilisation on the part of states and citizens. Transformations and reforms have been launched to respond to the new reality and to allow for a sustainable, environmentally friendly recovery. It was in this context that we witnessed the return of war to the European continent after 77 years of peace, with unprecedented suddenness and violence. Russia's war in Eastern Europe is not a conflict relegated to the periphery of political reality, but in its present form is a central threat to the international architecture as we know it.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Threat Perception, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe

64. Strategic dependencies, a question of sovereignty

Author:
Eric Maurice
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine triggered a massive response from Europeans and their Western allies. Instead of direct military intervention, which would have carried the risk of an armed or even nuclear escalation with Russia, the EU's response has taken the shape of sanctions against the Russian regime in many sectors of the country's economy, with the stated aim of weakening the government's ability to finance the war. The five packages of European sanctions adopted since the end of February in coordination with the sanctions of the G7 countries, have "devastated the Russian economy", deems Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The sanctions, in particular the exclusion of most Russian banks from the Swift financial messaging system, the ban on market transactions with the Russian Central Bank and the embargo on the sale of certain equipment, are having an impact because they rely on the economic and financial strength of the West and, conversely, on Russia's dependence on Western financial markets and foreign technology. Yet, after two months of war, the Russian regime continues its offensive despite numerous casualties, several tactical defeats and the impact of sanctions. Sanctions have so far failed to stop the fighting, or even to change the behaviour of the Russian President. And for the Europeans there is the question of the final stage of possible sanctions, an embargo on Russian oil and gas, which would deprive the regime of about €100 billion a year (€99 billion in 2021). In early April, EU High Representative Josep Borrell lamented that Europeans had bought €35 billion worth of gas from Russia since the war began. The reluctance of some member states, most notably Germany, to take the decisive step of an embargo highlights the fact that the other side of the EU's economic strength is its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which is hampering its decision-making capacity and leaves it at the mercy of supplies being cut off in retaliation for sanctions. While the Commission claims to be geopolitical and the President of the Council considers the European Union's strategic autonomy to be "the aim of our generation", recent events have raised the question of its capacity to act through economic power and sanctions and its dependence on the outside world. They are forcing Europeans to rethink their relationship with the economy and trade.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Sanctions, Gas, Military Intervention, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dependency
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

65. Reception of Ukrainian refugees. Between emergency responses and long-term solutions

Author:
Ramona Bloj and Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
By mid-April 2022, more than 7.1 million Ukrainians had been forced to move within their country. More than 4.6 million people have had to flee Ukraine since 24 February when the Russian invasion began (Figure 1). In total, more than a quarter of the population has been forced to leave their homes as a result of Russia's aggression. For Europe, this is the largest movement of a population since the Second World War, and the challenges for neighbouring countries - Moldova[1], Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - hosting the largest numbers of refugees are significant, from securing temporary accommodation and immediate access to health care, to ensuring children's education and access to labour markets.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. From the Russian Pact to the Green Deal?

Author:
Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, among other things, caused an energy crisis comparable to the oil crisis of the 1970s, one that goes beyond oil however since Russia is also a major supplier of gas and coal. By 2021, it was the EU's largest supplier of all three fossil fuels. The military hostilities started in a context dominated by price pressures induced by global economic recovery and by an abnormally low level of storage sites in Europe. In this context a policy of diversification as part of RepowerEU was launched in view - as put forward by the European Commission - to do away with the supply of fossil fuels from Russia by 2030. Beyond the quest for new short-term suppliers, the question of a radical acceleration of the energy transition in Europe in favour of low-carbon energy sources and sobriety is now being asked. This paper highlights the opportunity for Europeans to break not only with their dependence on Russia but also, and above all, with fossil fuels. It outlines the challenges to be met by underlining the extent to which the current stage of energy decoupling from Russia marks a turning point and closes several decades of close interdependence between Russian deposits and the European economies.
Topic:
European Union, Fossil Fuels, Green Deal, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

67. The Black Sea, the spectre of a new Iron Curtain?

Author:
Radu Magdin
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
For thousands of years, the Black Sea has been a place of meetings and exchange. It has often been the natural border between empires. Now, together with the Baltic Sea, it is the place where East and West, the United States (through NATO), the European Union, Turkey and Russia still meet on open terrain.
Topic:
NATO, History, European Union, Geopolitics, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, United States of America, and Black Sea

68. “In Russia today the whole media sphere has been destroyed."

Author:
Katerina Abramova
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
What role does media play in informing the Russian population about the war in Ukraine? I would like to emphasise that no problems can be solved until people realise that there is a problem. If independent media and independent journalists stop telling the truth about what is going on in Ukraine some people will just be left with state propaganda, others will just know nothing. Most governments thought the war would not last more than half a year. But it is far from being a short and victorious one as Moscow had planned, so people are starting to ask questions. Some analysts say that in the autumn ordinary citizens will start to feel some of the consequences, as they prepare, for example, their kids for school; they will have to pay more because of inflation and the effects of the sanctions. For the media it is simply very important to give people the opportunity to know what’s going on.
Topic:
Media, Journalism, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

69. The end of European dependence on Russian fossil fuels

Author:
Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The Russian war in Ukraine is entering its eighth month. As winter approaches, the question of energy and Europe's dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which has dominated European debate since the invasion began on 24 February, is turning into a major challenge for the 27 Member States. The latter must strike a delicate balance between reducing consumption, relieving pressure on consumers and making a genuine transition to deal with climate change
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

70. Nationalism, Sovereignism, Virilism: the sources of Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:
François Hublet
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Because war is the ultimate negation of all autonomy, all freedom and, a fortiori, all democracy, maintaining peace is the first of political necessities. Post-war Europe[1] knew this only too well. In the industrial age, education for peace and tolerance has become the condition for the survival of humanity: according to Adorna, "all political education must have at its centre the demand that Auschwitz cannot be repeated[2]”, not only because horror is imprescriptible, but because, in the absence of consistent education, it is destined to reproduce itself and sweep away the entire civilisation in which it is rooted. With the return of war in Europe, the question of collective education cannot be eluded. The mental patterns that led - directly or indirectly - to the massacres in Ukraine will have to be questioned in depth, lest any future peace be obliterated in advance, since "no peace treaty can be considered as such, if it secretly reserves for itself some subject for starting war again[3]”
Topic:
Nationalism, Sovereignty, History, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

71. What is President Putin so afraid of?

Author:
Francisco Juan Gomez Martos
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Faced with the brutal and unjustified military aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the vast majority of European citizens have realised what seemed unlikely until now: the possibility of a war in Europe[1]. A cruel and devastating war, both materially and morally, a war of occupation of a sovereign country and a free people. Undoubtedly the aggressor will be held accountable for his crimes before the international community and nothing will be forgotten. The EU is watching, perplexed but united and in solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people who are valiantly defending their independence and their freedom, which is also ours. The borderline between Western civilisation based on values and respect for human rights and authoritarian regimes that trample on the dignity of their citizens has been crossed in the blood of the victims, many of whom are civilians. The European Union, as a global actor, is facing its limits as it tries to curb the hideous logic of war against which it was built 72 years ago.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

72. The defeat of Russia in Ukraine will herald the defeat of the Lukashenko regime.

Author:
Svetlana Tikhanovskaia
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
What is the domestic political situation in Belarus? Has the government been weakened by its brutal and incessant repression? How is the population responding? The government has been weakened by the protest movement of the Belarusian population. It has chosen the path of repression instead of meeting the demands of the people and holding fair elections. It has been weakened. The government now has a very small toolbox. Only repression remains. Any easing in its stance will be a signal for people to launch further protests, even bigger than before. Because life has not improved. When you are at war with your own people all the time, your position is a weak one. And the gains here for the so-called government are not visible.
Topic:
Democratization, Authoritarianism, European Union, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

73. Rising Apprehensions

Author:
Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
To the end, Samuel Beckett insisted that he did not know who Godot was, nor what his two characters, Vladimir and Estragon, were waiting for. That was not the least absurdity of his play, which he wrote in French, the Irish author later explained, because he did not know the language well. That is where we all are now: confused over what to expect as we stagger into the second and possibly final half of the Biden presidency. In America, momentarily reset as the leader of the Free World, a democracy at risk; in Europe, an alliance recast by an unwanted war; and elsewhere, a global mutation told in languages we understand poorly even when they carry a slight American accent. This is unchartered territory: across the Atlantic, half the people waiting for Trump to return to the White House and the other half waiting for him to go to prison; around the world, half the people welcoming America’s restored leadership and the other half celebrating its demotion; and all over, rising apprehensions over a war which neither belligerent can realistically win but which both refuse to end.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

74. Development of the IT Industry and Structural Transformation: Focused on IT Cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Author:
Minhyeon Jeong, Jiyoung Min, and Dongyeon Jeong
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study was designed as a primary study to analyze the economic significance and potential of cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the IT sector, and to derive implications for new directions between Korea and the three countries with the advent of the fourth industrial revolution era. The goal of the study is to discuss what the development of the IT industry means for the three economies, examine the characteristics of each country, and gain policy implications on how cooperation with Korea should proceed in the future. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four components. First, the economic significance of IT technology cooperation with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan is viewed from the perspective of structural transformation. Second, the effect of IT cooperation between Korea and Russia on the Russian economy is quantitatively estimated through the analytical framework of structural transformation. Third, to supplement the limitations of theoretical discussions and derive customized cooperation directions for each country, the current status and policies of the IT industry in the three countries are examined in detail. Fourth, IT technology subsectors promising for cooperation between Korea and Russia are identified, from the patent citation analysis and network analysis.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Science and Technology, Industry, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan

75. Russia’s Energy Strategy in the Northeast Asian Region and New Korea-Russia Cooperation: Focusing on the Natural Gas and Hydrogen Sectors

Author:
Joungho Park, Boogyun Kang, Seok Hwan Kim, Won Soon Kwon, and Andrey Kovsh
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study attempts to identify new directions for energy cooperation between Korea and Russia, focusing on the areas of natural gas and hydrogen. In particular, we derive new directions and tasks for energy cooperation between the two countries, reflecting changes in the international energy environment, such as climate change and decarbonization, which are in full swing at the global level. To this end, this study is consisted of the following four parts. Part II examines the geopolitics of energy coming into the 21st century and Russia’s new energy strategy. Part III conducts an in-depth analysis of the energy cooperation strategies of China and Japan, major Northeast Asian countries, with Russia, and Part IV comprehensively evaluates Korea’s energy strategy and Korea-Russia energy cooperation. In conclusion, Part V presents new plans for Korea-Russia energy cooperation. As a side note, after carrying out this study, the policy environment for energy cooperation with Russia has significantly changed. Russia’s war against Ukraine is expected to change the landscape of global energy and its geopolitics in profound ways. In the midst of these significant changes, it is hoped that this study will serve as a meaningful reference for analyzing and forecasting the global energy dynamics surrounding Russia.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, Gas, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Asia, South Korea, and Northeast Asia

76. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

77. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

78. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Western Military Assistance

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The tenth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the Western military assistance to Ukraine. Tony Lawrence, the Head of the Defence Policy and Strategy Programme at the ICDS, examines donor dilemmas, and how the Western military assistance has changed the course of the war. He highlights the steps made by Western Allies even before the 24th of February, and their considerations regarding “offensive” and long-range weapons, as well as Russia’s efforts to discourage donors. He concludes that most weapons can be used for both offence and defence, and therefore the Allies earlier argued about self-imposed restrictions. He states that the offensive-defensive dilemma was largely resolved when the war shifted to the east. Donor dilemmas include fear of escalation, the apparently limited capacity of manufacturers to produce replacements, and ensuring that Ukraine is provided with what it needs. Lawrence concludes that the West’s military assistance, far from being historically unprecedented, has been uneven and broadly cautious. Ukraine’s victories are Ukraine’s alone, but they could not have been achieved without Western assistance. The outcome of the war will depend to a large extent on Western supply of weapons and equipment to Ukraine, as Russia’s military strength degrades.
Topic:
Conflict, Foreign Assistance, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

79. EU Security and Defence After Ukraine

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The first brief looks at the Union’s immediate response to the war: its direct assistance to Ukraine and its sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Belarus

80. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

81. EU Defence After Ukraine: France’s Presidency

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The third brief considers France’s 2022 Presidency of the Council of the EU, a presidency whose term was dominated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and whose successes in EU defence matters were somewhat overshadowed by President Macron’s high-profile attempts to broker peace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Peace, Emmanuel Macron, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and France

82. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

83. Germany, Russia, and Energy Politics

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fifth and final brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Kalev Stoicescu examines another of Germany’s key bilateral relationships—with Russia. Relations between Germany (or historical German and German-led states) and Russia have greatly influenced the Baltic region for centuries. In recent years, what the Baltic states see as Germany’s over-reliance on Russian gas supplies, even as they themselves have tried to secure energy independence from Russia, has been a source of tension. The Nord Stream pipelines, which Germany claims are a business project, but which the Baltic states regard as a security risk, have been particularly problematic. But at the same time, the Baltic states recognise that Germany has since 2014 adopted a resolute approach towards Russia regarding sanctions; even if they are sceptical that Berlin’s ambiguous policies towards Moscow, being both firm and conciliatory, will change Russia’s behaviour. With the appointment as foreign minister of Annalena Baerbock, who has opposed Nord Stream 2 and strongly criticised Russia’s misconduct, Olaf Scholz’s new government may stand closer to Baltic perceptions and interests and become a more principled and difficult counterpart for Russia. The Baltic states might be encouraged to trust Germany more in its dealings with Russia, but the new government must first prove itself in its words and actions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

84. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

85. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The first brief in a new series “Russia’s War in Ukraine” discusses Russia’s war aims. These are not limited to the destruction of Ukraine’s statehood, or even of the Ukrainian nation, its culture and language, but include altering Europe’s security architecture by undermining NATO and the European Union. Kalev Stoicescu, Research Fellow at the ICDS, also examines Russia’s extensive preparations domestically and abroad (versus Ukraine, the West, and China), and evaluates where Russia’s assumptions were right and wrong, as proved by the course of events after 24 February 2022. Stoicescu concludes that Vladimir Putin’s regime has an inclination for miscalculation and apparently an appetite for future adventures. The risks are thus far from over.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Organization, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

86. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:
Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

87. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics

Author:
Ronald Ti
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief of the series, Dr Ronald Ti examines Russia’s failures in planning and executing logistics operations for its war in Ukraine. In large part, these failures can be attributed to systemic weaknesses such as its ‘push’ (rather than ‘pull’) approach to expeditionary logistics, overly centralised command, a lack of non-commissioned officers, and a culture of bullying and corruption. Ronald Ti, PhD candidate at War Studies Department of King’s College London, cautions that Baltic and other planners should not assume that the Russian military will repeat their poor performance in Ukraine against other adversaries in the future, but also notes that Russia’s military culture is highly resilient and therefore difficult to change.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Logistics, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

88. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Large-Scale War and NATO

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the fourth brief of the series, Martin Hurt analyses the achievements of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and compares them with the NATO’s existing forces and capabilities. Martin Hurt, Research Fellow at the ICDS, briefly compares Ukraine’s military capabilities with those of some Allies and cautions against making any hasty conclusions about NATO’s ability to rapidly reinforce and defend its smaller member states in a potential war. He concludes that NATO should deploy its forces and capabilities along the borders of Russia, ready to defend Alliance territory as well as providing all necessary support to Ukraine, enabling it to significantly degrade the Russian forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

89. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Early Air War

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The fifth brief of the series looks at the early air war. Russia’s failure to conduct a devastating air offensive and secure air superiority, despite having all the advantages on paper at the start of its war in Ukraine, was a great surprise to observers and had major strategic impact. In this brief, ICDS research fellow Tony Lawrence describes the recent historical context for Russia’s air campaign, its failures in the air in Ukraine, the role of Western assistance, and the importance of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. The intertwining of the air war and information war is a common theme throughout.
Topic:
War, Air Force, Information Warfare, Military, Aerospace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

90. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

91. Russia’s War in Ukraine: When Russia Went to War

Author:
Konrad Muzyka
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The seventh brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s military and political preparations for attacking Ukraine through the prism of indicators of possible intent to conduct large-scale combat operations. Konrad Muzyka, an independent analyst and the Director of Rochan Consulting, which provides consultancy and advisory service on the Russian and Belarusian armed forces, examines the subsequent phases of the massive build-up of the Russian forces close to Ukraine since March 2021. He analyses particularly the prepositioning and moving of Russian forces to assembly and staging areas by the border, including in Belarus, from October 2021 to January 2021, that was not consistent with the intent to merely conduct exercises. Muzyka states that Russia used political negotiations as deception: “Russia’s participation in diplomatic discussions during its build-up of forces was not intended to avert war, but to produce false hope that war was avertable.” He concludes that Russia’s preparations for war against NATO might follow a different pattern. The build-up of forces might not take 11 months, as in the case of Ukraine, and they might not be spread thousands of kilometers, but be rather concentrated along the borders of the Baltic states and Poland. However, a surprise, large-scale, ground attack on NATO is improbable. Russia’s readiness to attack other countries in the future depends on how its war against Ukraine ends.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

92. Russia’s War in Ukraine: WMD Issues

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the eighth brief of our “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series, Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz examines issues related to weapons of mass destruction. Throughout the war, Russia has regularly threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against Western states. Analysts are divided on the credibility of these threats and on the risk that the war in Ukraine may escalate to the nuclear level, but Russia’s careless rhetoric is at least likely to set back prospects for nuclear arms control and increase the incentives for nuclear proliferation. While the nuclear taboo has remained unbroken, Russia’s use of hypersonic missiles and its readiness to disrupt civil nuclear operations may have created precedents with huge future consequences. Although Russia’s hypersonic missile attacks—a world first—have not been game-changing, they have sent important signals and, no doubt, advanced Russia’s quest to operationalise these weapons. Of more immediate concern have been Russia’s readiness to ignore basic safety protocols at Chornobyl and its recklessness in conducting offensive military operations near the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Meanwhile, its disinformation about Ukraine’s chemical and biological capacity has raised the spectre of the use of chemical or biological agents in a war in Europe. Weitz concludes that the non-use of weapons of mass destruction in the Ukraine War has contributed to emboldening Western states in their supply of advanced weapon systems to Ukraine.
Topic:
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Hypersonic Weapons, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

93. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Propaganda War

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The ninth Brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns Russia’s propaganda war. Igor Gretskiy, a Research Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the ICDS, examines key elements of Russia’s propaganda and disinformation that were crucial in the years long preparation of the invasion of Ukraine. He describes how the Kremlin’s official narratives were used to pave the way for Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, and how Russia’s propaganda has changed as the war has progressed. He states that the Kremlin began to prepare the Russian public for the invasion of Ukraine after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva on the 30th of June 2021. He analyses Moscow’s language of war and concludes that Soviet-style narratives about Nazism and Western anti-Russian conspiracies became the main premises of the propaganda offensive. He also concludes that Russia’s president most likely began to plot the outright aggression after his re-election in 2018. Gretskiy further states that the Russian mainstream media failed to provoke the populations and local authorities in eastern Ukraine into mass defections to the Russian side and lost the battle for the Ukrainians’ hearts and minds. It rather intensified the Russian domestic neo-imperial narrative.
Topic:
Propaganda, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. Russian Spring 2022 Recruitment Cycle

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In May 2022, we published our Egmont Paper 116 entitled The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited, in which we suggested, “The current spring recruitment cycle (1 April-15 July 2022) may be considered a more accurate indication of popular support for Putin’s war in Ukraine than the results of public opinion research as we know it. Therefore, the 2022 spring recruitment cycle may be regarded as a referendum on Russia’s war in Ukraine with the voenkomati as its voting stations.” Near the end of this recruitment period, it is time to return to this statement. How did the spring recruitment cycle go, and which conclusion can we draw from it? A critical review.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Civil-Military Relations, Recruitment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

95. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:
Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

96. Putin Is Creating the Multipolar World He (Thought He) Wanted

Author:
Sven Biscop, Bart Dessein, and Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Up until the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s and China’s worsening relations with the European Union and the United States meant that the world order was at risk of falling apart into two rival blocs, as during the Cold War: Europeans and Americans against Russians and Chinese. Since 24 February 2022, that is not so clear anymore. The more Russia escalates the violence in Ukraine, but also the strategic anxiety (by putting its nuclear forces on alert), the more difficult it becomes for other powers to stay completely aloof, let alone to simply align with Russia. The more EU and US sanctions reverberate throughout the global economy, the more it becomes impossible for other powers to avoid going at least partially along. China in particular has in fact already made a defining choice.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Social Order, Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

97. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

98. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

99. Russia’s connectivity strategies in Eurasia: Politics over economy

Author:
Kristiina Silvan and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia has been attempting to strengthen connectivity within Eurasia since the early 2000s as a part of its policy to “pivot to the East”. Yet due to limited resources and political will, the tangible effects of its connectivity strategy have remained limited. The Russian Far East would greatly benefit from an improved connectivity infrastructure, given its proximity to Asian markets and the abundance of natural resources in the region. However, the attempts to accelerate regional socio-economic development by strengthening the region’s connectivity have failed to make a difference. In post-Soviet Central Asia, Russia adopted a passive approach to connectivity in the 1990s and 2000s, which meant focusing on maintaining and protecting the links inherited from the Soviet Union. It was only the pressure of external actors – both China and the West – that prompted Moscow to take a more active stance in the region in the 2010s. The launch of China’s Belt and Road Initiative pushed Russia to promote its own grand vision of trans-continental connectivity, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, designed to reaffirm Moscow’s great-power status and its equal standing with China. While it lacks economic and administrative foundations and its implementation is highly implausible, it has fulfilled a symbolic role as Russia’s grand connectivity project for Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Rivalry, and Resource Allocation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

100. German strengths and weaknesses in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The Russian attack on Ukraine has activated a series of tropes about the international balance of power in Europe. Most mainstream opinion outlets have published criticisms of Germany for supposedly being dependent on Russia and threatening the European security system by hesitating when decisive action is required. The following points serve to reintroduce some facts into the conversation. The current war in Ukraine is primarily the result of German-Russian rivalry. The war is a case of an established power, Russia, miscalculating in its efforts to prevent a rising power, Germany, from absorbing a nation within its sphere of cooperation: Ukraine. Germany’s strategy has been subtle, seeking to manage through economic interdependence an international conflict predicated upon balance of power considerations. Since circa 1900, Turkey has also played a key role in the German security system in the Black Sea region. With the benefit of hindsight, Germany’s strategy has been the most appropriate to the situation, given that Russia has been completely isolated while Germany is surrounded by allies. Germany’s problems today are not in its Russian policy, but rather in self-defeating ideologies which include the “Green” movement and economic statism.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany