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Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years

151. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

152. Byting back: The EU’s digital alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:
Carla Hobbs and José I. Torreblanca
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s and Russia’s growing presence in Latin America and the Caribbean undermines democracy and Western influence in the region, along with the international rules-based order. The EU is responding to this threat by attempting to strengthen its relationships with Latin American and Caribbean countries. The bloc is attempting to build on their affinity for European values and rights, as well their preference for sustainable and inclusive development. Cooperation on digital technologies should be a priority in the effort, given the region’s need for greater connectivity. The Spanish presidency of the EU should lead the formation of a Digital Alliance with Latin America and the Caribbean at a summit scheduled for 2023. The EU can make this alliance work by focusing on connectivity investments, cyber-security, and rights to support Latin American countries’ digital transitions. The alliance will also require a long-term vision within the EU, commitments from member states, leadership by several Latin American countries, and public-private investment partnerships.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Alliance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Latin America

153. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:
International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

154. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:
Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
“Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:
European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

155. World food crisis: between withdrawal and responsibility, Europe must choose

Author:
Emmanuelle Ducros
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The profound destructuring of world food markets as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine is forcing all of the world's agricultural powers to question their place on the world stage of satiety - or hunger. This is primarily the case in Europe.
Topic:
Food, Hunger, Armed Conflict, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

156. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:
Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

157. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:
Luis Simon
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

158. International Legal Options for Prevention and Justice in Ukraine

Author:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
This March 2022 Fact Sheet presents international legal options for international criminal justice and prevention in Ukraine.
Topic:
United Nations, Accountability, Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Universal Jurisdiction
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

159. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

160. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:
Cori Fleser
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

161. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

162. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine

Author:
Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

163. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

164. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:
Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:
European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

165. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

166. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:
Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:
Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

167. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

168. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:
Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

169. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:
Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:
Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

170. Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa

Author:
Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the 2010s, Russia gradually returned to the African continent, where the Soviet Union was an influential actor for decades. The culmination of Russia’s public reorientation to Africa so far has been the high profile Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In his opening address to the Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted how “representatives of all 54 African states and leading regional organizations are gathered here. This is indeed the first meeting of such a scale, and this is a convincing testament to the mutual desire to develop contacts in all directions, to strengthen the multifaceted partnership”. Russia has many interests in Africa. One fundamental interest relates to the international distribution of power. As a self-defined great power with an ambition to extend its influence still further beyond its immediate regional setting, Russia is almost compelled to attempt to gain a stronger presence in Africa. Both trade and the exploration of energy and minerals support this ambition, but its other tools include economic support (including by writing off debt), military support (for instance through the provision of training assistance or even the deployment of troops), as well as political support (for instance by using Russia’s weight as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to publicly defend regimes under pressure or even to prevent the passing of critical statements or the introduction of sanctions). To illustrate, in January 2022, the Russian delegation to the United Nations strongly opposed the introduction of new sanctions against the interim government in Mali, noting that “we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems”. Other interests relate to trade (with a turnover of USD 20bn in 2020) and to the exploration of natural resources. Within the field of trade, Russian arms exports stand out. In the years 2016-2020, Russian arms exports to African states accounted for 18 per cent of all Russian arms exports, a 23 per cent increase over the period of 2011-2015. By contrast, Russia’s share of the global arms market decreased by 22 per cent in the decade of 2011-2020. This latter development is a clear sign of a very competitive market, and it suggests that emerging markets, such as Africa, will become increasingly important to Russian arms producers. The main importers are Egypt, Algeria, and Angola (where Russian producers supply 41 per cent, 69 per cent, and 64 per cent, respectively, of national imports).
Topic:
Wagner Group, Military, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Denmark

171. The impacts of the pandemic on investment flows in BRICS countries: a preliminary analysis based on UNCTAD global investment reports

Author:
Ana Garcia, Rafaela Mello, Victor Fernandes, Maria Eduarda Lopes, João Carmino, and Felipe Queiroz
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
In 2020, with the advent of the pandemic, the lockdown and social isolation actions implemented by governments in order to contain the contagion of the virus had an impact on the economies, reducing the speed of execution of existing investment projects and hindering the prospect of new ones. In this sense, the flow of direct investments around the world fell by 35% in 2020, reaching US$ 1 trillion, compared to US$ 1.5 trillion in the previous year, according to UNCTAD. Based on this observation, the present research aims to understand the main trends around the investment flow related to the BRICS countries, in order to assess how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted the dynamics of investments in the world, and especially, in emerging economies. To this end, the reports produced by UNCTAD from 2019 to 2022 regarding global investment flows were analyzed, in order to understand how the scenario was before the pandemic and what dynamics were underway before the health crisis, but it also allowed to understand what transformations occurred with the course of the pandemic, in addition to signaling paths and trends for the future.
Topic:
Economy, Investment, COVID-19, BRICS, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

172. Geoeconomics of Polarisation: Can BRICS eclipse western global economic power?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The 14th BRICS summit concluded on June 24 amid Western sanctions on Russia and rising tension between China and the US over Taiwan. The two-day event took place via video and was hosted by Beijing.
Topic:
Economy, BRICS, Polarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, and United States of America

173. The Russian Role! The domestic and regional dimensions of the military coup in Burkina Faso

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
In January 24, 2022, members of the army in Burkina Faso announced their seizure of power and the dismissal of Burkinabé President Roch Marc Kaboré. One of the officers who seized power delivered a statement on state television, signed by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Head of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), announcing the overthrow of the government, thus joining Burkina Faso to Mali and Guinea, in the third military coup in West Africa in just eight months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, France, and Burkina Faso

174. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

175. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:
Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its ­institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

176. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:
Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

177. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

178. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

179. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:
Régis Genté
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

180. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

181. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:
Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

182. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition

Author:
Raimondo Lanza
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Italy’s new far-right government has been widely perceived as the potential weak spot of the anti-Kremlin European front following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: traditionally pro-Putin politicians such as Matteo Salvini and Silvio Berlusconi are back in power. Yet, after Mario Draghi’s hawkish Euro-Atlantic government fell in July and Giorgia Meloni was looking forward to a probable victory, she immediately sided with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in a firm condemnation of Russia. Putin’s Friends? The Complex Balance Inside Italy’s Far-Right Government Coalition Download 0.66 Mo Key takeways: Italy’s good relations with Putin’s Russia have not been the prerogative of a specific party. Political, economic and energy ties developed significantly with center-left and center-right governments alike. In line with most far-right parties in the EU, Salvini’s Northern League and Meloni’s Brothers of Italy developed an appreciation for Putin’s neo-conservative regime while criticizing the EU and NATO for damaging Italy’s entente with Moscow. A potential reconciliation with Moscow goes against Italy’s national interest at this point. Russia accounts for only 1.5% of Italy’s exports against its Western partners’80%. Besides, the EU’s interconnected gas market requires a coordinated plan to overcome the energy crisis. Finally, the reconquest of Kherson by Ukraine in November makes support for the Kremlin political suicide. Meloni’s sudden pro-NATO shift has taken much of her electorate by surprise, while support for Ukraine is low in the country. Coalition allies Salvini and Berlusconi are ready to take advantage of this gap to weaken Meloni’s leadership. This is typical of Italy’s fragile parliamentary democracy. To avoid further disappointing her electorate, Meloni is rapidly satisfying other demands of theirs, on issues such as migration, family values and tax policies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Right-Wing Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

183. Russian policy towards Central Asia 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Sphere of influence shrinking?

Author:
Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia views Central Asia as its sphere of influence and attempts to keep the five post-Soviet countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in its geopolitical orbit. Central Asian countries’ dependency on Russia is decreasing, albeit at a different pace in different policy spheres and geographical areas. This variation depends upon factors ranging from Moscow’s priorities, the presence and capability of Russia and other actors, and Central Asian domestic issues. Russia’s policy in Central Asia is rooted in bilateral relations, but from the early 2000s onwards, Moscow has sought to integrate the region’s states into multilateral organizations that it leads, primarily in the spheres of economy and security. Russian influence in the region is greatest in the security sphere and, due to the rise of China, smallest in the economic sector. People-to-people contacts remain strong as a result of the common Soviet past and current migration flows. Central Asian countries share Russia’s authoritarian outlook on politics. Russia remains a powerful player in Central Asia, but Moscow’s lack of a forward-looking strategy and its current great-power posturing threaten its dominance in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Post-Soviet Space, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

184. Russia’s quest for digital competitiveness: The role of private businesses in securing state interests

Author:
Andrey Indukaev
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian leadership prioritizes digital technology for the country’s security and international standing, but also for its economic and technological success and development. These diverse goals are closely intertwined within the logic of geoeconomic competition. The Russian authorities have increased their involvement in the ICT sector over the years and this has led to the hybridization of business and state logic of action at all levels. While the state has an upper hand in the relationship, this does not exclude the possibility of mutually beneficial partnerships. Moscow-based start-up NtechLab’s close collaboration with the city of Moscow is a case in point. For private businesses, the Russian state’s proximity is a mixed blessing that creates business development opportunities but also major risks. These risks limit Russia’s capacity to make digital technology the driver of modernization of its economy.
Topic:
Business, Private Sector, Strategic Interests, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

185. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

186. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

187. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:
Dima Course
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

188. Greece, Russia and the EU: The Way Forward

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The visit of PM Mitsotakis to Sochi could open a new chapter in Greek-Russian relations as bilateral deals are in the pipeline. The Greek position is firm and unchanging: a normalization of EU-Russian relations would be in Europe’s best interests. The Greek government might be prepared to help bring about a new EU-Russia dialogue. The strengthening of Greek-American relations will not prevent Greece from employing a multidimensional foreign policy, vis-à-vis Russia, too. Stronger Greek-Russian relations could send a message to Turkey that some of its regional policies are alienating other actors. Greek-Russian relations enjoy greater historical depth than Turkish-Russian relations. While its strategic commitment to NATO and the EU remains steadfast, Greece is a valuable partner for Russia. Greece is in the process of diversifying its sources of natural gas imports, but considers Russia a critical market.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Imports
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Greece

189. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

190. 2020 Country Brief: Afghanistan

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
After 19 years of war in Afghanistan and a peace agreement signed with the Taliban, it’s time for the United States to withdraw. Although the United States has slowly reduced troops in Afghanistan, the Trump Administration has left the remaining troops vulnerable to the Taliban and to Putin’s Russia, which is paying bounties to Afghans for murdering American soldiers.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Political stability, Military Intervention, Peace, and State Building
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

191. Despite Political Tension, Americans and Russians See Cooperation as Essential

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
A joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center survey shows few Russians or Americans expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or in the next 10 years, although both publics see the merits of collaboration. According to a January–February 2021 joint survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center in Moscow, neither Russians nor Americans expect the new US administration to prompt a reset in bilateral relations. While many Russians have yet to form an opinion of US President Joseph Biden, few in either country expect great changes to US-Russia ties now or even in the next 10 years. Despite this anticipated stasis, both publics acknowledge the importance of bilateral cooperation on a number of long-term foreign policy issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

192. Melting Ice, Frozen Heart: Russia’s posture on climate change and decarbonisation

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru and Federica Prandin
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In the span of two decades, in its relations with Russia the EU has moved from ambitious endeavours to build Common Spaces and foster the Partnership for Modernisation to a more minimalist and defensive approach, epitomised by the dictum ‘to push back, to contain and to engage’ (1). There is no shortage of ideas on how to operationalise the first two aspects of this strategy, but the third one is more problematic. As global warming and the need for comprehensive decarbonisation efforts have risen to the top of the EU’s agenda, fighting climate change has re-emerged as one of the prospective areas for positive selective interaction with Russia. Global warming knows no borders and requires transnational solutions, thus for its own sake if nothing else Russia should be interested in expanding such cooperation too. This Brief proposes to test this assumption by addressing the following questions: what is Russia’s profile as a polluter? How strong is the impact of climate change in Russia? What shapes the Kremlin’s perceptions and responses? Is there room for genuine cooperation today between Russia and the EU on climate issues? If not, what factors could change Russia’s attitudes and actions in the near and distant future?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

193. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

194. How Russia Does Foresight: Where is the world going?

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Thinking about the long-term future is a prominent feature of the Russian official strategic planning and public policy debate. Speaking in 2008, for instance, President Putin indicated the horizons of strategic planning when he stated that a concrete development plan for the period through to 2010 had been elaborated, and “now we need to look beyond this horizon – look at least 10 years ahead”. “Today we are deciding one of the most important issues for Russia’s future – defining its development strategy through to 2020”, he stated, and in setting out Russia's long-term vision for the future, "our long-term references must be clear to everyone”, and “must have the support of our citizens.” By the mid-2010s, policy-oriented public organisations were looking even further ahead. The Valdai Club, for instance, was conducting a project entitled Club 2035, to “look beyond the horizon” at a number of themes, including technological and socio-cultural trends, and the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) was running a “World in 100 Years” project, including the series “On the eve of 2037”. Other major institutes, such as the Institute of World Economics and International Affairs (IMEMO) and the Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO), also hold regular major events and publish substantial volumes reflecting on twenty-first century megatrends and strategic forecasting up to 2030 and beyond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

195. Appeasement and Autonomy: Armenian-Russian relations from revolution to war

Author:
Narek Sukiasyan
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Armenia’s foreign policy and its role in the post-Soviet space are often characterised as ‘pro-Russian’. While such a description is partially true, it is overly simplistic. This Brief analysis the main trends and evolutions in Armenia’s Russia policy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution: how the changes have influenced Russia’s approach towards Armenia, how these dynamics affect Armenia’s autonomy and what the consequences of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war are for Armenia’s regional security and alliances. After the revolution and up until the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, no substantial strategic changes were made to Armenian foreign policy. The leadership has avoided framing its external affairs in geopolitical ‘pro or against’ terms, promoting a ‘pro-Armenian’ policy that aims to maintain good relations in all directions and prioritises sovereignty as a foreign policy principle. Instead, the revolutionary ambitions of the new leadership have been directed towards domestic issues such as fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary and law enforcement bodies, improving the business environment and addressing social issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Conflict, Regional Integration, Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, and Appeasement
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Armenia

196. Russia Meets Climate Change: The Domestic Politicization of Environmental Issues and External Pressure to Decarbonize

Author:
Jussi Lassila and Marco Siddi
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s role in international climate policy is central. Russia is the fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide and has vast potential for developing renewable energy. However, its fossil fuel-based economy and the legitimacy it creates for the Kremlin make climate action inherently difficult. Thanks to the growing politicization of environmental issues, the relevance of climate change may increase in the Russian public debate. The effects of climate change, such as melting permafrost and the Siberian forest fires, could catalyze this process. Climate-sceptical populism may sometimes feature in the rhetoric of the political elite, but its proliferation in society is unlikely. Most Russians are concerned about climate change, even if less so than Western Europeans. However, Russia’s decision-making on climate policy is highly centralized, with little or no input from civil society actors. The energy transition in Europe can eventually deprive Russia of its main market for fossil fuel exports, but it also creates new prospects for cooperation in green energy development.
Topic:
Civil Society, Climate Change, Environment, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

197. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

198. Russia’s Corona Diplomacy and Geoeconomic Competition: A Sputnik Moment?

Author:
Sinikukka Saari
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian science, technology and innovation (STI) system is geared towards global geoeconomic competitiveness and is based on three S’s: state control, sovereignty and self-sufficiency. State-sponsored biotechnological innovation is a component in Russia’s geoeconomic strategy: in the case of Sputnik V, Russia’s commercial and strategic objectives are intertwined. The Russian state’s close involvement in development, marketing and propagating Sputnik V – as well as its readiness to skip standard practices in order to make headway with the product – create well-founded distrust towards it in Western markets. In the emerging and developing markets, Sputnik V suffers from insufficient manufacturing capacity. In many countries, only a fraction of promised doses have been delivered, and setting up local manufacturing capacity outside the EAEU takes time. The European states should pay more attention to linkages between Russian innovation policies and its foreign, security and military policies. For Russia, these are not separate silos but build upon and support each other.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

199. Internet and Media Repression in Russia: Avoiding the Complicity of Western Actors

Author:
Veera Laine and Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Media control has been a key part of Vladimir Putin’s exercise of power. Recently, however, the repression of freedom of expression has taken both a quantitative and a qualitative turn for the worse. The political leadership now perceives independent media as a threat in itself, and is applying comprehensive control over media outlets and even individual journalists. In particular, declarations about the media and journalists being ʻforeign agentsʼ have increased sharply. Such repression drives journalists and the media to leave the country. Internet-enabled journalism from exile has duly become an important part of independent media. The growing importance of the internet, largely connected to Western platforms, and the diminishing role of state-run television in the face of multiple popular grievances, are key reasons for the regimeʼs accelerated repression. Under these difficult circumstances, the readiness of internet giants to censor political content on the basis of their commercial interests further restricts the information space in Russia, and therefore needs to be resisted.
Topic:
Mass Media, Media, Internet, Social Media, Freedom of Expression, Repression, and Freedom of Press
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

200. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe