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1. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

3. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

4. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

5. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

6. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

7. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:
Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:
Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

11. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:
Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

12. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:
Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

14. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:
Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

15. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:
Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

16. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

17. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:
Cori Fleser
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

19. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine

Author:
Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

20. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

24. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. EU Defence After Ukraine: Denmark’s CSDP U-Turn

Author:
Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The final brief looks at Denmark’s decision to abandon its opt-out from the Common Security and Defence Policy which, while not as significant as Finland and Sweden’s decisions to join NATO, will bring greater strategic coherence to northern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Denmark

26. The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy

Author:
Kristi Raik
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In this Brief, Kristi Raik explores the profound changes in the EU’s and NATO’s Russia strategy following the invasion of Ukraine. Russia is now approached as an adversary and existential threat not just to Ukraine, but to European and international rules-based security order. She highlights two major factors – enhancing Ukraine’s and NATO’s defence vis à vis Russia and isolating the Russian economy from the West – as key elements of an emerging new Western strategy. First, military force is now seen as an essential element in containing and pushing back Russian aggression. A considerable increase of NATO’s presence on its eastern front and extensive military aid to Ukraine both indicate a new approach. The previously widely held view that European security was improved by constraining Western military presence and involvement in Russia’s neighbourhood has proved untenable. Second, the EU and more broadly the West is reassessing its economic ties with Russia. The post-Cold War Western belief in positive economic interdependence as a tool to promote not just economic development and liberalisation, but also the spread of democracy and peace, is broken. The EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels has turned into a geopolitical vulnerability that the Union is gradually trying to diminish through sanctions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

27. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War in Cyberspace

Author:
Dmytro Dubov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The second brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war in cyberspace. Dmytro Dubov, Head of the Information Security and Cyber Security Department of the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kyiv, examines Russia’s methods of cyber attack against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure facilities, and their impact. He discusses the close coordination between Russia’s cyber and propaganda activities and highlights future challenges for Russia in the IT realm that, if left unaddressed, will degrade its competitiveness in cyberspace. He concludes that Russia has so far failed—at least in part due to Ukraine’s progress in cyber security and defence—to deliver the effects it desired in its cyber attacks against Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Propaganda, Cyberspace, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. Russia’s War in Ukraine: The War at Sea

Author:
Bill Combes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The sixth brief in the “Russia’s War in Ukraine” series concerns the war at sea. Captain USN (ret) William “Bill” Combes, the Director of the Department of Leadership and Management Studies at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, examines the activities and the role of Russia’s Black Sea Navy since 2014, and particularly after 24 February 2022, including the blockade against Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s naval and coastal defence. He assesses that the loss of the air defence and command functions associate with the flagship Moskva and the damage to other ships that carry land-attack missiles has eroded Russia’s ability to maintain sea control and reduced its naval-based strike capabilities. He concludes that what Ukraine really needs is direct naval assistance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Navy, Maritime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic Sea

29. Tanks versus Banks: Russian Military versus EU Geoeconomic Power

Author:
Bernard Siman, Sven Biscop, and Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
War is an instrument of policy. Those who lose sight of the policy objectives, or keep shifting them, rarely do well in war. The European Union and its Member States (and NATO) are not directly involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, but they have unleashed a major geoeconomic offensive in response to Putin’s geopolitical gambit. They too, therefore, have to define precise objectives, and prepare for the new geoeconomic and geopolitical world that will inevitably result from this war. First, rerouted supply chains will create new challenges and dependencies for the EU. Second, instability in other states, as a consequence of the disruptions in the global economy, may indirectly also affect the EU. Finally, long-term relations with Russia obviously have to be reassessed, but relations with China and the alliance with the US are evolving too.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Civil-Military Relations, and Banking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

30. Russia’s shifting foreign and security policy in Northern Europe: The new geopolitical meaning of ‘good neighbourliness’

Author:
Sinikukka Saari and Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since the start of Putin’s third presidential term in 2012, geopolitical competition has also become rooted in the Nordic region, and small states’ room for manoeuvre in security policy has shrunk. In Russia’s view, maintaining ‘good neighbourly relations’ is primarily the responsibility of small states that always need to negotiate the limits of their sovereignty with great powers, such as Russia. From the Nordic point of view, the relations may require walking on eggshells. Prior to 2014, Norway was often mentioned among Russia’s ‘good neighbours’, but now Russia regularly calls off its policy of ‘reassurance and deterrence’. There are increasing signs that, in Russia’s view, a ‘good neighbour’ should refrain from extensive security collaboration and training with NATO and the US. Hence, Finland and Sweden cannot wholly avoid political tension with Russia merely by staying outside of the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

31. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

32. German strengths and weaknesses in the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Emmanuel Comte
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The Russian attack on Ukraine has activated a series of tropes about the international balance of power in Europe. Most mainstream opinion outlets have published criticisms of Germany for supposedly being dependent on Russia and threatening the European security system by hesitating when decisive action is required. The following points serve to reintroduce some facts into the conversation. The current war in Ukraine is primarily the result of German-Russian rivalry. The war is a case of an established power, Russia, miscalculating in its efforts to prevent a rising power, Germany, from absorbing a nation within its sphere of cooperation: Ukraine. Germany’s strategy has been subtle, seeking to manage through economic interdependence an international conflict predicated upon balance of power considerations. Since circa 1900, Turkey has also played a key role in the German security system in the Black Sea region. With the benefit of hindsight, Germany’s strategy has been the most appropriate to the situation, given that Russia has been completely isolated while Germany is surrounded by allies. Germany’s problems today are not in its Russian policy, but rather in self-defeating ideologies which include the “Green” movement and economic statism.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

33. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Liana Fix and Steven Keil
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action

Author:
Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:
Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and North America

36. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:
Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

37. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. If Russia Uses Migration as a Weapon, Europeans Should Respond In Kind

Author:
Alia Fakhry, Roderick Parkes, and András Rácz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Around 442,000 people have so far fled Ukraine – not just to the EU, but also to neighbors like Moldova. This is a humanitarian issue, and should not be conflated with “migrant instrumentalization” (MI), whereby a state pushes people across a border to coerce the EU to change position. Yet Russia is likely to employ MI in this way, especially if it moves deep into Western Ukraine. Drawing on an in-depth study, we show how the EU can meet this specific threat.
Topic:
Security, Migration, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Ukraine

40. Sea Change for Europe’s Security Order: Three Future Scenarios

Author:
Christian Mölling, Tyson Barker, David Hagebölling, Afra Herr, and Kai Kornhuber
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The war of aggression that Russia launched against Ukraine in February has destroyed the European security order. The German government has defined this moment as a sea change (Zeitenwende) for its foreign and security policy. It still must envisage and shape a new order. Key factors are whether Europe will be united in strategic policy areas, and how Russia will position itself.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe

41. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:
Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

42. NATO’s Tunnel Vision

Author:
George Beebe
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Despite Russia’s violent rejection of a NATO-centric Europe, the United States should still pursue its vision of a continent that will one day be “peaceful, whole, and free.” The alternative is a blood-soaked division of the continent, constantly prone to escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. The United States needs to adopt a different approach to achieving its vision, as follows: • The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine’s independence as a neutral state outside NATO. • If Europe is to be whole, NATO cannot serve as its overarching security arm. NATO should focus on defense of its existing members, not expanding its ranks or operating out of area, including against China. • Over time, our goal should be evolution toward a U.N. Security Council-type arrangement in Europe that includes both NATO and non-NATO members. The price of admission for Russia must be good faith compliance with the terms of a settlement in Ukraine. • If Europe is to be free, we must recognize that a stable security environment in Europe is a prerequisite for the ex-Soviet states gradually becoming more liberal. The best means of ensuring that Europe is free is by revitalizing democracy within the West itself.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

43. The Ukraine Example: Circumstances Matter for Effective Security Assistance

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
US aid would not have been nearly as effective without Ukraine’s efforts to improve its military prior to the 2022 Russian invasion. US security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion in February 2022 has been substantial, but was not sufficient to guarantee Ukraine’s initial military success in the war. Data reveals that US security assistance to Ukraine, which mainly consisted of nonproliferation-related aid before 2014, increased after Russia’s invasion of Crimea that year. However, Ukraine’s failures against Russia in Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine were largely due to an undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained Ukrainian military. Ukraine’s focus on remedying these problems, along with increased combat experience, principally drove Ukrainian military improvements by 2022. These internal changes, as well as Russia’s poor military organization and force employment in the first phase of its 2022 invasion, are essential for understanding the contributions of US equipment and weapons to Ukrainian military successes. These lessons are instructive not only for US security assistance to Ukraine, but also for the many other settings where US security assistance is a prominent policy tool.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

44. The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine could mark a watershed for European security. There has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united around three key ideas. Firstly, they believe it is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally. Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crisis, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular. Europeans disagree on which are the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. The crisis will likely test Europeans’ readiness to defend the European security order.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. Survive and thrive: A European plan to support Ukraine in the long war against Russia

Author:
Piotr Buras, Marie Dumoulin, Gustav Gressel, and Jeremy Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is likely to last many years, even if the violence may subside at times. To sustain Ukraine during this conflict, Europeans should draw up a four-part ‘long-war plan’. This plan would comprise military assistance to Ukraine in the form of a ‘security compact’; security assurances that respond to scenarios of Russian escalation; economic support, giving Ukraine access to the EU’s single market; and help to secure Ukraine’s energy supply. Besides its practical impact, this plan will signal Europeans’ commitment to assisting Ukraine, showing Kyiv, Moscow, and the wider global community that the EU is in it for the long haul. The long-war plan will also provide clarity to anxious publics in member states. Together, these proposals would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and help create the long-term conditions for a resolution to the war – if and when a more constructive attitude emerges in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Conflict, Military, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:
Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

47. Pugwash Statement on the War in Ukraine

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is a very dangerous war inside Europe. It is the first significant Russian military intervention in Europe in more than 50 years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:
Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2020-21

Author:
M. Patrick Hulme and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, is increasingly critical as new and long-standing hotspots— including the Taiwan strait, Korean peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea—become more volatile. The need for confidence-building measures is clear, and a central tool of confidence building is defense transparency. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security, including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, and the major external powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, North Korea, Korea, East China, and United States of America

50. Trying to govern the ungovernable: International Law on cyber and information operations in Russian

Author:
Asbjørn Thranov and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia has proposed an international regime governing the use of cyber and information operations. However, ‘digital sovereignty’ means something very different in Moscow than it does in Washington. In September 2020, the Russian authorities launched a new initiative to regulate the use of cyber and information operations by states. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, introduced the debate by suggesting that Russia and the USA lead the way by signing a bilateral agreement restricting their activities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The two states, so Putin suggested, should establish regular dialogue and set up a ‘hot line’. Putin also proposed a new agreement on cyber and information operations that should ‘exchange guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of the other side, including into electoral processes, inter alia, by means of the ICTs and high-tech methods’. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, added more details. In a statement, he drew a dark picture of the world ‘facing a real cyber pandemic’, pointing to the risk of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the interference by some states in the internal affairs of other states. ‘It is high time’, so he claimed, that the international community agreed on a regime to regulate the use of ICTs. Russia has proceeded to promote the new initiative at the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which has responded with a decision to renew the mandate of the open-ended working group on the security and use of ICTs in 2021-2025.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America