Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography Iran Content Type Policy Brief

1. De-escalation Efforts: What Tehran wants from a prisoner swap deal with Washington?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
US National Security Council Spokesperson Adrienne Waston, in a statement on August 10, 2023, affirmed that Iran has released from prison five Americans who were detained and has placed them on house arrest. US citizens Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, Emad Shargi, and two others were released from Tehran’s notorious Evin prison to house arrest. The US official described their release as “an encouraging step” and stressed that Washigton will continue efforts to bring them “all back home in the United States.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

2. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

3. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

4. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

5. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:
Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Arming the Revolution: Trends in Iranian Defense Spending, 2013–23

Author:
Henry Rome
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic boasts a large and expanding nuclear program, the most capable missile and drone force in the Middle East, and a broad network of proxies that threaten U.S. interests. Nevertheless, scholars have devoted little attention to a key area: Iran’s defense spending. Although the data is publicly available, tabulating it is more difficult than one might assume, and three particular hazards await: (1) conversion of Iranian rials to dollars at unrealistic rates, (2) reliance on spending plans as opposed to actual spending, and (3) undercounting. Thus, any attempt to understand Iran’s military spending must scrupulously avoid such traps. In this Policy Note, Iran expert Henry Rome offers the most detailed public accounting yet of Tehran’s recent defense spending, illustrated by charts showing domestic trends and comparisons with regional rivals. The findings show how spending surged following the 2015 nuclear deal and plummeted following the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. They also suggest that a new nuclear accord with Washington will likely prompt another increase, demanding a broader strategy to counter Iran’s military ambitions alongside its nuclear ones.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Economy, Defense Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

8. Snapback Sanctions on Iran: More Bark Than Bite?

Author:
Henry Rome and Louis Dugit-Gros
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Threatening to reimpose old UN sanctions would likely have little practical effect on Tehran’s ability to trade oil and export drones, while the plethora of other potential complications suggest that it should be treated as a tool of last resort. In recent weeks, the United States, Britain, France, and Germany have argued that Iran’s sale of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231, the backbone of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). These allegations, combined with ongoing diplomatic deadlock over reviving that 2015 nuclear agreement, have led some to suggest pursuing “snapback,” a provision that would reimpose terminated UN resolutions on Iran and essentially scrub the JCPOA from the books. How would snapback work, and what political, economic, and security consequences would it have?
Topic:
Security, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

9. 2020 Country Brief: Iran

Author:
Third Way
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario. Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program, because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies were shocked—and for the first time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations in August of this year. Now it will be more difficult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the future. President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a difficult choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia, and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity. Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies, President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would include. Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a responsible global player.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. The 7th Round of Talks: Iran’s foot-dragging over the return to nuclear talks

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
French President Emanuel Macron, on September 6, held his sec-ond official phone call with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi since his ascent to presidency, to discuss the future of the Vienna talks aiming to revive the 2015 nuclear deal. Six rounds of talks have been held so far In Vienna.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

11. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

12. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

13. Pugwash Note on the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle Eastern Security

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
This is a very short note addressing the issue of the Iran nuclear agreement and pointing out some key issues that are relevant to enhancing Middle Eastern security.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

14. Europe Is Creating an Opportunity for Iran Talks, and Washington Should Take It

Author:
Charles Thépaut and Elena DeLozier
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
By triggering the nuclear deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, Britain, France, and Germany are opening diplomatic space that could help the United States and Iran return to the negotiating table. In a press conference following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, President Trump reaffirmed his administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and asked, once again, for European countries to leave the nuclear deal. Meanwhile, Tehran announced what it called a “fifth and final remedial step” away from its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In response, the British, French, and German foreign ministers stated on January 14 that they would trigger the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM). At the same time, however, the E3 clarified that they are not joining the Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign, which has steadily intensified ever since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Contrary to U.S. claims, the European decision will not immediately provoke “snapback” UN sanctions on Iran (though that scenario could unfold later if the E3 plan fails and Iran’s violations go before the UN Security Council). Instead, Europe is maintaining its evenhanded position somewhere between Washington and Tehran in order to preserve the possibility of new negotiations, on both the nuclear program and other regional issues.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

15. Assessing the JCPOA from a Historical Perspective

Author:
Christian Koch, Marc Finaud, and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Policy Forum issue analyses the 2004-2006 initiative to establish a sub-regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf (GWMDFZ) as a tool to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state. The initiative’s gradual approach which aimed at the ultimate goal of encompassing the entire Middle East (including Israel) was innovative, and the assertive role of some smaller Gulf states in expressing their security concerns/interests and verification standards that Tehran would have had to meet was unprecedented. But the entire sub-regional idea remained confined to the declaratory level. In contrast, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or greement/accord) – endangered as it currently is – struck between the E3/EU+3 and Iran exceeds some of the concerns of the earlier initiative, yet misses others. We conclude that new – and ultimately sustainable – regional forums as communication mechanisms are needed to tackle these issues without touching on the JCPOA. The challenges go beyond Iran and include the nuclear activities of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and even more so of Saudi Arabia. Our Cooperative Idea emphasises that moving beyond the purely declaratory policy of the GWMDFZ initiative could also help to overcome the current stalemate regarding a zonal disarmament arrangement for the whole Middle East/Gulf region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

16. Towards a Missile-Free Zone for the Middle East – Moving Beyond the Nuclear Dimension of the JCPOA

Author:
Marc Finaud and Bernd W. Kubbig
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The highly controversial missile problem in the Middle East should – and can – be constructively tackled by not singling out Iran and by avoiding onesided maximalist and unrealistic demands towards Tehran. The authors aim at providing incentives for Iran to start discussion on its missile arsenal in three ways: they propose (a) applying vital elements that led to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA; (b) regionalising future talks in a triangle that includes from the beginning the missiles of Saudi Arabia and Israel; and (c) starting with modest confidence-building steps among the three major powers. Among the extra-regional players the United States continues to have a special responsibility for engaging in such a cooperative approach.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Saudi Arabia

17. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

18. Beyond Camp David: A Gradualist Strategy to Upgrade the US-Gulf Security Partnership

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran. While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse. In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Persian Gulf

19. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Monumental Mistake by the Obama Administration or a New Beginning?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will be scrutinized by diplomats, military experts and politicians for months and years to come. Statesmen and politicians will interpret the deal differently and each will vie to use the argument which suites the audience and the domestic base she/he represents. However, the psychological, economic, political, and military implications of the deal on the United States, Europe and many Middle Eastern countries will be monumental. The deal will impact the balance of power in the Middle East and will change its dynamics forever, change the dynamics of the energy markets in Europe, Thus creating tension between Russia and Europe, and will ignite a fierce security debate between Democrats and Republicans in the United States on the culture of regime change and the use of force. The deal will bring the subject of regime change to the political forefront in the US and will raise a serious question on whether the use of force is the only effective mechanism to change the behavior of states in order to achieve favorable outcomes. Both Republicans and Democrats used force as a tool for regime change, however the Obama administration is a advocating for new means: diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Regime Change, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany

20. Slow Thaw: Testing Possibilities for Cooperation with Iran After a Nuclear Deal

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Jacob Stokes, and Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
With nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States restarting today, Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Middle East Security Program Director Ilan Goldenberg, CNAS Bacevich Fellow Jacob Stokes, and CNAS Middle East Program Research Associate Nicholas Heras have produced a new policy brief on potential cooperation with Iran in the wake of a nuclear deal. The authors argue any thawing of the relationship would face tremendous challenges.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

21. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

22. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

23. Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The international community has been acutely concerned for many years about Iran's increasing capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. With sufficient fissile material and a warhead design, Iran could use its existing ballistic missiles to pose a credible nuclear threat throughout the region. Consequently, after repeatedly directing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, the UN Security Council decided in 2010 that Iran also had to halt all activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now that serious negotiations are under way to curtail Iran's ability to dash for a bomb, seeking ballistic missile limits as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would be unwise. Getting adequate and verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program remains the highest priority. The best way to address Iran's potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent. To also demand severe limits on conventional weapons that Iran regards as vital to its self-defense would jeopardize the negotiations' key objective.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

24. Mitigating the Security Risks Posed by a Near-Nuclear Iran

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
US President Barack Obama has called the international dispute over Iran's advanced nuclear program "one of the leading security challenges of our time." Fitting for a problem of this magnitude, analysts have thoroughly examined the major policy options for addressing the challenge, including most notably, diplomacy, containment, and military strikes. Lost in this focus on the broad policy options to prevent or deal with a nuclear-armed Iran, however, is the acknowledgement that Iran already possesses a latent nuclear weapons capability and that this capability poses several threats to international peace and security at present. Moreover, it is almost certain that Iran will retain such a capability in the short to medium term regardless of how the nuclear diplomacy progresses-and even if the international community and Iran agree to a "comprehensive" nuclear deal. Rather than an exclusive focus on broad strategies for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, therefore, it would also be prudent to identify and mitigate against the challenges posed by Iran's extant latent nuclear capability, a capability that will likely remain in place even if Washington's policy of prevention is successful.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Iran

25. Background on the 'Possible Military Dimensions' of Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Nima Gerami
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Iran's compartmented nuclear program and fears of sabotage have complicated efforts to address IAEA concerns about the program's suspected military side.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

26. Easing US and EU Sanctions on Iran

Author:
Kenneth Katzman
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Since the seizure of US hostages in Iran following the 1979 revolution, the US government has imposed a succession of economic penalties against the Islamic Republic. The complexity and severity of these sanctions intensified following Iran's resumption of a uranium enrichment program in 2006. However, there are a variety of ways to provide extensive sanctions relief should there be a deal placing long-term restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

27. Iran and the P5+1: Getting to "Yes"

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
That nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the UK, U.S. and Germany) were extended beyond the 20 July 2014 deadline was neither unexpected nor unwelcome. The parties ha d made enough headway to justify the extension, which was envisioned in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) that was signed in November 2013 and came into force in January, but given the political and technical complexity, they remain far apart on fundamental issues. Unless they learn the lessons of the last six months and change their approach for the next four, they will lose the opportunity for a resolution not just by the new 24 November deadline but for the foreseeable future. Both sides need to retreat from maximalist positions, particularly on Iran's enrichment program. Tehran should postpone plans for industrial- scale enrichment and accept greater constraints on the number of its centrifuges in return for P5+1 flexibility on the qualitative growth of its enrichment capacity through research and development.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Economics, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Middle East, and France

28. States Will Not Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists

Author:
Daryl Press and Keir A. Lieber
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Nuclear terrorism is often described as the single biggest threat to U.S. national security. The fear is that a hostile state could surreptitiously transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile material to a like-minded terror group, thus orchestrating a devastating attack on the United States or its allies while remaining anonymous and avoiding retaliation. This fear served as a key justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and it helps drive current arguments in favor of a military strike against Iran's nuclear program.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Iran

29. Great Expectations: Iran's New President and the Nuclear Talks

Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In a region that recently has produced virtually nothing but bad news, Hassan Rouhani's 4 August swearing in as Iran's president offers a rare and welcome glimmer of hope. There are still far more questions than answers: about the extent of his authority; his views on his country's nuclear program, with which he long has been associated; and the West's ability to display requisite flexibility and patience. But, although both sides can be expected to show caution, now is the time to put more ambitious proposals on the table, complement the multilateral talks with a bilateral U.S.-Iranian channel and expand the dialogue to encompass regional security issues.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Democratization, Diplomacy, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

30. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs as P5+1 Talks Resume

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiations are poised to resume between Iran and the six powers seeking to rein in Iran's nuclear program, it is difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. For years now, the UN Security Council has demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran continues to expand its nuclear program and insists it will never compromise its right to enrich, the United States continues to tighten sanctions on Iranian trade and finances, and alarms are raised about Iran being able to sprint to a nuclear bomb with little warning. Yet, with a new Iranian president and negotiating team, there are grounds for cautious optimism that talks this time can be different. Although Iran continues to enrich uranium and add to its nuclear complex, time remains to negotiate an agreement that adequately guards against Iran building nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

31. Making the Case: Stopping Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Aki Peritz
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The U.S. is currently leading a multinational effort to squeeze Iran and force them to give up its weapons program. Here's how to make the case for that approach and why it makes sense: A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Sanctions are working—they are wrecking the Iranian economy—but they need more time to have their full impact. We can blunt Iran's capabilities by strengthening our allies' missile defense systems. Military strikes now could exacerbate the problem, but all options must remain on the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and North America

32. Turkey and the Iranian nuclear programme: Key to progress in regional disarmament?

Author:
Hanna Ojanen and Barbara Zanchetta
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The increasing tension around the Iranian nuclear programme and the uncompromising positions of the protagonists have made the goal of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East seem utopic. Yet, the current strategy of maintaining a low profile in the discussions on the zone, while keeping the focus exclusively on Iran, is not likely to lead to progress. Instead, combining the Iranian question with the zone and enlarging the content and scope of the negotiations even further by including Iran's neighbours could be a better strategy. Turkey could play a key role because of its unique relations with Iran, and because of its strong quest for a more prominent international position — if it can only strike the right balance between the role of lead actor and team player. Turkish-Iranian relations could notably inspire the consideration of accompanying pragmatic agreements on regional cooperation in other fields as a way forward for the upcoming Middle East disarmament negotiations in Finland.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Finland

33. Diplomatic Engagement: The Path to Avoiding War and Resolving the Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Seel
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
U.S.-Iranian relations are bad and getting worse. The New Year has opened with rising tensions between the United States and Iran and an increased prospect of war—either intentional or accidental. The Nov. 2011 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency details why the international community remains deeply concerned about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. While sanctions and other measures have slowed down Iran’s movement toward acquiring a nuclear weapons option, Tehran continues to improve its nuclear capabilities and has so far refused to implement the confidence-building steps necessary to ensure it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The latest round of U.S. unilateral sanctions has been met with Iranian threats of closing the Straits of Hormuz through which 35% of the world’s seaborne oil passes. Iran reinforced those threats with ten days of military exercises in nearby waters that included launches of anti-ship missiles. These and other developments highlight how relatively minor incidents could quickly escalate into a major military conflict. At the same time, Iran proposed on December 31 a new round of talks with the P5+1 group of nations, suggesting that that diplomatic options to resolve the nuclear concerns about its nuclear activities have not been exhausted. In the following Iran Nuclear Brief, ACA Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann argues that in order to avoid unintentional conflict with Iran, there is an urgent need to establish better lines of bilateral communication at all levels—between military forces in the region, between diplomats, and between senior officials. Thielmann also explains why pragmatic diplomatic engagement is essential to a successful strategy to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

34. Charting a Diplomatic Path On the Iran Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Peter Grail
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Even as tensions over Iran’s nuclear program rise, the principal parties engaged in the issue say that they seek a peaceful resolution through diplomacy. Earlier this month, Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili reportedly sent a letter to European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton—who represents the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—in response to the six-country offer for the renewal of serious talks on Iran’s nuclear program. With the P5+1 insisting that a diplomatic path to resolve the issue remains open and Tehran’s professed interest in dialogue, the question arises: what steps could the two sides take to resolve the impasse? In her letter to Jalili last October calling for renewed negotiations, Ashton said the process would need to begin with confidence-building measures to facilitate longer-term engagement. Given the current trust deficit and the inability of the fractured Iranian political leadership to agree on whether and how to engage on the nuclear issue, an approach that builds upon short-term arrangements makes sense. But it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement might be. In this respect, Ashton said in her letter that the goal of the six countries is “a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” reaffirming the group’s commitment to proposals it put forward 2006 and 2008. This brief provides an overview of these proposals and related confidence-building steps and discusses how they address the critical issue of Iran’s enrichment program.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Dialogue, and P5+1
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

35. The Breakout Option: Raising the Bar for the Supreme Leader

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The U.S. intelligence community still assesses that Tehran has not yet actually decided to build a nuclear weapon. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would be the one to give that order and the one who would control the weapons. It is therefore worth pondering what steps could discourage him from proceeding down the nuclear weapons path. If Khamenei's foremost goals are the survival of the Islamic Republic with himself as supreme leader, developing nuclear capabilities may be seen an asset, even with the damaging sanctions that result. By positioning himself as a defiant defender of Iranian nuclear progress against foreign bullying, he can reinforce the domestic legitimacy of the clerical regime. If he came to believe that Iran could forestall continuing economic punishment and eventual military attack only by abject capitulation, he might decide that breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to build a bomb would be the preferred path for restoring Iran's international position and securing the Islamic revolution. The challenge for the United States is to devise policies that would make it as difficult as possible for Khamenei to retain domestic support and international sympathy if he were to go for a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

36. Iran Nuclear Negotiations: What's Next After Moscow?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
On June 19, Iran concluded the third round of talks on its nuclear program in as many months, this time in Moscow, with senior officials of the six powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Although there were strong incentives for the six to secure limits on Iran's most worrisome stockpiles of enriched uranium and for Iran to avoid an impending tightening of economic sanction, no breakthrough was achieved by the end of the latest round. But neither did diplomatic dialogue come to an end. The sides reached agreement to meet again at a technical level within two weeks in Istanbul, to be followed by renewed contact between the senior negotiators. With perseverance from the parties, the ongoing talks can mark the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end of chances for ultimate resolution.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

37. Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor. What many now consider a proliferation loophole in the NPT was first seen as theoretical because only nuclear weapons states had nuclear-powered submarines when the treaty was negotiated. Now, as more and more countries initiate or announce intentions to initiate nuclear-powered submarine programs, this excuse for enriching uranium to levels beyond the needs of civilian power reactors intensifies the challenge of achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States should adjust its policy by: 1) choosing a reactor for the Ohio-class SSBN follow-on that does not require weapons-grade fuel and 2) pushing for multilateral action to close or at least narrow the NPT loophole that allows for non-nuclear weapons states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Submarines, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

38. Iran’s Nuclear Program: A Case Study in Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance Management

Author:
Vance Serchuk
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Speaking at Suntory Hall in Tokyo during his inaugural visit to the Asia-Pacific region as President of the United States, Barack Obama in November 2009 affirmed his Administration’s commitment to “an enduring and revitalized alliance between the United States and Japan.” Noting the impending 60th anniversary of the alliance, President Obama pledged to “deepen” the ties between Washington and Tokyo as a cornerstone of a broader strategy of reengagement with the region. At the same time, Obama cast the U.S.-Japan alliance in global terms, noting Japan’s “important contributions to stability around the world—from reconstruction to Iraq, to combating piracy off the Horn of Africa, to assistance for the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan.”
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

39. Iran's Internal Politics: The Supreme Leader Grows Ever Lonelier at the Top

Author:
Barbara Slavin and Yasmin Alem
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
As the nuclear standoff between Iran and much of the rest of the world deepens, Iranian domestic politics are in turmoil. Trying to reduce endemic conflict within the system, the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has succeeded in recent years in expelling discordant voices and closing off institutional loopholes for dissent.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran

40. Assessing Iran's Nuclear Program Without Exaggeration or Complacency

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Shortly after the early September release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on Iran’s nuclear program, the Arms Control Association assembled a panel of top experts to assess the status of Iran’s nuclear effort and examine strategies to address it. The September 19 briefing for Congressional staffers was part of an ongoing series of briefings organized by ACA and its partners on “Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle.” Along with nuclear terrorism, the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not yet in possession of them is at the forefront of U.S. national security concerns. Iran dominates the field. The following Iran Nuclear Brief by Mark Fitzpatrick, Director of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, is based on his presentation at the September 19 briefing. It provides a status report on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and an evaluation of their potential as a nuclear weapons threat.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

41. The IAEA’s November Report on Iran: More Confirmation than Revelation

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Loehrke
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The release of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program in early November attracted intense media interest and stimulated strong political reactions in the United States and around the world. The IAEA report and its 14-page annex represented a milestone for the Vienna-based agency in terms of its willingness to present detailed information to the public on activities of concern in Iran’s nuclear program. The Arms Control Association provided an in-depth assessment of the IAEA report on November 8, 2011. Yet much of the subsequent press coverage has been inaccurate in its comparison of the IAEA’s latest report with past characterizations of Iran’s nuclear activities – most notably, the public summary of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. The following Iran Nuclear Brief elucidates the similarities and differences in those two documents, incorporating an earlier article by ACA’s senior fellow, Greg Thielmann, and Benjamin Loehrke, senior policy analyst for the Ploughshares Fund, which was published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on November 23, 2011.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

42. Iran Sanctions: Preferable to War but No Silver Bullet

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The broadest and toughest sanctions regime imposed on any country except Libya has not convinced Iran's leaders to abandon a program that appears aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Instead of seeking even more crippling economic penalties—such as an oil embargo—that would fracture the international consensus on Iran, the United States should tighten implementation of measures already in force and enact more sanctions linked to human rights, which have a wide constituency in Europe and demonstrate to the Iranian people that international concerns extend beyond nuclear weapons. The U.S. should also work with its diplomatic partners to craft new proposals that would couple acceptance of limited uranium enrichment with rigorous international monitoring, and encourage China, Iran's major trading partner, to use its leverage in support of nonproliferation.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Iran

43. How Reliable is Intelligence on Iran's Nuclear Program?

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For a country that has been accumulating nuclear know-how since the Eisenhower administration, Iran has hardly been sprinting toward a bomb. Indeed, repeated prognostications that Tehran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear power have a Chicken Little quality: The sky did not fall over the past decade, and it seems unlikely to do so for the next year or two or three. Still, Iran has made steady progress accumulating the elements and expertise required to make nuclear weapons, and it would be naive and irresponsible to discount what appears to be a cottage industry of piecemeal proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

44. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions

Author:
Barbara Slavin
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Sanctions and China's growing economic clout have altered Iran's trading patterns in ways that are reducing Iran's access to hard currency but may also be insulating the Iranian government and political elite from further US unilateral pressures.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

45. The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing

Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The revelation in 2009 of nuclear facilities near Qom intensified international criticism of Iran's opaque nuclear development. As Western countries prepare to pursue tougher sanctions at the UN, China's acquiescence as a permanent Security Council member is vital but will be difficult to obtain. Beijing is reluctant to pursue further sanctions, insisting that a solution to the nuclear impasse must be sought first and foremost through diplomacy. It emphasises that as long as Iran honours its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments not to use nuclear technology for military purposes, it should not be obliged to forgo its rights, including enrichment, under that accord.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
China, Iran, and Beijing

46. New Multilateral Consensus Emerges on Iran

Author:
Patrick Clawson and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A February 18 report from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Paris-based organization that sets global standards for combating money laundering and terrorism financing, revealed new details about Iran's ongoing activities in both realms. The same day, a new report from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reached disturbing conclusions about Iran's past nuclear efforts while raising intriguing questions about technical problems the regime may be encountering. As global powers debate a fourth round of UN sanctions on Iran, these reports demonstrate growing international consensus on the nature of Iran's illicit conduct.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

47. Analyzing the New UN Sanctions Proposal on Iran

Author:
Patrick Clawson, Jeffrey White, and Michael Singh
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The May 18 draft resolution proposing additional sanctions to curb Iran's nuclear program is backed by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Although this unanimity is the proposal's principal strength, it comes at the cost of making the draft weaker in some sections than ideas discussed previously by the Obama administration. The following is an analysis of some of the resolution's key elements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Iran and Central Asia

48. Lessons from the Iran Nuclear Developments

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the fluid situation surrounding Iran's nuclear program, perhaps the safest bet is to expect more surprises. Despite the promising draft circulated on May 19, it is not clear how meaningful a sanctions resolution adopted by the UN Security Council will be, even if it is adopted soon. Nor is it clear how vigorously Brazil and Turkey will pursue the trilateral agreement that the two countries reached with Iran on May 16. All the same, important lessons can be drawn from this week's developments.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Central Asia, Turkey, and Brazil

49. The Iranian Opposition, the Nuclear Issue, and the West

Author:
Ray Takeyh and Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the wake of Iran's June 2009 presidential election and the development of an opposition movement, analysts are confronted with two questions: What impact will international diplomacy regarding the nuclear issue have on Iran's domestic politics? And what impact will Iran's domestic politics have on the issues of most concern to the international community? The newly released Washington Institute report Much Traction from Measured Steps offers good, bad, and mixed answers.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Washington, and Middle East

50. Ahmadinezhad's Bomb Rhetoric: Opportunities for U.S. Policy

Author:
Patrick Clawson
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 31, according to Iran's semiofficial Mehr News Agency, presidential chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashai claimed that the West had raised no objections to President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad's open proclamation that the Islamic Republic could build a nuclear bomb. How should this surprising claim be interpreted? And what implications might it hold for Iran's domestic politics, especially when viewed alongside Ahmadinezhad's history of confrontational rhetoric?
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and Iran