Search

Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years

31. Baltic Perspectives on Germany’s Role in NATO

Author:
Justinas Juozaitis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the second brief in our “Germany and the Security of the Baltic States” series, Justinas Juozaitis considers Germany’s contribution to NATO from a Baltic perspective and looks at what might change under Chancellor Olaf Scholz. Germany’s contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, including in the Baltic region, is substantial, but does not match what might be expected given its economic strength. The Bundeswehr already struggles to meet its commitments to the Alliance and recent increases in the defence budget have not translated into major improvements in capability. Germany will most likely not meet in full the promises it has made to enhancing collective defence. Even then, the new government will have to face decisions that will be unpopular with the public, and within their own coalition. Germany’s continued political support for deterrence in the Baltic region will likely continue, but its own military contribution will probably be smaller than promised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Economy, Regional Integration, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Baltic States

32. Why Belgium Needs a Cyber Command

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 19 October 2022, the Belgian Ministry of Defence declared the Initial Operating Capability of its new Cyber Command. Responding to the trend of states seeking competitive advantages in a new operational domain – as illustrated by several high-profile cyber-attacks on Belgian State institutions – the choice for developing a new instrument of statecraft has been made. This Egmont Policy Brief outlines the growing importance of developing cyber defence capabilities, discusses the organisational set-up for this Cyber Command, and finally zooms in on the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

33. The War against Ukraine and European Defence: When will we square the circle?

Author:
Bruno Angelet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
After the end of the Cold War, Europe’s harvesting of the peace dividend was fed by wrong assumptions and led to a persistent underinvestment in defence. Today, problems are three-fold: too small stocks, inadequate, insufficient capabilities, and very low industrial production capacity. In many cases, stocks went well below accepted NATO standards, putting many European military units in serious difficulty to achieve NATO and EU readiness-levels. Strategic enablers were in further decline over the last 20 years, and many European countries dismantled their stocks of heavy weaponry. Both in Libya (2011) and in Afghanistan (until the withdrawal of NATO troops, in August 2021), European armed forces were unable to sustain combat, or evacuate, without support of US military hardware. On the eve of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the intelligence gap left Europeans in disbelief when US intelligence proofed almost entirely correct. The European Defence industry is fragmented and overprotected by exemptions to the Single Market regulations for reasons of “national security”. Companies face shrinking export markets (due to stringent export-criteria) and reduced production capacity, often by more than half. They became easy prey for foreign take-overs. The war against Ukraine propels those problems to the critical edge: the rush to arm Ukraine has depleted national stocks. Heavy weaponry needed for Ukraine’s territorial defence (and for ours) is missing or already sold to private stores. The European industry cannot not ramp-up production without a long term prospect of sustained demand for Europe’s Armed Forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

34. Keeping the OSCE Alive

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
From September to December 2022 Belgium is chairing the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. Whilst political gridlock has plagued the organisation before, the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine has now plunged the OSCE in an existential crisis. This bodes badly for the European security architecture and the multilateral rules-based order in general. This Egmont Policy brief reviews the risk of a full breakdown in the functioning of the OSCE, analyses the multiple reasons for keeping the organization alive, and discusses several avenues by means of which the Belgian chairpersonship can contribute to such an outcome. Irrespective of the way in which the Russian-Ukraine war eventually concludes, the OSCE provides a unique framework for managing the post-war aftermath and reconstituting a novel arms control regime over the longer term.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

35. The New Force Model: NATO's European Army

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
At the June 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO leaders gave the green light to transition to a New Force Model (NFM) in the course of 2023. The avowed aim is to create a pool of 300,000 troops in a high state of readiness (as opposed to some 40,000 today), and to pre-assign these to specific defence plans. This is very ambitious (as well it should be), all the more so because these will mostly be European troops. Is NATO building a European army? The rationale behind the NFM is that to be able to respond to all eventualities, the NATO military commander, SACEUR, requires a better view of the available forces, and their state of readiness, beyond the 40,000 currently on rotation at any one time in the NATO Response Force (NRF). Hence the NFM provides for the organisation of forces in three tiers: 100,000 troops in tier 1 should be available within 10 days; 200,000 more in tier 2 within 10 to 30 days. Adding to the existing scheme of pre-deployed battlegroups in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, some additional tier 1 and 2 forces will be pre-deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, on a rotational basis, but probably not substantially so. More importantly, NATO aims for all tier 1 and 2 troops to be assigned to specific geographic defence plans for which they can then train. Tier 3, finally, provides for at least 500,000 troops more within one to six months.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

36. A European Defence Summit in May 2022: From Compass to Capabilities

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
By launching a war against Ukraine, right on the borders of the European Union, Russia has unleashed the strongest push to strengthen Europe’s defence since the end of the Cold War. Only its initial, 2014 invasion of Ukraine came close to having such effect. NATO has activated its defence plans and deployed forces on the borders with Russia. Just about every state in Europe has announced increased defence spending. And the EU finalised its Strategic Compass, its first ever defence strategy, with a much increased sense of urgency and purpose. The role of the EU in linking up national announcements and NATO targets is crucial, in fact, by providing a framework to align the efforts of the EU Member States, and by ensuring that the EU’s own indispensable targets are incorporated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

37. Germany’s shifting policy towards Russia: The sudden end of Ostpolitik

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A reassessment of Germany’s relations with Russia started after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was catalyzed by several offensive actions taken by Moscow, including hacking attacks against the national parliament, disinformation campaigns, as well as an attempt on the life of Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny. The new German government, formed following the September 2021 Bundestag election, is different from its predecessors in all important respects regarding foreign policymaking towards Russia. The Chancellor, the governing coalition, as well as the composition of the parliament have all changed. These changes have been pushing Germany towards a gradual reconsideration of its traditional Ostpolitik, which perceived mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Moscow as a guarantee of stability and predictability in Europe. Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, launched on 24 February, marks the point of no return. The war made Berlin cross several important red lines of German foreign policy, such as agreeing to very heavy sanctions against Russia, halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and delivering weapons to Ukraine. This de facto marks the end of Ostpolitik.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

38. A policy agenda for Finland’s entry into NATO: From ‘one for one’ to ‘one for all’

Author:
Edward Hunter Christie
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, Allies invited Finland and Sweden to join the NATO Alliance. In preparing for its membership, Finland will need to go through a reflection process on how it intends to contribute to NATO’s core tasks and make the most of its membership. Finland should consider making substantial contributions to the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea region, including in the Baltic states, and elsewhere on the Eastern Flank. In parallel, Finland should also ensure it contributes to the Southern Flank. Finland should aim to hit the ground running into the next cycle of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and fulfil all relevant capability targets. Finland should also aim to “start strong to stay strong” on all existing NATO Pledges, notably those on defence investment, cyber-defence, and resilience. It is typical for individual NATO Allies to seek a salient role when it comes to certain specific topics. For Finland, the Arctic (Northern Flank) and resilience seem most promising.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

39. NATO’s Nordic enlargement and Turkey’s reservations: Trilateral Memorandum of Understanding in the context of Turkey’s wider strategic interests

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
With the signing of the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Turkey dropped its initial objection to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership, but has since argued that the conditions agreed in the MoU have not yet been fulfilled. In addition to requiring Sweden and Finland to take a more vigorous stance regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its extension in Syria, Turkey has used Nordic NATO applications as a tool to raise these issues on NATO’s agenda, pressuring the US in particular for a change in its Syria policy. Turkey’s reservations need to be conceptualized within its determined search for strategic autonomy, increased room for manoeuvre, and an ideological decoupling from the West. Turkey’s strategic interests have increasingly diverged from the rest of the alliance, likely leading to a more permanent intra-alliance opposition position in the coming years, part of which are the ongoing trilateral talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and North America

40. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:
Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South