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Begin New Search Topic Science and Technology Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 1 Year Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Digital Sovereignty: For a Schuman Data Plan

Author:
Arno Pons
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 9 January, the European Commission launched the first cooperation and monitoring cycle for the achievement of the European Union’s digital decade by 2030. If, in the digital field, Europe faces issues of sovereignty, it is because it has left the sector open for over twenty years to the American Tech giants, who have imposed a game whose rules that have never been understood here. Either because these rules were inaccessible to the European Union (Moore and Metcalfe laws), or because we accepted that there were no rules of the game (code is law).
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Law, European Union, Data, European Commission, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:
Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

4. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Mobilizing Social Media Influencers: A European Approach to Oversight and Accountability

Author:
Paloma Muñoz Quick
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
To build a robust information space that is resilient toward the dangers of mis- and disinformation, European policy-makers must recognize the role of influencers and their messages. The EU’s Digital Services Act aims to establish accountability and transparency in online platforms. It includes civil society as an essential component of achieving that goal. Through collaborating with independent platform councils and promoting radical transparency, influencers can contribute to combating disinformation and ensuring that public values are upheld in online governance.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Social Media, Accountability, and Oversight
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Decisive but Forgotten: Germany’s Missing Technological Zeitenwende

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Bjorn Fägersten
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The digital technology transformation is a largely overlooked dimension of Zeitenwende. However, preserving national security, safeguarding core values enshrined in technology, ensuring access to critical technologies, and maintaining competitiveness need to be a policy priorities for Germany and Europe. All of these are integral elements of autonomy and sovereignty in a world increasingly characterized by great power rivalry. The looming policy decisions, however, will have divergent outcomes depending on the prevailing political paradigms.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

7. Evaluating Public Support for Chinese Vendors in Europe’s 5G Infrastructure

Author:
Tim Rühlig and Richard Q. Turcsányi
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany is considering banning equipment made by Chinese companies like tech giant Huawei – in its 5G mobile infrastructure. A revised 2021 IT Security Act failed to reduce China’s 59 percent market share. A representative opinion poll, shows only 30.8 percent of Germans want 5G cooperation with China. Across 11 European countries, skepticism is equal, with only 31.8 percent approval – though this varies greatly from country to country.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

8. A More Strategic Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Cross-border investment and trade give rise to both economic gains and economic vulnerabilities. As geopolitical competition is intensifying, governments increasingly resort to restricting cross-border investment and trade. Policies are informed by a desire to limit security risks and secure technological advantages rather than pursue efficiency gains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Americas

9. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:
Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

10. Assessing the Risk of Foreign Influence in UK Search Results

Author:
Bret Schafer and Peter Benzoni
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the de facto gateway to the vast troves of information available online, search services play a critical role in the modern information ecosystem. They are often the starting points for people’s questions about the world around them, from the innocuous to the deeply consequential. The results generated by search algorithms can therefore influence everything from consumer behavior to people’s political and social preferences, often in ways that are imperceptible to users of those systems. Given this significant power, search services are also targets of those who seek to manipulate information to advance a particular, and at times malign, agenda. This includes those working for or on behalf of autocratic foreign governments, who can attempt to leverage search results to whitewash human rights abuses, attack opponents, or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The threat is particularly acute with well-resourced states that operate global state-backed media outlets, troll farms, and other state-aligned information outlets that allow them to exploit search services through strategic content production, search engine optimization, or intentional manipulation. DOWNLOAD PDF To evaluate this potential risk, we analyzed data over a 30-day period across six search products on four search services (Google Search, Google News, Microsoft Bing, Bing News, Yandex Search, and Baidu Search) to assess the prominence of foreign state-linked websites, or those that reproduce content from those websites, in search returns for queries related to topics of national importance to the United Kingdom. Importantly, we could not assess, nor was it our intention to assess, whether the prominence of any state-linked sources in search results was the result of deliberate manipulation by those states or merely the product of search algorithms determining that the content produced by those sites was relevant to a given query. We also did not assess the relative quality of any individual state media outlets. We recognize that state-backed information sources exist on a broad spectrum in terms of their authoritativeness and journalistic standards, and that a connection to a foreign state is not necessarily problematic and should not be viewed by search services as an inherent risk. In short, our efforts to understand the prominence of state-linked sources in search results should not be viewed as an attempt to document wrongdoing, either by the sources themselves or by the search services that surfaced those sources. In addition, although we attempted to select topics that were important to UK interests instead of those that favored the interests of any one foreign government, some of the chosen queries—notably those related to the war against Ukraine—were more likely to be the focus of messaging from certain countries. Results from this study should therefore not be used as comparative data points to suggest that any one state is more influential in UK search results than any other. Instead, the goal of this research was simply to gain a better understanding of how and how often content from websites with direct or indirect links to foreign states—primarily state-backed media outlets but also websites directly or indirectly linked to foreign governments or foreign intelligence services—surfaced in search results in the four constituent countries of the UK. Though we offer several illustrative examples highlighting specific vulnerabilities uncovered by our research, the bulk of this report is focused on assessing a potential risk of foreign interference by identifying the types of variables—from the topic searched for to the language used—that regularly generated search results from state-linked websites, without assessing whether the content of those search results is potentially illegal under the UK’s newly created Foreign Interference Offense included in the National Security Act 2023. We did, however, pay particular attention to the presence of content produced by media outlets currently sanctioned by the UK government, namely Russian state media outlets that were sanctioned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe