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2. China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa
- Author:
- Dale Aluf
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In a new Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative issue brief, “China’s subsea-cable power in the Middle East and North Africa,” Aluf analyzes China’s campaign to make countries in the region more dependent on Chinese networks, while reducing its own dependence on foreign cables. For a country that seeks to alter the internet’s physical form and influence digital behavior while exerting supreme control over information flows, China’s growing presence in the Middle East and North Africa’s cable industry is significant because Beijing has the power to shape the route of global internet traffic by determining when, where, and how to build cables.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Science and Technology, Partnerships, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa
3. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes
- Author:
- Tiffany Vora
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
4. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine
5. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
- Topic:
- Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and United States of America
6. China “De-risking”: A Long Way from Political Statements to Corporate Action
- Author:
- Ole Spillner and Guntram Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Major Western leaders have been calling for “de-risking” from China, rather than “decoupling.” But what exactly de-risking means and how it differs from decoupling, remains unclear. It is ultimately firms, not governments, driving trade and investment relations. But firms cannot account for unidentified risks by themselves. National security risks are for governments to define. Complex supply chain externalities might entail risks to production that are also difficult for firms to account for. Furthermore, firms may bet that governments will rescue them if a worst-case scenario happens, effectively socializing risks. In the EU, Germany is particularly exposed to China risk in terms of security, macroeconomic, and political exposure.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Macroeconomics, Supply Chains, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
7. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa
- Author:
- Joshua Meservey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America
8. The battle for the Indian Ocean: How the EU and India can strengthen maritime security
- Author:
- Frédéric Grare and Manisha Reuter
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Over the last decade, China has gradually expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, combining its military modernisation and cooperation with partners with active diplomacy towards the island and coastal states of the region. China’s presence and capabilities threaten the freedom and influence of other actors in the area, including India and the EU. Europe’s key maritime trade routes to Asia run through the Indian Ocean, making the security of the region and freedom of navigation crucial for European interests. Many of the island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean have limited economic resources to exercise effective control at sea and are therefore dependent on extra-regional powers. As part of their approach to respond to China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the EU and India should jointly establish a regional maritime capacity building programme for island and coastal states in the Indian Ocean.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Maritime, Trade, Modernization, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, India, and Indian Ocean
9. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world
- Author:
- Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America
10. The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions
- Author:
- Tobias Gehrke and Julian Ringhof
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Technology is increasingly a battleground in the strategic competition between the US and China. Western technology contributes to China’s military modernisation as well as the development of Russian weapon systems. The US is restricting trade in key technologies with China and pushing EU member states to follow its lead. To better defend its interests, the EU needs to develop clearer policies on China and security, including pursuing the ‘de-risking’ of its relations with Beijing. The EU must develop a new strategic technology doctrine and upgrade its export control policy. This more coherent stance will enable the EU both to act where necessary but also to defend itself and its member states from future pressure from China – and the US.
- Topic:
- Security, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Exports
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
11. Australia’s Strategic Responses to the US-China Rivalry and Implications to Korea
- Author:
- Ina Choi, Sunhyung Lee, Jaeho Lee, and So Eun Kim
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- As in other Asia-Pacific countries, boosting trade with China has provided a growth engine for Australia's economy. Australia shared concerns over security threats posed by China’s military expansion, but up until the mid-2010s hard balancing against China did not seem to be an option for Australia. Australia’s recent moves against China, however, signal that Canberra has reset its China policy, with an overhaul of its national security and defense strategy. The shift of Australia’s China policy is an interesting case to explore how the regional order is likely to evolve in the growing US-China competition. Assessing Australia’s recent foreign policy is also relevant to Korea, both in terms of navigating Korea’s relations with the US and China and enhancing strategic ties between Australia and Korea. Against this backdrop, this study unravels Australia’s strategic responses to the changing regional order and draw implications for Korea's foreign policy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Economy, Trade, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
12. The Collapse of One China
- Author:
- Ivan Kanapathy
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
13. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
14. U.S.–China Relations in the Tank: A Handbook for an Era of Persistent Confrontation
- Author:
- Michael J. Mazarr
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Michael J. Mazarr argues that amid escalating U.S.-China tensions, American policymakers are gravely underprepared to manage the episodic crises that form an inevitable part of great power rivalry. Effective crisis response can not only prevent escalation, but also strengthen U.S. strategic advantage within the larger rivalry. Drawing lessons from the Cold War, Mazarr distills six principles to guide crisis management among U.S. policymakers navigating an increasingly crisis-prone U.S.-China relationship.
- Topic:
- Security, Rivalry, Strategic Interests, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
15. A Green Wave?
- Author:
- Jessica Drun
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
- Topic:
- Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
16. “Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China
- Author:
- Jude Blanchette and Gerard Dipippo
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions. When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
17. Xi Jinping Seeks Stability: The 20th National Congress of the CCP
- Author:
- Bart Dessein, Jasper Roctus, and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The 2,340 odd teacups have been rearranged in their cupboards, and sobriety has returned to the Great Hall of the People. What is the national and international impact of the 20th CCP Congress that was concluded on Saturday, 22 October 2022? Stability is the key word. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949, the country’s first and major concern was to be recognized as a nation state on an equal par with others in the post-World War II world order. As the Western world recognized the nationalist government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as the legal government and representative of “China” in the United Nations, the PRC turned to the Soviet Union for support, despite earlier ill-fated cooperation between the Communist Parties of the two countries. On 14 February 1950, Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The disastrous outcome of Mao’s “Great Leap Forward”, however, brought the “friendship” to a premature end.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
18. Securing Asia’s Subsea Network U.S. Interests and Strategic Options
- Author:
- Matthew Goodman and Matthew Wayland
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- More than 1 million kilometers of submarine cables traversing the ocean floor, each about as wide as a garden hose, transmit up to 99 percent of international data, underpinning global trade and communication. This vital digital infrastructure faces myriad threats, from earthquakes and typhoons to fishing nets and saboteurs. The United States derives significant advantages from its centrality in Asia’s subsea cables, which contribute up to $169 billion to the U.S. economy annually and could benefit more U.S. workers and businesses as demand for digital products and services grows globally. But realizing those benefits will require the United States to step up its policy engagement on Asia’s cable networks, which are changing with China’s rise, the emergence of new regional hubs, and new transpacific routes designed to reduce risks and increase network resiliency.
- Topic:
- Security, International Trade and Finance, Communications, Maritime, and Commerce
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
19. How to Respond to China’s Growing Influence in the Gulf
- Author:
- Louis Dugit-Gros
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Beijing’s use of intertwined civil and military tools in the Gulf mirrors its activity closer to home, but the West can readily counter this influence by capitalizing on the region’s desire for diversified partnerships. While the Biden administration works to repair ties with Persian Gulf partners in the wake of Russia’s Ukraine invasion, China is getting more attention for its expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific region, including recent reports of naval deals and military activity in the Solomon Islands and Cambodia. Some commentators have even criticized the White House for letting its resolve against Moscow supposedly delay the long-awaited “pivot to Asia” sought by three successive U.S. administrations. Yet talk of the “pivot” often oversimplifies the geopolitical situation, in particular by ignoring China’s progress in the Gulf. The pivot theory relies on the assumption that Beijing is mainly ramping up its influence in its own neighborhood. In reality, the Chinese strategy is global, and the methods it applies in the Indo-Pacific are being used in similar fashion elsewhere, including the Gulf. Such activities merit closer attention from the West even if they are not the number-one priority at the moment.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Strategic Competition, Military, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Gulf Nations
20. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After
- Author:
- Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia
21. What now for Australia-China relations?
- Author:
- The University of Sydney China Studies Centre
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- After the May Federal Election, Labor Party leader Anthony Albanese was sworn in as the new Prime Minister of Australia. What could this change in government mean for future Australia-China relations? At the China Studies Centre event on 3 June, four experts and practitioners in Australia-China relations discussed the bilateral relations over the past few years and the prospects for future political, social and economic interactions.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Australia
22. China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications
- Author:
- Marco Lyons and Natalia Angel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1 The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
- Political Geography:
- China and United States of America
23. Japan's "Economic Security" Measures
- Author:
- Didi Kirsten Tatlow and Afra Herr
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Japan and Germany face an acute dilemma. China, a key trading partner for both nations, uses political warfare and economic statecraft to advance its interests. Like Germany, Japan has a strong SME economy and auto industry, and has dependencies on China. Yet Japan faces more risk due to its geographical proximity to China and territorial disputes. As global tensions grow, Japan is responding robustly by building economic security. Germany, together with the EU and other like-minded partners, should do the same.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, Politics, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, and Germany
24. The Folly of Pushing South Korea Toward a China Containment Strategy
- Author:
- Jessica J. Lee and Sarang Shidore
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The narrow victory of conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the recent South Korean presidential election comes against the backdrop of an intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, now compounded by the Ukraine crisis. Washington would like South Korea to play a security role in its Indo-Pacific strategy — a strategy that effectively aims to contain China. However, South Korean elites (and the general public) are deeply ambivalent and internally divided on the question of containing China. Pushing South Korea — a robust democracy with major elite divisions — toward containing Beijing risks negative consequences for the United States. These include a reduction in U.S. influence in South Korea, erosion of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, a less-effective South Korean presence in the region, and, in the long run, the potential of South Korean neutrality with respect to China. To avoid these negative outcomes for the United States, Washington should: • Avoid pressuring South Korea to join its China-containment strategy, • Refrain from including Seoul in emerging, non-inclusive, bloc-like structures of U.S. allies in Asia, • Consider pulling back on its intended new Terminal High Altitude Area Defense deployments until a greater consensus is reached within South Korea on the issue, • See South Korea’s role as a bridge and an opportunity to stabilize Washington’s own relationship with Beijing. For example, both South Korea and China could be included in non-traditional security activities of the Quad such as infrastructure and climate change, and • More generally, demilitarize the Quad and open it to wider participation for strengthening U.S. influence in Asia, rather than see it as a zero-sum vehicle for containing China.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Containment, and Quad Alliance
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America
25. China and the U.S. Compete for Global Techno-Security Dominance
- Author:
- Tai Ming Cheung
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- In the struggle for global geostrategic and geoeconomic supremacy between the United States and China, the technosecurity sphere where economics, technological innovation, and national security meet has become a principal battleground. Two contrasting models are pitted against each other: China’s state-led top-down approach and the United States’ market-driven bottom-up system. Which of them will ultimately prevail will depend on how capable, robust, and adept they are in meeting the challenge of rapid and disruptive change? This brief examines the underpinnings of U.S.-China great power technosecurity competition and assesses what the countries’ different approaches imply for future techno-security rivalry.
- Topic:
- Security, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
26. A Restraint Recipe for America’s Asian Alliances and Security Partnerships
- Author:
- Michael D. Swaine and Sarang Shidore
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- As Sino–American relations deteriorate, risks of conflict between Washington and Beijing are growing. A major war would be terrible for both the United States and the region while setting back critical goals, like the fight to stop climate change. Avoiding a war while safeguarding vital U.S. interests ought to be a priority. But while many in the United States want to strengthen alliance structures as a means of deterring China and to make Taiwan a de facto security ally, those who espouse a strategy of Restraint believe this approach endangers Americans and undermines their prosperity. A policy of Restraint is predicated on the view that alliances are not ends in themselves, but a means of bolstering U.S. security. This brief analyzes the utility of America’s Asian alliances and security partnerships from a Restraint perspective under two scenarios. The first and preferred scenario is that of the United States and China walking back from their current march toward confrontation to achieve a stable, if still significantly competitive, relationship. The second and more likely scenario is a much sharper and sustained rivalry with China becoming a regionally strong, possibly in many ways dominant, power.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, and United States of America
27. U.S. Security Ties With Korea and Japan: Getting Beyond Deterrence
- Author:
- Stephen Haggard
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Japan and Korea—the United States’ two key allies in Northeast Asia—are both advanced industrial democracies facing similar constraints from a rising China and a nuclear North Korea. One would think that trilateral cooperation would be a cinch. Yet Japan and Korea have been at each other’s throats over simmering historical issues and differing approaches to China. Forging a trilateral alliance is highly unlikely. But strengthening cooperation is possible by focusing less on the military components of the alliance—i.e., providing extended deterrence—and more on new issues such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), and infrastructure, which can strengthen collective capabilities and make cooperation more appealing.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, Innovation, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, North Korea, and Indo-Pacific
28. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait
- Author:
- James Lee
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
29. Winning the Geo-Tech Battle and Building the Quad Alliance in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Eric B. Brown, John Lee, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established as its paramount geopolitical objective the replacement of the free and open, rules-based order in Asia with an alternative world order, one that is to be dominated by the interests and values of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This decision presents a danger to the entire world, not just to any one state or group of states. For, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the March 2021 US-PRC meeting in Alaska, the alternative to a rules-based order “is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” In furtherance of its objectives, the PRC is in the midst of a large military build-up, but there is much more. For today’s CCP, political power grows not only from the “barrel of the gun,” as Mao Zedong once put it, but also from cutting-edge technologies. Thus, while Beijing pours billions into artificial intelligence and surveillance tech to impose its new “digital totalitarianism” inside the PRC, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, it is also using its growing technological prowess to press its larger geopolitical agenda in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is weaponizing technology and connectivity, along with trade, finance, and other policy instruments to try to rule the key technologies and industries of the future, as well as to improve its strategic positioning and acquire political power over other countries—for instance, through its bid to dominate other nations’ most sensitive data networks, or via the export of its suite of “social stability” technologies, i.e., the “techno-tyrant’s toolkit.” In all this, the CCP’s intent is to entrench its power and Leninist norms and practices to the extent it can do so beyond the PRC’s borders, and to make other nations, or at the least their ruling elites, beholden to it. So in addition to the PRC’s militarily destabilizing activities in the West Pacific and incursions into India’s Himalayas, there is also a “geo-technological front.” If Xi’s CCP succeeds at enmeshing other countries in its expanding “PRC sphere of technological influence,” it could unlock and be able to exploit decisive military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological advantages.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, Economics, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific
30. A Just Response to Beijing’s COVID-19 Abuses
- Author:
- David Asher, Miles M. Yu, David Feith, Matthew Zweig, and Thomas DiNanno
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Nearly 18 months after word of a deadly new virus began leaking out of Wuhan, China, the Chinese government’s response remains fundamentally hostile to international cooperation and transparency. Despite hundreds of offers of assistance, polite diplomatic entreaties, and demands for access to data by governments and health authorities across the globe, the world still knows far too little about COVID-19’s origin. As in a Dali painting, the clocks have melted but time has not stood still. China’s initial silencing and censoring of its doctors and scientists, followed by misinformation about COVID-19’s dangers—especially denials concerning the virus’s ability to be spread human-to-human, invisibly and asymptomatically—helped cost the world trillions of dollars and millions of lives. Whether one believes COVID-19 originated in a zoonotic host, a bat cave, a frozen food shipment, or a Wuhan lab’s dangerous “dual-use” research supporting undeclared bioweapons programs, the world needs answers from the Chinese Communist Party. These are answers Beijing won’t provide unless it faces a high price for refusing. For the good of public health and international security, the Biden administration and the Congress can unite in a coordinated, long-term response.
- Topic:
- Security, Health, Research, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
31. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests
- Author:
- Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
32. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech
- Author:
- Didi Kirsten Tatlow
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- China and Estonia
33. China’s Nuclear Arms Race: How Beijing Is Challenging US Dominance in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Elisabeth Suh and Leonie Reicheneder
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- China is building up its military capabilities. Not only is the country investing heavily in conventional arms, but it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. To secure its nuclear deterrent, China is diversifying its delivery systems. The United States sees this as a challenge to its military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington and Beijing are both fueling a qualitative arms race by investing in new capabilities. This spiral poses risks to stability that affect Germany and Europe as well.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Military
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
34. AUKUS Security Pact: Setting the Rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Krševan Antun Dujmović
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
- Abstract:
- The announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known by the acronym AUKUS, intended to enhance cooperation between the three countries in the Indo- Pacific region in defense and security, has sent shockwaves throughout the world, especially the UK for the Royal Navy of Australia. The nuclear fueled submarines will be armed by conventional weapons, the number of acquired vessels will be at least eight, and as a typically Australian request, part of the vessels will be constructed in Australia’s naval shipyards. So far, the US, the UK, Russia, China, France in China and Europe. The key element of the AUKUS pact, signed on 15th September 2021, is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from the US and and India are the only six countries that have commissioned nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, before signing the AUKUS pact, the UK was the only country in the world with which the US was sharing the nuclear propulsion technology, under the Mutual Defense Agreement signed back in 1958. The supply of Australia with British and American nuclear-powered attack submarines, as the most delicate part of the AUKUS pact, attracted by far the most of media attention and provoked China’s aggressive reaction. Even more, the three nations security pact, which is in principal intended to bring “enhanced trilateral security partnership for the 21st century”, has made Beijing particularly worried as China fears that this triple alliance is pointed directly against it. The three countries intend to step up their cooperation in the security and defense sector, and apart from cooperation in industrial production of new military equipment, AUKUS also envisages a broad cooperation in the fields where the three countries feel particularly threatened by China’s staggering growth, and they include cyber security, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Alliance, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Australia, North America, and Indo-Pacific
35. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula
36. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
37. What to do about China? Forging a compromise between the US and Europe in NATO
- Author:
- Mikkel Runge Olesen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Biden administration is likely to adopt a less chaotic US approach to the NATO alliance concerning China. European members should utilize this calmer time to develop viable strategies on how to tackle non-conventional threats from China within the Alliance in concert with the US. RECOMMENDATIONS: NATO members should: Continue to develop their own strategies and procedures against non-conventional Chinese threats in the domains of cyber, influence activities, and trade and investments. Resist the temptation to fall into inertia in determining how NATO should deal with China after the fear of a US withdrawal from NATO has subsided. Work with the Biden administration to develop NATO’s role in relation to China further on grounds that are acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and International Organization
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Denmark, and United States of America
38. Greenland’s minerals to consolidate China’s rare earth dominance? No green future without China
- Author:
- Per Kalvig and Hans Lucht
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital for communications, the green energy transition and defense, but are produced almost exclusively in China. As the projected REE mines in southern Greenland inch closer to realization, Denmark and its EU partners remain sidelined from future supply chains for raw materials. Key findings: Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital to daily life, communications, green energy and defense. Yet, REEs and products containing REEs are almost exclusively controlled and produced by China. Significant long-term strategic state or supra-state support is required to challenge Chinese dominance of the REE sector and reduce the vulnerability of European and American energy supplies. In the absence of REE industries in Europe or America, the two REE projects in South Greenland, with their potential to become significant suppliers of REE, will most likely supply Chinese-controlled raw materials industries.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, Minerals, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
- Political Geography:
- China, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America
39. China: The Renewable Hydrogen Superpower?
- Author:
- Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- President Xi Jinping’s pledge during the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, that China would reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, is a significant step in the fight against climate change. Since China is the world’s top contributor of greenhouse gases, there is no doubt that Beijing needs to be front and center of any effort to curb global emissions. In 2019, China accounted for almost 30 percent of global emissions, about twice as much as the second largest emitter, the United States.1 But while U.S. emissions have been on an overall decline since 2007,2 China’s have increased, raising concerns over whether Beijing can actually deliver on its targets. This reality should not distract from the fact that China is also the world’s top developer of renewables and other clean energy technologies. For example, China was the world’s largest installer of photovoltaics (PV) by 2013 and, in less than two years, also became the global leader in solar module manufacturing. At the same time, China leveraged its industrial might and economies of scale to drive down modules’ costs—which, by the end of 2018, were 90 percent lower than only ten years before. In this context, renewable hydrogen could significantly accelerate China’s transition to a low-carbon economy, increasing the likelihood of meeting its carbon neutrality goal. Renewable hydrogen offers significant advantages for China. It can help Beijing meet its climate and pollution goals—at a time when coal continues to dominate—while avoiding increased reliance on imported fuels. As a readily dispatchable means of storing energy, hydrogen can help to address intermittency and curtailment issues as renewable energy increases its share of China’s energy mix. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. Finally, renewable hydrogen can open new avenues for developing clean technology manufactured goods for both internal and export markets. Today, most of China’s hydrogen is produced from coal via 1,000 gasifiers, accounting for 5% of the country’s total coal consumption. Hydrogen costs vary significantly as a function of production technology and prices of fossil fuels and electricity. Production from coal remains the lowest cost option: about 30 percent cheaper than hydrogen from natural gas. Therefore, reducing the carbon footprint of coal-based hydrogen will be critical in a low-carbon economy. In the medium term, coal-based hydrogen with carbon capture, utilization and storage will likely remain China’s lowest-cost clean hydrogen production pathway. Hence, the underlying question is whether Beijing will prioritize cost considerations or put its full industrial might behind the development and deployment of renewable hydrogen. In March 2019, the Chinese government took a significant step forward by announcing measures to promote the construction of hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles. Wan Gang, who is known as China’s “father of the electric car,” called for China to “look into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”3 Given that Gang made a similar call two decades ago on vehicle electrification, which played a key role in China’s current battery electric vehicles market dominance, close attention is warranted.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia-Pacific
40. Multilayered Challenges: Why are foreign oil companies planning to leave Iraq?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- Numerous foreign oil companies have recently announced plans to sell their shares in several major oil fields in Iraq, as part of measures that may negatively impact Iraqi oil production. There are multiple explanations for this step, including unstable security and political conditions as well as Iraq's failure to pay foreign companies their dues for operating the fields, in addition to the growing Chinese influence in the oil sector.
- Topic:
- Security, Oil, and Business
- Political Geography:
- China, Iraq, and Middle East
41. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark
42. The Interests of Global Powers in the Mediterranean and Israeli Policies
- Author:
- Mitvim
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- This policy paper sets out the various interests and goals of global powers (the US, Russia, China and the EU) in the Mediterranean, and the measures they are undertaking to implement them. The document also describes Israeli policies vis-àvis the powers’ activities in this region, and points to the principles that should guide them. The paper is based on a July 2019 meeting in Jerusalem of the research and policy working group on Israel in the Mediterranean, held at the initiative of the Mitvim Institute, the Hebrew University’s Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations and Haifa University’s National Security Studies Center.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Security, and Foreign Policy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, United States of America, and Mediterranean
43. A Peace Regime for the Korean Peninsula
- Author:
- Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi, Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Yun
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- A joint statement by the United States and North Korea in June 2018 declared that the two countries were committed to building “a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.” Such a peace regime will ultimately require the engagement and cooperation of not just North Korea and the United States, but also South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. This report outlines the perspectives and interests of each of these countries as well as the diplomatic, security, and economic components necessary for a comprehensive peace.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Security, Diplomacy, Economy, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America
44. 5G Security: The New Energy Security
- Author:
- Kristine Berzina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
45. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations
- Author:
- Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus
46. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union
- Author:
- Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
47. Sino-Russian Cooperation in Outer Space: Taking Off?
- Author:
- Richard Weitz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- China and Russia are the two most influential space players besides the United States. Whereas in the past NASA was Moscow’s partner of choice, many influential Russians now look to China as their main future partner. Sino-Russian cooperation regarding global positioning and navigation satellites, space exploration, and space security has been growing and will likely continue.
- Topic:
- Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia
48. Policy Papers by Women of Color: Diverse Voices on Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Security, and Global Health Security Policy
- Author:
- Wardah Amir, Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Jennyfer Ambe, Rahwa Osman, Seema Gahlaut, Nomsa Ndongwe, Togzhan Kassenova, Kimberly Ma, Jasmine Owens, Celeste Rogers, Sylvia Mishra, Liza Arias, Sumaya Malas, Jessica J. Lee, Jessica Gott, April Arnold, and Takiva Pierce
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
- Abstract:
- This edition features articles from member sin two of the WCAPS working groups: Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Security; and Global Health Security. A critical goal of WCAPS is to cultivate a new generation of women of color in the areas of peace and security, foreign policy, and national security.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Infrastructure, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, COVID-19, and Global Health
- Political Geography:
- China, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
49. United G20 must pave the way for robust post-COVID-19 recovery
- Author:
- Phil Thornton
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The world is facing unprecedented health and economic crises that require a global solution. Governments have locked down their economies to contain the mounting death toll from the COVID-19 pandemic. With this response well underway, now is the time to move into a recovery effort. This will require a coordinated response to the health emergency and a global growth plan that is based on synchronized monetary, fiscal, and debt relief policies. Failure to act will risk a substantial shock to the postwar order established by the United States and its allies more than seventy years ago. The most effective global forum for coordinating this recovery effort is the Group of 20 (G20), which led the way out of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2009, the closest parallel we have to the current catastrophe. Eleven years ago, world leaders used the G20 meeting in London as the forum to deliver a unified response and a massive fiscal stimulus that helped stem economic free fall and prevented the recession from becoming a second Great Depression. A decade on, it is clear that the G20 is the only body with the clout to save the global economy. This does not mean that the G20 should be the only forum for actions for its member states. The United States, for example, should also work closely with like-minded states that support a rules-based world order, and there are many other fora where it can and must be active with partners and allies. But no others share the G20’s depth and breadth in the key focus areas for recovery. The other multilateral organizations that could take up the challenge lack either the substance or membership. The United Nations may count all countries as members but is too unwieldly to coordinate a response. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the resources but requires direction from its 189 members. The Group of Seven (G7), which once oversaw financial and economic management, does not include the fast-growing emerging economies. The G20 represents both the world’s richest and fastest-growing countries, making it the forum for international collaboration. It combines that representation with agility.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, G20, Global Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Business, Trade, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Canada, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America
50. Taking stock: Where are geopolitics headed in the COVID-19 era?
- Author:
- Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The COVID-19 pandemic is a strategic shock, and its almost immediate, damaging effects on the global economy constitute a secondary disruption to global order. Additional secondary strategic shocks (e.g., in the developing world) are looming. Together, these developments pose arguably the greatest threat to the global order since World War II. In the aftermath of that conflict, the United States and its allies established a rules-based international system that has guaranteed freedom, peace, and prosperity for decades. If the United States and its allies do not act effectively, the pandemic could upend this order. This issue brief considers the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it considers the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it examines how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlights uncertainties ahead, and provides recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Economy, Business, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, South Asia, Eurasia, India, Taiwan, Asia, North America, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
51. Asia Beyond China: Developing a European Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Changing Global Order
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Much of Europe’s attention to Asia is currently being captured by China. However, if the European Union and its member states are serious about maintaining a rules-based global order and advancing multilateralism and connectivity, it should increase its work in building partnerships across Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific super-region. To save multilateralism, go to the Indo-Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Multilateralism first. Unpack and differentiate where the United States and China support the rules-based order and where not, but also look to new trade deals and security pacts with India and Southeast Asia partners. ■ Targeted connectivity. The EU should continue to offer support to existing regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. ■ Work in small groups. EU unanimity on China and Indo-Pacific policy is ideal, but not always necessary to get things done. ■ Asia specialists wanted. Invest in and develop career paths for Asia specialists in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence services.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, International Organization, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
52. U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- U.S.-China strategic rivalry is intensifying – and nowhere more so than in the Indo-Pacific. This is likely to result in new US requests to close allies like Denmark to increase their security and defense policy contributions to the region. French and British efforts to establish an independent European presence in the Indo-Pacific present Denmark with a way to accommodate US requests without being drawn directly into the US confrontation with China. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Danish security and defense policy is likely to grow in the coming years. The focus and resources should therefore be directed towards strengthening Danish knowledge of and competences in the region. ■ Several European states, led by France and the UK, are increasing their national and joint European security and defense profiles in the Indo-Pacific by launching new initiatives. Denmark should remain closely informed about these initiatives and be ready to engage with them. ■ Regarding potential requests to the Danish Navy for contributions to the Indo-Pacific, Denmark should prioritize the French-led European naval diplomacy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, and Power Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, Denmark, North America, and United States of America
53. India–China Unsettled Boundary & Territorial Dispute: Institutionalized Border Mechanisms since 39 Years, Sans Resolution
- Author:
- Monika Chansoria
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
- Abstract:
- The border dispute between India and China does not pertain to the definition of a boundary that can be marked physically on ground, and, on a military map, alone. It also takes on board vast tracts of disputed territorial frontiers. China continues to be in illegal physical occupation of large territorial land areas of India’s territory, starting with the entire Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, approximately 38,000 sq kms, since the mid-1950s. In addition, India maintains that in 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded to China, 5,180 sq kms of Indian Territory in the Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), north of the Siachen Glacier, under a bilateral boundary agreement that holds no legal validity. Besides, China also stake claim to about 96,000 sq kms of Indian Territory in north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh, which it terms as ‘Southern Tibet’. The statements regarding Arunachal Pradesh being “Chinese territory and part of southern Tibet” are a key instrument of the marked shift in China’s strategy and stance in the early 1980s when Beijing began signaling that the eastern sector was the larger part of the boundary dispute. China’s stated position is that reunification of Chinese territories is a ‘sacred duty’ of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China shares a 22,000 kms land border with 14 adjacent states. It has resolved territorial disputes with 12 of them, but still needs to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute with India. Beijing, for that matter, also challenges the total length of the Indo-China International Land Border, which runs 3,488 kms according to the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. This was also acknowledged by Indian Prime Minster, Narendra Modi, while addressing the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai on May 16, 2015.
- Topic:
- Security, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- China, South Asia, India, and Asia
54. Managing US-China Rivalry in the Arctic: Small states can be players in great power competition
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Many fear that strategic competition between the US and China threatens longstanding regional cooperation and stability in the Arctic. But if they recognise their own political and economic significance and work collectively, the Nordic states and Canada can still play an instrumental role in steering the region’s future away from confrontation. Recommendations: Recognise how US–China strategic competition represents a false binary for policy choices in the Arctic. Understand how economic connectivity provides room for manoeuvre against big power pressure. Encourage participation of non-Arctic states with similar economic and political norms on natural resource and infrastructure development.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
55. The Networking Strategy of Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy
- Author:
- Jai Chul Heo
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- China is actively building Network Power in economic and traditional security and non-traditional security areas, while in some cases maximizing its own interests by using the Network Power already formed. In particular, China is building Collective Power at a rapid pace in significant areas. China also actively participated in existing networks and established Positional Power by preoccupying important positions. However, China’s Network Power still seems to have a long way to go in terms of Programming Power to build new systems, unlike Collective or Positional Power. What is notable in the process of analyzing China’s Network Power is that competition between the U.S. and China is fierce over Network Power.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Economics, and Power Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
56. Prospects for the New EU Strategy on India: Game Changer or Business as Usual?
- Author:
- Garima Mohan
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The new European Union (EU) strategy on India marks a major moment of departure in EU-India relations. It reflects three critical shifts: firstly, the EU no longer views India from a “trade lens” only, recognizing its important geopolitical role in maintaining a multipolar Asia. Second, the strategy frames EU-India relations in the context of broader geopolitical developments, primarily the rise of China. Recognition of the China challenge and its impact not only in Europe, but also on the balance of power in Asia, has pushed the EU to change the nature of its partnerships in the region, particularly with India. Finally, the strategy links European security and prosperity to developments in Asia, broadening the scope of EU foreign policy substantially. This paper analyses the new EU strategy on India and highlights areas, which represent a departure from previous strategies. The paper looks specifically at proposals for greater foreign and security cooperation, for securing a rules-based order, increasing regional connectivity, improving trade and investment, and building better coordination on and with India. These proposals are commendable and respond to a long laundry list suggested by experts from both sides over a long time. They also fit well with India’s priorities, namely responding to increasing Chinese political, economic and military presence in South Asia, security in the Indian Ocean, as well as more proactive engagement in regional and global institutions. Finally, the paper suggests ways of taking this forward and ensuring the strategy does not remain a paper tiger in the long arsenal of EU-India declarations. While more dialogues on global and strategic issues is a great idea and will help change perceptions in New Delhi that the EU is not a strategic actor, the EU will have to ensure this is not hindered by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ already overstretched capacities and the 30 existing EU-India dialogues. Focusing on ongoing debates in India and Europe in these dialogues, particularly connectivity projects, maritime security in the Indian Ocean, 5G networks and infrastructure might also open up new avenues of cooperation. Overall the EU-India relationship has witnessed remarkable momentum over the last four years – aided by political will from both sides, the China challenge, friction in transatlantic ties, and common challenges within Europe and India. The new strategy is a good first step to build on this momentum. However, it needs to be translated into action fast.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, South Asia, India, and European Union
57. The Great Puzzle: China in Central and Eastern Europe
- Author:
- Małgorzata Jankowska
- Publication Date:
- 03-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
- Abstract:
- China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) through the 16+1 economic platform addressed investment needs imposed by the global financial crisis. Despite limited outcomes, it was accompanied by a negative EU narrative towards the sponsor of the program. The main argument has been that the platform undermines EU cohesion and unity. This narrative discouraged bilateral or sub-regional initiatives of CEE states towards China and served to mobilize European Institutions around policies that were primarily shaped by Berlin.
- Topic:
- Security, Globalization, International Cooperation, and Hegemony
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
58. Can China Buy Peace? Money and Security in the South China Sea
- Author:
- Yang Jiang
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- Despite China’s strong economic influence over Southeast Asian countries, tensions in the South China Sea have been flaring up again this year, as domestic oppositions and external interventions create dilemma for Southeast Asian governments. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ When considering joining the freedom of navigation operations in the SCS Denmark should consider that foreign interference will likely escalate Chinese military activities. ■ Denmark’s delicate relationship with the US and China must be carefully evaluated and managed. ■As a major maritime nation it is important for Denmark to secure a free sea through diplomacy and UN institutions. ■European countries have much room to enhance their contribution to regional development in Southeast Asia.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, Power Politics, Economy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
59. Denmark's China Challenge
- Author:
- Luke Patey
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknowledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task. Recommendations Intensify cooperation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to ensure Denmark’s initiatives in foreign policy, security and economic relations with China are more closely integrated. Beware of the bilateral. Beijing’s new assertive foreign policy and US-China strategic competition require that Denmark leverage its interests increasingly through the EU, NATO and other multilateral bodies. Assess the economic vulnerabilities of Danish industries in China and diversify trade and investment across Asia’s emerging markets and developed economies in the G7/EU.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Global Political Economy
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark
60. Berlin’s Preliminary 5G Decision: Limiting Damage and Learning Lessons
- Author:
- Kaan Sahin and Didi Kirsten Tatlow
- Publication Date:
- 11-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Despite the security concerns of the US, EU, and Australia, Germany plans not to exclude any telecom equipment vendors, including Chinese companies such as Huawei, from its 5G network. This stance reflects a narrow view of the issue that prioritizes short-term economic interests and fails to uphold national security and democratic values. Widespread criticism, including from within the government, shows that political decision-makers in Germany need a more sophisticated, forward-looking approach to 5G.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, European Union, and Internet
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Germany, Australia, North America, and United States of America
61. China’s great game in the Middle East
- Author:
- Camille Lons, Jonathan Fulton, Degang Sun, and Naser Al-Tamimi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- China has significantly increased its economic, political, and – to a lesser extent – security footprint in the Middle East in the past decade, becoming the biggest trade partner and external investor for many countries in the region. China still has a limited appetite for challenging the US-led security architecture in the Middle East or playing a significant role in regional politics. Yet the country’s growing economic presence is likely to pull it into wider engagement with the region in ways that could significantly affect European interests. Europeans should monitor China’s growing influence on regional stability and political dynamics, especially in relation to sensitive issues such as surveillance technology and arms sales. Europeans should increase their engagement with China in the Middle East, aiming to refocus its economic role on constructive initiatives.
- Topic:
- Security, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America
62. Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
- Author:
- Valentin Weber
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Business, 5G, and Huawei
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe