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201. Mapping China’s Participation in Multilateral Development Institutions and Funds

Author:
Scott Morris, Rowan Rockafellow, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
China has emerged as a leading participant in multilateral development organizations. In many ways, this is a welcome development. Today’s global challenges, including COVID-19 and climate change, require an international response and have prompted renewed calls for increased multilateral engagement by the major economy countries. This, combined with the recognition of multilateral institutions’ high standards for transparency and environmental safeguards, have led the United States at times to encourage China to step up its multilateral contributions. At the same time, countervailing voices focused on strategic competition increasingly view China’s multilateral participation with skepticism. When the People’s Republic of China joined the World Bank in 1980, it was allocated 12,000 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) shares, becoming the Bank’s sixth largest shareholder with 3.47 percent of the of the voting power. By 2013, decades of rapid economic growth had propelled China to its current position as the IBRD’s third largest shareholder, eclipsing France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with 5.03 percent of IBRD voting power. In many ways, China’s rise in stature at the IBRD mirrors its growth in influence across the multilateral development system. This is certainly true of China’s increasing voting share in the World Bank, IMF, and UN system, all of which tie financial contributions to economic size (see Figure 1). But China’s growing importance in the multilateral system is also the product of distinct policy choices made by the Chinese government. These policy choices go beyond the wealth-based financial contributions that dictate IBRD shareholding to include voluntary financing, borrowing, and commercial contracting. In concert, they make China a unique player in the multilateral system by virtue of to its simultaneous roles as a multilateral organization donor, shareholder, aid recipient, and commercial partner.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Participation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

202. The pandemic’s long reach: South Korea’s fiscal and fertility outlook

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korea was one of the first countries affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. A combination of high societal discipline and competent and prompt government actions on mass testing capacity and technologically enabled tracing and quarantines enabled South Korea to quickly control the pandemic. Consequently, South Korea did not need to enter into full economic lockdown in early 2020 and needed only much smaller fiscal stimulus than most other advanced economies. The limited fiscal impact of COVID-19 is fortuitous for South Korea, as the pandemic coincided with the country’s dramatic demographic transition to a future of rapidly shrinking working-age population and accelerating overall aging. South Korea recorded the lowest total fertility rate of any advanced economy in 2020. Unless fertility rates rise, the country will not escape large and negative economic effects from what will be a rapidly declining total and working-age population. Kirkegaard proposes several policy reforms for South Korea, while arguing that the direct role of government action in increasing the South Korean fertility levels is likely to be modest.
Topic:
Demographics, Economy, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, and Fertility
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

203. RCEP Is Not Enough: South Korea Also Needs to Join the CPTPP

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The benefits of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for South Korea are limited and need to be supplemented by more comprehensive agreements that deepen Korea’s ties to strategic allies in the Asia-Pacific region. RCEP's most important achievement is its new regional content rule that will encourage deeper integration of supply chains across the 15 markets, a key benefit for Korean industries invested in the region. But Schott notes that the pact also has significant limitations. To complement RCEP, he recommends that South Korea move forward with two other trade negotiating priorities, membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and upgrading the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), the latter aimed at encouraging US reengagement in the Asia-Pacific integration pact.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Regional Integration, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

204. Collateral benefits? South Korean exports to the United States and the US-China trade war

Author:
Mary Lovely, David Xu, and Yinhan Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the extent to which the United States increased its imports from South Korea after the US imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports. Korea benefited from this shift in US imports, although the increase was relatively small in most sectors. The authors use highly disaggregated US import and tariff data to examine adjustments in US purchases of manufactured goods from its trade partners. Their analysis indicates that Korea made a small gain in the US market following the levying of US tariffs on Chinese exports, with Korea’s share of overall US manufacturing imports rising 0.9 percent and its share of US manufacturing imports subject to trade war tariffs rising 1.0 percent. Gains were spread across a variety of manufacturing sectors—such as wood products, textiles and apparel, and machinery—reflecting both the choices made by US officials regarding which Chinese exports to tax and the nature of preexisting trade relationships between South Korea and the United States.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

205. How the rest of the world responds to the US-China split

Author:
Hung Tran
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The election of Joe Biden as the forty-sixth US president is not expected to change the list of substantive issues dividing the United States and China, such as trade, investment, technology, geopolitical competition, national security, and human rights—except that the priority among them may change, with human rights concerns moving more to the forefront. However, the tone and modality of the unfolding of the US-China competition will change from Donald Trump’s unilateralism to Biden’s efforts to build alliances with “likeminded” countries in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to deal with the challenges China has posed. In a way, Biden’s alliance-building approach may intensify pressure on the rest of the world to take sides. How countries respond to this challenge, unwelcome by most, depends on whether they see themselves as competitors to China, or as “price takers” in the international economic system.
Topic:
Global Markets, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Trade, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

206. A strategic framework for countering China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China is engaged in a systematic campaign of repression against predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in northwest China. Through a combination of detention camps, mass surveillance, birth suppression, and other means, China is responsible for gross human-rights violations. In recent years, the international community has devoted an increasing amount of attention to China’s actions in Xinjiang. Earlier this year, the United States declared that Beijing’s behavior constituted genocide. More recently, the United States and several key partners announced multilateral sanctions on Chinese officials facilitating repression in the region. To build on these developments, the United States and its allies and partners should adopt a more strategic approach to addressing China’s human-rights abuses. This Issue Brief proposes a framework for such a strategy, articulating a multilateral approach for dealing with China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang. This Issue Brief argues that addressing China’s abuses in Xinjiang is of strategic importance. Ultimately, the goal of this strategy is to achieve an end state in which China has ceased its repressive activities; however, even if achieving this objective proves elusive, imposing costs on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang can still serve broader strategic ends vis-a-vis China. China has chosen an assertive path to attaining global power and influence, and decades of economic growth and incorporation in the global economic system have not been enough to transform Beijing into a responsible stakeholder in a rules-based international system. The United States and its allies and partners will need to impose costs on Chinese behavior that violates international norms. Imposing costs on China’s human-rights violations in Xinjiang is a critical element of a broader strategy to dissuade Chinese Communist Party (CCP) behavior that undermines international norms and to push Beijing toward becoming a cooperative member of a rules-based international system.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Organization, Politics, Sanctions, Economy, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

207. Trusted connectivity: A framework for a free, open, and connected world

Author:
Kaush Arha
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Global affairs are increasingly shaped by three important and overlapping trends: 1) the unprecedented and growing demand for trillions of dollars’ worth of global digital and physical infrastructure; 2) the ideological battle between democracy and autocracy for the best path forward to achieve peace and prosperity; and 3) the world’s response to changing climate. As democracies address the global demand for a free, open, and connected world while ensuring that local and global emissions targets are met, they need an organizing framework: the concept of “trusted connectivity.” Democratic governments and institutions function with intricate checks and balances to ensure public trust. Unchallenged aggregation of power is antithetical to democracies and instinctively distrusted by their citizens. While holding unimaginable promise, today’s advancements in digital and physical infrastructure also embody new opportunities for malign actors in general, and authoritarian governments in particular, to accumulate and wield this power. Malign influence or control over data, communications, trade routes, energy, and transportation, all of which becomes possible when countries accept infrastructure investments from authoritarian states, could open potential vectors for coercion, disruption, or attack in times of crisis or conflict. In order to deny malign actors this influence over other countries’ infrastructure, democracies need to work together to ensure that the benefits and terms for the host country in building a bridge, port, rail, road, or telecommunications network are equitable and transparent, thereby leading to greater trust and security in addition to economic prosperity. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., rallied the world’s leading democracies behind this cause at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in June 2021 in Cornwall, England. The G7 nations, comprising the world’s leading free economies and free societies, proclaimed that, as they aim to meet global infrastructure demand, among other goals, their efforts will be guided by shared democratic values. For China, the standard-bearer of an alternate, illiberal model, infrastructure investment serves a different purpose: to increase China’s global economic leverage for its political gain. To prevail in this competition, advance their values, and develop much-needed digital and physical infrastructure, the world’s leading democracies should adopt the principle of trusted connectivity.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

208. The Special Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This issue brief is based on Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s written testimony at a hearing on “Nuclear Deterrence Policy and Strategy” before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate, conducted on June 16, 2021. US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

209. Nuclear priorities for the Biden administration

Author:
John Harvey and Robert Soofer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How can the administration of President Joseph R. Biden both address the deteriorating international security environment and follow through on campaign promises to reduce the role of nuclear weapons? Former nuclear deterrence policymakers John R. Harvey and Robert Soofer, from Democratic and Republican administrations, respectively, contend in this issue brief that the Biden administration can address the increasing nuclear threat to the United States, meet its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, and maintain bipartisan support for US nuclear policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

210. Subsidising Balkanisation: What China’s 3G Subsidies Teach us about 5G Open RAN

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Open RAN is increasingly becoming the answer to how to diversify 5G networks and beyond, especially in the light of a potential exclusion of China’s participation in western networks. In recent times, the US and Japan have jointly pledged $4.5 billion to support its development. Much – or perhaps entirety – of this support is predesignated for the O-RAN Alliance, a closed-door and private industry consortium. State interventionism is back – in a sector hereto characterised by open western markets and free competition. The public support currently pledged to the O-RAN consortium bear many resemblances to the Chinese government’s attempt to support TD-SCDMA, a unique standard for the Chinese market that was designed to support local vendors. Its use was a pre-condition for public subsidies for R&D or public procurement. As recent as 2020, the US Trade Representative reported on China’s standard-setting practices and subsidies as one of the world’s worst trade barriers. Those who advocate similar support in the West are either indifferent or nescient about how EU and US trade negotiators worked to address subsidies and opaque standard-setting. It is an open question whether the US and Japan will offer a level-playing field to European vendors – or non-O-RAN members who may develop their own Open RAN variants. Nowadays, Chinese scholars and senior officials openly talk of “TD-style innovation” as a disaster for the nation that delayed China’s rollout of 4G and plunged the economy into a performance and innovation lag. A key lesson for policymakers today is how vendors that cannot survive without subsidies will not optimise the organisation for innovation but public grant-seeking. This is an eerie warning for the 5G debate in some western capitals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Digital Economy, 5G, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
China and Asia

211. China’s Public Procurement Protectionism and Europe’s Response: The Case of Medical Technology

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Anna Guildea, Oscar Guinea, and Philipp Lamprecht
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This paper concerns China’s market for medical technologies and how the Chinese state is assisting its own companies to gain greater sales at the expense of producers from Europe and other advanced manufacturing economies. The medical technology sector captures a variety of products, services and solutions which are essential to the provision of healthcare to citizens. Examples range from fairly simple technologies such as sticking platers, to complex ones, such as coronary stents, orthopaedics and pacemakers. In the last decades, Europe’s exports of medical devices to China have grown robustly. On the back of vibrant innovation, firms from Europe and elsewhere have not just followed the growth of Chinese demand for medical devices – they have also increased their share of Chinese imports. Now, however, this market is at risk of being gradually closed off for European firms as China doubles down on various policies that advantage local firms, while ultimately harming innovation and Chinese patients. China has recently introduced a new element in its industrial policy for its medical technology sector – a policy that builds on its long-term ‘made-in-China’ ambition to have local firms taking up the lion’s share of the market for medical devices by 2030. Beijing and provincial governments are using many different policies to provide support to the domestic industry and are in effect pursuing a policy for import substitution. Accessing the Chinese market for medical devices has never been easy but it has become increasingly challenging in recent years. Direct financial support, tax benefits, R&D support, local content requirements, opaque approval systems and other forms of advantages to domestic MedTech producers are now becoming major sources for the behaviour and development of the Chinese medical device market. China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Plan and the country’s new economic model of ‘dual circulation’ reinforces this trend. The Chinese market is becoming less open. Added to that is centralised state procurement – a new public procurement policy in China that was launched in 2019 for medical devices which has led to a grossly distorted procurement market. While this policy has reduced the price of medical devices in a drastic way, it has also paved the way for Chinese firms to take up a larger market share. This procurement policy is gradually squeezing European firms out of the Chinese market. Competition in China is becoming less fair. These policies follow a pattern. In several sectors, Chinese firms have grown their domestic market share through industrial subsidies and policies that restrict market access for foreign firms – or make it more difficult for foreign firms to compete in China. From their domestic market, these firms have then expanded abroad and taken a more prominent role outside of China. Backed by the Chinese state, these firms can squeeze market opportunities even more for otherwise-competitive European producers. Now this development is happening in the MedTech sector. It is urgent for Europe to respond to China’s procurement protectionism. MedTech manufacturers in Europe are often small and medium-sized enterprises, and they already struggle with getting into the Chinese market. China’s new procurement policy has also had a significant impact on Chinese imports of medical devices: a 1.3 billion euro trade deficit for China in medical technology products in 2019 turned into a 5.2 billion euro surplus in 2020. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, competitive European manufacturers are now confronted with competition from Chinese MedTech companies that have the backing of the Chinese state. The competitive distortions in the Chinese market now spill over to the global market – making European MedTech manufacturers even more disadvantaged. Europe should consider a case at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) against China’s policies which reduce European market presence for medical devices. Once agreed, a new International Procurement Initiative might be a useful instrument to wield pressure against the Chinese government to agree to free and fair competition. Europe can also negotiate with China – for instance in the framework of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) or through the new initiative on trade and health that Europe proposed to the Ottawa Group in 2020. These responses should focus both on remedying China’s current policy for growing its domestic medical technology industry by distorting its market and setting out the core policies and rules that should guide the future market for medical technologies. Fredrik Erixon and Anna Guildea are Director and Research Associate, respectively, at ECIPE. Oscar Guinea and Philipp Lamprecht are Senior Economists at ECIPE. The authors are grateful to a number of experts in the private sector and from the European Commission, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology that have taken their time to share their knowledge with us.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, European Union, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

212. The One-China Policy: Adapting to Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James Lee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Tensions are growing in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese warplanes have violated Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in record numbers, prompting fears of an invasion.1 2021 was the first year in which a potential crisis over Taiwan rose to the level of a “Tier 1 risk” in the Council on Foreign Relations’ Preventive Priorities Survey, which is an annual survey of American foreign policy experts.2 The United States faces a decision about what it can do to help prevent crossstrait tensions from escalating into war. A vital question is whether, and how much, the United States should change its “One-China policy.” Beginning with the Trump administration and continuing with the Biden administration, the United States has bolstered its support for Taiwan and become more assertive in resisting Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the self-governing democracy.3 Although U.S. officials stress that the United States continues to adhere to the One-China policy, there is growing concern, as expressed by Daniel Russel of the Asia Society Policy Institute, that the United States is “edging closer and closer to the line that separates unofficial relations with official relations, which, in effect, could hollow out America’s One-China policy.”4 How much flexibility is built into the One-China policy, and what limits does the policy impose on what the United States can do to support Taiwan? To answer those questions, this policy brief explains what the One-China policy is and how it can exhibit both continuity and change. Analysis of the One-China policy often focuses on the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances, which can create the impression that the One-China policy has not changed since those texts were formulated in the 1970s and 1980s.5 In fact, the One-China policy has been revised, such as in the Taiwan Policy Review during the Clinton administration.6 The One-China policy is neither set in stone nor completely fluid, and this policy brief identifies which elements are fixed and which elements are variable. It explains the OneChina policy at three levels: the fundamental position, the doctrinal statements, and the practices and conventions. These levels of policy range from the most abstract to the most concrete, but each is logically consistent with the others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Security, Strategic Competition, and One-China Policy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

213. Precarity and the Pandemic: A survey of wage issues and Covid-19 impacts amongst migrant seafood workers in Thailand

Author:
Josh Stride
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This report presents findings from an extensive survey of migrant workers in the Thai seafood industry conducted by the CSO Coalition. The report focuses on the issue of low wages, the gender pay gap and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on these issues and the workers who experience them. It also aims to develop a national discussion around the issues of a living wage and a decent living for the hardworking migrant workers who generate wealth and produce food for wealthy companies and consumers around the world.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Labor Policies, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Asia and Thailand

214. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

215. Genocide in Xinjiang: Centering Uyghur Human Rights in US Policies Toward China

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Acts of genocide are currently underway against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of northwestern China, also known as East Turkistan. As part of a campaign of persecution and cultural eradication, Chinese authorities have, according to former detainees and prisoners, subjected millions of Uyghurs and other minorities to rape, torture, forced labor, arbitrary detention, involuntary abortion and sterilization in state-run facilities, and the separation of around half a million Uyghur children from their families. Although both Republicans and Democrats in the United States have acknowledged these horrifying acts as genocide, the rest of the world has been slow to follow, whether because they find the evidence to be inconclusive or because they are reluctant to antagonize China. Regardless, now that the Biden administration is on record declaring the actions of the Chinese government to be genocide, the United States has a legal and moral obligation to do what it can to end the mass atrocities that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing against the Uyghur people. While both the Trump and Biden administrations and Congress have already taken steps to address this human rights disaster, more can and should be done to defend the Uyghur people, address their humanitarian needs, promote accountability, and ensure that individuals and entities within the United States—including private businesses—are not complicit in the abuses underway. A strong response to the ongoing genocidal campaign would send a powerful message to Beijing that America will not tolerate efforts to destroy ethno-religious groups, either as a whole or in part. Conversely, failure to act would render the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (which the United States ratified in 1988) and its implementing legislation null and void. Through the three Cs—competition, confrontation, and cooperation—the Biden administration can act in coordination with US friends and allies abroad to end these atrocities. The Biden administration is now on record as recognizing this repressive campaign as genocide, a move that must trigger a response toward Beijing that departs from business as usual. Although China’s significant global influence supports the assumption that effective levers to influence its behavior with respect to human rights issues are lacking, international attention and pressure have already caused Beijing to backpedal to a certain degree. This attention and pressure resulted from US-led efforts to rally international support coupled with US legislative and executive responses, including sanctions, visa restrictions, and trade restrictions. This policy memo outlines the nine areas of action that, performed in coordination with complementary actions of partners and allies, could alleviate the Uyghur human rights crisis, pressure China to reverse course, and ensure that the West and corporate America are not complicit in genocide.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, Human Rights, and Religion
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Xinjiang

216. The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic Challenge to the Free World

Author:
Miles M. Yu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The Chinese economy and the philosophical roots of China’s system have greater implications for the United States economy than many assume. The one critical fact to understand about the People’s Republic of China is that it is a communist dictatorship ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party. The Party is dedicated to maintaining and strengthening its monopoly on all powers in the world’s most populous country and to mounting the most serious challenge to the free world since the Cold War. This policy memo will examine the Chinese economy’s distinct traits, how it operates, and why it thrives under a monopolistic government that exploits and challenges the global free market system, along with possible policy recommendations for the United States and its allies. Unlike most other communist countries, China has been afforded the benefits of a global free-market system and enjoys largely open access to international trade, capital markets, and advanced technologies. The paradox of a communist nation fully participating in a largely capitalist system has enriched and strengthened the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), to the point where Beijing poses a mortal threat to the United States and to the international free market economic system that has enabled the rise of the communist state. The West played a role in creating the current state of play. But too many conversations in the United States focus only on our own strategic thinking. In his historic speech at the Richard Nixon Library in July 2020, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo aptly described the situation and how we got here: “Our policies—and those of other free nations—resurrected China’s failing economy, only to see Beijing bite the international hands that were feeding it.” As President Richard Nixon admitted in his later years, his initiative to open up China in 1972 might have created a Frankenstein.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Communism, Economics, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

217. The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang

Author:
Nury Turkel
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This memo is adapted from Nury Turkel’s testimony before the US House of Representative’s Committee on Foreign Affairs’ hearing on May 6, 2021, “The Atrocities Against Uyghurs and Other Minorities in Xinjiang.” He testified on behalf of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Religion, Repression, Uyghurs, and Freedom
Political Geography:
China and Asia

218. A Just Response to Beijing’s COVID-19 Abuses

Author:
David Asher, Miles M. Yu, David Feith, Matthew Zweig, and Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nearly 18 months after word of a deadly new virus began leaking out of Wuhan, China, the Chinese government’s response remains fundamentally hostile to international cooperation and transparency. Despite hundreds of offers of assistance, polite diplomatic entreaties, and demands for access to data by governments and health authorities across the globe, the world still knows far too little about COVID-19’s origin. As in a Dali painting, the clocks have melted but time has not stood still. China’s initial silencing and censoring of its doctors and scientists, followed by misinformation about COVID-19’s dangers—especially denials concerning the virus’s ability to be spread human-to-human, invisibly and asymptomatically—helped cost the world trillions of dollars and millions of lives. Whether one believes COVID-19 originated in a zoonotic host, a bat cave, a frozen food shipment, or a Wuhan lab’s dangerous “dual-use” research supporting undeclared bioweapons programs, the world needs answers from the Chinese Communist Party. These are answers Beijing won’t provide unless it faces a high price for refusing. For the good of public health and international security, the Biden administration and the Congress can unite in a coordinated, long-term response.
Topic:
Security, Health, Research, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

219. A Strategic US Approach to India’s COVID-19 Crisis

Author:
Husain Haqqani and Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The recent surge of COVID-19 in South Asia challenges India’s traditional ability to aid its smaller neighbors, a change that could, in turn, affect India’s influence in its competition with China. Unless India can recover from this surge with the help of allies like the United States, the pandemic could impact the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical balance. In the past, India has often acted as a first responder across South Asia, helping other countries recover from natural disasters, and it initially occupied this role during the first months of the coronavirus pandemic, when it helped several South Asian and Indian Ocean region countries cope with the effects of the disease. India’s role as ‘first responder’ has been a key factor in its geopolitical power and in maintaining its role as a leader in the region. However, the resurgence of COVID-19 has jolted India at a time when democratic countries, including the United States, view India as critical to balancing China’s deepening influence cross Asia. South Asia, a region holding 23 percent of the world’s population, now accounts for over 11 percent of global COVID-19 cases and 6 percent of COVID-related deaths. The world’s largest democracy and second-most populous country, India alone currently accounts for over 84 percent of South Asia’s cases and deaths. For most of 2020, it appeared that India, thanks partly to a lockdown, had managed to avert a huge health crisis. During this time, India supported its immediate South Asian neighbors by supplying personal protective equipment and medications. However, the latest COVID-19 surge has created a crisis that has strained the Indian health infrastructure’s ability to meet. With more resources being diverted towards domestic ends, India’s ability to maintain friends and influence other countries has diminished, also potentially shrinking its sphere of influence. The US must therefore go beyond dealing with its own health crisis and also support India in dealing with its crisis. Instead of allowing China to consolidate its positions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, helping India restore its ability to provide assistance would be in the best interests of the United States and its allies.
Topic:
International Relations, Health Care Policy, Geopolitics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and United States of America

220. Recommendations to Congress Concerning the Investigation into SARS-CoV-2's Origin

Author:
Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On May 26, 2021, President Biden announced that he had tasked the US Intelligence Community (IC) with providing a definitive review of SARS-CoV-2’s origins within 90 days, and that deadline is fast approaching. On the same day, CNN reported that the Biden administration had shut down another investigation into possible Chinese government dual-use biological programs being conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) and its associated facilities. This investigation, which was being conducted by the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC), had been initiated by Secretary Pompeo’s State Department in 2019, and its purpose was to answer the following questions: What role, if any, did the Chinese government’s virus research program play in its biological weapons program? Under the Biological Weapons Convention, any use and development of capabilities with potential dual uses (civilian and military) must be for peaceful purposes. Did this virus research program and the spread of SARS-CoV-2 represent a further Chinese violation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)? Following the completion of the 90-day review, Congress should, over the short term, request that the AVC Bureau continue the investigation into SARS-CoV-2’s origin that President Biden interrupted and re-assigned to the Intelligence Community. In contrast to the US IC, the Bureau’s sole function is to assess other nations’ compliance with their international arms control obligations and, moreover, has the legal mandate to do so. Additionally, this memo contains recommendations concerning the US government’s compliance-and-verification function over the long term that would support policymakers and allow it to effectively fulfill its Congressional mandate.
Topic:
Health Care Policy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
China and Asia

221. Europe's China Chimera

Author:
Peter Rough
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), dreams of global domination, he worries about one thing above all else: a hostile United States backed by its allies—and on the Eurasian landmass, the US has no more important ally than Europe. As a result, Xi has worked to weaken the transatlantic alliance through a two-pronged economic stratagem. First, under the guise of globalization, China has insinuated itself into the European economy, creating dependencies. Second, Beijing is manipulating those dependencies to hollow out and supplant Europe’s advanced economies. To give this deception cover, China has built a vast political network across Europe, from basic sympathizers to outright spies. Until recently, barely anyone took notice, but the financial crisis and forever wars of the past two decades, culminating in the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States, lured the self-confident Xi out into the open. During the coronavirus pandemic, China revealed an aggressive attitude toward Great Britain’s former colonies that shocked the United Kingdom. In the span of mere months, London shifted from cooperation to confrontation. In July, it became the first country in Europe to block the Chinese telecommunications giant, Huawei, from its next-generation networks. Germany, the continent’s most important country, still sees China as key to post-pandemic recovery and economic growth, however. Xi has exploited this attitude to strike an investment agreement with the European Union (EU), the chief purpose of which is to forestall a transatlantic approach under the new US president, Joe Biden. Together, the United States and Europe have unparalleled advantages against any competitor. Now is the time for cooperation, before Xi’s dreams become our collective nightmare.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

222. China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe

Author:
Frederico Mollet
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In its 14th Five-Year Plan, China has mapped out a grand economic and industrial strategy that upends many of the assumptions that underpin the EU's approach - how can the Union respond? With this new plan, the EU can expect tougher competition and greater protectionism in its economic relations with China. A further blurring of the public-private sector distinction in the country's economic model will make it harder to combat unfair Chinese competition. And while China is actively courting foreign investment, it is also signalling greater protectionism to products not made in China, which will lead to European investors' and exporters' interests diverging. To balance the scales, the EU should adapt its own strategy by: continuing to develop trade instruments to combat unfair competition at home and abroad; ensuring that these instruments and institutions can respond to unfair competition from private companies benefiting from state capital investment; ensuring that the extensive and often opaque government holdings in private firms are reflected in foreign direct investment and export controls; incorporating China's attempts to reconfigure supply chains into its own assessment of strategic dependencies, identifying areas that could become vulnerable; prioritising the improvement of access to the Chinese market for goods and services produced in Europe; developing alternative sources of growth, and boost demand and reduce barriers within the Single Market to offset greater Chinese protectionism; and ensuring that its industrial policy efforts will enable European industry to match China's developments. The present moment may mark a turning point in EU–China relations: in a little over three months, an agreement on an investment treaty was followed by sanctions and countersanctions. Geopolitical conflict ratchets up between China and the US. Beijing's new economic course will reshape its global relationships. China's protectionist turn and growing one-sided dependencies will threaten Europe's long-term strategic autonomy and undercut any attempts to construct a balanced approach to EU–China relations. If the EU's multi-track strategy is to work, a concerted effort is required to preserve economic parity and balance between the two powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Economy, European Union, Grand Strategy, Industry, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

223. China's Ties with Southeast Asia : From Green Shoots to Sustained Recovery

Author:
Kensuke Tanaka
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
China's rebound happened relatively quickly owing to a large extent to timely macroeconomic policy responses to the crisis. Lagging somewhat behind China, most Southeast Asian countries have now entered the transition from recession to recovery. Some export-dependent Southeast Asian countries shifted their export destination to China to benefit from its early recovery. This switch of export destination to China illustrates China's important role in leading the recovery of the region. Enhancing regional macroeconomic co-operation would help reduce vulnerability of the region and ensure a sustained recovery. Regional macroeconomic co-operation remains at an early stage in Southeast Asia, but possibilities for further co-operation should be explored.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

224. Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
What are China's intentions in the South China Sea? In The 2020-21 Wilson China Fellowship: Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications, Oriana Skylar Mastro uses a two-part analytical framework to outline why she believes China is trying to establish de facto control over the South China Sea. This means sovereignty over the disputed islands and the ability to dictate the rules of behavior in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests. Mastro goes on to provide a list of recommended measures the United States can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

225. Mitigating the Risk of a China–India Conflict

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The Ladakh crisis between China and India seems to have settled into a stalemate, marked by somewhat reduced tactical tensions and continuing fruitless talks on disengagement—but its trajectory could again turn suddenly, even flaring into a limited conventional war. Despite a limited disengagement, both sides continue to make military preparations near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to increase their readiness for potential conflict. While China proved its revisionist intent with its 2020 incursions, its specific goals and plans remain opaque. The broader political context is marked by distrust and hostility, and bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb in decades. War remains unlikely—both sides can ill-afford the distraction from higher national priorities and have demonstrated a recent keenness to step back from the brink. But, with growing capabilities and unclear intent, and with military operations no longer impaired by winter, the Ladakh crisis may still escalate to conflict. The crisis has been full of surprises. Despite observing major military maneuvers in China, India didn’t anticipate the multiple incursions across the LAC in May 2020. For weeks thereafter, the Indian Army leadership insisted the incursions were nothing out of the ordinary. After both sides agreed to an early disengagement plan, the crisis took a shocking turn with a deadly skirmish in June — the first loss of life on the LAC in 45 years. India also mustered its own surprises, deploying troops to occupy tactically valuable heights in late August, to gain some bargaining leverage. And the crisis also abated with a surprise, with the sudden announcement of disengagement from heavily militarised stand-off sites around Pangong Tso Lake in February 2021. Future surprises may yet occur. This paper argues that the risk of China–India conflict is significant because, even if its likelihood is low, its consequences may be considerable. A limited conventional war would be likely to impose significant costs on India, but, depending on the reactions of its partners, it may also reinforce latent Indian suspicions over the utility and reliability of its strategic partnerships. In that way, even a localized limited war on the LAC may have far-reaching implications, if it incidentally drives a wedge between India and its partners in the Quad. Mitigating that risk will require sound policy settings and astute diplomatic and public messaging from Canberra, Washington, Tokyo, and other like-minded capitals. The remainder of this paper is in three parts: first, why a border war is plausible; second, what costs it would impose on India and how it might stir distrust of India’s Quad partners; and, finally, a framework to mitigate those risks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Risk, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

226. Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

Author:
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro begins her paper by emphasizing that U.S. national defense strategy has characterized the US-China relationship as one of great power competition (GPC). Both the US and China have existing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region and are undergoing efforts to foster new relationships there as well. China’s efforts, however, conflict with US military efforts to promote peace, strategy, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, making them much harder to achieve. Mastro argues that it will be difficult to deter China’s efforts — perhaps even more difficult than it was to deter the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Cold War. She cites the geography of the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of Central Europe), the US’s ongoing struggle to establish a credible deterrent, China’s range of options for nonlethal but effective uses of force, and the lack of US willingness to grant China a parallel sphere of influence to that in which the Soviet Union was allowed to control as evidence to support her claim. Thus, Mastro recommends that the US must avoid relying on the same Cold War tools and competition strategies in its competition with China, despite their success in the past. Instead, the US needs to combat the threat posed by China through 1) convincing China that the costs of using force outweigh the benefits and 2) forging a counterbalancing coalition of allies and partners that are confident that the US will not only protect them from a military attack but other costly behaviors (e.g., economic coercion, diplomatic isolation) that China may leverage against them as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

227. China's Blockchain and Cryptocurrency Ambitions: The First-mover Advantage

Author:
Alice Ekman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
China was initially cautious in the development and application of blockchain technology. Among the technology’s best-known attributes are the relative anonymity and immutability of the information, as every blockchain transaction has a digital record and signature that can be identified, validated, stored and shared. This technology could therefore become a double-edged sword for the Communist Party of China (CPC), as it goes against the government’s efforts to censor content it considers sensitive and, in more general terms, efforts to assert its cyber-sovereignty. However, after at first observing the emergence of blockchain technology with concern, China’s central government has increasingly seen it as an opportunity, as has been the case with most emerging technologies. Since the launch of the 13th five-year plan in 2016 and the release of the first White Paper on Blockchain Technology and Application Development by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology the same year, the CPC has increasingly considered that blockchain could become an economic, political and geopolitical asset for the country, if ‘guided’ well. China has continued to shape its positioning on and conceptualisation of blockchain technology on a regular basis over the last 5 years: the China Blockchain Industry White Paper (1) was published in 2018, another White Paper entitled Blockchain Technology Application in Judicial Evidence Storage was published in 2019 (2) and the 14th five-year plan (2021–2025), released in March 2021, also refers to blockchain and cryptocurrency (see timeline diagram on page 7) (3). China’s unique approach to blockchain is conditioned precisely by this paradox, stemming from the decentralised nature of the technology and the highly centralised nature of the Chinese political system. While blockchain technology is essentially decentralised, regulations in China have aimed to guarantee state control over its development and application. As part of this dual policy, which is analysed in the first part of the Brief, the Chinese government has launched its own digital currency – the digital yuan. At the same time, it dislikes bitcoin, which relies on a truly decentralised type of blockchain. Although blockchain is best known for being the technology behind cryptocurrency, the Chinese government’s approach towards blockchain is very comprehensive, going far beyond cryptocurrencies. It promotes application of the technology in a variety of fields, ranging from energy conservation to urban management and law enforcement, and has strong ambitions to become the world leader in the field. In October 2019, China’s President Xi Jinping, speaking at a study session for members of the Politburo, declared that he wanted the country to be a ‘rule-maker’ on blockchain, suggesting that this technology will increasingly become a key arena in the country’s race against the United States for technological supremacy (4). Blockchain has become a fast-growing sector in China over the last two years. But is China likely to succeed in the global promotion of an alternative form of blockchain? This Brief answers this question by analysing the development of different applications at national level, before and during the Covid-19 pandemic, but also the emergence of international cooperation on blockchain and cryptocurrency.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cryptocurrencies, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
China and Asia

228. China's Data Strategy: Creating a state-led market

Author:
Camille Boullenois
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 2019 and 2020, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States issued strategy papers on data governance acknowledging the importance of data to their economic development and national security. With different emphases, four competing objectives dominate these data strategies: innovation (using data to create new business models and boost economic growth); security (ensuring that sensitive data is not used by a hostile foreign power); privacy (protecting citizens from abusive use of personal data); and surveillance (using data to monitor and control citizens’ and companies’ behaviour). In the past two years, China has been defining its own data strategy and governance regime and, while juggling the same four competing objectives as its Western counterparts, is taking an innovative approach. While the specific data governance framework is still being debated among scholars, policymakers, industrial lobbyists and state institutions, local pilot regulations on data and stakeholders’ public positions have already hinted at its future characteristics. This Brief aims to shed light on these debates over China’s emerging data governance framework. It starts by describing the objectives of the framework, then summarises the debates around the new data rights that Chinese policymakers are establishing and analyses China’s first local pilot regulations defining those rights. The Brief then focuses specifically on health data to illustrate how China'sdata governance regime is designed to work. Finally, the Brief gives an overview of the challenges that China’s data governance framework presents for EU governments and companies. Ultimately, China’s data governance regime will have important implications for the protection of EU citizens’ data and creates a risk of data protectionism. It is therefore crucial that the EU understands early enough the direction that China is taking, so that it can respond appropriately.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Transnational Actors, and Data
Political Geography:
China and Asia

229. Strategic Foresight in Chin: The other missing dimension

Author:
Paul Charon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the last few decades, analysis of international relations and strategic issues has developed rapidly in China, both within the Chinese Communist Party– state apparatus and in think tanks and universities. However, the richness of this field of study is in stark contrast to the absence of any real open reflection on the question of foresight. If, like other nations, China is committed to understanding the world in which it is evolving and to identifying possible changes, the function of foresight has not been conceptualised or institutionalised to the same degree as in the West. Foresight analysis in China is marked by several salient features: firstly, it remains almost non-existent in Chinese institutional frameworks dedicated to the analysis of international relations; secondly, the concepts of the ‘black swan’ and the ‘grey rhino’ have made a significant breakthrough, particularly in economics, before being cannibalised and politicised by the Party; and thirdly, the reading of the horizon remains essentially informed by the Party’s vision, fears and obsessions.
Topic:
International Relations, Political Parties, Domestic Policy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China and Asia

230. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

231. The Geostrategic Interests of External Actors in Myanmar: A Struggle for Influence in a Country in Turmoil

Author:
Bart Gaens and Olli Ruohomäki
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Countries with geostrategic stakes in Myanmar have reacted in different ways to the military coup of 1 February 2021 and its aftermath, which have resulted in over 750 casualties thus far. China benefits from stability in Myanmar but, given its vast geoeconomic and geopolitical interests as Myanmar is a vital part of the BRI, will not criticize the military. Thailand, itself a military-dominated pseudo-democracy, is certainly reluctant to exert pressure. India focuses on its own national interest and prioritizes the partnership with its strategically important neighbour. Japan applies quiet diplomacy and aims to function as mediator, while at the same time protecting its business interests. The EU and US have sanctions in place, but history shows these do not have much effect on the junta. Russia’s presence is not significant, but Moscow uses arms sales to establish a foothold in the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN aims to mediate with Indonesia in the lead, and even achieved a broad consensus on the situation in Myanmar, but likely remains too divided to deliver lasting change on the ground. Given the divergent geostrategic interests of external actors in Myanmar, a concerted effort to achieve change in the country is unlikely. Hence, sustained change has to come from within the country.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Coup, Military Government, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:
Asia, Burma, and Myanmar

232. China’s Foreign Policy at the Centennial of the Communist Party: Prestige Above All

Author:
Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Chinese external and internal politics have manifested increased ideologization in recent years, presumably laying the groundwork for the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary this year. The trend is likely to continue at least until the completion of the 20th Party Congress in 2022. In China’s foreign policy, this ideologization has taken the form of increased emphasis on the realization of China’s “Grand Rejuvenation” and heightened sensitivity to anything that might stand in its way. This is in line with the Party’s historical narrative emphasizing the “century of humiliation” and the ensuing efforts to curb China’s rise. The resulting prestige-driven foreign policy has proved harmful to China’s external image. An easing of Chinese politics may thus be conceivable once the Party has left the current sensitive times behind to its satisfaction. Countries with vital economic ties to China, and which depend at the same time on continued US support in security policies, have little choice but to continue tightroping for a few more years at least.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Conflict, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

233. Fish and ships: Chinese fishing and Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The fisheries sector has become a central geopolitical issue in the Indo-Pacific. China is a major cause of the problems in the industry, thanks to the size of its fleet and the tonnage of its captures. China also contributes to the erosion of ocean governance through its participation in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Beijing instrumentalises its fishing fleet for geopolitical gain, as evidenced by its policy on the South China Sea. These predatory fishing activities threaten Europe’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests, as well as its attempts to protect marine biodiversity. Europe cannot be a bystander on the issue; it should develop a more proactive policy on fisheries.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Fishing, Strategic Interests, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

234. China vs. US: The Green Energy Race

Author:
Katharine Klačanský
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In her policy paper, Katharine Klačanský, Research Fellow at EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, discusses the role of climate in geopolitics and provides an overview of the Chinese and American green investment plan and its implications for the future of fossil fuels.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, Green Technology, and Fossil Fuels
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

235. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

236. How 2400 Pages of Tech Industrial Policy will change Transatlantic Relations

Author:
Tobias Gehrke
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The currently 2400-page long ‘US Innovation and Competition Act’ making its way through Congress is about one thing only: China. But it also signals a much broader shift in American geoeconomic strategy towards tech industrial policy which matters just as much for Europe. To avoid major rifts, tech industrial diplomacy will need to become a staple of transatlantic affairs.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

237. How to Think About the China-Russia Partnership

Author:
James Sherr and Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the conclusion of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, the balance of power between China and Russia has appreciably shifted in favour of the former, but their common definition of the enemy and the complementarity of their core interests remains as strong as it ever was. If the China-Russia relationship is not an alliance, then what is it, and what are its limits? In the Xi-Putin era, apprehension and ambition have transformed the ‘axis of convenience’ into an axis of necessity. But will ‘strategic partnership’ prove important or irrelevant to potential conflicts in Taiwan, Belarus or Ukraine? How much should be made of divergences of approach in Central Asia and the Arctic, where China’s rise leaves no stone unturned? To what extent will Russia continue to welcome the growth of China’s power — to the point of nuclear parity with the United States and, by extension with Russia itself?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

238. A New World Order, According to Beijing

Author:
Nadège Rolland
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
After seven decades of liberal order and three decades of American unipolarity, it may be difficult to imagine that the current rules-based international system, supported by liberal norms and values and organised around a set of multilateral institutions, could eventually give way to something radically different. But in Beijing, political and intellectual elites have engaged in intense discussions about building a new world order. This latest brief of China Awareness Series casts light on this discussion and outlines the emerging contours of vision and strategy pursued by China in building a new world order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, Unipolarity, Emerging Powers, and International System
Political Geography:
China and Asia

239. Trojan Dragons? Normalizing China’s Presence in the Arctic

Author:
Bryan J. R. Millard and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Many Arctic narratives cast suspicion on China, based on concern that the Asian power will seek to undermine the sovereignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional governance mechanisms to facilitate access to resources and new sea routes to fuel and connect its growing global empire. This paper focuses on China’s Arctic maritime capabilities to analyze and infer possible Arctic interests of this self-declared “near-Arctic” state. Do Chinese state officials mean what they say about the Arctic, or are they using the cover of polar scientific research and thinly veiled language in an attempt to normalize their presence and advantageously position themselves? Assuming that acceptance of China’s presence – or at least apathy to it – serves as a necessary precondition to access and exploit Arctic resources, the authors deduce how Chinese scientific research reflects and fits with the country’s regional interests and its global commercial, resource extraction, and power projection goals. After producing a timeline of key inflection points in Chinese academic and official discourse, the authors analyze the activities of Chinese icebreaker Xue Long and the 11 Chinese national Arctic research expeditions (CHINARE). They conclude that China has successfully used its scientific community as an instrument to normalize its presence in the region for skittish Arctic nations. This is consistent with China’s “near-Arctic state” narrative, thus laying the foundation for the broader strategic goal of accessing the region and exploiting its resources.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Maritime, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Arctic

240. Lithuania, China and EU lawfare to counter economic coercion

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Without any formal notification, China recently declined customs clearances for shipments from Lithuanian firms in the pharmaceutical, electronics, and food sectors, and warned multinationals of secondary sanctions if they did not sever their ties with Lithuania. These covert actions were taken in response to Lithuania’s invitation to Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims as its own territory, to open a ‘representative office’ in Vilnius. No other country has ever found itself at the receiving end of such intense and politically motivated Chinese economic pressure. These actions on the part of the PRC are politically explosive because it raises serious questions about the international conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If it can simply wipe a country off its trade book, a state belonging to the EU’s customs territory no less, then what does it mean to be a member of the WTO, or a signatory to any other number of international agreements? And, given the lamentable state the WTO is in: could the European Commission’s newly proposed anti-coercion instrument bring any solace to Lithuania and the EU?
Topic:
Law, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Lithuania

241. Industrial Policy Implementation: Empirical Evidence from China’s Shipbuilding Industry

Author:
Panle Barwick, Myrto Kalouptsidi, and Nahim Bin Zahur
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Industrial policy has been widely used in developed and developing countries. Examples include the United States and Europe after World War II; Japan in the 1950s and 1960s; South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s and 1970s; and Brazil, China, India, and other developing countries more recently. Industrial policies are now back in the spotlight in developed countries, such as Europe and the United States. Designing and implementing industrial policies is a complicated task. Governments seeking to promote the growth of selected sectors have a wide range of policy tools at their disposal, including subsidies on output, provisioning loans at below‐​market interest rates, preferential tax policies, tariff and nontariff barriers, and so on. They must also choose the timing of policy interventions and whether to target selected firms within an industry.
Topic:
Government, Industrial Policy, Economic Policy, and Shipbuilding
Political Geography:
China and Asia

242. Effects of Sanctions on North Korea’s Refined Oil Prices

Author:
Kyoochul Kim
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
During 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted three nuclear tests and four missile launches, and, in response, the international community strengthened its sanctions against North Korea. The sanctions were aimed at deterring North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; the means to achieve this included blocking the inflow of foreign currency into North Korea and banning the import of goods related to its nuclear development efforts. Specifically, the sanctions against North Korea banned the exports of anthracite, processed garments, and marine products to limit its foreign currency acquisition; they banned the import of machinery; and they limited the amount of oil (crude oil and refined oil products) introduced, thus hurting its economy.
Topic:
Oil, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

243. The architecture of repression: Unpacking Xinjiang’s governance

Author:
Vicky Xiuzhong Xu, James Leibold, and Daria Impiombato
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since the mass internment of Uyghurs and other indigenous groups in China was first reported in 2017, there is now a rich body of literature documenting recent human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. However, there is little knowledge of the actual perpetrators inside China’s vast and opaque party-state system, and responsibility is often broadly attributed to the Chinese Communist Party, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo, or President Xi Jinping himself. For accountability, it is necessary to investigate how China’s campaign against the Uyghurs has been implemented and which offices and individuals have played a leading part. The current knowledge gap has exposed international companies and organisations to inadvertent engagement with Chinese officials who have facilitated the atrocities in Xinjiang. It has also prevented foreign governments from making targeted policy responses. Finally, it is essential to carry out such an investigation now. Amid debate internationally about whether the recent events in Xinjiang constitute genocide, Chinese officials are actively scrubbing relevant evidence and seeking to silence those who speak out.
Topic:
Human Rights, Governance, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

244. China’s cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance

Author:
Nathan Attrill and Audrey Fritz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report provides a primer on the roots of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) within China’s policy system, and sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions to use cyberspace as a tool for shaping discourse domestically and internationally. The report details the position of the Cyberspace Administration of China in China’s propaganda system. Considering its origins in the former Party Office of External Propaganda, the authors argue that ‘countries that lack comprehensive cyber regulations should err on the side of caution when engaging with the CCP on ideas for establishing an international cyber co-governance strategy.’ By assessing the CCP’s strategy of becoming a ‘cyber superpower’, its principle of ‘internet sovereignty’, and its concept of ‘community of common destiny for cyberspace’, this report seeks to address how the CCP is working to build a consensus on the future of who will set the rules, norms and values of the internet. The report also examines the World Internet Conference - a ‘platform through which the CCP promotes its ideas on internet sovereignty and global governance’ – and its links to the CAC.
Topic:
Governance, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

245. China’s Nuclear Arms Race: How Beijing Is Challenging US Dominance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Elisabeth Suh and Leonie Reicheneder
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
China is building up its military capabilities. Not only is the country investing heavily in conventional arms, but it is also modernizing its nuclear weapons. To secure its nuclear deterrent, China is diversifying its delivery systems. The United States sees this as a challenge to its military superiority in the Indo-Pacific region. Washington and Beijing are both fueling a qualitative arms race by investing in new capabilities. This spiral poses risks to stability that affect Germany and Europe as well.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

246. It’s complicated: Russia’s tricky relationship with China

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Western policymakers are now asking whether Russia and China will join forces in an alliance of autocracies, and whether they have a chance to manage this challenge by drawing Moscow away from Beijing. Neither of these outcomes is likely in the short term: Russia has many reasons to maintain a cordial relationship with China, while policymakers in Moscow view rapprochement with the West as impossible or too politically costly. The Kremlin’s thinking on China is an amalgam of quickly developing trends that will determine Russia’s position in a world shaped by the US-China rivalry. While the West does not have an opportunity to prompt a policy U-turn in Moscow that divides Russia and China, it could give Russia space to hedge against China in key areas such as advanced technology.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, Ideology, Pragmatism, and Autocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

247. Confronting China on sensitive issues

Author:
Andreas Bøje Forsby
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In the past few years, we have witnessed a resurgence of liberal human rights issues and other sensitive political questions in bilateral relations between Denmark and China. This has triggered a series of confrontations over, among other things, a satirical cartoon in Jyllands-Posten, Chinese sanctions against the Copenhagen-based Alliance of Democracies and the installation of a ‘pillar of shame’ sculpture in front of Christiansborg (housing the Danish Parliament) in solidarity with the pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong. Meanwhile, bilateral relations have taken a sharp downward turn, threatening the very existence of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership launched by Denmark and China in 2008. While Danish governments are mandated by Folketinget (Parliament) to raise human rights concerns with Beijing, for many years Copenhagen preferred to do so in a relatively discreet manner, on the margins of bilateral meetings or together with a coalition of states in multilateral fora such as the UNHRC. Since 2019, however, human rights and other sensitive issues have come to dominate the bilateral agenda, reflecting a broader Western development as China has come to be widely seen as ‘a systemic rival’ to liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Denmark, and Baltic States

248. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

249. Digital RMB: A Possible Way to Reassert Data Control in the Digital Economy

Author:
Alex He
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
As the first digital currency piloted by a major economy, China’s digital renminbi (RMB) has drawn worldwide attention. Many observers, however, have exaggerated the digital currency’s influence on RMB internationalization; others have focused on its potential replacement of the current third-party payment system, or the possibility that the digital RMB could be exploited to strengthen China’s authoritarian regime by way of monitoring everyday transactions conducted by Chinese citizens. However, these observations have missed the main point of the digital RMB as a key fintech innovation in the age of the digital economy. It could be an important tool in assisting China’s central bank to reassert control over big data in the financial system and to bring the rapidly growing power of Chinese fintech giants under control. Its issuance also acts as a pre-emptive measure that positions the People’s Bank of China to compete with other central bank digital currencies and cryptocurrencies.
Topic:
Governance, Digital Economy, Banking, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

250. Korea's Aid Agencies and Result-Based Management System

Author:
Yul Kwon, Ju Young Lee, and Chami Park
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study was conducted to analyze the current situation of results-based management in Korea's ODA agencies and to find ways to reform the results-based management system. To this end, a fact-finding survey and literature review were conducted for the government agencies implementing ODA. This study also analyzed each institution’s aid implementation system, types of aid, and performance management environment. Based on this analysis, organizations that conduct self-evaluation were compared and classified into three results-based management models. The appropriate results-based management methods and evaluation indicators were derived according to the evaluation system and characteristics of each model.
Topic:
Development, Domestic Policy, and Management
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

251. How Can South Korea Teach, Lead, and Help in Asia’s Quest for Smart Cities?

Author:
Clara Gillispie
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As of 2021, virtually every country in Asia has announced some plan for standing up their own smart cities, with national- and/or city-level governments launching either pilot projects or official strategies to coordinate activities and investment across different stakeholder groups. In this context, South Korea could (and does) play a positive role in how countries across the region might be able to realize these plans. This includes through not only providing direct financial, technical, and development support, but also sharing its own lessons learned and practices in promoting sustainable, secure, and inclusive smart cities. Even so, both South Korean and Asian interests could benefit from greater attention to expanding South Korea-Asia engagements and cooperative mechanisms on digital development issues, as a means of better supporting and bolstering ongoing regional priorities.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, Digital Economy, Investment, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

252. Korea’s Strategy on Trade Agreements with Developing Countries in Africa and the Pacific Regions

Author:
Meeryung La
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the US-China trade conflict intensifies, high dependence on US and China has been pointed out as a potential risk to the Korean economy. This calls for trade policies including diversification of trading partners and the establishment of a new model for trade agreements suitable to such diversified partners. Meanwhile, the necessity for such policies grows as protectionism spreads globally and trade order changes after the Covid-19 pandemic. Africa and the Pacific (AP) regions, the main areas of interest in this report, have been excluded from Korea’s FTA network despite their high growth potential and strategic significance. Most countries in the AP regions are geographically distant from Korea and mostly underdeveloped, so we have approached the region only in terms of development cooperation. Currently, trade agreements and systems for trade and investment with AP countries are insufficient, and the size of economic cooperation with these countries remains small. However, Africa has high market potential, owing to various factors such as its high population growth, middle-class growth, and transition to digital economy, while the Pacific island countries have abundant fisheries and marine resources, and wield voting power in international organizations. In this regard, it is necessary to build the foundation for cooperation with AP countries in the mid-to-long term. Against this backdrop, this study seeks mid- to long-term strategies to promote trade cooperation with AP countries. First we consider introducing and expanding nonreciprocal arrangements for developing countries in the AP regions, as currently provided to United Nations-defined least developed countries. Then we consider introducing a reciprocal trade agreement, for example, an FTA. As a result, we found that it is necessary to introduce an FTA model suitable for developing countries in the AP regions instead of introducing further nonreciprocal agreements. Based on the results of the study, this paper proposes strategic directions for trade cooperation with the AP regions, and furthermore, provides policy suggestions that should be included in the agreement with those countries.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Digital Economy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, South Korea, and Asia-Pacific

253. Changes in the Regional Structure of China's Domestic Market and Implications

Author:
Jihyun Jung, Won Seok Choi, Hong Won Kim, and Joohye Kim
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In response to intensifying conflict with the United States and the shock of Covid-19, China reinforced its strategy to expand domestic demand. China's domestic market is an important factor affecting Korea's exports and economic growth. Accordingly, a large body of research has been conducted in Korea on China's expansion policy and changes in its domestic market. However, most studies have analyzed changes in China's consumer market, import market and imported items, limiting the overall understanding of China's domestic economy. In addition, most studies on China's regional domestic market have analyzed the market segmented by region. Recognizing this gap, this study expanded the scope of analysis of the domestic market in China to the entire domestic final demand, and analyzed inter-regional trade relations and other economic relations based on an inter-regional input-output analysis, which has rarely been attempted in analyses of the Chinese domestic market. In addition, the changes in the regional structure of the Chinese import market and Korea's competitiveness were analyzed using Chinese trade statistics. In particular, by synthesizing the changes after the global financial crisis, a turning point in China's economic structure, we project future changes in the regional economic structure of China, which emphasizes the independence of its domestic economy. In addition, in the era of US-China conflict, the study aimed to select regional markets meaningful to Korea, and to present strategic directions toward China focusing on regional cooperation and approaches into the domestic market.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Regional Economy, and Domestic Market
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

254. Digital Platform Markets of ASEAN and India: Implications for Cooperation with Korea

Author:
Jeong Gon Kim, Seung Kwon Na, Jaeho Lee, ChiHyun Yun, and Eunmi Kim
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The growth of digital platform markets in ASEAN and India is prominent. With COVID-19, demands for economic and social activities centered on digital platforms are expected to rise further; especially five sectors (e-commerce, sharing economy, education, healthcare and fintech) are fast growing seectors. Korean is a potential partner of ASEAN countries and India. Korea's Digital New Deal policy now stresses tasks such as sharing and utilizing data, convergence of 5G and artificial intelligence across whole industries, spreading digital education, digital healthcare, etc., which are closely related to the economic and social needs of ASEAN countries and India. In order to promote regulatory harmonization and cooperation with ASEAN and India, it is necessary for Korea to promote digital economy and trade agreements.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, ASEAN, COVID-19, 5G, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and South Korea

255. ASEAN Economic Integration on Services: An Analysis of Economic Impacts and Implications

Author:
Meeryung La
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
ASEAN continues its efforts to liberalize services trade in the region as part of the process of establishing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). ASEAN has been increasing the level of regional liberalization through package negotiations of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS). After signing the 10th AFAS package, the package negotiations were replaced by the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), which takes a negative list approach and includes regulatory cooperation between member states. Upon this backdrop, this paper attempts to examine the progress of service market integration within ASEAN and analyze the impact of service liberalization pursued by ASEAN. Based on the analysis results, we also present policy implications to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in the service sectors.
Topic:
Economy, Services, ASEAN, Economic Integration, and Regional Economy
Political Geography:
Asia

256. Increasing Global Climate Ambition and Implications for Korea

Author:
Jinyoung Moon, Soo Hyun Oh, Youngseok Park, Sunghee Lee, and Eunmi Kim
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, wider and decisive actions to tackle climate change and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been called for in the international community. Many countries are seeking a sustainable economic recovery plan that reflects climate change and environmental considerations. The private sector has also been trying to expand environmentally sustainable investments and disclose relevant information on climate change. In particular, major GHG emitters such as China, the United States (U.S.), European Union (EU), Japan and Korea have pledged to move forward carbon neutrality. For this goal, the EU has established action plans for the European Green Deal, including a plan for introducing a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). In this context, this study aims to propose policy recommendations for Korea by analyzing measures to strengthen reduction targets and the economic impact of the EU's CBAM. The following implications can be derived. First, it is necessary to support low-carbon transition efforts in industries. Second, it is also important to support low-carbon technological innovation. Third, monitoring and response measures for the CBAM should also be prepared. Fourth, the private sector should expand voluntary efforts to reduce emissions and environmentally sustainable investment. Lastly, it is necessary to actively engage in international cooperation, not only in terms of reducing GHG emissions but also responding to climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Science and Technology, Sustainability, Carbon Emissions, and Paris Agreement
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

257. EU-China Engagement in Humanitarian Aid: Different Approaches, Shared Interests?

Author:
Ina Friesen and Leon Janauschek
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN. Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision. China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus. • Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance. • Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, Humanitarian Aid, European Union, Food Security, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

258. How to avoid the repetition of history: the case of North Korea

Author:
Song Young Gil
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
To most European audiences, the issue of the North Korean nuclear programme and its intercontinental ballistic missile development is a neglected topic that is not frequently covered by the international news unless there has been a severe provocation. Most often, North Korea is seen as a country with a young, ruthless leader, and a people who show cult-like support to its regime.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, History, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

259. What might have been: Globalization on the medal stand at the Tokyo Olympics

Author:
Soyoung Han and Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Summer Olympic Games are the most globalized sporting event on earth. Until now, the Summer Games had been postponed only three times—in 1916, 1940, and 1944—all because of world wars. So, the announcement that in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 Tokyo Games would be postponed by a year is significant, implicit testimony to the destructiveness of the pandemic. The Tokyo Games were expected to continue the evolution of the Games away from the aristocratic European milieu where the modern Olympic movement began. As poverty has declined and incomes across the global economy have converged, participation in the Games has broadened and the pattern of medaling has become more pluralistic, particularly in sports with low barriers to entry in terms of facilities and equipment. This Policy Brief presents forecasts of medal counts at the 2020 Tokyo Summer Games had they had gone on as scheduled, setting aside possible complications arising from the coronavirus pandemic. The forecasts are not just a depiction of what might have been. They establish a benchmark that can be used when the Games are eventually held, to examine the impact of the uneven incidence of the pandemic globally.
Topic:
Economics, Globalization, Sports, and Olympics
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Global Focus

260. Mining and R&D of Rare Earth Elements: Prospects, Challenges, and Avenues for Indo-Japan Partnership

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The prospects for exploring seabed minerals, specifically rare earth elements (REEs) have risen courtesy technological innovations in the field of deep-sea exploration. REEs are identified as a group of 17 chemical elements in the periodic table, found relatively in abundance in the Earth’s crust. They share similar chemical and physical properties and are of vital use in a variety of sectors, including by military manufacturers and technology firms. The largest subgroup within the REEs are the 15 lanthanides. The two other elements being scandium and yttrium. Based on quantity, the lanthanides, cerium, lanthanum, and neodymium are the most produced rare earths elements. These elements earn the distinction of being ‘rare’ for their availability in quantities which are significant enough to support viable economic mineral development of the deposits. However, from a cost-effective point of view, they are not consumable. It is not economically viable to extract these elements for consumption purposes since they are not concentrated enough and remain thinly dispersed as deep as 6.4 kilometers underwater
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Research, Mining, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, and Asia

261. Initiating Tibet and English East India Company’s Ties in the 18th Century: The Warren Hastings Years

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
In the last quarter of the 18th century, Warren Hastings, the first de facto Governor General of India from 1774 to 1785 initiated and set up the English East India Company’s relations with Tibet. The first contact in this reference was initiated by the Tibetans, when, upon hearing the news of the defeat of Bhutan’s King Desi Shidariva by the British forces in the battle for Cooch Behar (1772-1774), the Panchen Lama, Palden Yeshe, wrote a historic letter of mediation addressed to the Governor General. Hastings seized the opportunity, and, in his response proposed a general treaty of amity and peace between Bengal and Tibet.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Affairs, History, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, England, and Tibet

262. George Bogle’s 1774 Mission to Tibet: Establishing English Trade and Reach beyond Northern Borders of Bengal

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
In the last quarter of the 18th century, Warren Hastings, the first de facto Governor General of India from 1774 to 1785 initiated and set up the English East India Company’s relations with Tibet. The backdrop to this was created when the ruler (sde-srid or srid-skyon) of Bhutan overran Sikkim some years prior. In 1771, the Bhutanese descended on the plains and invaded Cooch-Behar, taking in the Raja (King) as a prisoner. The royal family called on Warren Hastings for assistance, who, in turn, dispatched a battalion of sepoys. The Bhutanese were driven away from Cooch-Behar and chased into the Duars around winter 1772-1773.1 In the given circumstances, the Bhutanese government appealed the Tashi Lama (who was the acting Regent of Tibet during the infancy of the Dalai Lama) to intervene on their behalf.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, History, and Trade
Political Geography:
India, Asia, England, and Tibet

263. Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation Agreements: A Contextual Study of India & Japan’s First 2+2 Foreign & Defense Ministerial Meet

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs) have become the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in fundamental areas such as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wideranging impacts on national and international security outcomes. A theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis explains the significance and need for DCAs. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s fueled the demand for DCAs. Ever since, States are known to have used DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. However, the DCA proliferation cannot be attributed to the demand factor alone. Nations are required also to overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. Network influences can increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. Two specific network influences that can be identified here are—preferential attachment and triadic closure. They show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, India, and Asia

264. Japan and the Indian Ocean Region: Engagement for Capacity-Building, Regional Security, and Ports Development

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The 20th and 21st centuries will be remembered for many things, including primacy of the vast and seemingly endless seas and oceans. In this setting, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) finds itself at the heart of the world map connecting distant nations through limitless waters. As a Northeast Asian island nation, Japan’s involvement with the Indian Ocean is heavily defined by virtue of its trade, investment and supplies from this region. Japan’s story in this reference dates back to the 17th century when a prominent Japanese adventurer, merchant, and trader, Tenjiku Tokubei sailed to Siam (Thailand) and subsequently to India in 1626 aboard a Red Seal ship via China, Vietnam and Malacca. Often referred to as the ‘Marco Polo of Japan’, Tokubei’s adventurous journey and account of his travels to India gained distinction also because he became perhaps the first Japanese to visit Magadh (which was an Indian kingdom in southern Bihar during the ancient Indian era).
Topic:
Security, Development, Regional Cooperation, History, and Capacity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Indian Ocean

265. China, Africa and the WHO : a challenge for post covid19 multilateralism

Author:
Valerie Niquet
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
China plays a significant role in Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, where the current Director-General of the WHO was Minister of Health and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. This opaque influence and the support given by Beijing to Dr. Tedros seems to have weighed on the positions taken by the WHO in the face of the Covid 19 crisis. The consequences of these decisions are now being felt worldwide and contribute to undermining the credibility of a fragile multilateral system.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, United Nations, World Health Organization, Multilateralism, Soft Power, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

266. Arbitration as a Means to Settle Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Case Study and History of China and The Philippines

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
South China Sea’s territorial disputes gained the spotlight yet again with the April 18, 2020 announcement1 by China’s State Council, through which, it approved setting up ‘two new’ municipal districts (dependencies of the southernmost Sansha city, in the Hainan province) covering the South China Sea – namely the ‘Xisha District’ and ‘Nansha District’. Home to an estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil, and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea possess rich natural resources and fishing areas. The Fiery Cross Reef will be in charge of the administration of the islands, reefs, and sea areas of the Spratly Islands.2 The Fiery Cross Reef used to be an underwater reef that was converted into an artificial island following massive land reclamation undertaken by China. This reef was virtually untouched by manmade structures until March 2014 and was transformed into an artificial island in the span of one year by March 2015. Furthermore, the Woody Island will be in charge of the administration of the islands, reef, and sea areas of the Paracel Islands.3 China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Natural Resources has released the longitudes, latitudes, and standardized names of 25 islands and reefs and 55 undersea geographic entities in the disputed South China Sea. The listed islands include Sanzhizai – an islet north of the Woody Island in Sansha city in South China’s Hainan Province.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Arbitration
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, and South China Sea

267. COVID-19’s reality shock for external-funding dependent emerging economies

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
COVID-19 is by far the biggest challenge policymakers in emerging economies have had to deal with in recent history. Beyond the potentially large negative impact on these countries’ fiscal accounts, and the related solvency issues, worsening conditions for these countries’ external funding are a major challenge.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Latin America

268. Transparency in the Fight against the Coronavirus: The South Korean Example

Author:
Hülya Görkem Demirbulak Bae
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
South Korea constitutes an important example in fighting the pandemic. South Korea handled the process in a planned, rapid manner, and at the same time transparently. In fact, transparency has been one of the secrets of the country’s current success. In light of all of these developments, this essay will lay out how South Korea managed the coronavirus pandemic process and the policies it implemented, with a special emphasis on the role of transparency in the country’s fight.
Topic:
Accountability, Transparency, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

269. The Sino-Russian Disinformation Axis During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
For the first time, the European Commission has identified the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with Russia and other actors, as responsible for conducting “targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, its neighborhood, and globally” (European Commission, June 10). In the past, PRC media management normally focused on censoring undesirable narratives at home while employing positive messaging to promote favorable images of China’s policies abroad. This contrasted with the more combative international approach traditionally adopted by Moscow. During the current COVID-19 crisis, however, PRC propaganda has followed the Russian practice of not only advancing positive reviews of its own actions, but also promoting negative messages about other states. The PRC and Russian foreign ministries have jointly complained that “certain [i.e., Western] countries, out of ideological bias and political needs, have been spreading disinformation, distorting history, attacking other countries’ social systems and development paths, politicizing the pandemic, pinning labels on the virus, and restrict[ing] and oppress[ing] foreign media for doing their job” (PRC Foreign Ministry, July 25). Their information departments have agreed to cooperate against the West’s media policies, including by executing joint digital media projects (Russian Foreign Ministry, July 24).
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

270. China-U.K. Relations Grow More Strained Over Huawei and Hong Kong

Author:
Taylor Butch
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In October 2015, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping visited the United Kingdom at the request of Queen Elizabeth II, marking the first time that the PRC head of state had done so in ten years. In the lead-up to the visit, both Chinese and British officials had publicly acknowledged the significance of this meeting, calling it a “golden era” in relations between the two countries. Five years on, U.K.-China relations remains steady, but there are increasing signs of tension in the relationship. Rising controversies over Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure, and Beijing’s actions to suppress opposition in Hong Kong—as well as tensions over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—lie at the heart of this downturn in relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, COVID-19, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and Hong Kong

271. Xinjiang’s System of Militarized Vocational Training Comes to Tibet

Author:
Adrian Zenz
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In 2019 and 2020, the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) introduced new policies to promote the systematic, centralized, and large-scale training and transfer of “rural surplus laborers” to other parts of the TAR, as well as to other provinces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the first 7 months of 2020, the region had trained over half a million rural surplus laborers through this policy. This scheme encompasses Tibetans of all ages, covers the entire region, and is distinct from the coercive vocational training of secondary students and young adults reported by exile Tibetans (RFA, October 29, 2019). The labor transfer policy mandates that pastoralists and farmers are to be subjected to centralized “military-style” (军旅式, junlüshi) vocational training, which aims to reform “backward thinking” and includes training in “work discipline,” law, and the Chinese language. Examples from the TAR’s Chamdo region indicate that the militarized training regimen is supervised by People’s Armed Police drill sergeants, and training photos published by state media show Tibetan trainees dressed in military fatigues (see accompanying images).
Topic:
Labor Issues, Minorities, and Repression
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Tibet, and Xinjiang

272. India’s “Tibet Card” in the Stand-Off with China: More Provocative than Productive

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Tensions between India and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have remained high ever since violent clashes occurred in the Galwan Valley region in mid-June, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian Army soldiers and an undisclosed number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops (Jamestown, June 29; China Brief, July 15). A significant new development occurred on the night of August 29-30, when the Indian Army took control of strategic heights at the southern bank of the Pangong Tso, a lake in eastern Ladakh that straddles the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto border between India and China. The operation was significant: it was the first time since the eruption of tensions along the LAC in May that the Indian Army preempted the Chinese from unilaterally altering the status quo (The Telegraph, September 2).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, and Tibet

273. Diplomatic Visits, New Arms Sales, and PLA Provocations Raise Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Events throughout 2020 have seen a measured but steady increase in tensions surrounding Taiwan. The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to deny any legitimacy to the democratically-elected government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. The PRC also continues to make menacing insistence upon unification on Beijing’s terms, in language that has grown more strident throughout the tenure of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (China Brief, February 15, 2019; China Brief, November 1, 2019). Against this background, the PRC has reacted with both harsh rhetoric and saber rattling to enhanced U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic contacts in August and September, as well as a reported further round of impending U.S.-Taiwan arms sales (see discussion further below). One PRC English-language outlet opined in late September that “The U.S. has been releasing all kinds of supportive signals to Taiwan this year, with the level and frequency of their so-called interactions flagrantly enhanced… While [some in Taiwan] jump at such signals, they’d better think long and hard whether the signals are sweet poisons from the U.S. for Taiwan” (PLA Daily, September 25).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

274. The Trans-Himalayan ‘Quad,’ Beijing’s Territorialism, and India

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Connectivity linkages between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and trans-Himalayan countries have taken on a new hue with the recent Himalayan ‘Quadrilateral’ meeting between China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nepal (MOFA (PRC), July 27). Often referred to as a “handshake across the Himalayas,” China’s outreach in the region has been characterized by ‘comprehensive’ security agreements, infrastructure-oriented aid, enhanced focus on trade, public-private partnerships, and more recently, increased economic and security cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] The geopolitics underlying China’s regional development initiatives, often connected with its crown jewel foreign policy project Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have been highly concerning—not just for the countries involved, but also for neighboring middle powers like India, which have significant stakes in the region.[2] At the Himalayan Quad meeting, foreign ministers from all four countries deliberated on the need to enhance the BRI in the region through a “Health Silk Road”. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping’s ‘Community of a Shared Future for Humanity’ was cited as justification for facilitating a “common future with closely entwined interests,” and the ministers agreed to work towards enhancing connectivity initiatives to ensuring a steady flow of trade and transport corridors in the region and building multilateralism in the World Health Organization (WHO) to promote a “global community of health” (Xinhua, July 28).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, India, Asia, and Nepal

275. Sino-Russian Cooperation in Outer Space: Taking Off?

Author:
Richard Weitz
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
China and Russia are the two most influential space players besides the United States. Whereas in the past NASA was Moscow’s partner of choice, many influential Russians now look to China as their main future partner. Sino-Russian cooperation regarding global positioning and navigation satellites, space exploration, and space security has been growing and will likely continue.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Weapons, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

276. Behind Xi Jinping’s Declaration of Victory Over Poverty

Author:
Elizabeth Chen
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Chinese state news organization Xinhua announced on November 23 that nine provinces in Guizhou had been lifted out of absolute poverty, marking the removal of all counties from China’s national list of most impoverished counties (Xinhua, November 24). About a week later, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping announced that China had achieved the goal of eradicating absolute poverty and becoming a “moderately prosperous society” (小康社会, xiaokang shehui) before the end of 2020 (China Daily, December 2; Xinhua, December 4).[1] This heralded a wave of triumphal propaganda. Xi stressed the “critical importance of continuously advancing global poverty reduction” during his remarks at the G20 Riyadh Leader’s Summit on November 22, and held up China’s imminent achievement of eliminating absolute poverty ten years ahead of the deadline set by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as a model for global emulation (Xinhua, November 23). Chinese official media frequently cited the praise of foreign experts, who were quoted as saying that China’s achievement “gave a hope to the developing countries” and represented a “great historic accomplishment” amid the COVID-19 pandemic (Xinhua, November 25, Xinhua, December 8) On December 14, Xi sent a letter of congratulations to the International Forum on Sharing Poverty Reduction Experience that said, “China stands ready to work with all countries in promoting the process of international poverty reduction and building a community with a shared future for mankind” (China Daily, December 14).
Topic:
Development, Poverty, Xi Jinping, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

277. Curbing State-Driven Trade Policies: How to Craft New & Effective Approaches to Counter Distortive Practices

Author:
Wendy Cutler
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Much attention has been focused on China’s unfair intellectual property practices and the imbalance in the U.S.-China trade relationship, but equally troubling are large-scale Chinese industrial subsidies, the behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in general, the oversized and opaque role of the Chinese state in the economy. While the U.S-China phase one trade deal tackled some important sources of bilateral tension and aimed to boost Chinese purchases of U.S. goods and services, it was silent on industrial subsidies and related matters, leaving them for the next phase of negotiations, the fate of which is now in question. U.S. concerns on these matters are shared by other trading partners including the European Union (EU) and Japan. Yet despite widespread disapproval of such practices, building new global rules to combat subsidies has proven challenging. This is due to several factors, ranging from gridlock at the WTO, differences of views among like-minded countries on the required level of ambition, and uncertainty as to how best to approach the enormous complexities in China’s subsidies and related policies. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has sought to unpack this complexity, conducting recent studies of Chinese subsidies in two key sectors: aluminum and semiconductors. Both studies illustrate how Chinese subsidies are not simple cash handouts from the state to protected firms so that they can sell at favorable and distorting prices. The OECD finds subsidies can take various forms, including downstream or upstream help that trickles up or down to the firm that’s intended to benefit. They can take the form of favorable equity or debt purchases or bonds provided at below-market rates. And with interconnected global value chains, subsidies can effectively be granted covertly, intended to benefit one firm that might be several links away along the chain. In China, the problem is compounded by an opaque “party-state” structure that obscures not only the recipients of subsidies, but also the source. According to Mark Wu, a Harvard Law School professor who previously served as the Director for Intellectual Property in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, subsidies not only flow directly from government bodies in Beijing, but also indirectly through informal responses to directives — sometimes even left unsaid, but understood — from the Chinese Communist Party. Against this backdrop, the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) convened two roundtables in the fall of 2019 and the spring of 2020 to discuss how best to build a new rules-based infrastructure that might combat such subsidies and prevent trade-distorting results such as unfair competition, market access barriers, and, above all, overcapacity in global markets. Experts from the private sector, think tanks, governments, and academia weighed in with possible solutions, which included: Negotiating new rules in the WTO; Using the WTO dispute settlement system, despite its often-discussed flaws; Forming ad hoc rules-based approaches, where possible, like the U.S-EU-Japan trilateral initiative; Plurilateral negotiations conducted on a sector-by-sector basis; Forming coalitions of like-minded trading partners to establish an alternative model, much in the way that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was framed. During the roundtables, most experts agreed that there is no silver bullet that solves the subsidy and related issues on its own. And most agree that, left unaddressed, the problem is likely to deepen. The COVID-19 pandemic might even exacerbate it by leading to more state involvement in economies around the world and making it hard to discipline Beijing’s practices. Recognizing all of these real challenges that the international trade community faces, the roundtables reached the following key conclusions: Transparency on the scope, level, and nature of industrial subsidies is vital; Efforts to publicize the ongoing work in these areas, particularly that being done by the OECD, should accelerate; Turning research into tangible new policies is a key step; and Persuading China to agree to updated rules will be necessary, given that China is a singular contributor to overcapacity.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, Industry, and WTO
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

278. United G20 must pave the way for robust post-COVID-19 recovery

Author:
Phil Thornton
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The world is facing unprecedented health and economic crises that require a global solution. Governments have locked down their economies to contain the mounting death toll from the COVID-19 pandemic. With this response well underway, now is the time to move into a recovery effort. This will require a coordinated response to the health emergency and a global growth plan that is based on synchronized monetary, fiscal, and debt relief policies. Failure to act will risk a substantial shock to the postwar order established by the United States and its allies more than seventy years ago. The most effective global forum for coordinating this recovery effort is the Group of 20 (G20), which led the way out of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2009, the closest parallel we have to the current catastrophe. Eleven years ago, world leaders used the G20 meeting in London as the forum to deliver a unified response and a massive fiscal stimulus that helped stem economic free fall and prevented the recession from becoming a second Great Depression. A decade on, it is clear that the G20 is the only body with the clout to save the global economy. This does not mean that the G20 should be the only forum for actions for its member states. The United States, for example, should also work closely with like-minded states that support a rules-based world order, and there are many other fora where it can and must be active with partners and allies. But no others share the G20’s depth and breadth in the key focus areas for recovery. The other multilateral organizations that could take up the challenge lack either the substance or membership. The United Nations may count all countries as members but is too unwieldly to coordinate a response. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has the resources but requires direction from its 189 members. The Group of Seven (G7), which once oversaw financial and economic management, does not include the fast-growing emerging economies. The G20 represents both the world’s richest and fastest-growing countries, making it the forum for international collaboration. It combines that representation with agility.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, G20, Global Markets, Geopolitics, Economy, Business, Trade, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Canada, Asia, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

279. Taking stock: Where are geopolitics headed in the COVID-19 era?

Author:
Jeffrey Cimmino, Matthew Kroenig, and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is a strategic shock, and its almost immediate, damaging effects on the global economy constitute a secondary disruption to global order. Additional secondary strategic shocks (e.g., in the developing world) are looming. Together, these developments pose arguably the greatest threat to the global order since World War II. In the aftermath of that conflict, the United States and its allies established a rules-based international system that has guaranteed freedom, peace, and prosperity for decades. If the United States and its allies do not act effectively, the pandemic could upend this order. This issue brief considers the current state of the pandemic and how it has strained the global rules-based order over the past few months. First, it considers the origins of the novel coronavirus and how it spread around the world. Next, it examines how COVID-19 has exacerbated or created pressure points in the global order, highlights uncertainties ahead, and provides recommendations to the United States and its partners for shaping the post-COVID-19 world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, Economy, Business, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, South Asia, Eurasia, India, Taiwan, Asia, North America, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

280. Transforming the power sector in developing countries: Geopolitics, poverty, and climate change in Bangladesh

Author:
Robert F. Ichford
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Governments across South Asia face many challenges as they seek to improve the lives of the more than 1.8 billion people that live in the region. Increasing geopolitical competition—especially between and among China, Russia, and the United States—is one factor that is affecting progress. This “great power competition,” including over the South China Sea, is intertwined with regional rivalries (e.g., India and Pakistan, India and China, and the United States and Iran) and has important economic, military, technological, and environmental consequences. Energy is a key strategic sector in this competition as China pursues its expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and trade vision, Russia uses arms sales and nuclear energy to expand its regional presence, and the United States confronts Iran and gears up its free and open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asia EDGE (Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy) initiative. This issue brief considers the transformation of the electricity sector in Bangladesh. It is the fourth country analysis in the Atlantic Council’s “Transforming the Power Sector in Developing Countries” series. This issue brief applies to Bangladesh the analytical framework developed in the first report in the series, which presents general challenges and strategic priorities for developing countries in the context of their implementation of electric power policies and reforms following the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Markets, Oil, Governance, Geopolitics, Gas, Renewable Energy, Fossil Fuels, and Transition
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, South Asia, and Asia

281. Democracy under siege: Advancing cooperation and common values in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Kharis Templeman
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the past three decades, democracy has put down roots in many seemingly unlikely places across Asia, from Mongolia to Indonesia. At a time when democracy is in global retreat, the majority of these Asian regimes have demonstrated surprising resiliency, though many continue to suffer from glaring flaws: weak state capacity and accountability institutions, the absence of impartial rule of law, and uneven protection of political rights and civil liberties. This issue brief, “Democracy under Siege: Advancing Cooperation and Common Values in the Indo-Pacific,” by Dr. Kharis Templeman, examines challenges and opportunities for advancing cooperation and common values in the Indo-Pacific as the region faces an increasing challenge from China.
Topic:
Civil Society, Corruption, Diplomacy, International Organization, Politics, Reform, Elections, Democracy, Rule of Law, Norms, and Transition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, Australia, Korea, and Indo-Pacific

282. Economic Priorities for a Sustainable Peace Agreement in Yemen

Author:
Zaid Ali Basha and Rafat Al-Akhali
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The sustainability of a peace agreement in Yemen depends on two critical economic issues. First, in a conflict that is largely over access to resources, the issues of distribution, control, and sharing of those resources can make or break peace. Therefore, these issues must be addressed head-on during negotiations. Second, where peace agreements lack provisions that create overall economic stability, warfare can resume during the fragile implementation period. The fears over the resumption of conflict after signing a peace agreement are substantiated by several historical events in Yemen, such as the failure of the GCC Initiative.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Economics, Natural Resources, Peacekeeping, Peace, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Asia, Yemen, and West Asia

283. Developing Yemen’s Fishing Industry

Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The fishing industry in Yemen faces many structural challenges that have limited its production and potential contribution to overall economic output. Development of the industry’s infrastructure, human capacity and regulation was already poor prior to the outbreak of the ongoing armed conflict in Yemen. Since the war began five years ago the fishing industry has faced increased challenges, including a significant drop in the level of production with the displacement of many fishermen and associated workforce; fish processing plants halting production; surging fuel costs; the decline of local purchasing power leading to a drop in the local demand for fish products; and the disempowerment of the Ministry of Fish Wealth (MFW), among other challenges.
Topic:
Economics, Oceans and Seas, Economic Development, and Fishing
Political Geography:
Asia, Yemen, and West Asia

284. Developing Human Capital

Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This policy brief summarizes discussions regarding Yemen’s human capital at a “Rethinking Yemen’s Economy” workshop held in Amman, Jordan, on August 24-25, 2019. The workshop participants agreed that Yemen’s human capital accumulation has almost certainly regressed since the current conflict began. However, there is a dearth of reliable data to assess the scope and nature of this regression and thus how to best direct responses. There was also a consensus that many of the obstacles to improving Yemen’s human capital were present prior to the current conflict. In line with these findings, this brief recommends: countrywide population surveys; more funding of development projects over emergency humanitarian assistance; education reforms; and the targeting of sectors with high human capital returns. Crucially, policymakers should not wait for the end of the conflict to implement these recommendations. Investment in Yemen’s human capital now, specifically in geographic areas away from frontline fighting, should hasten the speed of the post-conflict economic recovery and lay the foundations for the sustainable development of the economy beyond the war.
Topic:
Economics, Human Capital, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Asia, Yemen, and West Asia

285. Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea: Resolve and Costs

Author:
Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
China’s coercive behavior in the post–Cold War period suggests three patterns. First, China uses coercion when it wants to establish a reputation for resolve. Second, China has been a cautious bully, resorting to coercion only infrequently. Third, when China perceives the “geopolitical backlash cost” of military coercion to be high, it chooses instead to use sanctions and grayzone coercion. (“Geopolitical backlash cost” refers here to the possibility that the target state will seek to balance against China, with the potential for U.S. military involvement.) When China perceives the geopolitical backlash cost to be low, it is more likely to use military coercion.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South China Sea

286. Asia Beyond China: Developing a European Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Changing Global Order

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Much of Europe’s attention to Asia is currently being captured by China. However, if the European Union and its member states are serious about maintaining a rules-based global order and advancing multilateralism and connectivity, it should increase its work in building partnerships across Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific super-region. To save multilateralism, go to the Indo-Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Multilateralism first. Unpack and differentiate where the United States and China support the rules-based order and where not, but also look to new trade deals and security pacts with India and Southeast Asia partners. ■ Targeted connectivity. The EU should continue to offer support to existing regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. ■ Work in small groups. EU unanimity on China and Indo-Pacific policy is ideal, but not always necessary to get things done. ■ Asia specialists wanted. Invest in and develop career paths for Asia specialists in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence services.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, International Organization, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

287. U.S.-China Strategic Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Camilla Tenna Nørup Sørensen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
U.S.-China strategic rivalry is intensifying – and nowhere more so than in the Indo-Pacific. This is likely to result in new US requests to close allies like Denmark to increase their security and defense policy contributions to the region. French and British efforts to establish an independent European presence in the Indo-Pacific present Denmark with a way to accommodate US requests without being drawn directly into the US confrontation with China. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ The importance of the Indo-Pacific region for Danish security and defense policy is likely to grow in the coming years. The focus and resources should therefore be directed towards strengthening Danish knowledge of and competences in the region. ■ Several European states, led by France and the UK, are increasing their national and joint European security and defense profiles in the Indo-Pacific by launching new initiatives. Denmark should remain closely informed about these initiatives and be ready to engage with them. ■ Regarding potential requests to the Danish Navy for contributions to the Indo-Pacific, Denmark should prioritize the French-led European naval diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Denmark, North America, and United States of America

288. China's Financial Opening Accelerates

Author:
Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Despite predictions by some observers that the United States and China are headed for a “decoupling,” China’s integration into global financial markets is accelerating. Regulatory reform has opened China’s financial market to many US and other foreign financial institutions. Foreign ownership of onshore Chinese stocks and bonds is growing rapidly and is likely to continue to expand in 2021. And inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) is on track to hit a new record in 2020. This integration is very asymmetric, however. China retains relatively tight control over both outbound direct investment and outflows of portfolio capital. US efforts to roll back the trend of deepening financial integration by threatening to delist Chinese companies traded on US markets and prohibiting any US investment in 35 Chinese companies that the Department of Defense alleges to be linked to the Chinese military appear to be largely symbolic.
Topic:
Financial Markets, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

289. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

Author:
Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

290. India–China Unsettled Boundary & Territorial Dispute: Institutionalized Border Mechanisms since 39 Years, Sans Resolution

Author:
Monika Chansoria
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The border dispute between India and China does not pertain to the definition of a boundary that can be marked physically on ground, and, on a military map, alone. It also takes on board vast tracts of disputed territorial frontiers. China continues to be in illegal physical occupation of large territorial land areas of India’s territory, starting with the entire Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh, approximately 38,000 sq kms, since the mid-1950s. In addition, India maintains that in 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded to China, 5,180 sq kms of Indian Territory in the Shaksgam Valley of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), north of the Siachen Glacier, under a bilateral boundary agreement that holds no legal validity. Besides, China also stake claim to about 96,000 sq kms of Indian Territory in north-eastern Arunachal Pradesh, which it terms as ‘Southern Tibet’. The statements regarding Arunachal Pradesh being “Chinese territory and part of southern Tibet” are a key instrument of the marked shift in China’s strategy and stance in the early 1980s when Beijing began signaling that the eastern sector was the larger part of the boundary dispute. China’s stated position is that reunification of Chinese territories is a ‘sacred duty’ of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). China shares a 22,000 kms land border with 14 adjacent states. It has resolved territorial disputes with 12 of them, but still needs to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute with India. Beijing, for that matter, also challenges the total length of the Indo-China International Land Border, which runs 3,488 kms according to the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. This was also acknowledged by Indian Prime Minster, Narendra Modi, while addressing the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai on May 16, 2015.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

291. Why Canada Must Embrace a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:
Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Stephen Nagy
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
How has Canada viewed the scope of its engagement in Asia? The traditional lens to look at such engagement has been through the Asia-Pacific framing – defining the region largely through our experience in the multilateral architecture such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on the trade side, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) on the political-security side. Canada was a founding member of APEC in 1990 and has been a dialogue partner in the ARF since its formation in 1994. Aside from these two main vehicles, Canada has been active in the international development space over the years through and is member of the Asian Development Bank, and more recently joined – while not before considerable internal debate – the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2017.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, International Development, Multilateralism, Investment, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Canada, Asia, North America, Korea, and Indo-Pacific

292. Whose “Indo Pacific”? competing visions of regional order

Author:
Thomas S. Wilkins
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The introduction of the term “Indo Pacific” is designed to focus attention on a vast geographic space stretching from the eastern coast of Africa and the Gulf to the eastern seaboard of Asia, via its great continental heartland. Its advocates claim it represents nothing less than the conceptualisation of a new “mental map” precipitated by the intensifying trade and energy flows across between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the pulsing economies of the Asian continent that they propel forward. In short, the Indo Pacific is now viewed by many as the heart of the global economic and political system. As the discussion below reveals the Indo Pacific mental map is a conscious attempt by certain governments to reframe or “rescale” the region they inhabit, or must interact with. In the case of several key countries featured below, the Indo Pacific has now displaced the earlier “Asia Pacific” regional descriptor. Yet this by no means indicates consensus on its exact definition and interpretation among such states, nor its universal acceptance among others.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Borders, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Indo-Pacific

293. Japan at a Political and Strategic Crossroads: Complex Strategic Choices and a Balancing Act?

Author:
Valerie Niquet
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
On August 28, Shinzo Abe, the longest-serving prime minister in Japan (2,822 days) stepped down and was replaced by Yoshihide Suga, Abe’s former Chief Cabinet Secretary. Having long focused on internal politics and the intricacies of Japanese bureaucracy, Prime Minister Suga is now facing the task of navigating an increasingly tense and uncertain strategic situation, with stakes going far beyond Japan’s borders and immediate environment in the context of the unresolved COVID-19 pandemic.1 The challenges that Prime Minister Suga is facing are manifold and diverse; some can be considered long-term or permanent. Others are relatively new or continued trends with new effects on the strategic balance of power and threats to the region and beyond.
Topic:
Politics, Bureaucracy, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

294. Deglobalisation in the context of United States-China decoupling

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Junyun Tan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
After decades of increasing globalisation on every front, from trade – pushed further by the growing role of value chains – to technology, movement of people and investment, there now seems to be a turn towards slower globalisation if not deglobalisation, at least in some areas. Deglobalisation is not a new concept but rather a megatrend which has been seen before, for example right before the First World War. Signs of deglobalisation, measured by decelerating trade and investment, and smaller global value chains, started to appear already in 2008. But this trend seems to have accelerated because of the United States’ push to contain China in the context of the strategic competition between the two. Such containment is apparent not only in bilateral trade and investment flows but also in technology. COVID-19 has been a second very important factor contributing to deglobalisation. The most obvious impact has been in movement of people. However, the trend towards deglobalisation is much less evident for finance, with the exception of foreign direct investment, though increasing attempts by the US and China to decouple particular types of financial flows are emerging, including the delisting of Chinese companies from US stock exchanges and the imposition of sanctions for transactions with certain Chinese companies and individuals. Overall, it is too early to confirm the depth and the sustainability of the current wave of deglobalisation, but an increasing number of signals suggest a trend of deglobalisation is underway.
Topic:
Globalization, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

295. Managing US-China Rivalry in the Arctic: Small states can be players in great power competition

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Many fear that strategic competition between the US and China threatens longstanding regional cooperation and stability in the Arctic. But if they recognise their own political and economic significance and work collectively, the Nordic states and Canada can still play an instrumental role in steering the region’s future away from confrontation. Recommendations: Recognise how US–China strategic competition represents a false binary for policy choices in the Arctic. Understand how economic connectivity provides room for manoeuvre against big power pressure. Encourage participation of non-Arctic states with similar economic and political norms on natural resource and infrastructure development.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

296. An Eastern Policy Update, but No Upgrade: The EU needs a more ambitious Eastern Partnership strategy

Author:
Cristina Gherasimov
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The EU is set to adopt a new Eastern Partnership (EaP) policy at a summit in June. This is strategically important for it and for its eastern neighborhood, where other powers like Russia and China pursue competing interests. As the policymaking process stands and given the tight deadline, however, the EU will only update and not upgrade the EaP framework due to EU states’ diverging interests. Brussels and Berlin will need to keep the EaP on the agenda after the summit to safeguard the EU’s transformative power in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

297. How 'Democratic Security' Can Protect Europe from a Rising China

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Communist Party of China (CPC) plans for China to achieve effective global dominance by 2049. It is using the major global crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic to secure strategic advantage through propaganda and disinformation, assertive, sometimes aggressive diplomacy, pursuing targeted investments, and offering “health cooperation.” The CPC has long targeted European business and political elites to build constituencies of support. Europe must counter by building robust societies based on core democratic values.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, COVID-19, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

298. Connectivity in Eurasia: Geopolitical Chances for the EU

Author:
Jacopo Maria Pepe
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic fuels technological and geopolitical competition among the great powers, Europe’s relations with China and Russia are facing new challenges and risks. Still, the reconfiguration of power in Eurasia also brings unexpected opportunities for European actors in the area of connectivity. To seize them, the EU needs to reconcile its aspiration to be a globally accepted “normative-regulatory” power with both its limited financial means and its more assertive attitude to geopolitics.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and Asia

299. The new China consensus: How Europe is growing wary of Beijing

Author:
Janka Oertel
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since the onset of the covid-19 crisis, there has been a new convergence of EU member states’ assessment of the challenges China poses to Europe. The Sino-European economic relationship lacks reciprocity, and there are mounting concerns within the EU about China’s assertive approach abroad, as well as its breaches of international legal commitments and massive violations of human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Overall, there is growing scepticism about the future trajectory of the relationship, which provides an opportunity for a more robust and coherent EU policy on China. In its remaining months, the German Council presidency could use this momentum to create institutional structures to improve the EU’s capacity to act. In doing so, it will be crucial to ease concerns about Franco-German dominance of the China agenda – especially those of eastern and southern European countries – while enabling all member states to become more engaged in shaping the EU’s future approach to China.
Topic:
International Relations, Human Rights, European Union, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

300. Challenges in the Transatlantic Partnership: Are We Drifting Apart?

Author:
Martin Michelot
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During November 2019, EUROPEUM co-organized the second Transatlantic Policy Forum along with CEPA, a leading US think-tank. The private roundtable provided a unique opportunity for candid and open discussion about the issues that are at the heart of transatlantic cooperation. Our research fellow Martin Michelot concluded a debrief and analysis of these debates. 2019 will certainly go down as a year when the political unity of the Alliance was tested - and when NATO held together strong. The year ended with a NATO Leaders Summit that centered around the comments made by French President Emmanuel Macron a month prior, where he declared NATO to be in a state of “brain death” and cast a shadow on whether the collective security guarantee would still hold strong in the near future. That was not the only moment of transatlantic tension: tensions flared over European 5G markets, which may be built by Chinese companies, and trade has become an inflamed issue between Europe, the U.S. and China. The debrief includes analysis of NATO, U.S.-EU Trading Relations and a to-do list for transatlantic cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, United States of America, and North America