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Begin New Search Topic Governance Political Geography Africa Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 5 Years

1. From Paper to Practice: Enhancing Integrated Development Plans to Improve Governance

Author:
Stuart Morrison and Pranish Desai
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) systems play an important role in ensuring that South Africa’s municipalities are able to effectively fulfil their core mandate of service delivery. One central component of this system is the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), a strategic framework used for several functions, including guiding key priorities and providing a roadmap for effectively delivering public services. However, even though most municipalities consistently submit IDPs, the quality of service delivery, especially amongst municipalities that have Water Services Authority responsibilities, is uneven. This raises the questions around which factors are more influential in determining effective service provision, and why they are lacking in dozens of municipalities. Using Good Governance Africa’s 2024 Governance Performance Index (GPI), this policy briefing provides a range of stakeholders with consolidated insights into how these issues can be addressed.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Services, Planning, Monitoring, and and Evaluation (PME)
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

2. What shall we do with the suspected pirates? Why piracy prosecution doesn't always work

Author:
Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In African waters, incidents of piracy still far outweigh apprehensions, leaving few suspects to prosecute. Those who are prosecuted may face either impunity or legal uncertainty, because the illegal act of piracy is difficult to prove in some cases. There are steps that the states involved in counter-piracy should take to address these challenges. Piracy has been a constant issue of concern since the early 2000s in the waters off East and West Africa, albeit with numbers of incidents fluctuating with seasons and geography. The international community has in both theatres developed a practice, where international navies patrol the waters and hand over suspects for prosecution in regional states. But bringing piracy suspects to justice faces many challenges. This policy brief points to the main issues and possible solutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Water, Governance, Piracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa

3. Enhancing political accountability in South Africa

Author:
Pranish Desai and Mxolisi Zondo
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Enshrined in the founding provisions of South Africa’s democratic constitution is the commitment to a “multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness”.1 Today, South Africa is entering a new form of multiparty governance through the emergence of coalition governments in municipalities across the country. Following the Constitutional Court’s June 2020 decision to strike down parts of the Electoral Act of 1998, there have also been critical discussions about whether our national and provincial electoral framework of proportional representation fosters the accountability and responsiveness to which our constitution aspires.2 Both the nascent era of widespread coalition governance and the debate over electoral reform occur while the confidence that citizens have in our democracy is depreciating. In order to revive South Africans’ belief in our democratic system, we must renew that system to improve accountability. Many of the policy proposals that Good Governance Africa (GGA) considers in this briefing already exist,3 but we evaluate them in specific relation to how they can deepen political accountability in South Africa. The upshot is that a shift in approach from our institutions, political parties, civil society and citizens themselves is required.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Accountability, Social Contract, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

4. Dangerous Delay 2: The cost of inaction

Author:
Emily Farr, Leah Finnegan, Joanna Grace, and Mathew Truscott
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
In 2011, Somalia experienced a devastating famine that killed over a quarter of a million people. Afterwards, leaders in the region made a commitment to end drought emergencies by 2022. The international community sought to ensure that there would be no repeat of the failures that led to famine. Next time, the world would heed the warnings and act early to avoid the crisis. But despite various warnings and alarms over the past two years, the commitment to anticipatory action has proven half-hearted. We are once again responding too late and with too little to avert the crisis. In this follow-up to their 2012 briefing A Dangerous Delay, Oxfam and Save the Children, supported by the Jameel Observatory, examine what has changed and what has not in the humanitarian system since 2011. They explain how it must evolve in order to enable and fully fund anticipatory action. With the climate crisis set to deepen, the current system must change quickly in order to meet the challenges we face in the years ahead.
Topic:
Security, Famine, Governance, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

5. Laying Foundations for Civic Engagement and Government Accountability in Guinea (2011-2020)

Author:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
When President Alpha Condé took office after Guinea’s first democratic election in 2010, he promised to reform the country’s mining sector. Following decades of sector mismanagement and corruption, Guinea introduced a new mining code in 2011 (later amended in 2013) and, in 2012, the government committed to implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard and reviewed 19 mining contracts signed by previous administrations. This reform effort precipitated a significant expansion of the industry: investments picked up and bauxite exports rose, and mining revenues grew. Despite progress, and because of the speed of mining expansion, communities in mining areas experienced increasingly negative impacts from the industry. Their interests went unaddressed; the government had been slow to implement key regulations aimed at protecting them. As a result, 2016 saw uprisings in key bauxite-producing areas. In addition, civil society engagement on extractive issues was weak and fragmented; citizens, activists and journalists lacked crucial information and were ill-equipped to engage on key governance issues.
Topic:
Government, Natural Resources, Governance, Accountability, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa and Guinea

6. Social Protection Reforms in the MENA Region: Possibilities and Challenges

Author:
Abdalhadi Alijla
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The COVID-19 crisis that hit the world in 2020 revealed a huge gap in access to public services, equality and government responsiveness to the consequences of the pandemic. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the COVID-19 crisis showed the inadequacy of the public institutions and their abilities to protect the poor, and ensure that populations’ needs are met, especially informal workers, women, children and the elderly. The social protection systems in the MENA countries are relatively weak, facing challenges or disfunctions through many ad-hoc programmes, making it difficult to respond to the COVID-19 crisis. This is particularly observed in countries facing a pre- COVID-19 economic crisis, such as Lebanon. There is clear evidence that social protection systems have a positive impact on the lives of the population in times of crisis. They improve access to health and education, and increase economic security. Social protection systems work during times of crisis and times of stability, but they are strategic tools that show that states have the capacity to design and deploy policy tools to protect people. In divided societies, inequalities are usually wider and, therefore, a comprehensive social protection system with a high rate of coverage is needed. In this Policy Study, we present four chapters, examining the state-of-the-art of social protection systems in the MENA region, challenges, and potential opportunities that government, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the European Union (EU) could take to assist in establishing comprehensive social protection systems. The COVID-19 crisis is an opportunity to learn and identify where the gaps are and what needs to be done by formal and informal institutions in the MENA region to reform and re-engineer their social protection systems with help from the EU and its institutions. COVID-19 arrived in the MENA region during an economic crisis in Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia, marked by huge inequalities, vulnerabilities with increasing poverty and low trust in governments and their performance. Lockdown, closure and physical distancing have also led to loss of jobs and income for millions of people, mainly informal workers, and businesses. The vulnerable groups who are already living in economic distress, such as informal workers, youth, women and the elderly, are the most affected parts of the population. They are the most vulnerable to loss of income and unemployment. This study highlights that MENA states lack comprehensive and effective social protection systems. In many MENA countries, ad-hoc programmes substitute a comprehensive social protection system. The study examines the rural-urban and socioeconomic group gaps in accessing services, such as health and education, and economic opportunities. It shows that the historic gap between urban-rural and socioeconomic groups' ability to access the same services and opportunities compared to other groups affected the ability of those groups to cope with the pandemic, exposing them to more vulnerability. The study examines the policy response of the MENA governments to the pandemic, namely in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco – four countries that have been particularly challenged by COVID-19. It identifies several gaps and op- portunities to develop the social protection system. The study examines cash- based programmes, access to public health, informal workers, women’s protection, digitalisation of social protection systems, and education, to some extent. It focuses on youth, women, the elderly, disabled persons and children as the most vulnerable groups in the region. It identifies that coordination between formal in- stitutions and INGOs needs to be formalised, informal workers need to be included in the social protection system, women and the elderly should be prioritised, and informal social protection mechanisms could be supported through livelihood activities, but is not seen as a major part of any social protection mechanism. It finally highlights the need for digitalisation of reformed social protection systems or strategies.
Topic:
Governance, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

7. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

8. Youth Inclusion in the Development of South Africa's National Youth Policy (2020–2030): Reflections and Recommendations

Author:
Steven Rebello
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
Abstract:
South Africa's National Youth Policy (NYP) 2020–2030 (DWYPD, 2020) represents the country's third attempt to outline actions that can or should be taken, by government and other stakeholders, to facilitate youth development at local and national levels. Meaningful youth inclusion and participation represents a central value within this policy. This emphasis on inclusion aligns with the Constitution of South Africa, where public participation in governance is enshrined as a constitutional imperative. Recognising this emphasis on youth inclusion, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) engaged with a key representative within the Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities (DWYPD) to determine what steps or activities the department has initiated to include youth in the development of the NYP 2020–2030 (hereafter referred to as the NYP 2030).
Topic:
Development, Governance, Youth, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

9. Reforming Constitutional Governance in Ghana

Author:
Kojo Asante and Nicholas Opoku
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:
Manifestos are increasingly becoming an important polical contract in Ghana's highly compeve electoral polics. The preparaon of manifestos offers cizens and civil society organizaons (CSOs) a unique opportunity to mobilize and unite behind crical socio-economic and governance issues, and compel polical pares to prescribe reforms or proposals to them, with the view of implemenng such proposals when voted into office. The expectaon is that following this process, cizens and CSOs, working closely with the media, will hold polical pares to account for their proposed reforms to these issues. In line with this, the Ghana Center for Democrac Development (CDD-Ghana) ahead of the 2020 general elecons, embarked on The Manifesto Project with the view of highlighng crical problem areas in ten (10) sectors that hinder naonal development and progress and prescribe soluons for polical pares to comprise in their respecve manifestos. The issues were captured in a report tled 'The Manifesto Project: Promong responsive and responsible manifestos for inclusive development'. As a new government has been formed in 2021 following the outcome of the 2020 elecons, it is our expectaon that government will take steps towards addressing the key sector-specific issues highlighted. In the area of governance, some perennial challenges and gaps persist. This policy brief outlines the key issues idenfied as constung crical problem areas and gaps in Ghana's efforts towards ensuring good governance, with a view to informing and influencing agenda-se ng and policy for inclusive development.
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, Governance, Reform, and Constitution
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

10. Decentralization And Local Governance Reform: Towards Accountable Local Government And Better Service Delivery In Ghana

Author:
Mohammed Awal
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:
Since the late 1980s, many countries in Africa started the process of devolving polical, administrave, and fiscal responsibilies from central to local governments. The movaons of countries for undergoing such a governance change are varied and include a range of polical as well as social and economic factors (see; Dickovich and Wunsch, 2014; Mogues, Benin and Cudjoe, 2009; Crawford and Hartman, 2008). Ghana has been implemenng decentralizaon reform since 1988. The central purpose of the reform is to improve local governance and be er provision of public services that would improve the lives of ordinary cizens (see; Ahwoi, 2010). Yet, in spite of a wave of decentralizaon policy reforms, local governments in Ghana sll remain weak. Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) – the polical, administrave and fiscal authority responsible for local governance- have weak accountability systems, are unresponsive and in many instances unable to deliver important public services that impact the lives of ordinary cizens (See; Ofei-Aboagye, 2018; CDD-Ghana and UNICEF, 2019). The poor performance of local governments in delivering public services has led to calls for deepening decentralizaon reform in Ghana. In response to the calls for strengthening local governance, government has in recent mes iniated and is implemenng key policy reforms in polical, fiscal and administrave decentralizaon. While the current reforms proposals –parcularly in polical decentralizaon –are far reaching, there sll remain areas of decentralizaon and local government reforms that require the a enon of policy makers, local government accountability oversight agencies as well as social accountability actors. This paper aims to smulate public discourse on strengthening decentralizaon for be er local government accountability and responsive public delivery service in Ghana. The aim of this paper is two fold; to provide key pointers to policy makers on the outstanding reform and policy issues in decentralizaon and local governance that needs polical crical a enon, and , to serve as an advocacy tool for non-state actors in fostering evidence informed advocacy towards achieving accountable, responsive local governments in Ghana.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Services, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

11. An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:
Busisipho Siyobi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Secretariat should take the lead in developing intervention mechanisms that ensure a strong civil society representation in the multi-stakeholder groups, to enable real public participation and obtain local legitimacy of the Initiative: This can be done through actively identifying and partnering with relevant grassroot civil society organisations that work directly with mining-affected communities. Implementing countries should work more collaboratively with the EITI to investigate any reported revenue discrepancies highlighted in the country-specific EITI reporting: This can be enforced by implementing countries in alignment with their guiding principles of regulatory bodies and the national EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) in the effort to fight against corruption and ensure local ownership of the EITI process.
Topic:
Civil Society, Corruption, Natural Resources, Governance, Regulation, Mining, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:
Africa

12. Zimbabwe media policy briefing

Author:
Sikhululekile Mashingaidze and Stephen Buchanan-Clarke
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
The 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution’s well-articulated provisions for media freedom are in stark contrast to the fragility of the country’s current media landscape, 41 years after the attainment of independence. The Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) is a constitutional body mandated with functions that include the duty to uphold, promote and develop media freedom, enforce good practices and ethics, as well as fair competition and diversity. However, that the ZMC chairperson and its eight other members are presidential appointees poses a challenge for ZMC’s operational independence. The 2013 Constitution’s Part 5. Section 248. Part 1a) notes that a chairperson is ‘…appointed by the President after consultation with the Committee on Standing rules and orders;’ and Part b cites eight other members appointed by the President from a list of 12 nominees submitted by the same committee. This is a structural problem within the Constitution itself, as it enables disproportionate executive influence and curtails the commission’s independence in its primary mandate to uphold, promote and develop freedom of the media. Sections 61 and 62 of the Constitution, however, outline ordinary citizens’ and journalists’ rights to freedom of expression, freedom of the media and the right of access to information. Although subject to restrictions in contexts of defence, public security, or professional confidentiality, these freedoms include citizens’ right of access to information for public accountability and stipulate journalists’ right to protection of the confidentiality of their sources of information. The Constitution further specifies the freedom of all state-owned media to independently determine the editorial content of its broadcasts, be impartial and afford fair opportunity for the representation of divergent views and dissenting opinions.
Topic:
Governance, Media, Constitution, and Journalism
Political Geography:
Zimbabwe and Africa

13. When jihadists broker peace: Natural resource conflicts as weapons of war in Mali’s protracted crisis

Author:
Boubacar Ba and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Following Mali’s coup d’état of 18 August 2020, the transitional government is yet to present a roadmap for peace in central Mali outlining a new strategy for dialogue with armed non-state actors. To support this process, it is important that Mali’s international donors identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue with all parties to conflicts. Recommendations: Immediate de-escalation of conflicts is needed through disarmament of militias and rebuilding of trust between local communities and Mali’s armed forces, with a strong focus on protecting civilians. Mali needs a national, comprehensive strategy for how to include jihadists and local militias in dialogue, reconciliation and dispute resolution. International donors need to identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue between all parties to conflicts. Long-term solutions regulating equal access to natural resources for different population groups are key.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Democratization, Environment, Terrorism, Water, Food, Non State Actors, Governance, Fragile States, Investment, Peace, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

14. Assessing SSR Opportunities and Challenges During the Transition in Mali

Author:
Flore Berger
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Five months after the coup d'état in Mali, the main questions about the 18-month transition period - Who will be the key players? What will the priorities be? - have been answered. But while the transition period opens up new opportunities, there remain many challenges and obstacles to significant progress in security sector reform.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Leadership, Coup, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

15. From Unilateral Response to Coordinated Action: How Can Mobility Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa Adapt to the Public-Health Challenges of COVID-19?

Author:
Ling San Lau, Kate Hooper, and Monette Zard
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic challenged public health and migration management infrastructures in sub-Saharan Africa, like elsewhere, as never before. While many countries in the region had experience dealing with infectious disease outbreaks, including Ebola and yellow fever, the nature of transmission under COVID-19, among other factors, forced governments to reassess many of their public-health strategies and adopt strict guidelines to prevent pushing fragile and over-burdened health-care systems over the edge. However, border closures and other mobility restrictions brought unintended consequences, including stranding large numbers of people, imperiling the supply of essential goods and services, and cutting off income for border communities and prospective migrants. In addition, unilateral containment and mitigation policies prevented a coordinated approach to both public health and migration management. The policy brief examines the different strategies employed by governments in sub-Saharan Africa during the first year of the pandemic, and the limitations of unilateral action. It offers recommendations on how states and the international community can work together to restart migration and mobility and, looking forward, build capacity to respond to COVID-19 and future public health emergencies.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Migration, Governance, Employment, Refugees, Borders, Mobility, Public Health, COVID-19, Remittances, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

16. Deepening Labor Migration Governance at a Time of Immobility: Lessons from Ghana and Senegal

Author:
Camille Le Coz and Kate Hooper
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The pandemic has upended labor migration around the globe, and with it, an important avenue for supporting socioeconomic development in many low- and middle-income countries. In Ghana, Senegal, and other West African countries, for example, migration and its corollaries, such as remittances and knowledge transfers from the diaspora, have long contributed to development. Ongoing travel restrictions and uncertainty about when migration will more fully restart threaten this progress and add an extra layer of complexity to efforts to improve the governance of international labor migration. This policy brief explores how governments and other stakeholders can promote better labor migration governance in low- and middle-income countries, and how these efforts are being shaped by the pandemic. It focuses on the experiences of Ghana and Senegal—two countries that were in the process of strengthening their migration policies before the pandemic began. The policy brief looks at these countries’ migration policy priorities, efforts to facilitate mobility within the region and further afield, and strategies for building closer ties to the diaspora. Crucially, the authors note, while the pandemic has disrupted efforts to improve labor migration governance, it has also made abundantly clear why doing so is important. Continued work in this area promises to help achieve better outcomes for migrants and for countries of origin and destination.
Topic:
Development, Migration, Labor Issues, Governance, COVID-19, and Remittances
Political Geography:
Africa, Senegal, and Ghana

17. Global rivalry in the Red Sea: A ‘Geopolitical’ European Union should encourage cooperation in the Red Sea region

Author:
Fabrizzio Tassinari and Mehari Taddele Maru
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Geopolitical competition in Africa is here to stay, and the question for the EU is not if but how to position itself in this global competition. In the case of the Red Sea region, the EU should support regional initiatives to build effective regional maritime governance and promote global public goods such as maritime security and the blue economy. Under the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission has branded itself a ‘Geopolitical Commission’. With regard to geopolitics, the Red Sea has for years been seen as a primary focus of action, a point the European Council stressed in July 2021, when it identified the region as a ‘geostrategic priority’. In 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, finding that there was ‘renewed geopolitical competition on both shores of the Red Sea’. The EU further stressed that ‘at stake are the preservation of the security of the Bab el Mandeb maritime route through which a significant proportion of trade to and from Europe passes; the harnessing of irregular migration flows; the containment of terrorist threats; and the prevention of instability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood’.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, International Organization, Governance, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Red Sea

18. Decentralisation amidst hybrid governance: The case of northern Mali

Author:
Anna Schmauder
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Malian peace agreement of 2015, known as the Algiers Agreement, aimed to improve relations between select representatives of northern Mali and central state authorities through decentralisation. Yet, in contrast to ongoing counterterrorism efforts, governance reform through the decentralisation process has received little attention from either the Malian government or its international partners. As a consequence, effective decentralisation in northern regions remains limited at this point in time. This policy brief contributes to the debate on decentralisation in Mali by illustrating how decentralisation in northern Mali has become an issue of contestation between central state authorities and armed signatories. Decentralisation remains captured in a logic of territorial control, in which the representation of armed signatories takes precedence before the needs and interests of marginalised tribes and communities in northern regions. Central state authorities and signatories have been reinforcing this logic of representation, each trying to hamper the influence of the other over territorial control in northern regions.
Topic:
Governance, Fragile States, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

19. Improving decentralised natural resource management in the Sahel: The case of the Sourou river plain in Mali

Author:
Fransje Molenaar
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the course of 2019, and despite being located in a region marked by violent conflict, the Inter collectivité du Sourou achieved a unique feat in the West African region. It developed an Integrated and Sustainable Development Programme (ISDP) that defined concrete actions to implement the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the Sourou river plain in Mali in an adaptive fashion and set itself up as the main coordinator for the implementation of this plan. Both achievements will help the region coordinate natural resource management – thereby addressing one of the region’s root causes of conflict. This policy brief outlines how the effective devolution of power was achieved through an inclusive rather than a ‘rubber stamp’ approach to the planning process and by having a donor that made the improvement of local governance a result of its own intrinsic value. For the long- term implementation of the ISDP, care should be taken to ensure the continued inclusivity and representativeness of local development and resource management while remaining mindful of the interaction of this new governance structure with existing governance and power structures.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Governance, Sustainable Development Goals, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, and Sahel

20. Higher Education as a Pathway toward Peace in Burkina Faso: New Policy Perspectives

Author:
Dagan Rossini and Felicity Burgess
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Social Science Research Council
Abstract:
Higher education plays an important role in promoting inclusive democracies and driving social and economic change. Many African universities, however, face key structural challenges including limited Internet, outdated curricula, overburdened faculty, and archaic infrastructure. These systemic issues have been exacerbated by rising enrollment rates in the wake of global pressures to expand access and ensure quality of education for all. As governments and multilateral institutions look to capitalize on the continent’s demographic dividend, it is important to rethink, revitalize, and restructure African university systems, particularly in (post-)conflict settings. This policy brief is based on a report prepared for the Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research, and Innovation in Burkina Faso. It identifies a mismatch between the supply of skilled graduates and labor market demands, bearing in mind Burkina Faso’s ambition to become one of three main knowl- edge hubs in West Africa and the ongoing crisis in the Sahel region. Research was conducted between September 2019 and April 2020 and included three weeks of qualitative research in the capital city, Ouagadougou, involving focus groups and semi-structured interviews with 67 individuals. Findings suggest that increased collaboration between the education and economic sectors will enhance both student learning experiences and professional practices, thereby enabling more peaceful and democratic futures
Topic:
Education, Governance, Democracy, Peace, Higher Education, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Africa and Burkina Faso

21. Context matters – Why Africa should Tailor its own Measures to fight COVID-19

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
African governments have been faster than most of their European counterparts in imposing measures to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak despite dealing with numerous other challenges. However, context matters, and for Africa, the political and socioeconomic consequences of the lockdown measures may cause more havoc than the actual virus. This brief identifies political, economic and social risks related to coronavirus responses in Africa and emphasises the disproportionate burden carried by women. It argues that localised measures, which include dialogue, transparency and flexibility, may be the only realistic way forward, while underlining the need for wealthier states to provide generous aid packages, debt cancellations and continued investments, in spite of current challenges, in order for Africa to pull through yet another challenge.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

22. Corruption Crossroads? Rising Perceptions of Graft Weaken Citizen Trust, Threaten Botswana’s Democratic Standing

Author:
Thomas Isbell and Batlang Seabo
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Corruption is widely considered one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in African countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Corruption hinders macro-economic growth by weakening governance structures and diluting the positive effects of investments. At the micro level, corruption can trap the poorest, who are least likely to have alternatives to state provision of services, in a downward spiral (Peiffer & Rose, 2014). Botswana has long been considered one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and top performers in democratic practice and good governance. But while Transparency International’s (2019) Corruption Perceptions Index continues to rank Botswana as best on the continent, other observers have questioned this reputation (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017; Good, 2017). Allegations have focused on, among other things, high-level corruption in military procurement contracts under former President Ian Khama, close ties between members of the ruling party and the agricultural sector, and charges that well-connected suspects are often cleared by the courts (Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2016; Konopo, 2017; Good, 2017; Norad, 2011; Sebudubudu 2014; Gasennelwe, 2018). Recent corruption scandals have reached the highest levels of government, including the alleged looting of the National Petroleum Fund (Kgalemang, 2019; Motshegwa, Mutonono, & Mikazhu, 2019), and are still before courts of law (Shuma, 2020). In this paper we use Afrobarometer survey data to explore citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Botswana. We find that far more people see corruption increasing than decreasing and that perceptions of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament have risen sharply over the past decade. Fewer Batswana approve of how the government is handling the anti-corruption fight, and while many believe ordinary people can help fight corruption, a majority say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to the authorities. A correlation analysis suggests that perceptions of corruption, especially in the Presidency, are strongly associated with less popular trust in public institutions and less satisfaction with democracy.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Democracy, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

23. PP67: COVID-19 in Africa - Vulnerabilities and Assets for an Effective Response

Author:
Robert Mattes, Carolyn Logan, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and George Ellison
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Not only did the COVID-19 disease arrive on Africa’s shores (and at its airports) later than in Asia, Europe, and North America (Loembé et al., 2020), but for months the numbers of infections and deaths also appeared to remain relatively low. As of early August, the continent had experienced more than 1 million confirmed cases and 23,000 deaths (Africa CDC, 2020), though these figures were increasing rapidly. At this point, the causes behind Africa’s comparatively low initial numbers are not completely clear. One reason may be that early and decisive responses on the part of many African governments prevented the virus from gaining an easy foothold (Beech, Rubin, Kurmanaev, & MacLean, 2020; Hirsch, 2020; Levinson, 2020; Moore, 2020; Loembé et al., 2020). Indeed, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2020), 46 African countries took some form of official action – in the form of new legislation or executive orders and decrees – restricting or banning travel and public gatherings, enforcing quarantines, or in some cases imposing full “lockdowns.” But Africa, somewhat paradoxically, may also have benefited from a range of structural factors, such as the continent’s relatively limited international exposure, its relatively low rates of intra- and inter-state air travel (Marbot, 2020), a generally hot and humid climate, relatively lower levels of population density and urbanization (De Waal, 2020; Marbot, 2020), and its substantially younger populations (Binding, 2020). It may have also profited from cultural factors, such as the fact that older people tend to remain with their families, rather than being institutionalized in retirement homes (Marbot, 2020), though this also has consequences for residential density, or that it has a more collectivist, less individualistic culture, which, according to recent research, may make COVID-19 interventions more effective (Frey, Presidente, & Chen, 2020). Yet most public health experts remain wary, and still expect significant further transmission of the virus across the continent, requiring drastic public health responses and interventions, especially where governments eased initial restrictions and lockdowns. Indeed, some officials have expressed concerns that Africa’s low numbers merely reflect very low rates of testing (Sly, 2020) and even, in some countries such as Tanzania, deliberate under-reporting (BBC, 2020). Some press reports have described instances where local reports of death rates bear little relation to official data (MacLean, 2020; York, 2020). These concerns appear well-founded given that community transmission is now present in all African countries and the number of infections increased by 50%, and deaths by 22%, in the last two weeks of July (World Health Organization, 2020). And officials at the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention have warned that Africa could well become the next epicenter of the pandemic (Loembé et al., 2020). If, as these events suggest, early interventions in African countries successfully erected a wall that kept the virus at bay, albeit temporarily, how well prepared are these countries if and when the virus penetrates their initial defenses? A wealth of Afrobarometer survey data suggests that Africans are especially vulnerable, in part due to lack of access to clean water and adequate health care (Gyimah-Boadi & Logan, 2020a; Logan, Howard, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2020). In this paper, we attempt to take the issue of vulnerability a step further by developing a more fine-grained approach, using insights from public health to examine different dimensions and components of vulnerability (Morrell, 2018). Specifically, we develop three inter-connected indices intended to capture the extent to which Africans might 1) run a heightened “risk of exposure to infection,” 2) face a heightened “susceptibility to illness” (once infected), and 3) face a “lack of resilience” (to recover once they become ill). In addition, a fourth index of “lockdown readiness” estimates the proportion of people who are more (or less) likely to be able to withstand the most severe forms of government health interventions, i.e. lockdowns or “shelter in place” orders, We then demonstrate how cross-country variations in the extent of exposure and susceptibility, and in the degree to which people are prepared for a lockdown, might help us better understand policy choices that African governments have made, and the extent to which these interventions were able to achieve desired reductions in mobility and contact. Finally, we briefly explore some of the soft assets that governments can bring to the table, such as legitimacy and trust, that may help increase compliance with restrictions on mobility, especially in countries we have identified as least able to tolerate lockdowns.
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

24. State of Financial Cooperatives in Zambia: A viable option for increasing financial inclusion?

Author:
Tamara Billima-Mulenga, Felix Mwenge, and Gibson Masumbu
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR)
Abstract:
This policy brief presents the summary findings of a study on Promoting Financial Cooperatives (FCs)in Zambia that was conducted between 2017 and 2018 with financial support from the Rural Finance Expansion Program (RUFEP), Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI) and the Zambia Center for Accountancy Studies (ZCAS). The study used both qualitative and quantitative approaches which included a situational analysis of FCs in Zambia, a study tour to Kenya and a Census of FCs in eight provinces. The main objective of the study was to contribute to the development of FCs in Zambia by generating information on their performance. The secondary objectives of the study were to: 1. Undertake a situational analysis to develop a clear understanding of the landscape for the FCs in Zambia in terms of the regulatory framework, support institutions and the nature and level at which the FCs operate. 2. Undertake a Census of FCs to understand the opportunities and constraining factors for the growth of the Cooperatives movement in Zambia. It was envisaged that the study would provide evidence about FCs that could be used in the revision of the Cooperatives Act currently underway, aid MCTI understand the nature of Cooperatives and devise strategies for monitoring FCs. The study also aimed at providing information about the state of FCs that can be used for various purposes by the apex body of FCs and stakeholders such as the Bank of Zambia.
Topic:
Governance, Economy, Trade, and Financial Cooperatives
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

25. Quantifying the Size and Development of the Shadow Economy in Swaziland

Author:
Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (ESEPARC)
Abstract:
The size of the shadow economy has been declining at a slow rate over the past 16 years in Swaziland. The size of the shadow economy was found to be 37.4 % in 2016. This was equivalent to E20.5 billion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016. The key drives of the shadow economy in Swaziland were found to be the tax burden (direct and indirect taxation), self-employment, the importance of the agricultural sector and the institutional quality of governance institutions. For the country to fast tract its developmental agenda (Vision 2022), it is important for the country to enact policies that will harness and transition the shadow economy into the mainstream economy by targeting the drivers of the shadow economy locally.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Governance, and GDP
Political Geography:
Africa and Swaziland

26. Capacity profiling and needs assessment of the public service of Swaziland

Author:
Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Eswatini Economic Policy Analysis and Research Centre (ESEPARC)
Abstract:
Governments are constantly under pressure to improve public sector performance and at the same time restrain expenditure growth. Public sector organisations are responsible for providing the necessary public goods and services to the citizens, hence the administration of the public service is traditionally grounded in the achievement of efficiency in the work of its departments in pursuance of goals related to service provision (Manzoor 2014). Some scholars argue that the efficiency of the public sector is key to delivering a ‘smarter state’ capable not only of delivering more for less, but better public services, which requires an evidence-based understanding of what the public service has been able to deliver so far, the drivers of these outcomes and the different options available (Hawkins et al. 2016). Swaziland’s private sector, non-governmental organisations, and the public feel that while the country’s public service is evolving, it is still grappling with finding an ideal management style that will ensure better service provision, but in the process of evolution, service delivery of public goods remains compromised, hence customer satisfaction is low. So what can be done to improve the efficiency and performance of the public service? Analysts argue that implementing e-governance has brought unprecedented efficiencies in the work of government to serve citizens (Manzoor 2014). To achieve this and more, governments are widening their base of development partners who can assist in capacity building for civil servants, and funding for the implementation of its programmes.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Public Sector, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Africa and Swaziland

27. Creating the Political Space for Prevention: How ECOWAS Supports Nationally Led Strategies

Author:
Paige Arthur and Céline Monnier
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This policy brief examines how ECOWAS has successfully addressed the concerns of their member states in West Africa to build nationally led, upstream prevention strategies. ECOWAS’ upstream prevention approaches support national sovereignty by putting the ownership of early response and structural prevention in the hands of national actors.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Governance, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

28. Experience and Awareness of Climate Change in Africa

Author:
Edem E. Selormey, Marvis Zupork Dome, Lionel Osse, and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Climate change is “the defining development challenge of our time,” and Africa the continent most vulnerable to its consequences, according to the African Union (2015) and the United Nations (UN Environment, 2019). Farmers in Uganda waiting endlessly for rain (URN, 2019), cyclone survivors in Mozambique and Zimbabwe digging out of the mud and burying their dead (Associated Press, 2019) – these images bring home what changing climate and increasingly extreme weather conditions may mean for everyday Africans. Long-term changes in temperatures and rainfall patterns are a particular menace to Africa, where agriculture forms the economic backbone of development priorities such as food security and poverty eradication (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2018). As an issue, “climate change” per se does not register among the “most important problems” that Africans surveyed by Afrobarometer want their governments to address (see Coulibaly, Silwé, & Logan, 2018). But concerns about the effects of climate change may be embedded in some of the other priorities identified, including water supply (cited by 24% of respondents), food shortages (18%), and agriculture (17%). And progress in addressing these priorities may be seriously impeded by a changing climate. African countries dominate the bottom ranks in the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index (2019), meaning they are the world’s countries most vulnerable to and least prepared for climate change. Despite the continent’s minuscule contribution to the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change, most African countries have willingly signed on to international agreements to fight it, including the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 2016 Paris Agreement on Climate Change (United Nations, 2019). The Paris Agreement mobilizes worldwide action to limit further temperature increases and to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, including a commitment from developed countries to allocate $100 billion by 2020 for climate adaptation and mitigation needs of developing countries (Munang & Mgendi, 2017; UN Climate Change, 2018). In March 2019, policymakers and key stakeholders from all 54 African countries gathered in Accra for Africa Climate Week 2019 to lay plans to be presented at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September (UN Climate Change, 2019). The United Nations has summed up its pressing demand for climate action in its Sustainable Development Goal No. 13: “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts,” calling on countries to integrate climate-change measures into national policies and strategies, strengthen resilience to climate-related hazards and natural disasters, and build awareness and capacity for early warning and impact reduction (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Many African governments have laid out their countries’ vulnerabilities in agriculture, water resources, food security, livelihoods, and other sectors and have incorporated climate-change mitigation in national plans (see, for example, Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2018, and Ministry of Water and Environment, 2015). But building climate resilience will require a committed and coordinated effort (Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2012), backed by significant resources and a population that understands and supports the need for prioritizing climate change. How do ordinary Africans see climate change? Does talk of urgent action align with their experiences and needs? Findings from Afrobarometer’s latest round of public-opinion surveys across Africa show a keen awareness of climate change in some countries – often backed by personal observation – but the opposite in others. Across the continent, among people who have heard of climate change, a large majority say it is making life worse and needs to be stopped. But four in 10 Africans are unfamiliar with the concept of climate change – even, in some cases, if they have personally observed detrimental changes in weather patterns. And only about three in 10 are fully “climate change literate,” combining awareness of climate change with basic knowledge about its causes and negative effects. Groups that are less familiar with climate change – and might be good targets for awareness-raising and advocacy in building a popular base for climate-change action – include people working in agriculture, rural residents, women, the poor, and the less-educated.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Infrastructure, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa

29. Are Africans’ Freedoms Slipping Away?

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Peter Penar
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Protection of individual rights and liberties has been on both the African continental agenda and the global agenda for decades, shaped especially by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. But the reality on the ground is often a far cry from the high standards set forth in these documents. In recent months, the world has watched as the governments of Algeria and Sudan have sought to stifle popular protests, often violently. And the past couple of years have witnessed a wide range of government attacks on civil liberties and individual freedoms. Cameroon shut down Internet service for months in the country’s anglophone regions, and Zimbabwe did the same in an effort to short-circuit opposition efforts to organize protests. Governments have responded with violence to protests in countries as diverse as Burundi, Senegal, Togo, and Zambia. Uganda now taxes social media use, while Tanzania requires expensive licenses for individuals who want to blog. In countries across the continent, government surveillance, restrictive media laws, and other freedom-limiting tactics appear to be on the rise. Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World report was subtitled ”Democracy in Retreat,” and the Africa section appeared under the heading “Historic openings [in Angola, Ethiopia, and the Gambia] offset by creeping restrictions elsewhere” [Freedom House, 2019). How do African citizens perceive and interpret the state of political and civil liberties in their respective countries? This report takes the measure of popular demand for and government supply of basic individual rights and freedoms as captured in Afrobarometer Round 7 surveys, carried out in 34 countries between late 2016 and late 2018. It also looks at how attitudes, experiences, and perceptions have changed over the past decade. We uncover two troubling trends. First, consistent with the alarms sounded by Freedom House and others, citizens generally recognize that civic and political space is indeed closing as governments’ supply of freedom to citizens decreases. But the results also reveal a decline in popular demand for freedom, in particular the right to associate freely. Moreover, we find considerable willingness among citizens to accept government imposition of restrictions on individual freedoms in the name of protecting public security. In a context where violent extremists are perpetrating attacks in a growing number of countries, the public may acquiesce to governments’ increasing circumscription of individual rights and collective freedoms. Fear of insecurity, instability, and/or violence may be leading citizens of at least some African countries to conclude that freedoms come with costs as well as benefits, and that there may be such a thing as too much freedom.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Violent Extremism, Oppression, and Freedom
Political Geography:
Africa

30. Democracy in Africa: Demand, Supply, and the ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’

Author:
Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The increasing threat to democracy from populist movements and authoritarian leaders occupies a prominent place in current political debate. Yet political scientists who study this question reach contrasting conclusions, often because they use different measures and standards of democracy. Some say the world is in a democratic recession, with countries experiencing recent declines in the quality of democracy outnumbering those where it has improved (Diamond, 2015; Lührmann, Mechkova, & Wilson, 2017; Economist, 2018; Freedom House, 2018). Others see no such decline (Levitsky, 2015) or trendless variation (Jiménez, 2017; Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). In Africa, Freedom House has tracked a significant retreat in political rights, civil liberties, and the overall quality of democracy. The biggest shifts have occurred among countries previously rated as “partly free,” many of which have retreated to “not free” status. Analysts have observed that this is often the result of hybrid regimes using counter-terrorism legislation to shrink democratic spaces (Temin, 2017) or of governments responding to increased electoral competition by restricting opposition parties and critical civil society organizations (Cheeseman, 2019). On the other hand, the V-Dem Institute finds more positive than negative change in Africa (Lührmann et al., 2018). African public opinion seems to embody this sense of divergence. While Yasha Mounk (2018) has claimed to find a systematic decline in citizens’ attachment to democracy across most of the established democracies in North America and Western Europe, Africans’ responses to questions posed by Afrobarometer over the past decade present a more varied and complex picture. At the most general level, the picture seems relatively clear and simple: The typical African is strongly committed to democracy and opposed to authoritarian rule, and has remained so for more than a decade. However, this image of solid democratic commitment changes radically if we narrow our focus to only those people who consistently express pro-democratic preferences across several different survey questions – those whom Afrobarometer describes as “demanding democracy” (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Under these more demanding criteria, fewer than half of all Africans qualify as committed democrats. And levels of commitment vary sharply depending on a person’s demographic category and level of political engagement. The picture becomes even more complex when we look at specific countries or take a longer-term view. In some countries, publics are strongly committed to democracy, while in others people are largely indifferent. Similarly, some societies are developing more favourable views of democracy over time, while others are moving in the opposite direction. These trends in individual countries may matter even more than trends on the continent as a whole. The same kind of complexity emerges when we examine people’s evaluations of democracy. A slight majority of the Africans we interviewed say their country is a democracy, and somewhat fewer people are satisfied with the way democracy works – two indicators that Afrobarometer combines to measure the perceived “supply of democracy.” Overall, Africans say they get less democracy than they want. But in some countries, the perceived supply of democracy is greater than demand. And while this supply is increasing in some countries, it is declining in others. What does this mix of results mean for the survival of Africa’s multiparty regimes and the deepening of democracy? Of course, a great deal will depend on factors other than what citizens think, such as the degree to which democratic values are embraced by a country’s leaders and elites, as well as the extent to which countervailing institutions (legislature, courts) constrain the executive. But we argue that popular demands also have the power to drive countries toward democracy, and that this is most likely under certain conditions of high, but unmet, popular demand. In particular, this report concludes by highlighting the specific importance of citizens who are not only deeply committed to democracy but who also adopt a critical perspective toward their country’s current leaders and institutions – in other words, those citizens who demand democracy but do not think they are getting it. We describe these citizens as “dissatisfied democrats.” To the extent that citizens’ commitment to democracy matters for the survival and quality of democracy, evidence suggests that it is these dissatisfied democrats who matter most. While fewer than one in six Africans qualify as dissatisfied democrats in our most recent round of surveys, they make up much larger proportions in some countries in which electoral processes are deeply flawed and opposition forces are harassed, suggesting a continuing struggle between the forces of democracy and autocracy. However, dissatisfied democrats are in especially short supply in other places where the space for opposition has recently narrowed, offering little evidence that further restrictions will meet popular resistance.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa

31. Angola under Joao Lourenço: Who Are the New Players of MPLA State?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In 2017, the coming to power of João Lourenço put an end to nearly four decades of rule by the former head of state, José Eduardo Dos Santos. João Lourenço’s first objective was to strengthen his authority by appointing people close to him and cadres from the old regime, who had professed loyalty to him, to high office. The speed of the takeover of all the decision-making centers – army, intelligence services, state-owned companies, oil industry and above all the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) party-state – by the new “Comrade Number One” surprised the leaders of the Dos Santos era, some of whom were abruptly dismissed or even sentenced to prison. Now firmly established in Angola’s command centers, João Lourenço is however facing a serious economic crisis, the most worrying for the country since the end of the civil war in 2002.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa and Angola