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62. Youth Inclusion in the Development of South Africa's National Youth Policy (2020–2030): Reflections and Recommendations
- Author:
- Steven Rebello
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
- Abstract:
- South Africa's National Youth Policy (NYP) 2020–2030 (DWYPD, 2020) represents the country's third attempt to outline actions that can or should be taken, by government and other stakeholders, to facilitate youth development at local and national levels. Meaningful youth inclusion and participation represents a central value within this policy. This emphasis on inclusion aligns with the Constitution of South Africa, where public participation in governance is enshrined as a constitutional imperative. Recognising this emphasis on youth inclusion, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) engaged with a key representative within the Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities (DWYPD) to determine what steps or activities the department has initiated to include youth in the development of the NYP 2020–2030 (hereafter referred to as the NYP 2030).
- Topic:
- Development, Governance, Youth, and Inclusion
- Political Geography:
- Africa and South Africa
63. The Youth's Continent: Meaningful Youth Inclusion in Policy and Programme Cycles
- Author:
- Steven Rebello, Brian Kimari, and Mwangi Mwaura
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
- Abstract:
- This policy brief develops from research carried out by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR, South Africa) and the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS, Kenya). Known as the Youth Inclusion for Violence Prevention Project, this research investigated the role of socio-economic and livelihood support programmes in promoting youth social and economic inclusion and preventing violence. A key finding of the research highlighted how such programmes continue to follow a top-down approach, where youth are either merely viewed as beneficiaries or not meaningfully involved in conceptualising, implementing, evaluating and revising such programmes. A discussion around the value of greater youth inclusion is supplemented with examples of how youth may have been more meaningfully included in South Africa's Community Work Programme (CWP) as well as Kenya's Youth Employment Opportunities Project (KYEOP). The brief concludes with recommendations relevant to youth inclusion in these as well as other socio-economic and livelihood support programmes.
- Topic:
- Employment, Youth, Violence, and Inclusion
- Political Geography:
- Africa and South Africa
64. Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the state of climate finance in one of the world’s regions worst hit by the climate crisis
- Author:
- Norman Martin Casas and Azara Remalia Sanogo
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Oxfam Publishing
- Abstract:
- In West Africa/Sahel, countries and their communities are experiencing the worst impacts of the climate crisis. Elsewhere, Paris Agreement climate finance commitments are set to prioritise the countries that are most impacted by climate change. However, new research by Oxfam shows that, despite West Africa/Sahel being one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions, the international climate finance received falls far short of meeting national climate finance needs and is being significantly over-reported in favour of debt instruments. Adaptation finance is also insufficient. Reported climate finance does not place gender equality at the centre, and only a small part directly reaches local actors. In light of this, developed countries and other donors should scale up grant-based adaptation finance that reaches the local level and responds to the real needs of particularly hard-hit regions such as West Africa/Sahel.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Development, Environment, and Finance
- Political Geography:
- Africa, West Africa, and Sahel
65. Violent Extremist and Terrorist Threats: Examining Ghana’s Preparedness
- Author:
- Mawusi Yaw Dumenu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Ghana Center for Democratic Development
- Abstract:
- The growing spate of violent extremism and terrorism in the sub-region spells doom for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 16 which focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Ghana is now the only country among the earlier mentioned coastal states that has not suffered from any violent extremist and terrorist violence. This notwithstanding, there have been several alarming incidents involving extremist attacks that have occurred in close proximity to Ghana’s borders.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Sustainable Development Goals
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Ghana
66. An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy
- Author:
- Alex Thurston
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- The Sahel region of Africa is in freefall. Upwards of 19 million people need humanitarian assistance, five coups have occurred since 2020, jihadists and militias are killing thousands, and security forces and Russian mercenaries abuse civilians with impunity. The Sahel’s primary external actor, France, pursues intensive counterterrorism with the aim of helping Sahelian national authorities to reassert legitimacy; France also seeks to retain influence over its former colonies. But French policy has floundered. Anti-French sentiments drove France mostly out of Mali, one epicenter of the Sahel crisis, and many other Sahelians resent perceived French encroachments on their sovereignty. The United States lacks a real policy for the Sahel. Rather, U.S. policy drifts and reacts. Important humanitarian and development programs are overshadowed by securitized rhetoric and undermined by the considerable U.S. military activity in the Sahel, including vestiges of the “War on Terror.” The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy, its Africa Strategy, and a forthcoming Sahel Strategy envision diverse efforts going beyond counterterrorism, but they read as laundry lists of priorities rather than as concrete plans of action. The vagueness of existing policy risks allowing obsolete assumptions and programs to continue.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Africa, France, Mali, and Sahel
67. Understanding the Firm-Level Export Diversification Characteristics in Botswana
- Author:
- Pinkie Gertrude Kebakile
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
- Abstract:
- This Policy Brief unravels interesting insights pertaining to firm-level export diversification characteristics in Botswana, which is an approach that views export diversification at the micro-level. The following are the key highlights from the Policy Brief: • Exporters whose export portfolios are varied in terms of products and export markets, commonly referred to as multi-product multi-destination exporters in the literature fetch high export values, which is a prerequisite for sustained economic growth in the country. • The growth and diversification of Botswana’s export bundle is undermined by the exporters’ inability to break into new export markets. • The main policy message is therefore that to transition from the upper-middle income status to high-income status by 2036, the country needs to nurture and develop the multi-product multi-destination exporters. Targeted interventions aimed at developing these exporters are therefore called for.
- Topic:
- Business, Economic Growth, Diversification, Exports, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Botswana
68. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective
- Author:
- Matthias Krönke
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Afrobarometer
- Abstract:
- In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
- Topic:
- Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
- Political Geography:
- Uganda and Africa
69. Rising concern, falling performance: Health-sector challenges evident before and after onset of COVID-19 pandemic
- Author:
- Carolyn Logan and Tosin Salau
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Afrobarometer
- Abstract:
- As Africa and the world begin to regroup now that the worst ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic appear to be past, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of health care systems on the continent. The pandemic is not over – South Africa is just coming out of its fifth wave of infection (Al Jazeera, 2022), and there may be more to come (Landman, Irfan, & Resnick, 2022). In the meantime, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2022) and national governments continue to scale up their vaccination campaigns. But the war in Ukraine and global economic deterioration have finally supplanted COVID-19 at the top of the news cycle. In the early stages of the pandemic, many assessments warned of the possibly extreme vulnerability of Africans to the pandemic based in part on the many challenges already facing health care systems across much of the continent (Mattes, Logan, Gyimah-Boadi, & Ellison, 2020). While the direst predictions did not come to pass in most countries – South Africa being a notable exception – the pandemic has highlighted gaps in health systems amid the recognition that the next global health crisis could hit harder if improvements and preparations are not made. Taking a longer-term view, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also highlight the need to strengthen health systems (United Nations, 2018). SDG#3 focuses on good health and well-being. But Afrobarometer’s SDG Scorecards, based on our most recent data from 34 countries surveyed in Round 8 (2019/2021), show that from the perspective of citizens, only a handful of countries have been making significant progress toward achieving this SDG (Afrobarometer, 2021). Instead, a growing number of Africans report going without medical care, and the share who cite health as one of their country’s most important problems is also on the rise. Even among those who do get care, increasing proportions report finding it difficult, and having to pay bribes, to obtain the medical services they need. Not surprisingly, citizens are also increasingly critical of their governments’ performance in this sector: For the first time in two decades of Afrobarometer polling, a majority of respondents say their governments are performing badly on improving basic health services. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the challenges wrought by the pandemic were not the cause of these increasingly negative reviews: The downward trends were already under way before COVID-19 entered the picture, and in fact, in some cases the trends appear to be somewhat less negative since the onset of the pandemic.
- Topic:
- Health, Inequality, Pandemic, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Africa
70. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them
- Author:
- Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Afrobarometer
- Abstract:
- Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- Uganda and Africa