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Begin New Search Political Geography Africa Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years

81. Efforts to mitigate elections in SADC countries becoming Covid-19 spreaders

Author:
Craig Moffat
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Gwede Mantashe, the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, has threatened to judicially review the Zondo Commission’s (‘the Commission’) findings against him. This decision highlights legal and political weaknesses in South Africa’s democratic system. The law is unclear on whether the findings of a Commission of Inquiry (COI) could constitute administrative action reviewable in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). This was not sufficiently dealt with by the High Court the only time it previously faced a judicial review of a COI’s findings. Even if COI findings could constitute administrative action, it seems that the Commission’s findings and recommendations concerning Mantashe in particular are unlikely to be reviewable in terms of PAJA. The principle of legality would be his most viable option for a legal challenge, but on analysis it is unlikely Mantashe would succeed on this basis either. Moreover, challenging the findings of this Commission on legally dubious grounds underscores political weaknesses in the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, and consequently the electoral system more generally. Not only does the proposed challenge by a senior party member in Cabinet undermine the ANC’s steadfast commitment to end entrenched corruption, but it also demonstrates that the party’s step-aside rule is too narrow. The rule does not impose political accountability on members implicated by COI findings unless they are criminally charged by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). This sets the bar too low for political accountability, which should not be equated with criminal liability. The ANC’s lenient stepaside rule, and its members’ use of legal technicalities to avoid political accountability, is dangerous in a proportional representation system with a one-party-dominant legislature. Voters elect a party in a closed list system, and so depend entirely on the ruling party to hold its members individually accountable for wrongdoing. The ANC needs to prove to the electorate that it takes this job seriously
Topic:
Elections, Crisis Management, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

82. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

83. Rising concern, falling performance: Health-sector challenges evident before and after onset of COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Tosin Salau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As Africa and the world begin to regroup now that the worst ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic appear to be past, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of health care systems on the continent. The pandemic is not over – South Africa is just coming out of its fifth wave of infection (Al Jazeera, 2022), and there may be more to come (Landman, Irfan, & Resnick, 2022). In the meantime, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2022) and national governments continue to scale up their vaccination campaigns. But the war in Ukraine and global economic deterioration have finally supplanted COVID-19 at the top of the news cycle. In the early stages of the pandemic, many assessments warned of the possibly extreme vulnerability of Africans to the pandemic based in part on the many challenges already facing health care systems across much of the continent (Mattes, Logan, Gyimah-Boadi, & Ellison, 2020). While the direst predictions did not come to pass in most countries – South Africa being a notable exception – the pandemic has highlighted gaps in health systems amid the recognition that the next global health crisis could hit harder if improvements and preparations are not made. Taking a longer-term view, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also highlight the need to strengthen health systems (United Nations, 2018). SDG#3 focuses on good health and well-being. But Afrobarometer’s SDG Scorecards, based on our most recent data from 34 countries surveyed in Round 8 (2019/2021), show that from the perspective of citizens, only a handful of countries have been making significant progress toward achieving this SDG (Afrobarometer, 2021). Instead, a growing number of Africans report going without medical care, and the share who cite health as one of their country’s most important problems is also on the rise. Even among those who do get care, increasing proportions report finding it difficult, and having to pay bribes, to obtain the medical services they need. Not surprisingly, citizens are also increasingly critical of their governments’ performance in this sector: For the first time in two decades of Afrobarometer polling, a majority of respondents say their governments are performing badly on improving basic health services. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the challenges wrought by the pandemic were not the cause of these increasingly negative reviews: The downward trends were already under way before COVID-19 entered the picture, and in fact, in some cases the trends appear to be somewhat less negative since the onset of the pandemic.
Topic:
Health, Inequality, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

84. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

85. Profile and determinants of lived poverty in Benin

Author:
Romaric Samson and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, launched in 2015, outlines global aspirations and priorities through the end of this decade. Prominently, the first two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for ending poverty “in all its forms everywhere” and for “zero hunger” (United Nations, 2021a). The proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty decreased from 36% in 1990 to 16% in 2010 and to 10% in 2015, but the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have reversed this trend (Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). Benin has had one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (Adegoke, 2019), with per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 3.6% between 2017 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). But the most recent household survey led by the Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (2018) estimated that 38.5% of citizens still live in poverty. Are GDP gains translating into better lives for ordinary Beninese? According to Afrobarometer survey findings, “lived poverty” – the experience of going without basic life necessities – has worsened significantly over the past decade in Benin. More than three out of four Beninese face moderate or high levels of lived poverty. Many of these citizens continue to have limited access to the electricity grid, water and sanitation services, and other essential development infrastructure. Most importantly, our analysis shows they often lack the education and employment needed to break the poverty cycle.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

86. The Emergence of African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement and Lessons from the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement

Author:
Samuel Igbatayo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Africa’s regional integration agenda arrived at a cross roads in 2019, with the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The AfCFTA framework came into force on 30th May, 2019, with its ratification by The Gambia, which brought the total number of African Union (AU) member state ratifications to twenty-two, the minimum threshold for AfCFTA implementation (Baker McKenzie 2019). As of May; 2022, forty-three of the 55 African countries have ratified the AfCFTA agreement (African Union 2018). The 12th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Niamey on 7th July; 2019, witnessed the launching of AfCFTA’s operational phase, which is governed by five instruments, namely: the rules of origin, the online negotiating forum, the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers; a digital payment system and the African Trade Observatory. In addition, the beginning of trade under the terms of the agreement was set for July 1, 2020 (TRALAC 2020). A free trade agreement (FTA) can be aptly described as a pact between two or more countries on areas in which they agree to lift most or all tariffs, and other barriers to imports and exports among them (Barone 2019). Under a free trade framework, goods and services can be traded across international borders, with little or no government tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or prohibitions to inhibit their exchange. The theory of free trade Agreements is rooted in classical economics, dating back to the era of Adam Smith. During this period, David Ricardo (1772-1823), a British political economist, was acknowledged with pioneering thoughts on free trade as a key instrument for wealth accumulation. The evolution of preferential trade agreements is traceable to the rise of European countries after World War II, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, a development that eventually culminated in the creation of the European Union (EU) (Johnston 2019). Spurred by the success of regional bodies with free trade agreements and Africa’s poor trading performance; estimated at a paltry 3% of annual global trade, the African Union embarked upon the creation of the AfCFTA agreement as a tool for Intra-Africa trade and regional integration.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Regional Integration, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Africa and Asia-Pacific

87. Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Munsu Kang
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study investigates the climate change impacts on agriculture and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). SSA is the most vulnerable region responding to the weather shocks such as drought and flood. Furthermore, more than half of population in SSA are engaged in agricultural production that is highly affected by the rainfall pattern and temperature increases. For this reason, disruption of agriculture caused by the weather shock also can increase the probability of conflict such as demonstration and riot. This study focuses on 43 SSA countries after excluded small islands. Using scenario analysis, we find that temperature increases rather than precipitation might affect maize and sorghum production negatively while it is unclear for the rice production. We also find that increases in average temperature and maximum temperature might increase the probability of conflicts even if the effects of climate on riot and demonstration are U-shape pattern while it is reverse U-shape for battle and civilian conflicts.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

88. Finding a Path through Quagmire

Author:
Will Brown
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
n the Central Sahelian nations of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, a decade of violent instability has left 18 million individuals in need of humanitarian assistance. Climate change, underdevelopment, ethnic violence, corruption, and state decay have left civilians in need of peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development support. The deterioration of security conditions, however, has limited civilian access to essential services and impacted humanitarian response capabilities. Donors have promoted the “triple nexus” approach aimed at enhancing the coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding interventions. Yet, implementation in the Sahel has been hamstrung by a lack of common understanding among partners and a disconnect between the interests and operations of humanitarian and security actors. For the triple nexus approach to effectively improve conditions in the Sahel, humanitarian, development, and security partners must improve collaboration. Actors in the region should develop operational frameworks that ensure they enhance complementary objectives.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Intervention, Humanitarian Crisis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

89. Building downstream capacity for critical minerals in Africa: Challenges and opportunities

Author:
Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Demand for critical minerals—bauxite, cobalt, copper, lithium, nickel, and other minerals that underpin solar, wind, geothermal, and other forms of renewable energy and electric vehicles—is already booming and is projected to continue to grow at a rapid pace. Africa’s mineral-rich developing economies could benefit greatly from this increase in demand. Many African economies have vast critical mineral reserves, and their nascent industrial sectors imply vast export potential. These countries could increase the benefits they reap from these minerals by building downstream capacity in processing—the steps that turn mined ore (bauxite, iron ore) into refined intermediate goods (aluminum, steel). To do so, however, they need to improve their infrastructure, investment climate, and governance and learn to navigate an increasingly complicated geopolitical environment. Hendrix assesses the challenges facing four critical mineral–rich developing African economies: Guinea (bauxite); the Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt); Madagascar (graphite and nickel); and Mozambique (graphite). The solutions he offers include (a) embracing hydropower potential—which is vast in these countries—while paying attention to social costs and distributive impacts, (b) exempting refinery-related capital goods and industrial inputs from import duties, (c) locating downstream capacity in areas of relative stability, and (d) leveraging external policy anchors to provide policy stability and transparency.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Supply Chains, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Africa and Global Focus

90. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:
Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

91. How China Came to Dominate the Global EV Lithium-ion Battery Value Chain: Lessons and Opportunities for Africa

Author:
Xieshu Wang
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
The electrification of vehicles is accelerating and the global automotive industry is under full transformation. China has become an indispensable partner for EV makers as the only country that has succeeded in building a complete and competitive industry value chain of EV lithium-ion batteries. Top-down government-led policymaking has been an important driver; bottom-up firm-level vertical integration strategy and investments have effectively created a closedloop supply chain. Africa is still at an early stage in this mobility transition. But with its rich deposits of minerals and potential markets, it can become a key player in the global EV value chain, if a favourable ecosystem for the fast uptake of EV and related green businesses could be developed in time.
Topic:
Industry, Global Value Chains, Lithium, Automotive Industry, Batteries, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Africa and China

92. The UN Environmental and Climate Adviser in Somalia

Author:
Jenna Russo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was among the first special political missions to receive climate-related language in its mandate, reflecting Somalia’s acute vulnerability to the impact of climate change. In 2020, UNSOM also became the first mission to have an environmental and climate adviser deployed to help implement this mandate. The adviser’s work is structured around three pillars: Mainstreaming the environment and climate throughout the mission’s mandated areas of work; Coordinating UN agencies, government actors, and NGOs working on climate across the humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding sectors; and Supporting the government in developing, funding, and coordinating its climate action plans and policies. This issue brief reviews the role of the environmental and climate adviser in Somalia, including their areas of work, successes, challenges, and opportunities for replication in other mission settings. Strong buy-in from both mission leaders and national and regional counterparts has facilitated the adviser’s ability to help the mission implement its mandate relating to climate change, environmental degradation, and other ecological challenges. Furthermore, the adviser has successfully helped to coordinate climate-related work, incorporate strategic analyses into climate-related risk assessments and responses, and liaise with local actors. The adviser has also faced challenges, including the broad scope of work tasked to a single person and the unique set of skills required, as well as the political contention surrounding the concept of climate security. The brief concludes by looking ahead to the growth of environmental and climate advisers in other UN missions and the importance of understanding and addressing interlinkages among climate, peace, and security as the impacts of climate change accelerate.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Peacekeeping, and UNSOM
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

93. Disinformation against UN Peacekeeping Operations

Author:
Albert Trithart
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, a growing barrage of disinformation has targeted UN peacekeeping operations, particularly the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). This includes false allegations that UN peacekeepers are trafficking weapons to armed groups, supporting terrorists, and exploiting natural resources. This disinformation makes it harder for peacekeeping operations to implement their mandates and has put the safety of peacekeepers at risk. This paper provides an overview of the recent rise in disinformation against MINUSCA, MINUSMA, and MONUSCO. It also examines how these three peacekeeping operations have been addressing disinformation and the challenges they have faced. While these initial efforts have tended to focus on strategic communications, disinformation is not only a strategic communications issue; it affects all mission components, and effectively tackling it requires situating it in the broader political context and understanding its drivers. This paper offers the following questions the UN Department of Peace Operations and individual missions could consider as they develop policies, guidelines, structures, and activities to address disinformation: How can missions develop a cross-cutting, strategic approach to disinformation? Disinformation is more than a technical or tactical issue; it is a political and strategic issue that requires the proactive attention of mission leaders. How can missions better monitor and analyze disinformation both online and offline? Monitoring disinformation is critical not only so missions can address it; tracking rumors also has intrinsic value by helping missions better listen to and understand the sentiments of local populations. How can missions respond to disinformation more quickly? For many UN personnel, the slowness of the UN response is one of the biggest challenges inhibiting their efforts to address disinformation. How can missions reshape anti-UN narratives? Anti-UN disinformation is woven into a broader anti-UN (and anticolonial) narrative that is grounded in both great-power politics and legitimate public grievances. In countering individual falsehoods, missions should consider whether and how they could also respond to this broader narrative. How can missions contribute to a healthier information environment? From the perspective of civil society, the most important shift the UN can make would be to focus more on supporting local journalists. Does the scale of the problem call for a more decisive shift in approach? Any shift in approach should be premised on the principle that under no circumstances should missions respond to disinformation with disinformation of their own.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic

94. Advancing Youth Inclusion and Violence Prevention through Public Support Programmes

Author:
Jasmina Brankovic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
Abstract:
State-run socio-economic and livelihood support programmes have been shown to increase the social inclusion of young people and thereby contribute to the prevention of violence involving youth. This practice brief outlines strategies for civil society practitioners to advocate for these public programmes, improve their implementation and amplify their positive effects, based on experiences in Southern and East Africa.
Topic:
Youth, Violence, Inclusion, and Livelihoods
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, and East Africa

95. Youth Inclusion in the Development of South Africa's National Youth Policy (2020–2030): Reflections and Recommendations

Author:
Steven Rebello
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
Abstract:
South Africa's National Youth Policy (NYP) 2020–2030 (DWYPD, 2020) represents the country's third attempt to outline actions that can or should be taken, by government and other stakeholders, to facilitate youth development at local and national levels. Meaningful youth inclusion and participation represents a central value within this policy. This emphasis on inclusion aligns with the Constitution of South Africa, where public participation in governance is enshrined as a constitutional imperative. Recognising this emphasis on youth inclusion, the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) engaged with a key representative within the Department of Women, Youth and People with Disabilities (DWYPD) to determine what steps or activities the department has initiated to include youth in the development of the NYP 2020–2030 (hereafter referred to as the NYP 2030).
Topic:
Development, Governance, Youth, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

96. The Youth's Continent: Meaningful Youth Inclusion in Policy and Programme Cycles

Author:
Steven Rebello, Brian Kimari, and Mwangi Mwaura
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR)
Abstract:
This policy brief develops from research carried out by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR, South Africa) and the Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS, Kenya). Known as the Youth Inclusion for Violence Prevention Project, this research investigated the role of socio-economic and livelihood support programmes in promoting youth social and economic inclusion and preventing violence. A key finding of the research highlighted how such programmes continue to follow a top-down approach, where youth are either merely viewed as beneficiaries or not meaningfully involved in conceptualising, implementing, evaluating and revising such programmes. A discussion around the value of greater youth inclusion is supplemented with examples of how youth may have been more meaningfully included in South Africa's Community Work Programme (CWP) as well as Kenya's Youth Employment Opportunities Project (KYEOP). The brief concludes with recommendations relevant to youth inclusion in these as well as other socio-economic and livelihood support programmes.
Topic:
Employment, Youth, Violence, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

97. Climate Finance in West Africa: Assessing the state of climate finance in one of the world’s regions worst hit by the climate crisis

Author:
Norman Martin Casas and Azara Remalia Sanogo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
In West Africa/Sahel, countries and their communities are experiencing the worst impacts of the climate crisis. Elsewhere, Paris Agreement climate finance commitments are set to prioritise the countries that are most impacted by climate change. However, new research by Oxfam shows that, despite West Africa/Sahel being one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions, the international climate finance received falls far short of meeting national climate finance needs and is being significantly over-reported in favour of debt instruments. Adaptation finance is also insufficient. Reported climate finance does not place gender equality at the centre, and only a small part directly reaches local actors. In light of this, developed countries and other donors should scale up grant-based adaptation finance that reaches the local level and responds to the real needs of particularly hard-hit regions such as West Africa/Sahel.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Environment, and Finance
Political Geography:
Africa, West Africa, and Sahel

98. Violent Extremist and Terrorist Threats: Examining Ghana’s Preparedness

Author:
Mawusi Yaw Dumenu
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:
The growing spate of violent extremism and terrorism in the sub-region spells doom for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 16 which focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Ghana is now the only country among the earlier mentioned coastal states that has not suffered from any violent extremist and terrorist violence. This notwithstanding, there have been several alarming incidents involving extremist attacks that have occurred in close proximity to Ghana’s borders.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

99. Our climate future depends on conflict dynamics in Congo

Author:
Peer Schouten, Judith Verweijen, and Fergus Simpson
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Congo Basin rainforest – the second largest on earth – absorbs four percent of global CO2 emissions and constitutes a crucial line of defense against cataclysmic climate change. However, a complex mix of illegal resource exploitation and conflict is currently threatening the rainforest. To curb these threats and their global consequenses, we need to understand the interplay between resources, conflict and environmental protection in Congo.
Topic:
Climate Change, Armed Forces, Conflict, Carbon Emissions, Forest, and Deforestation
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of the Congo

100. No climate security without human security: Insights from Africa’s climate hotspots

Author:
Louise Wiuff Moe and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
As Denmark prepares its candidature for a non-permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council in 2025-26, priority should go to shifting the international climate security agenda from state security and military responses to human security and climate change adaptation in fragile contexts.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, UN Security Council, and Human Security
Political Geography:
Africa