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41. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

42. Rising concern, falling performance: Health-sector challenges evident before and after onset of COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Tosin Salau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As Africa and the world begin to regroup now that the worst ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic appear to be past, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of health care systems on the continent. The pandemic is not over – South Africa is just coming out of its fifth wave of infection (Al Jazeera, 2022), and there may be more to come (Landman, Irfan, & Resnick, 2022). In the meantime, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2022) and national governments continue to scale up their vaccination campaigns. But the war in Ukraine and global economic deterioration have finally supplanted COVID-19 at the top of the news cycle. In the early stages of the pandemic, many assessments warned of the possibly extreme vulnerability of Africans to the pandemic based in part on the many challenges already facing health care systems across much of the continent (Mattes, Logan, Gyimah-Boadi, & Ellison, 2020). While the direst predictions did not come to pass in most countries – South Africa being a notable exception – the pandemic has highlighted gaps in health systems amid the recognition that the next global health crisis could hit harder if improvements and preparations are not made. Taking a longer-term view, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also highlight the need to strengthen health systems (United Nations, 2018). SDG#3 focuses on good health and well-being. But Afrobarometer’s SDG Scorecards, based on our most recent data from 34 countries surveyed in Round 8 (2019/2021), show that from the perspective of citizens, only a handful of countries have been making significant progress toward achieving this SDG (Afrobarometer, 2021). Instead, a growing number of Africans report going without medical care, and the share who cite health as one of their country’s most important problems is also on the rise. Even among those who do get care, increasing proportions report finding it difficult, and having to pay bribes, to obtain the medical services they need. Not surprisingly, citizens are also increasingly critical of their governments’ performance in this sector: For the first time in two decades of Afrobarometer polling, a majority of respondents say their governments are performing badly on improving basic health services. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the challenges wrought by the pandemic were not the cause of these increasingly negative reviews: The downward trends were already under way before COVID-19 entered the picture, and in fact, in some cases the trends appear to be somewhat less negative since the onset of the pandemic.
Topic:
Health, Inequality, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

43. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

44. Profile and determinants of lived poverty in Benin

Author:
Romaric Samson and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, launched in 2015, outlines global aspirations and priorities through the end of this decade. Prominently, the first two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for ending poverty “in all its forms everywhere” and for “zero hunger” (United Nations, 2021a). The proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty decreased from 36% in 1990 to 16% in 2010 and to 10% in 2015, but the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have reversed this trend (Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). Benin has had one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (Adegoke, 2019), with per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 3.6% between 2017 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). But the most recent household survey led by the Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (2018) estimated that 38.5% of citizens still live in poverty. Are GDP gains translating into better lives for ordinary Beninese? According to Afrobarometer survey findings, “lived poverty” – the experience of going without basic life necessities – has worsened significantly over the past decade in Benin. More than three out of four Beninese face moderate or high levels of lived poverty. Many of these citizens continue to have limited access to the electricity grid, water and sanitation services, and other essential development infrastructure. Most importantly, our analysis shows they often lack the education and employment needed to break the poverty cycle.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

45. The Emergence of African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement and Lessons from the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement

Author:
Samuel Igbatayo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Africa’s regional integration agenda arrived at a cross roads in 2019, with the adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The AfCFTA framework came into force on 30th May, 2019, with its ratification by The Gambia, which brought the total number of African Union (AU) member state ratifications to twenty-two, the minimum threshold for AfCFTA implementation (Baker McKenzie 2019). As of May; 2022, forty-three of the 55 African countries have ratified the AfCFTA agreement (African Union 2018). The 12th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Niamey on 7th July; 2019, witnessed the launching of AfCFTA’s operational phase, which is governed by five instruments, namely: the rules of origin, the online negotiating forum, the monitoring and elimination of non-tariff barriers; a digital payment system and the African Trade Observatory. In addition, the beginning of trade under the terms of the agreement was set for July 1, 2020 (TRALAC 2020). A free trade agreement (FTA) can be aptly described as a pact between two or more countries on areas in which they agree to lift most or all tariffs, and other barriers to imports and exports among them (Barone 2019). Under a free trade framework, goods and services can be traded across international borders, with little or no government tariffs, quotas, subsidies, or prohibitions to inhibit their exchange. The theory of free trade Agreements is rooted in classical economics, dating back to the era of Adam Smith. During this period, David Ricardo (1772-1823), a British political economist, was acknowledged with pioneering thoughts on free trade as a key instrument for wealth accumulation. The evolution of preferential trade agreements is traceable to the rise of European countries after World War II, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, a development that eventually culminated in the creation of the European Union (EU) (Johnston 2019). Spurred by the success of regional bodies with free trade agreements and Africa’s poor trading performance; estimated at a paltry 3% of annual global trade, the African Union embarked upon the creation of the AfCFTA agreement as a tool for Intra-Africa trade and regional integration.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Regional Integration, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Africa and Asia-Pacific

46. Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Munsu Kang
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study investigates the climate change impacts on agriculture and conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). SSA is the most vulnerable region responding to the weather shocks such as drought and flood. Furthermore, more than half of population in SSA are engaged in agricultural production that is highly affected by the rainfall pattern and temperature increases. For this reason, disruption of agriculture caused by the weather shock also can increase the probability of conflict such as demonstration and riot. This study focuses on 43 SSA countries after excluded small islands. Using scenario analysis, we find that temperature increases rather than precipitation might affect maize and sorghum production negatively while it is unclear for the rice production. We also find that increases in average temperature and maximum temperature might increase the probability of conflicts even if the effects of climate on riot and demonstration are U-shape pattern while it is reverse U-shape for battle and civilian conflicts.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

47. Finding a Path through Quagmire

Author:
Will Brown
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
n the Central Sahelian nations of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, a decade of violent instability has left 18 million individuals in need of humanitarian assistance. Climate change, underdevelopment, ethnic violence, corruption, and state decay have left civilians in need of peacebuilding, humanitarian, and development support. The deterioration of security conditions, however, has limited civilian access to essential services and impacted humanitarian response capabilities. Donors have promoted the “triple nexus” approach aimed at enhancing the coordination and effectiveness of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding interventions. Yet, implementation in the Sahel has been hamstrung by a lack of common understanding among partners and a disconnect between the interests and operations of humanitarian and security actors. For the triple nexus approach to effectively improve conditions in the Sahel, humanitarian, development, and security partners must improve collaboration. Actors in the region should develop operational frameworks that ensure they enhance complementary objectives.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Intervention, Humanitarian Crisis, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

48. Laying Foundations for Civic Engagement and Government Accountability in Guinea (2011-2020)

Author:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
When President Alpha Condé took office after Guinea’s first democratic election in 2010, he promised to reform the country’s mining sector. Following decades of sector mismanagement and corruption, Guinea introduced a new mining code in 2011 (later amended in 2013) and, in 2012, the government committed to implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standard and reviewed 19 mining contracts signed by previous administrations. This reform effort precipitated a significant expansion of the industry: investments picked up and bauxite exports rose, and mining revenues grew. Despite progress, and because of the speed of mining expansion, communities in mining areas experienced increasingly negative impacts from the industry. Their interests went unaddressed; the government had been slow to implement key regulations aimed at protecting them. As a result, 2016 saw uprisings in key bauxite-producing areas. In addition, civil society engagement on extractive issues was weak and fragmented; citizens, activists and journalists lacked crucial information and were ill-equipped to engage on key governance issues.
Topic:
Government, Natural Resources, Governance, Accountability, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa and Guinea

49. Resource-Backed Loans in Ghana: Risks, Opportunities and Lessons

Author:
Denis Gyeyir
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Developing countries have trouble financing development mainly due to limited access to capital markets, high cost of borrowing, slow growth, or a mix of these. Countries with natural resource endowments have attempted in the last few decades to leverage these endowments to surmount those challenges. Many of their development efforts focus on closing huge infrastructure gaps. Ghana is a producer of cocoa, minerals, oil and gas—assets that have increasingly featured in the government’s infrastructure financing plans. Ghana’s infrastructure financing totaled USD 23 billion between 2007 and 2020, and annual infrastructure investment will need to reach $9.3 billion by 2030 (13.9 percent of 2019 GDP). Official development funding and private sector financing have been inadequate to meet these infrastructure needs. As a result, the Ghana Infrastructure Plan identifies Chinese infrastructural funding as a source to fill the gap. Ghana’s infrastructure financing has in part relied on leveraging its natural resources. Through resource-backed loans (RBLs), governments (directly or through state-owned companies) borrow funds and repay the loans in physical natural resources or with money from resource-related future income streams. Ghana has entered into three such RBL deals, totaling more than $5 billion, in the last two decades; all three involve Chinese state-owned enterprises as lenders.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Resource-Backed Loans, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

50. NRGI Impact: Guinean Communities Benefit from Mining Revenues and Civil Society Capacity Building

Author:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Like many resource-rich low-income countries, Guinea faces challenges in leveraging its natural resource wealth for sustainable development. Despite being the world’s second largest bauxite producer and rich in iron ore, gold and diamonds, Guinea has so far delivered only limited benefits from mining to its citizens, more than half of whom live in poverty. Guinea introduced sector-wide reforms following democratization in 2010 and is successfully implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, social unrest, political instability, and the impacts of the Ebola crisis and coronavirus pandemic have slowed the country’s progress toward ensuring that mining income helps improve citizens’ quality of life.
Topic:
Civil Society, Natural Resources, Mining, Revenue Management, and Revenue Sharing
Political Geography:
Africa and Guinea

51. Social Protection Reforms in the MENA Region: Possibilities and Challenges

Author:
Abdalhadi Alijla
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The COVID-19 crisis that hit the world in 2020 revealed a huge gap in access to public services, equality and government responsiveness to the consequences of the pandemic. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the COVID-19 crisis showed the inadequacy of the public institutions and their abilities to protect the poor, and ensure that populations’ needs are met, especially informal workers, women, children and the elderly. The social protection systems in the MENA countries are relatively weak, facing challenges or disfunctions through many ad-hoc programmes, making it difficult to respond to the COVID-19 crisis. This is particularly observed in countries facing a pre- COVID-19 economic crisis, such as Lebanon. There is clear evidence that social protection systems have a positive impact on the lives of the population in times of crisis. They improve access to health and education, and increase economic security. Social protection systems work during times of crisis and times of stability, but they are strategic tools that show that states have the capacity to design and deploy policy tools to protect people. In divided societies, inequalities are usually wider and, therefore, a comprehensive social protection system with a high rate of coverage is needed. In this Policy Study, we present four chapters, examining the state-of-the-art of social protection systems in the MENA region, challenges, and potential opportunities that government, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the European Union (EU) could take to assist in establishing comprehensive social protection systems. The COVID-19 crisis is an opportunity to learn and identify where the gaps are and what needs to be done by formal and informal institutions in the MENA region to reform and re-engineer their social protection systems with help from the EU and its institutions. COVID-19 arrived in the MENA region during an economic crisis in Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia, marked by huge inequalities, vulnerabilities with increasing poverty and low trust in governments and their performance. Lockdown, closure and physical distancing have also led to loss of jobs and income for millions of people, mainly informal workers, and businesses. The vulnerable groups who are already living in economic distress, such as informal workers, youth, women and the elderly, are the most affected parts of the population. They are the most vulnerable to loss of income and unemployment. This study highlights that MENA states lack comprehensive and effective social protection systems. In many MENA countries, ad-hoc programmes substitute a comprehensive social protection system. The study examines the rural-urban and socioeconomic group gaps in accessing services, such as health and education, and economic opportunities. It shows that the historic gap between urban-rural and socioeconomic groups' ability to access the same services and opportunities compared to other groups affected the ability of those groups to cope with the pandemic, exposing them to more vulnerability. The study examines the policy response of the MENA governments to the pandemic, namely in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco – four countries that have been particularly challenged by COVID-19. It identifies several gaps and op- portunities to develop the social protection system. The study examines cash- based programmes, access to public health, informal workers, women’s protection, digitalisation of social protection systems, and education, to some extent. It focuses on youth, women, the elderly, disabled persons and children as the most vulnerable groups in the region. It identifies that coordination between formal in- stitutions and INGOs needs to be formalised, informal workers need to be included in the social protection system, women and the elderly should be prioritised, and informal social protection mechanisms could be supported through livelihood activities, but is not seen as a major part of any social protection mechanism. It finally highlights the need for digitalisation of reformed social protection systems or strategies.
Topic:
Governance, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

52. Times they are A-changin’: Africa at the Centre Stage of the new (II) Liberal World Order

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Amid a renewed Global Power competition, Africa’s abundance of natural resources, its exponential demographic development, and the current expansion of militant Islamist groups in the region, increases its strategic importance and pushes the continent to the center stage of international relations. This brief explores Africa’s position in this changing global context and examines major actors’ presence in, and stance towards, Africa on the global arena. It does this while arguing that as the competition for influence and access to resources in Africa is intensified, Western actors need to become clearer about their interests, avoid ill-perceived imposition of conditionalities – unless they are willing to risk access and follow them through – and adopt a case-by case approach to states on a continent as diverse as Africa.
Topic:
Globalization, International Cooperation, Liberal Order, and World System
Political Geography:
Africa

53. Al-Shabab in Mozambique: Taking Stock of an Insurgency Under Cover

Author:
Tom Van Rentergem
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Since the first attack in October 2017, Mozambique has been confronted with an extremist insurgency called Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Al-Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabab in Somalia). The alleged Jihadists targeted the Mozambican coastline and have carried out indiscriminate attacks in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, with the capture of coastal towns Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021 being important markers for the insurgents. The intense five-year conflict has resulted in 4,000 people dead and 800,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), roughly half of the province. The identity of the insurgents has become subject for debate among policy makers and researchers, raising questions about whether the group is primarily a local insurgency or whether there are tangible links to Jihadism in other areas of Africa and the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

54. Protecting Civilians From Those Who Should Protect Them

Author:
Delina Goxho
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As violent attacks targeting civilians in the Sahel region of West Africa are mounting, allegations of abuses perpetrated by Sahelian armed forces share the news with attacks committed by non-state armed groups. This brief analyses the main shortcomings within the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with regard to ensuring meaningful Protection of Civilians (PoC) from their own security and defence forces. It finds that formal, structural measures to address state security forces’ abuse of civilians is lacking in all three states, although some promising initiatives to build trust between security forces and civilians have been held on a local level. On a regional level, the OHCHR-mandated Human Rights Compliance Framework, which has partially been adopted by regional force Force Conjointe – G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), represents an example of a mechanism that could ensure better protection of civilians both for the region, and on a national level. However, the advent of Russian paramilitary group Wagner in Mali and the most recent massacre of civilians in Moura is challenging all optimistic forecasting.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Africa

55. Who’s Been Making “African Solutions”? Mapping Membership Patterns in the African Union’s Peace and Security Council

Author:
Nina Wilen and Paul D. Williams
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
This year marks the 20th anniversary since the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union, the AU’s principal decision-making body for promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. This brief examines the patterns and trends that have emerged during the past two decades of PSC elections and finds that African governments persistently elected autocrats and states experiencing violent conflict to serve on the PSC, thus undermining the AU’s principles. This pattern risks skewing PSC decision-making in unhelpful ways, undermining effective crisis management, and making it difficult to uphold the AU’s stated norms and principles.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Peace, and Africa Union
Political Geography:
Africa

56. France in the Eastern Mediterranean and the MENA region’s geopolitical competition: French grandeur or European sovereignty?

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The global rivalry between the US and China, as well as geopolitical competition and instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, are perceived by France as urgent matters requiring stronger EU foreign policy, conceptualized as European sovereignty. The French foreign policy elite are still largely committed to the idea of France’s exceptional role in the world, and to the extent that the EU as a whole fails to live up to the tasks presumed by France, continue their attempts at forging coalitions of the willing. France has in recent years built a web of strategic partnerships, for example with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, through which it aims to govern the instability in the EU’s southern neighbourhood. The aim is also to deter regional adversaries such as Turkey, a strategy that needs to be re-evaluated due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. France often equates its national interests with those of the EU. While this can be seen to enhance European sovereignty, it also risks increasing the perception that the EU would be a participant in various Middle Eastern conflicts. This undermines the EU’s ability to function as an objective broker and anchor of norms.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Foreign Interference, and Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, France, North Africa, Mediterranean, and MENA

57. Barriers to Effective Whistleblowing in Botswana: Lessons from the Construction Industry

Author:
Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:
Adopting Botswana’s construction industry as a case study, this Policy Brief examines key barriers to effective whistleblowing in Botswana. Data were drawn from 117 construction firms and interviews with regulators of this sector. Despite the enactment of the Whistleblowing Act 2016, the study finds the following key barriers to effective whistleblowing: (i) fear of retaliation or punishment, (ii) fear of job loss, (iii) absence of organisational whistleblowing policies, (iv) lack of incentive to report, (v) lack of education on whistleblowing, and (vi) insufficient action and follow-up on disclosures by authorities. From a policy perspective, there is a need to strengthen the existing legal protection offered to whistleblowers, their families and associates to ensure they are not subject to harm, retaliation or victimisation. There is also a need to increase levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in general, and the Whistleblowing Act 2016 in particular.
Topic:
Corruption, Regulation, Whistle Blowing, and Construction
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

58. ABCs of the IFIs: The African Development Fund’s 16th Replenishment

Author:
Jocilyn Estes and Erin Collinson
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Many African countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to grapple with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic while simultaneously confronting the challenges posed by slowing global growth, private capital outflows, debt distress, and the impacts of climate change. An estimated 55 million people on the continent have been pushed into extreme poverty since the onset of the pandemic. This devastating trend has been exacerbated by the ripple effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—supply chain disruptions, tightening fiscal space, and growing pressure on the cost of food, fuel, and fertilizer. International financial support for the continent has fallen woefully short of levels required to prevent the current crisis from derailing long-term development. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is the largest regional multilateral development finance institution on the continent. It provides critical financial support to countries across the region, including investment in vital infrastructure projects. The African Development Fund (AfDF) is the Bank’s concessional window, providing financing in the form of grants and concessional loans to resource-constrained governments responding to the growing challenges on the continent, including gaps in critical infrastructure and rising debt burdens. Amid ongoing and overlapping global emergencies, the stakes for the AfDF’s upcoming replenishment could hardly be higher. The AfDF is making the case to donors—who will come together later this year for a final meeting of the AfDF’s 16th replenishment (AfDF-16)—that the Fund needs substantial new resources to continue to support African people, businesses, and governments and make up lost ground in the fight against poverty. An ambitious 16th replenishment—coupled with policy and governance reform commitments—presents an opportunity for donors, including the United States, to complement long-standing investments in regional growth and infrastructure, offer a sustainable alternative to non-concessional Chinese lending, and make headway on the long road to economic recovery from the pandemic and worsening food security crisis.
Topic:
Development, Investment, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

59. Recommendations for US-Africa Space Cooperation and Development

Author:
Rose Croshier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
The United States, a leader in space exploration and innovation, has a unique opportunity to establish enduring diplomatic, commercial, and security ties with African nations through space cooperation—with the potential to yield substantial development benefits. The U.S. space sector is robust, an area of comparative strength vis-à-vis Europe, Russia, and China. By driving space cooperation, the U.S. can reinforce the rules-based order as articulated in international agreements like the Artemis Accords. Expanded space capabilities can also support the achievement of several of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, which range from improving data-driven governance to closing the global digital gap. U.S. policymakers have an opportunity to implement a collaborative approach with emerging African space actors both to grow a peaceful and law-abiding community in space and to benefit from Africa's contributions to the global space ecosystem. Space capability can also serve a crucial infrastructure role, yielding similar benefits to “traditional” infrastructure—including facilitating access to 5G connectivity through low orbit satellites and addressing clean water and food security needs through remote sensing and satellite communications.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Space, and Territory
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

60. Beyond 2025: The Future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act

Author:
Daniel F. Runde and Sundar R. Ramanujam
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, the United States has provided assistance and support for sub-Saharan Africa’s efforts to transform its economic and trade relationships, centered around the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). First enacted into law on May 18, 2000, AGOA was designed to significantly enhance designated sub-Saharan African countries’ market access to the United States by providing duty-free treatment for specific import categories. The legislation’s primary goal was to promote economic growth through good governance and free markets. To qualify and remain eligible for AGOA, countries were expected to demonstrate progress toward market liberalization and to improve the rule of law, human rights protections, and core labor standards. More than 20 years later, AGOA continues to provide preferential treatment to 44 countries in the region, spanning over 6,500 tariff lines. Since May 2000, AGOA has been amended four times, mostly to clarify preferential treatment terms, technical standards, and sunset deadlines. The act was initially designed to be valid for eight years, expiring at the end of September 2007. In July 2004, however, President George W. Bush signed the AGOA Acceleration Act, extending it to 2015. Toward the end of his second term, in June 2015 President Barack Obama extended its validity by signing the Trade Preferences Extension Act, under which AGOA is set to expire in 2025. The global political and economic landscape has changed profoundly since AGOA was enacted in 2000, even before the Covid-19 pandemic created new disruptions and accelerated several ongoing changes. The mobile telephony revolution has created new opportunities for millions to participate in the digital sphere, use mobile banking and payments systems, and receive commercial, educational, and medical services via the internet. Even as the sub-Saharan African region’s middle class continues to grow, it is also set to experience a youth population boom in the next three decades—which, under the right conditions, could pay a demographic dividend and avert a social crisis. Meanwhile, the United States has also entered an era of great-power competition with China. With China’s influence in sub-Saharan Africa rising significantly, this competition is also playing out through the region’s political and economic institutions. Considering these opportunities and challenges, leaders in Washington (and their constituents across the United States) ought to look at Africa as a prospect for deepening commercial partnerships, not as a continent that needs to be “saved” through foreign assistance. Accordingly, the United States can consider one of the three following scenarios in response to AGOA’s current expiration timeline
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Cooperation, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Africa