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Begin New Search Topic Security Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

251. Rethinking U.S. Efforts on Counterterrorism: Toward a Sustainable Plan Two Decades After 9/11

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the sixth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Matthew Levitt reimagines the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise with a view to its long-term sustainability. Since the September 11 attacks, Washington has poured funding into a largely military-led response to terrorism, but today both Democrats and Republicans stress the need to end “forever” wars, focus limited resources on protecting the homeland, and lean more on foreign partners to address terrorism in their neighborhoods. Yet any shift in posture must seek a maximum return on the twenty-year U.S. investment in counterter­rorism while also keeping up with terrorists’ exploitation of new technologies, from drones to encrypted communication to social media. This will require finding areas of policy overlap between counterterrorism and Great Power competition, and disentangling U.S. counterterrorism budgets from the military budgets on which they have been grafted over the past two decades. More broadly, the author explains, “convincing partners to share more of the counterterrorism burden will require that Washington repair its damaged credibility and demonstrate the staying power to meet its alliance commitments.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Military Spending, and 9/11
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

252. Sustained Counterterrorism Efforts Remain Key to Preventing Attacks in Jordan

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat. Last year’s abnormally low terrorist activity in Jordan could be interpreted as an indication that the threat of ISIS in the country has diminished significantly. Unfortunately, this is not the case; while there are several explanations for the low occurrence of terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2020, none of them point to a future in which ISIS does not continue to pose a threat to Jordanian security. On the contrary, the decrease in ISIS activity in Jordan last year was primarily a result of effective counterterrorism efforts, not the special circumstances of the pandemic or any other factor. Accordingly, Jordanian anti-terror institutions should not relax their guard. Rather, they should capitalize on their successes, expanding cooperation with their partners and enhancing their resources in combatting extremism. Jordanian security forces should be especially concerned with activities along their borders. There have been several recent international and UN reports that confirmed the rising activities of terrorist groups in countries that border Jordan. Iraq in particular has seen a recent rise in terrorist attacks, including two suicide bombings in Baghdad on January 21, 2021 that killed 32 people and injured 110 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. In turn, ISIS's mounting activities in Iraq have led to increased terrorist activity in the Badia al-Sham region and the Jordanian Syrian-Iraqi border triangle, where terrorist militants move in small, highly mobile groups. This increase in activity has prompted Jordanian security forces to strengthen their presence on the borders with Iraq and Syria. Following a Russian air campaign in the Badia region in late February, in which Russian planes launched at least 130 air strikes in one day against terrorist groups in the area, Jordan started to strengthen and tightened its security presence on the borders to prevent infiltration of ISIS elements into Jordan. Russian strikes were especially targeted at ISIS, which extends between the governorates of Homs and Deir al-Zour at the border with Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

253. Seizing Opportunities and Strengthening Alliances in Northwest Africa: Ideas for Policy Toward Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

Author:
Robert Satloff and Sarah Feuer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Modest invest­ments of U.S. diplomatic capital, economic aid, and security assistance can help these three countries and advance American interests. In the third in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Robert Satloff and Sarah Feuer look at the U.S. relationship with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All three countries are facing sharp challenges, from economic strains exacerbated by the pandemic to potential instability arising from the conflicts in Western Sahara and Libya. But this far corner of the region also offers strategic opportunities for the Biden administration to help these countries and, in turn, advance a range of key U.S. interests. “In contrast to many other areas of the Middle East, northwest Africa offers a realm in which relatively modest invest­ments of American diplomatic capital, economic aid, and security assistance can yield substantial returns, and the point of departure for the incoming administration’s bilateral engagement will, for the most part, be not one of tension but rather of opportunity,” write the authors. In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Economy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Algeria, North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, and United States of America

254. Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with Israel

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Areas for especially timely U.S.-Israel cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. In the fifth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock assess the multifaceted strengths of the U.S.-Israel partnership and its prospects for growth under the Biden administration. Areas for especially timely cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. Israel’s recent normalization deals with several Arab states only further widen the horizon. “Israel is a world-class innovator in technologies that will be critical to meeting future challenges, including artificial intelligence, information technology, and cybersecurity; sustainable water, food, and energy solutions; and high-tech medicine,” explain the authors. “All these areas are supportive of America’s foreign policy priorities.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

255. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe

256. The Impact of COVID-19 on CSDP: Forging Opportunity out of Crisis?

Author:
Tobias Pietz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Covid-19 pandemic began to sweep through the world in the early months of 2020, no country or international organisation had contingency plans in place to deal with a crisis that could occur anywhere and affect everybody simultaneously. In the case of the missions and operations deployed under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Covid-19 had a severe impact, including on Brussels-based personnel and structures, early on. In hindsight, it is easy to criticise the first three months of crisis management at the CSDP structures in Brussels as well as what operations and missions did in the field. However, the unique and novel challenge of this pandemic must never be lost sight of in any assessment of CSDP performance. The pandemic and its effect on the CSDP revealed some crucial challenges faced by EU missions and their operational and planning structures. This Brief tries to shed light on the impact that Covid-19 has had on the CSDP and points to some lessons which can be drawn from the experiences of dealing with the pandemic crisis so far.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

257. Securing the Heavens: How can space support the EU's Strategic Compass?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It may be customary to begin an analysis on space by referencing famous sci-fi productions such as Star Trek. Yet terms such as ‘final frontier’ or ‘to boldly go where no man has gone before’ are outdated. Today, space is used for countless civil and military applications and it is an increasingly contested and congested political and technological arena. While it is true that space is not yet home to photon torpedoes or deflector shields, reality is starting to catch up with the sci-fi world. Consider that the United States took the decision in December 2019 to create a ‘Space Force’ and in September 2020 France created an ‘Air and Space Force’, which followed on from the creation of a Space Command in 2019. Germany too took the decision in September 2020 to create an ‘Air and Space Operations Centre’. A month later, NATO created its first-ever Space Centre in Germany and in 2021 it was decided that France would host the new NATO Centre for Excellence in military space. Additionally, other EU countries such as Italy have established space-defence capacities and on 8 March 2021 France started its first-ever military space exercise, Aster X 2021.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

258. Transatlantic relations and European strategic autonomy in the Biden era: Neglect, primacy or reform?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The relief in Europe following Joe Biden’s election has been tempered by uncertainty as to how the new administration might approach transatlantic relations. This paper lays out three paths that the US could take. The benign neglect model assumes that Washington will be consumed by domestic challenges and competition with Beijing, de facto downgrading Europe as a priority. In the primacy model, the US sees its leadership as indispensable for sustaining the international order and battling authoritarianism. The US would expect Europe to follow its lead, while old reservations about European strategic autonomy would resurface. The major reform model would see a humbler US foreign policy, understanding that it cannot repair the fragile international liberal order alone. Supporting European strategic autonomy would be key in devising a new transatlantic division of labor. Domestic challenges and ingrained policy habits mean that the US will likely gravitate toward neglect or primacy in its dealings with Europe. A major reform of the transatlantic relationship, while desirable, would require significant political will and investment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, Transatlantic Relations, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

259. The Eastern Mediterranean conflict: From Turkey-Greece confrontation to regional power struggles

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For several decades, the Eastern Mediterranean confict consisted of a three-part struggle over territorial wa- ters, sovereignty and exclusionary national narratives between Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Its origins can be traced as far back as the Greek War of Independence in the 1830s, the Lausanne Peace Trea- ty determining the current borders of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and the failed bicommunal federal state established in Cyprus in 1960. Regarding the Cyprus confict, the best – but ultimately lost – opportunity to resolve the issue was the 2004 Annan Plan for a bicom- munal federal state. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean confict is a multi-level and multi-actor power strug- gle that is unlikely to wane any time soon. In addition to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, it also includes actors such as France, Italy, Libya, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Tis Briefng Paper frst identifes the main actors involved, and then proceeds to analyze the key de- terminants of the confict. Te paper concludes that tension in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue in the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is unlikely, however, as NATO can provide a necessary platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation. Tis is likely to prevent an actual war, but will not be enough to produce any lasting solution in the increasingly confict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean regional power struggle.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

260. Ukraine’s Half-Hearted Reforms: What Needs to Change in the West’s Approach?

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Comprehensive internal reforms, along with security cooperation, are a key pillar of West-Ukraine interaction. Thus far, however, the Western effort has not sufficed to overcome the resistance of the local elites and make the reforms irreversible. High hopes raised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s election as Ukraine’s president in 2019 were short-lived. In three priority areas – anti-corruption, the judiciary and the economy – reforms have stalled. Instead, Zelensky has started to adapt the same socio-political system that the West aims to transform to his own political purposes. Western support – or even leadership – is once again becoming crucial in keeping Ukraine on the reform track. Ongoing domestic developments seriously challenge Zelensky’s administration, creating a window of opportunity for a more successful application of reform conditionality. In turn, a new US administration may be much more capable of using this emerging opportunity than its predecessor. If they are to promote reforms more efficiently, Western actors should go beyond the technocratic approach and recognize their own “ownership” of the process. Progress with reforms requires direct and high-level political engagement to enforce the implementation of agreements and to empower pro-reform forces inside the country.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Reform, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

261. Solidarity during Covid-19 at national, regional and global levels: An enabler for improved global pandemic security and governance

Author:
Mika Aaltola, Johanna Ketola, Karoliina Vaakanainen, and Aada Peltonen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Solidarity has become a global and regional buzzword in the fght against Covid-19. As a result of the unequal and shifting disease burden and resource scarcity among countries, solidarity has manifested itself in various forms depending on the national and regional contexts and disease situations. Politicians worldwide have called for solidarity, which has taken many shapes and forms. At the nation- al and sub-national level, Covid-19 has prompted calls for communal solidarity. Solidarity, at the EU level, has often been used as a synonym for intra-EU coordination and assistance between member states as well as safe- guarding the welfare of EU citizens. In the global arena, UN and WHO leadership has been pushing for global sol- idarity to highlight the global nature and scope of the crisis, simultaneously alluding to the uneven distribu- tion of vaccines and the embedded systemic injustices in global health governance. Tis mosaic of solidarities difers from the normative ideal. In this Briefng Paper, we explore the diferent types of pandemic solidarities to understand the political dis- course during the frst year of the Covid-19 pandemic. We analyze the solidarity rhetoric of the high political leadership as well as key solidarity initiatives at three diferent governance levels: global (UN), regional (EU), and national (case Finland) to see how solidarity has been defned, in which context, and to what ends. Compared to other types of emergencies, pandemics are in a league of their own. One key characteristic of a pandemic emergency is the anxiety connected to the processes of contagion, infection, and spread. As the term ‘pandemic’ signifes, the frst line of defence at the local level has failed, as happened in the initial stage of Covid-19. Whereas natural catastrophes are usually lo- cally contained without additional concerns stemming from the fear of spread, pandemics are, to a degree, an- ti-humanitarian by their very nature. Tey usually lead to a knee-jerk reaction to step back and bufer oneself to prevent the harm from spreading.1 From this per- spective, pandemic solidarity is far more limited and qualitatively diferent. Instead of compassion for distant. others, a nearest-and-dearest approach can ensue. Tis Briefng Paper argues that lower levels of soli- darity should act as enablers for better pandemic gov- ernance at the global level. Until now, the impact of na- tional and regional solidarity has been relatively bleak. Calls for solidarity can act as empty signifers or merely as political rhetoric that is not tied to any concrete efort or action. To shed light on the meanings of solidarity, it is important to identify and distinguish the operative nature of solidarity, or lack thereof, in various contexts.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

262. Recognizing ‘Geoeconomic Risk’: Rethinking Corporate Risk Management for the era of Great-Power Competition

Author:
Christian Fjader, Niklas Helwig, and Mikael Wigell
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
As economic policy has become a key strategic means in great-power rivalry, states are attempting to control the economic networks that connect the world. By instrumentalizing businesses they change the risk picture for both public and private companies. The securitization of the economy entails a first source of new risk as states attempt to strengthen their control of companies in sectors considered strategic and security-sensitive. Another source of risk stems from the balkanization of the global economy, whereby it would disintegrate into separate spheres of economies decoupled from each other. The competition for control of the global standard-setting regimes constitutes an emerging area of such risk. A final source of risk is the weaponization that accelerates the use of sanctions and export controls. It entails more barriers for companies and puts pressure on the rules-based international system. A novel concept of ‘geoeconomic risk’ is therefore needed to identify, assess and mitigate these new uncertainties associated with the repurposing of the global economy.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Conflict, Economic Development, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

263. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

264. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea

265. 100 days of Biden’s new transatlantic strategy – where does Central and Eastern Europe stand?

Author:
Danielle Piatkiewicz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In her policy paper, our research fellow Danielle Piatkiewicz provides an in-depth review of President Biden’s first 100 days in office. Piatkiewicz particularly examines Biden's new transatlantic strategy and how it affects the Central and Eastern Europe region. So far, the US administration’s focus on tackling immediate shared threats has called upon their EU allies to take a stronger role and to continue to invest in its own defense capabilities. This includes not just investing in stronger NATO cooperation, but also the strengthening of economic and security support in CEE region through various avenues. For the CEE region, it will be a true test to see how they adapt towards a Biden administration – the deterioration of democratic processes and rule of law will certainly come to haunt the region, but the question remains to what extent? For Poland and Hungary, whose relations flourished under Trump’s administration, may have to reevaluate their posture to adhere to the pro-democratic policies that the Biden administration will certainly call for, and this can lead to a splintering within the V4 particularly between Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland and Hungary.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Transatlantic Relations, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, North America, Czech Republic, Central Europe, and United States of America

266. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

267. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

268. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

269. Expanding the Reach of the Special Forces with a Gender-Mixed Deep Development Capability (DDC): Identifying Challenges and Lessons Learned

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Driven by the need to adapt to a changing security environment, the Belgian Special Forces Group has developed a new gender- mixed capability in 2020, including female soldiers in the operational detachment of the unit for the first time. This brief examines the development and implementation of the project and identifies challenges for future similar capacities. It points to the need for clarification of tasks and employment conditions, while attracting male candidates is necessary to maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have been successful and the creation of the capability is a first step in the direction to diversify the composition of the Special Forces, a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a complex security context.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Gender Issues, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

270. Breaking the Law of Opposite Effects: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Revived Transatlantic Partnership

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have been marked by something akin to the law of opposite effects. When the relationship is vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, Europeans pull themselves together to advance their security and defence interests. During the Clinton presidency, Europeans comfortably outsourced military crisis management in the Balkans to Washington. In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the Iraq war during the Bush administration triggered the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military operations under the banner of the European Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations were back on an even keel during the Obama era, the time when Europeans haphazardly reduced their defence budgets and lost a great share of their military capabilities. Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies in decades, Europeans re-energized their defence integration with a set of new initiatives, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore somewhat logical and far from unexpected that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet again a heightened risk that Europeans would fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of dependency on the US military shield. Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and avoiding European complacency is crucial for a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it requires concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

271. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

272. What Belgium Can Do: Proposals for the National Security Strategy

Author:
Sven Biscop and Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgium has never had a National Security Strategy: a single strategic vision outlining how to safeguard its national interests from external threats and challenges and to prevent the exploitation of its internal vulnerabilities. Many in Belgium intuitively feel that none is needed: Are we not shielded by the EU and NATO? And what could the world expect from this small country anyway? But the fact is that the Kingdom of Belgium is not such a small player. The geopolitical heart, and the host, of the EU, it ranks 9th out of 27 in terms of population and GDP; worldwide, it is the 12th exporting country. Hence recurring tensions between Belgium’s own – often low – level of ambition as a security actor and the expectations of its allies and partners.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

273. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

274. A New Start for EU-US relations?

Author:
Jim Cloos
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The election of President Biden was greeted by sighs of relief across Europe and offered the promise of a renewed relationship. The first hundred days in the office have been impressive. The tone vis-à-vis the EU has changed radically. New perspectives of cooperation are opening up, as set out in the Commission’s December communication on “EU-US: A new transatlantic agenda for global change”. For this to be fruitful two conditions need to be met. The first and most important one is linked to the capacity of the EU to deliver and to do what it takes to be a credible and strong partner. In this sense the future of the transatlantic partnership depends more on the European side than the American one. America is a super power and will remain one. And super powers only listen to other powers that are serious. But there is also a need for changes on the U.S side. The quiet assumption, so prevalent in the U.S, that it is natural for it to lead on all major issues and for the Europeans to follow will not stand up to the requirements of today. A strong partner can and will at times have different views and even different interests and should be allowed to defend them without being accused of jeopardizing the relationship.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

275. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

276. The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, must generate immediate action. The best way of ensuring that is to prepare new capability initiatives and, potentially, new operational engagements now, so that they can be launched simultaneously with the Strategic Compass. In that light, “the development of an initial-entry force as a pool of Member State forces that train and exercise together and are made available to the EU” (as summarised in an EEAS working paper), is one of the most promising ideas on the table. How to make it work?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

277. Seven Steps to European Defence, Transatlantic Equilibrium, and Global Europe

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Panta rhei – everything flows (Heraclitus). Once again, geopolitics is in transition, and a new crossroads is being approached. While we already knew that global leadership is beyond any single country, now it appears to be beyond even any single continent – beyond an alliance of two continents even. This means that the old strategic truth, that the power that has Europe on its side has the potential to dominate the world, no longer holds. Europe no longer is the kingmaker. And that changes a lot, for the EU, the US, and the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

278. Readiness as a Mission: Implications for Belgian Defence

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Readiness reflects the ability of the armed forces to accomplish their assigned tasks in time. Like many European counterparts, Belgian Defence disposes of some high readiness assets, but is lacking in readiness overall. This impacts its contribution to collective defence and its wider ability to support societal resilience. This Egmont Security Policy Brief explains the concept of readiness as a question of resource management and applies this to the ongoing defence review. Treating readiness as a meta- mission implies not only balancing the budgetary input parameters – investing in personnel, training, equipment and maintenance simultaneously – but also taking a selective approach towards operational engagement. Doing so will enable the force to regenerate as rapidly as possible, and boost Belgium’s ability to act both at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

279. Rosatom in Europe: Russia’s Trojan Horse?

Author:
Tomas Janeliūnas, Yuri Tsarik, and Andrea Bonelli
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The national security aspects of nuclear energy have long been sidelined, overshadowed by the much larger geopolitical interest in gas and oil. However, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, which is pursuing various opportunities in Europe and globally, has become part of Russia’s broader strategy to rebuild its geopolitical influence. According to some recent estimates, Russia has spent over $92 billion to support this prong of its strategy over the last ten years. The European Union (EU), however, is not fully cognisant of or properly postured to address the geopolitical and security risks accompanying Moscow’s use of Rosatom to advance its strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Baltic States

280. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO

Author:
Justyna Gotkowska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

281. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
China and Estonia

282. #NATO2030: NATO’s Force Structure and Posture

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The forces and capabilities that will be available for NATO operations in 2030 have, to a great extent, already been decided through the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is now up to individual Allies to deliver on their commitments. In the third of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Martin Hurt of the ICDS looks at how NATO’s force structure and posture have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and outlines the challenges of the further modernisation necessary if NATO is to keep pace with an evolving security environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

283. Advancing the Role of the OSCE in the Field of Climate Security

Author:
Niklas Bremberg and Anniek Barnhoorn
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Policy Brief assesses the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of climate security, in terms of its current and possible future commitments. Despite growing political momentum among most OSCE participating states about the need to address the issue of climate security, there appear to be divergent views on how to move forward on this important issue. Based on an assessment of recent OSCE activities linked to climate-related security risks and interviews with representatives from OSCE participating states, this policy brief suggests four avenues for the OSCE to advance its role in the field of climate security: (a) agree to new commitments; (b) engage in agenda setting; (c) strengthen the mandate of institutions; and (d) develop existing resources.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

284. Winning the Geo-Tech Battle and Building the Quad Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Eric B. Brown, John Lee, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established as its paramount geopolitical objective the replacement of the free and open, rules-based order in Asia with an alternative world order, one that is to be dominated by the interests and values of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This decision presents a danger to the entire world, not just to any one state or group of states. For, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the March 2021 US-PRC meeting in Alaska, the alternative to a rules-based order “is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” In furtherance of its objectives, the PRC is in the midst of a large military build-up, but there is much more. For today’s CCP, political power grows not only from the “barrel of the gun,” as Mao Zedong once put it, but also from cutting-edge technologies. Thus, while Beijing pours billions into artificial intelligence and surveillance tech to impose its new “digital totalitarianism” inside the PRC, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, it is also using its growing technological prowess to press its larger geopolitical agenda in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is weaponizing technology and connectivity, along with trade, finance, and other policy instruments to try to rule the key technologies and industries of the future, as well as to improve its strategic positioning and acquire political power over other countries—for instance, through its bid to dominate other nations’ most sensitive data networks, or via the export of its suite of “social stability” technologies, i.e., the “techno-tyrant’s toolkit.” In all this, the CCP’s intent is to entrench its power and Leninist norms and practices to the extent it can do so beyond the PRC’s borders, and to make other nations, or at the least their ruling elites, beholden to it. So in addition to the PRC’s militarily destabilizing activities in the West Pacific and incursions into India’s Himalayas, there is also a “geo-technological front.” If Xi’s CCP succeeds at enmeshing other countries in its expanding “PRC sphere of technological influence,” it could unlock and be able to exploit decisive military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological advantages.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific

285. A Just Response to Beijing’s COVID-19 Abuses

Author:
David Asher, Miles M. Yu, David Feith, Matthew Zweig, and Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nearly 18 months after word of a deadly new virus began leaking out of Wuhan, China, the Chinese government’s response remains fundamentally hostile to international cooperation and transparency. Despite hundreds of offers of assistance, polite diplomatic entreaties, and demands for access to data by governments and health authorities across the globe, the world still knows far too little about COVID-19’s origin. As in a Dali painting, the clocks have melted but time has not stood still. China’s initial silencing and censoring of its doctors and scientists, followed by misinformation about COVID-19’s dangers—especially denials concerning the virus’s ability to be spread human-to-human, invisibly and asymptomatically—helped cost the world trillions of dollars and millions of lives. Whether one believes COVID-19 originated in a zoonotic host, a bat cave, a frozen food shipment, or a Wuhan lab’s dangerous “dual-use” research supporting undeclared bioweapons programs, the world needs answers from the Chinese Communist Party. These are answers Beijing won’t provide unless it faces a high price for refusing. For the good of public health and international security, the Biden administration and the Congress can unite in a coordinated, long-term response.
Topic:
Security, Health, Research, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

286. Building a Strong and Independent Iraq: Policy Guidance for the Biden Administration

Author:
Abram N. Shulsky
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Formulating US policy toward Iraq can be a fraught matter, given all the debate and disagreement concerning the actions that brought us to the current situation. However, our policy must be formulated in light of it, regardless of views about our past actions. Policy formulation should begin with the realization that Iran has gained a predominant political and military influence in Iraq. Despite efforts of past PM Adel Abdul Mahdi and current PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, many of the militias comprising the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) still answer to Iran, not the Iraqi government. Iran exerts widespread influence throughout the political class. Economically, Iraq remains dependent on Iran for energy;1 religious tourism from Iran to the holy sites in Karbala and Najaf is an important source of revenue; and Iran has flooded markets with cheap food and consumer goods. Although Iraqi oil production has rebounded, the economy remains relatively moribund and the level of basic public services is poor. (That Iraq flares off its natural gas at the same time it is importing it from Iran to produce electricity2 highlights the economic disfunction.) Popular discontent boiled over in 2019, leading to widespread protests. The protests took on an anti-Iranian aspect, and Iran-aligned PMF units attacked the protestors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Economics, Government, Politics, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

287. Give Lisbon a chance: How to improve EU foreign policy

Author:
Fraser Cameron
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
After almost three decades of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a decade since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is high time to assess whether EU foreign policy has indeed become “more visible, more coherent and more effective”, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite most media and experts having a rather disdainful view, there have been some successes. And the increasingly bleak geopolitical situation has a led to growing recognition in EU member states that they must try and work together if Europe is to become an international actor, defend multilateralism and maximise its influence on the world stage. But that understanding has not always been on display in recent years. Clearly, there remain significant challenges in coordinating the foreign policies of 27 member states, each with their own interests, traditions and capabilities. Fraser Cameron (EPC Senior Adviser), therefore, argues that the EU should have more modest ambitions. Instead of harbouring grand ideas, it could take small yet concrete steps in the direction of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. In this Policy Brief, he puts forward ten practical ideas.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe

288. Assessing SSR Opportunities and Challenges During the Transition in Mali

Author:
Flore Berger
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Five months after the coup d'état in Mali, the main questions about the 18-month transition period - Who will be the key players? What will the priorities be? - have been answered. But while the transition period opens up new opportunities, there remain many challenges and obstacles to significant progress in security sector reform.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Leadership, Coup, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

289. The Impact of Climate Change on Global and Local Security Governance

Author:
Flavia Eichmann
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Climate change presents a major threat not only to sustainable development and global biodiversity but also to peace and security. Security sectors around the world are increasingly faced with the challenges of climate security risks, given their traditional role in disaster risk prevention, management, and response - but also in migration and border management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

290. Climate Change and Its Impact on Security Provision - The Role of Good Security Sector Governance and Reform

Author:
Hans Born
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
While it is clear that SSG/R must play a role in responding to climate change, a greater understanding of how to translate this into practice is required. This policy brief seeks to identify concrete entry points for SSG/R in addressing climate-related security risks, and outlines means for influencing policy in this direction.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Global Focus

291. EU sets new course for the Arctic

Author:
Laurent Mayet
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union's strengthened engagement in the Arctic, presented on 13 October, marks two new directions in the Union's diplomatic positioning: a strategic and security turn, and the absolute priority given to the fight against climate change.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

292. Peace and Security 2025

Author:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On the one hand, 2025 is just around the corner while, on the other hand, it seems far, far away. In Part I of this publication, experts and associates from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) paint a picture of possible futures in five areas by presenting scenarios that depict potential developments in the period up to 2025. The discussion will include suggestions on what can be done to prevent these scenarios from becoming a reality. In Part II, authors will make specific suggestions on how we can effectively respond to the peace and security environment out to 2025 by using appropriate leadership, crisis management and strategic foresight approaches.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Peace, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

293. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?

Author:
Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

294. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

295. Poland and the United States: What’s right, what’s not, and what’s next

Author:
Daniel Fried and Jakub Wiśniewski
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Around the time of President Joe Biden’s first trip to Europe in June 2021, US-Polish relations experienced a short, but intense, rough patch. Missteps on both sides caused the problems, including fears on the Polish side of a high-handed US attitude and a general lack of consultation on issues (like Nord Stream 2) that Poland regards as critical. Some Poles started questioning the good faith of their biggest ally. The US side, for its part, thought Poland was ignoring US overtures and assuming the worst of the United States. Draft legislation that would target the largest US investment in Poland (the TVN television network) generated US concerns about both the investment climate in Poland and political pressure on independent media. In short order, wiser counsel emerged on both sides, and top-level discussions may ease the sense of tension. 1 But, the episode suggests that problems have developed in what has been (and should remain) one of the closest transatlantic relations. Both the United States and Poland need to look hard at what this relationship can do for both countries and for the transatlantic relationship, and at the sources of problems.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Poland, North America, and United States of America

296. Addressing instability in Central America: Restrictions on civil liberties, violence, and climate change

Author:
Maria Fernanda Bozmoski, María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, and Domingo Sadurní
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean are rising up in protest. Political frustration and economic stagnation are fueling social discontent exacerbated by the continued COVID-19 pandemic and the slow health response. In Central America, restrictions on civil liberties, high rates of gender-based violence and extortion, and worsening climate change are compounding the lack of economic opportunities and pervasive corruption seen in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In the year of its bicentennial, can northern Central America chart a new path, in partnership with the United States, to tackle the sources of social instability that are forcing migrants to seek a better life? In July 2021, the Joseph Biden administration released the US Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America report. Three of its five pillars call for the United States and northern Central American countries to work together to respect human rights and a free press, counter violence at the hands of criminal organizations, and combat sexual and gender-based violence.1 To ensure a sustained and effective implementation of this strategy, especially on these three pillars, the United States will need to find new ways to work closely with northern Central American governments, domestic and international private sectors, and organized civil-society groups. Following consultations with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Northern Triangle Advisory Group (NTAG), this brief highlights the importance of implementing a holistic, multisector approach to mitigate gender-based violence, protect civil liberties and human rights, and build climate resilience. This brief is the third in a three-part series by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and DT Institute that provides policy recommendations for the United States and its northern Central American partners to address the root causes of migration.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Politics, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Latin America

297. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

298. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:
Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

299. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

300. NDC@70: more relevant than ever

Author:
Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The information revolution put brick and mortar academic institutions under pressure to adapt, and the COVID pandemic has increased atten- tion on higher education models – business, intellectu- al, and philosophical. As the NATO Defense College (NDC) turns 70, and the Alliance ponders a new Stra- tegic Concept, it is worth reviewing the NDC model and value of education more broadly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower created the College in 1951 to prepare military and civilian officials for duty in NATO posts or in NATO-related positions in their capitals. War col- leges in France, the United States, and the United King- dom provided the conceptual basis for the NDC, but the NATO equivalent would have two differences: the NATO College would focus on Alliance issues more than national colleges, and consensus-building would be a key part of its education method. Seventy years later, the College still prepares military and civilian officials to assume positions of responsibility within NATO and that preparation has always included acquiring geo-stra- tegic knowledge and building relationships. NDC@70 means reflecting on how senior leaders acquire knowl- edge, develop skills, and strengthen relationships in to- day’s challenging period with rapid rates of technologi- cal change and increasingly segmented societies.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and North America