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Begin New Search Political Geography Afghanistan Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution United States Institute of Peace Publication Year within 10 Years

21. Licensing Afghan Opium for Medicinal Use: Why It Won't Work

Author:
David Mansfield and William A. Byrd
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
With large increases in Afghan opium cultivation and production in 2013 and 2014, there is a risk that resulting frustration may give rise to a search for extreme but unproductive solutions. There are no easy solutions to the illegal narcotics problem. The proposal that Afghanistan could shift to licensed production of opium for pain medications will not work. Due to severe problems with governance, rule of law and security, opium licensing in Afghanistan would be subject to extremely high leakages. Afghanistan's comparative advantage in supplying the illicit market means that it would likely expand cultivation to meet demand in both markets. Afghanistan is a high-cost producer of opium, and prices for licensed opium are much lower than on the illegal market, so profits might well be marginal or even negative. Existing producers of licensed opiates— Australia, Turkey, India, France and others—would strongly oppose any move to let Afghanistan become a competitor on the licensed market. Even if a more liberalized market for opiates is envisioned, technological advances and modern techniques in other countries mean that Afghanistan could not be a competitive producer.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Narcotics Trafficking
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Turkey, India, France, and Australia

22. How to Spur Afghan Reforms: The Limits and Benefits of Incentives

Author:
Trent Ruder
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Donors have increasingly sought to condition assistance funds for Afghanistan, particularly as a result of inadequate reforms during the Karzai administration. Since its negotiation in 2012, the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework has been the basis of most donor incentive decisions on Afghanistan. Donors need to consider who benefits from incentives, how resources and requests align, Afghanistan's capacity to implement reform, and the consequences of success or failure. Donors should both temper their expectations and minimize the linkage between highly politicized issues and incentive programs. Incentive programming is not a magic bullet, but it can help shape dialogue with the new Afghan administration.
Topic:
Corruption, Foreign Aid, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Tokyo

23. Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Afghanistan Without Government Revenues or Development Benefits

Author:
William A. Byrd and Javed Noorani
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Case studies of five ongoing mining operations show that Afghan mining companies are wantonly exploiting easily extractable mineral resources with little or no taxes and royalties going to the government. Revenue losses from just two sources —royalties and land rent —at the five mines are more than US$50 million per year. Total revenue losses from all sources for the hundreds of mines contracted to different companies easily could be hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The tendering processes, awards, and contents of contracts issued, contract implementation, and actual operations at the mines all showed clear signs of political interference, favoring bidders that often had no prior mining experience. Companies usually began extracting resources soon after mining contracts were awarded, without paying any taxes and royalties —even though the contract called for an initial exploration period. Companies did not provide the legally and contractually required documents, such as exploration reports and environmental and social impact assessments. Effective inspections of mines were not conducted, and companies were not held accountable for payments due. Sometimes mining activities precipitated local conflicts, resulting in violence and deaths; weaker local communities called on Taliban elements for support in one such dispute. Serious reforms are needed to ensure that mining activities are developmentally beneficial and that revenues generated are paid to the government.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Natural Resources, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Taliban

24. Revisiting Chicago: The Critical Need To Maintain Support For Afghanistan's National Security Forces Post-2014

Author:
William A. Byrd
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Two years ago, the Chicago international summit agreed on long-term targets for the size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and committed to continued international financial support until 2024. Since then, the ANSF have taken over lead responsibility for Afghanistan's security and have by most accounts performed well, taking substantial casualties but holding their own against the Taliban. However, the ANSF still rely heavily on U.S. financial and logistical support and military "enablers" in such roles as air support, medevac and reconnaissance. The Afghan government's failure to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States during the past eight months has coincided with, and undoubtedly contributed to, declining political support for the international engagement in Afghanistan. Not only has U.S. civilian aid in the current fiscal year been halved, but the White House recently announced a complete U.S. troop pull-out by the end of 2016, except for "normal levels" to protect the U.S. Embassy and oversee military assistance. That is close to a "zero option," albeit in 2016 and not 2014. The announcement raises serious questions about the staying power of international security funding (which would amount to billions of dollars per year into the early 2020s if the Chicago commitments hold); management of security assistance; provision of logistical support and enablers; whether Afghanistan's domestic revenues will grow fast enough to meet its own ANSF funding commitments; and timing of any future ANSF reductions in relation to possible negotiations with the Taliban insurgency. The ANSF (especially the Afghan National Army, or ANA) was largely a creation of the United States, which has advocated for and endorsed its current size and cost. It would be irresponsible to create such a force and then turn around and undermine it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, International Security, Military Strategy, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Chicago