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1. Peace and Security 2025

Author:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On the one hand, 2025 is just around the corner while, on the other hand, it seems far, far away. In Part I of this publication, experts and associates from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) paint a picture of possible futures in five areas by presenting scenarios that depict potential developments in the period up to 2025. The discussion will include suggestions on what can be done to prevent these scenarios from becoming a reality. In Part II, authors will make specific suggestions on how we can effectively respond to the peace and security environment out to 2025 by using appropriate leadership, crisis management and strategic foresight approaches.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Peace, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?

Author:
Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

3. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

4. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability

Author:
Alexander Decina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
Topic:
Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

5. Emerging Security Challenges: framing the policy content

Author:
Graeme P. Herd, Detlef Puhl, and Sean Costigan
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Security challenges are ‘emergent’ or ‘emerging’ when the wider community of security experts begin to discuss and debate a given issue as a prelude to developing, resourcing and then implementing appropriate policy responses. Some security challenges are "ab ovo" – they emerge onto the policy landscape at incredible speed, complete and entire, rather than slowly over a long gestation period. For some institutions, the ‘real’ emerging challenge is defined as much by institutional and cultural change needed to enable more efficient, effective and legitimate policy response as it is by the inherent complexity of the challenges themselves. Highest priority challenges (e.g. climatological, nuclear, biological, health and agriculture-related) are those that threaten the survival of people and institutions. Second order priority challenges undermine essential ways of life and the fabric of state-society relations, the nature of democratic governance and the integrity of the ‘social contract’.
Topic:
Security and Institutions
Political Geography:
Global