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1. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2. The European Union renews its offensive against US technology firms

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The European Union's proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) contemplates extensive regulation of "gatekeeper" digital platforms—firms that perform a "core platform service" in the European Union (defined as online intermediation, online search, social networking, video sharing, electronic communication, cloud services, or online advertising), have a significant impact on the EU internal market, serve as an important gateway between business users and end-users, and enjoy an entrenched and durable position. Although at least one European firm could qualify as a gatekeeper, Hufbauer and Hogan say, the DMA discriminates against American technology firms by singling them out for the label of "gatekeepers." The European Commission’s proposed DMA targets both US tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft and smaller (albeit huge) US tech firms such as Airbnb and PayPal. The authors say the EU goal is to confer competitive advantage on European digital firms, breaching the EU commitment to national treatment of foreign firms, violating their intellectual property rights, and imposing high expenses on the "gatekeepers." At the same time, France is planning to enact its own steep barriers against US and other foreign cloud services.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

3. The case for a cautiously optimistic outlook for US inflation

Author:
David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Federal Reserve and most other analysts failed to anticipate the surge in inflation in 2021. Considerable debate now surrounds the question of whether the Fed is too sanguine in anticipating that too-high inflation will mostly take care of itself over the next few years, even as the unemployment rate remains low and monetary policy remains accommodative. This Policy Brief concludes that although the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was too optimistic in the projections it issued in December 2021, the broad contour of its baseline inflation outlook for 2022 and beyond remains sensible. The authors find the 2021 surge in inflation resulted mainly from COVID-19-related sectoral developments rather than the classic situation of aggregate demand outstripping the overall economy's long-run productive potential. The statistical analysis in this Policy Brief was conducted before Russia invaded Ukraine. As a result of the war, the inflation situation will probably get worse before it gets better, and could do so in dramatic manner if Russian energy exports are banned altogether. Nonetheless, if the key considerations identified in this Policy Brief remain in place, and if monetary policymakers respond to evolving circumstances in a sensible manner, the inflation picture should look considerably better in the next one to three years.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. For inflation relief, the United States should look to trade liberalization

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Megan Hogan, and Yilin Wang
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
With US inflation running at 40-year high rates, the Federal Reserve is signaling more interest rate hikes in 2022 and 2023. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has also vowed to act against what he calls anticompetitive behavior by corporations. But policymakers are overlooking one set of actions that could make a meaningful contribution to taming inflation: trade liberalization. The data cited in this Policy Brief indicate that a feasible package of liberalization could deliver a one-time reduction in consumer price index (CPI) inflation of around 1.3 percentage points, amounting to $797 per US household, about half the size of pandemic relief in 2021. As a bonus, the embrace of trade liberalization would curb inflationary expectations taking hold in American firms now protected by trade barriers from foreign competition.
Topic:
Economy, Inflation, and Trade Liberalization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Have trade agreements been bad for America?

Author:
Alan Wm. Wolff, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Many Americans are persuaded that trade agreements of the last 40 years have been a costly mistake. To be sure, open markets leave some people behind, and promises to help those hurt were broken. But on balance, expanding trade has greatly benefited the US economy, and policy approaches taken need to be built on rather than abandoned. Alan Wm. Wolff, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, and Robert Z. Lawrence say more must be done to help those harmed, but protectionism is not the solution. The international trading system needs more outspoken US support and leadership if it is to be maintained and improved.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

6. CHIPS Act will spur US production but not foreclose China

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The CHIPS and Science Act, export controls, and agreements with allied countries will accomplish many of their multiple objectives. More US semiconductor fabrication plants will be built, US R&D will be accelerated, and advanced chips and chip-making machines will be denied to China, Russia, and other adversaries. However, the Act will not make a material difference to US chip supplies in the next two or three years. Slower economic growth has already tipped the chips market in favor of ample supplies. While collective measures have inflicted considerable short-term pain on China, causing a sharp drop in the fortunes of its high-tech firms, China will respond by redoubling its self-sufficiency programs. The United States, however, should not mimic China in pursuing self-sufficiency, as US self-sufficiency is an illusion. The United States currently exports high-value chips and imports low-value chips, so increasing self-sufficiency would require the United States to prioritize basic chip production at the same time it is supposed to be competing with China in advanced chip production. Continuing to prioritize advanced chip production—where the United States has a clear advantage—is the most efficient course of action.
Topic:
Economics, Legislation, Exports, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

7. Soaring demand is driving double-digit import price inflation in the United States

Author:
Caroline Freund
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
At a time of soaring price increases in the United States, inflation in the US import sector has been soaring the most. Import price inflation in the first half of 2022 was in the double digits, above US consumer price index and personal consumption expenditures inflation. Excess demand for certain imported goods is playing a big role, but so are supply shortages caused by temporary business closures overseas and shipping delays associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Correctly identifying the culprit for misaligned demand and supply, and hence rising prices, is central to understanding the type and extent of policy intervention needed. Using movements in prices and quantities of specific goods, the analysis presented in this Policy Brief shows that the increase in import price inflation has been driven to the same or a greater extent by demand compared with supply constraints. The results have important implications for policies to help reduce the supply and demand imbalance and thus tame inflation.
Topic:
Economics, Inflation, COVID-19, Imports, and Supply and Demand
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

8. Is South Korea vulnerable to EU and US carbon border restrictions?

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
South Korean exports, especially carbon-intensive products like steel, are increasingly vulnerable to both the European Union’s proposed carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)—set to begin on January 1, 2023—and the proposed Clean Competition Act (CCA) before the US Congress. Schott and Hogan caution that Korean exporters should not count on Korea’s decade-old EU and US free trade agreements (FTAs), nor on the multilateral trading rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to protect them from new carbon-based import barriers in key foreign markets. The WTO and the FTAs have broad and loosely defined exemptions for environmental protection. Nor is Korea likely to be shielded by its own cap-and-trade emissions trading system (the K-ETS), because of extensive use of free allowances and large differences between EU and Korean carbon prices. While the threat the EU CBAM poses to Korean exports is imminent, passage of the CCA faces major legislative obstacles. But US imports of Korean steel and other carbon-intensive goods are still subject to climate-related duties at the US border under US unfair trade statutes. The US Department of Commerce has ruled that free allowances issued under the K-ETS (and EU ETS) are implicit subsidies that can be offset by countervailing duties. These charges are in addition to the harsh tariff-rate quotas on imported Korean steel applied under the “national security” authority of Section 232 of US trade law, which are more restrictive than measures imposed against European and other steel exporters. The authors suggest relaxing these US barriers, as they have been for shipments from Europe, in return for Korean participation in the nascent US-EU talks to establish a “Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum.”
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Exports, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

9. Bad news for the Fed from the Beveridge space

Author:
Olivier Blanchard, Alex Domash, and Lawrence H. Summers
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Federal Reserve seeks to cool an overheated US labor market to ease wage hikes and reduce job vacancies, without a painful spike in unemployment. But empirical evidence indicates that these goals have never been accomplished together and remain unlikely now. In fact, fighting inflation will require a reduction in job vacancies and also an increase in unemployment. The inverse relationship between job vacancies and unemployment is measured by the Beveridge curve, named after a British economist. Blanchard, Domash, and Summers find that the Fed’s hope that vacancies can be decreased without increasing unemployment flies in the face of historical empirical evidence. The current low unemployment rate and the very high vacancy-to-unemployment ratio suggest that the labor market is overheating and the natural unemployment rate has increased. It has increased about 1.3 percentage points from its pre-COVID level, implying the labor market is even more overheated than suggested by the current unemployment rate.
Topic:
Economy, Unemployment, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. South Korea should prepare for its exposure to US-China technology tensions

Author:
Mary Lovely and Abigail Dahlman
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The stated goal of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) is to create standards that enhance and elevate regional trade and investment flows, but it is clearly aimed at reducing the role of China in global supply chains. As China is Korea’s largest trading partner, US policy discouraging Chinese participation in supply chains has immediate detrimental implications for Korean manufacturers. The United States is the second-most important destination for Korean exports. Given the values of these triangular trade flows, Lovely and Dahlman assess South Korea’s exposure to US demands to remove or reduce Chinese participation in the manufacture of exports destined for the US market. The reliance of the proposed framework on certain standards will likely reduce Chinese participation in IPEF trade networks. Korea may benefit from this trend, but IPEF could also increase production costs for Korean companies, especially in the electronics sector, a problem that would worsen if China retaliates against these companies. To reduce these risks, Korea might find it prudent to reduce its reliance on intermediate goods from China for products it produces for export to the United States. The Korean government should also seek to better understand its exposure to US–China trade tensions and diversify its trade relations. Korean firms should start preparing for supply chain disruptions, perhaps by making investments at home. Korea could also help other IPEF members reduce supply chain disruptions while addressing security concerns over China.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Supply Chains, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

11. Collateral benefits? South Korean exports to the United States and the US-China trade war

Author:
Mary Lovely, David Xu, and Yinhan Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the extent to which the United States increased its imports from South Korea after the US imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports. Korea benefited from this shift in US imports, although the increase was relatively small in most sectors. The authors use highly disaggregated US import and tariff data to examine adjustments in US purchases of manufactured goods from its trade partners. Their analysis indicates that Korea made a small gain in the US market following the levying of US tariffs on Chinese exports, with Korea’s share of overall US manufacturing imports rising 0.9 percent and its share of US manufacturing imports subject to trade war tariffs rising 1.0 percent. Gains were spread across a variety of manufacturing sectors—such as wood products, textiles and apparel, and machinery—reflecting both the choices made by US officials regarding which Chinese exports to tax and the nature of preexisting trade relationships between South Korea and the United States.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

12. Another reason to raise the Fed's inflation target: An employment and output boom

Author:
David Reifschneider and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In 2012, the Federal Reserve formally adopted an inflation target and set it at 2 percent, in line with the level chosen by many other central banks. In hindsight, this setting left policymakers with too little room to cut interest rates when they want to fight recessions. Many researchers have noted that if central banks raised their inflation targets—either individually or in concert—they could do a better job in the long run of keeping inflation near its target and the workforce fully employed. Reifschneider and Wilcox highlight an additional and less-noted consequence of raising the inflation target modestly: The economy could enjoy a temporary but substantial boom in employment and output as it adjusted to the increase in the target. Critical to generating this favorable outcome would be decisive action by monetary policymakers to ensure that the higher inflation target is achieved in a reasonably timely manner. In light of substantial transition benefits, as well as the long-run improvement in economic performance, the authors recommend that the Federal Reserve raise its inflation target to 3 percent as part of its next framework review.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Employment, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. An Uneven Global Rebound Will Challenge Emerging-Market and Developing Economies

Author:
Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
As the US economy rebounds amid elevated inflationary pressures and Europe grows at a rapid clip, an uneven global rebound looms. Although emerging-market and developing economies (EMDEs) generally retain good access to global capital markets for now, their relatively slow pace of COVID-19 vaccination will continue to hamper their economic recoveries and strain their public finances—already stretched owing to the fiscal pressures of the pandemic over the past year and a half. Higher interest rates in the rich countries, particularly the United States, could tip EMDEs into liquidity and even solvency crises. The likelihood of crises is higher if advanced-economy central banks move abruptly, surprising markets. Global policymakers should prepare now by enhancing mechanisms for providing liquidity to EMDEs and, in cases of insolvency, for restructuring their sovereign debts. Perhaps even more important, the scope for uneven recovery can be limited if rich countries make an all-out effort to deliver vaccines globally and enhance less prosperous countries’ infrastructures for getting shots into arms.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, Inflation, Economic Development, COVID-19, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

14. Digital agreements: What’s covered, what’s possible

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Rapidly expanding digital flows have significantly contributed to world economic growth. The exponential expansion of digital flows since 2005 has partially compensated for lethargic growth in global conventional trade and foreign direct investment flows. COVID-19 accelerated the digital revolution in 2020, as businesses and consumers increasingly “went digital” in everything from online education and work to shopping. Many countries, particularly the United States, have enormous commercial and cultural interests in preserving the freedom of cross-border digital traffic. Strong international agreements can keep digital highways open, but agreements reached so far do too little to discipline government practices that threaten to restrict digital flows, allowing ample room for ideological and protectionist obstacles. A new and better agreement is necessary to safeguard the growth of digital flows.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economic Growth, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

15. Raising a caution flag on US financial sanctions against China

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China’s policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea and its ongoing support for Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela pose major challenges for the United States, where bipartisan pressure is growing to ramp up punitive sanctions against leading Chinese firms and financial institutions. Financial sanctions freeze the US assets or bar US entry of the targeted individuals and firms and prohibit US financial firms from doing business with them. Schott explains why US officials should carefully weigh the risks to international financial markets and US economic interests before imposing punitive sanctions on major financial institutions engaged with China. The collateral costs of such sanctions would be sizable, damaging US producers, financial institutions, and US alliances. By restricting access of major banks to international payments in US dollars and barring use of messaging systems like SWIFT, tougher US financial sanctions would effectively “weaponize” the dollar; friends and foes alike would be pushed to seek alternatives to dollar transactions that, over time, would weaken the international role of the dollar. Instead of doubling down on current unilateral financial sanctions, US policy should deploy sanctions in collaboration with allies and calibrate trade and financial controls to match the expected policy achievements.
Topic:
Human Rights, Sanctions, Finance, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed?

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Open Sub-navigation BackOpen Sub-navigation Publications Back Policy Briefs Working Papers Books PIIE Briefings Open Sub-navigation Commentary Back Op-Eds Testimonies Speeches and Papers Topics & Regions PIIE Charts What Is Globalization? Educational Resources Open Sub-navigation Back Senior Research Staff Research Analysts Trade Talks Open Sub-navigation Back RealTime Economic Issues Watch Trade & Investment Policy Watch China Economic Watch North Korea: Witness to Transformation 中文 Open Sub-navigation Back All Events Financial Statements Global Connections Global Economic Prospects Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lectures Trade Winds Open Sub-navigation Back News Releases Multimedia Media Center Open Sub-navigation Back Board of Directors Staff Employment Contact Annual Report Transparency Policy POLICY BRIEF VIEW SHARING OPTIONS Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed? Gary Clyde Hufbauer (PIIE) Policy Brief21-5 March 2021 Photo Credit: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse One economic argument for government subsidies is that they are necessary to compensate firms and industries for benefits they provide to society at large but cannot capture in the prices they charge for goods or services. For example, subsidies to renewable energy are defended because renewable energy limits carbon emissions. When a major economy subsidizes extensively, however, its trading partners are drawn into the game, with losses all around. As the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, a better outcome would entail mutual restraint. But the goal of mutual restraint is no less difficult in international trade than it is in international arms control. Both the European Union and the US federal system try, in different ways, to regulate industrial subsidies. Hufbauer examines efforts to contain unjustifiable subsidies and proposes modest improvements, bearing in mind that as countries struggle to overcome the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little appetite for restoring a free market economy—one in which firms compete with minimum government assistance or regulation. Selective upgrading of the rulebook may nevertheless be possible.
Topic:
Agriculture, Government, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Manufacturing, Industry, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

17. The unappreciated trend toward unilateral trade liberalization

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Afrequently voiced complaint from the Trump administration was that US firms have faced a competitive disadvantage in exports because the US market is open and US tariffs are low but US trading partners protect their markets with high tariffs. The administration used this concern to justify raising US tariffs whenever it could. Lawrence argues that these claims should be more nuanced and account for the extensive unilateral liberalization by many countries over the past 30 years and that the grievances that motivated the Trump trade policies are increasingly misplaced. Many developing countries have reduced their tariffs unilaterally to rates that are far lower than they applied three decades ago and far less than the bound rates reflected in their World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. Globally, on average, tariffs were not raised during the global financial crisis of 2008 and continued to decline through at least 2018. Even when shocks from imports resulted in serious injury to domestic industries, several developing countries temporarily provided safeguard protection but at levels that were lower than their WTO bound rates. This evidence of import liberalization also suggests that rising protectionism was not responsible for the slow growth in world trade that has been evident since 2011. It remains uncertain whether countries will now respond to disruptions to global supply chains since 2018 caused by Trump’s trade policies and the COVID-19 pandemic by reversing their tariff liberalization stance, but the sustained enthusiasm for new megaregional trade agreements suggests many countries will not.
Topic:
Emerging Markets, World Trade Organization, Trade Wars, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. The evolving gender gap in labor force participation during COVID-19

Author:
Simeon Djankov, Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, Lisa Hyland, and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Despite many significant gains by women in the paid workforce in recent decades, the percentage of women participating in the labor force has remained lower than the percentage of male participants. Now, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic downturn it precipitated, the gap in labor force participation between men and women in some economies has actually widened, with potentially damaging repercussions for women’s career prospects and pay. The pandemic has disproportionately affected sectors employing more women, such as retail stores, restaurants, and the hotel and hospitality business. An increase in family caregiving responsibilities because of school and childcare closures has also fallen on working mothers' shoulders. Both factors have pulled women out of the labor force. The authors track trends in male and female labor force participation in 43 countries and find substantial differences across countries in the way women’s participation has been affected relative to that of men. In some countries, such as Colombia, Chile, and Cyprus, the gender gap in labor force participation widened the most during the pandemic. The gender gap also widened in the United States, driving 2.5 million women from their jobs in what Vice President Kamala Harris called a “national emergency” for women. In other economies, such as Luxembourg and Lithuania, the gender gap in labor force participation, unexpectedly, shrank during the early period of the pandemic. On average, female employees have fared better in countries where women are less concentrated in the services sector, less likely to be employed as temporary workers, and where laws supported greater equality at the onset of the crisis. Greater government expenditure on childcare in the pre-COVID-19 era, however, does not appear to have insulated female workers from the damaging repercussions of the pandemic.
Topic:
Economics, Gender Issues, Labor Issues, Women, Services, COVID-19, and Empowerment
Political Geography:
Colombia, Chile, Cyprus, Global Focus, and United States of America

19. Startups in the United States during the pandemic reflect some dynamism amid job losses

Author:
Simeon Djankov and Eva (Yiwen) Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
New business applications have surged in the United States since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The growth is driven largely by startups in online retail, transportation, and personal services. Many of these new entrepreneurs are self-employed and were likely laid off and forced into entrepreneurship by necessity. No official data are available yet on the number of businesses destroyed in 2020, because business data for firms that close without entering bankruptcy are lagging. But the authors calculate that firm births may have surpassed firm deaths during the pandemic. While this boom in business entry is a tribute to the adaptability and potential innovative spirit in US capitalism, one should not be overly optimistic about jobs created in this wave of startups. As many of these new startups are by people forced to strike out on their own, the number of jobs created per new firm is even smaller than it was during previous US recessions. And like online businesses started around the last recession (e.g., Uber, Airbnb, and Venmo), some of these new firms may turn out to be major contenders in their sectors, displacing workers employed by their traditional rivals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Financial Crisis, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

20. Economic costs and benefits of accelerated COVID-19 vaccinations

Author:
Joseph E. Gagnon, Steve Kamin, and John Kearns
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
COVID-19 vaccination programs are generally understood to be a prerequisite for a return to normalcy in our social and economic lives. Emergency measures to research, test, produce, and distribute vaccines have been expensive, but increases in GDP resulting from the vaccines are expected to exceed those costs by wide margins. Few studies have quantified the economic costs and benefits of different rates of COVID-19 vaccination, however. This Policy Brief focuses on developing such a quantitative assessment for the United States; the approach may be applied to other countries as well. Two illustrative scenarios support the conclusion that most plausible options to accelerate vaccinations would have economic benefits that far exceed their costs, in addition to their more important accomplishment of saving lives. This Policy Brief shows that if, for example, the United States had adopted a more aggressive policy in 2020 of unconditional contracts with vaccine producers, the up-front cost would have been higher but thousands of lives would have been saved and economic growth would have been stronger. Instead, the federal government conditioned its contracts on the vaccines’ being proven safe and effective. The projections presented in this analysis show that even if unconditional contracts led to support for vaccines that failed the phase III trial and ultimately were not used, the cost would have been worth it.
Topic:
Economics, Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

21. Overheating debate: Why not in Japan?

Author:
Egor Gornostay and Madi Sarsenbayev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
An intense debate has erupted over whether the unprecedented size of the US fiscal stimulus will cause the US economy to overheat and generate high inflation. To date, the debate has focused primarily on the United States, even though many other developed economies responded to the COVID-19 crisis with unprecedented economic stimulus packages. By some measures, Japan stands out: The total amount of its three consecutive stimulus packages is estimated to exceed 50 percent of its GDP, about twice as high as the US fiscal packages (about 26 percent of US GDP). However, overheating concerns are not being actively raised for Japan. This Policy Brief finds that although Japan’s headline number looks astonishingly high, the actual size of its discretionary fiscal measures is about 16 percent of GDP, substantially smaller than the total size of the US packages. US fiscal stimulus is the largest among Group of Seven (G7) countries relative to GDP, justifying the attention economists have given it. The United Kingdom is estimated to spend more than Japan as a proportion of GDP, but even the UK stimulus program markedly lags behind that of the United States. If additional stimulus measures making their way through the legislative process in Canada are counted, Japan’s fiscal stimulus looks even smaller and would amount to being only average in size among G7 countries. Given this and the lackluster performance of its economy in the first quarter of 2021, it is unlikely that Japan will find itself in overheating territory any time soon.
Topic:
Inflation, G7, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America