Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Europe Content Type Policy Brief Publishing Institution Bruegel Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

1. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

2. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3. Adjusting to the energy shock: the right policies for European industry

Author:
Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future. In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU. First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly. Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue. Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage. Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Value Chains, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

5. The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero

Author:
Alexander Lehmann and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European Union governments have for some years issued green bonds that raise funds for climate-related spending. These bonds have been received well in capital markets but because they promise a certain use of proceeds, they complicate budget management and may not match investors’ claims of having an impact on national climate policies. Public commitments made by major investors and asset owners suggest that limiting climate transition risks and the assessment of the alignment of sovereigns with net-zero targets will now become key determinants of portfolio allocation. Yield differentials in bond markets are already beginning to reflect transition risks that arise from the inadequate pursuit by issuers of climate targets. Unlike standard green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) create a link between performance (outcome) indicators and the financial terms of the bonds. SLBs have grown rapidly in importance in private markets and are now being assessed by sovereign issuers. We show that sovereign SLBs could help incentivise climate policies in EU countries, and accelerate emission reductions. They would be an effective tool for signalling commitment. A common EU framework for issuance by EU countries would enhance capital market integration and the transparency of national policies, and would limit climate transition risks in EU capital markets more broadly.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Finance, Carbon Emissions, and Sovereign Bonds
Political Geography:
Europe

6. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has so far weathered the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023. We assess the demand reduction needed if the 90 percent storage target is to be achieved. Our assessment takes into account EU imports, exports to refill gas storage facilities in Ukraine and Moldova, the weather and the situation in power markets, where gas demand is highly dependent on non-gas energy sources. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13 percent lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023. Two variables will determine how easily the target can be met: 1) liquified natural gas (LNG) supply, and 2) the nature of demand reductions. Plans for rapid deployment of regasification units will alleviate concerns over LNG import infrastructure capacity. However, the EU will continue to compete internationally for LNG cargoes, and will remain vulnerable to global dynamics. Strong economic growth in China, for example, could further tighten markets. The way demand is reduced will determine the economic consequences. So far, large reductions in industrial gas demand have not been accompanied by dramatic drops in industrial output, suggesting good substitution options. However, hardly any gas was saved in the power sector last year, because of weak nuclear and hydro output. The return of French nuclear output will therefore be a huge positive. Finally, households have reduced gas demand, partly driven by warmer than usual weather. Record numbers of heat pumps were deployed in 2022, suggesting the start of a structural shift away from gas demand for heating. Policy should support a continued structural shift away from gas. This involves enabling rapid deployment of renewables and the accompanying grid infrastructure, energy-efficiency measures, help for households that want to switch to cleaner heating, and collaboration with industry to accelerate adoption of new low-carbon production methods.
Topic:
Security, Gas, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Decarbonisation of the energy system

Author:
Georg Zachmann, Alexander Roth, Ben McWilliams, Franziska Holz, Robin Sogalla, Frank Meissner, and Claudia Kemfert
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Three quarters of the European Union’s greenhouse gas emissions stem from burning coal, oil and natural gas to produce energy services, including heating for buildings, transportation and operation of machinery. The transition to climate neutrality means these services must be provided without associated emissions. It is not possible today to determine tomorrow’s optimal clean energy system, largely because the cost, limitations and capability developments of competing technologies cannot be predicted. Energy systems with widely diverging shares of ‘green fuels’, in the form of electricity, hydrogen and synthetic hydrocarbons, remain conceivable. We find the overall cost of these systems to be of the same order of magnitude, but they involve larger investments at different stages of value chains. A large share of synthetic hydrocarbons would require more investment outside the EU, but less in domestic infrastructure and demand-side appliances, while electrification requires large investment in domestic infrastructure and appliances. Current projections show an overall cost advantage for direct electrification, but projections will evolve and critical players may push hard for alternative fuels. Policy will thus play a major role in shaping this balance. Political decisions should, first, push out carbon-emitting technology, primarily through carbon pricing. The more credible and predictable this strategy is over the coming decades, the smoother will be both divestment from brown technologies and investment in green technologies. Second, policy needs to help ensure that enough climate-neutral alternatives are available in time. Clear public support should be given to three system decisions about which we are sufficiently confident: the massive roll-out of renewable electricity generation; the electrification of significant shares of final energy consumption; and rapid phase-out of coal from electricity generation. For energy services where no dominant system has yet emerged, policy should forcefully explore different solutions by supporting technological and regulatory experimentation. Given the size and urgency of the transition, the current knowledge infrastructure in Europe is insufficient. Data on the current and projected state of the energy system remains inconsistent, either published in different places or not at all. This impedes the societal discussion. The transition to climate neutrality in Europe and elsewhere will be unnecessarily expensive without a knowledge infrastructure that allows society to learn which technologies, systems, and polices work best under which circumstances.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Does Europe need a Health Union?

Author:
Anne Bucher
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Health outcomes in the European Union are good by international standards, even compared to other developed economies, and improved continuously before COVID-19. This reflects the alignment of the objectives of improving health and wellbeing with the overall socio-economic objective of prosperity, and suggests that a radical overhaul of EU health policy is not needed. However, the EU could benefit from closer integration in some areas and be more effective in delivering a high level of health protection. Action could be taken in the following areas: The European Commission’s November 2020 Health Union package to increase resilience to cross-border health threats is ambitious, in particular with the establishment of the Health Emergency Response Authority, which extends the scope of cooperation in health emergencies. The EU should pursue further the Health Union approach to address cross-border externalities and enhance health security. It could, for instance, do more to tackle anti-microbial resistance, or define minimum requirements for the resilience of health systems. For non-communicable diseases, the EU should tap the economies of scale of research and knowledge organised at EU level, and put in place systems for the surveillance of non-communicable diseases and consolidation of scientific knowledge. This could be achieved through an extension to non-communicable diseases of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control mandate. The ‘Health in all Policies’ principle is a key channel to deliver good health outcomes at EU level. EU scientific agencies provide health risk assessments in a number of areas, but the EU should better organise, coordinate and consolidate the scientific knowledge that underpins health-protection measures in sectoral legislation, and should more systematically apply better regulation rules to the health impacts of EU policies. The EU should support the digital transformation of health systems and set high targets for the European Health Data Space initiative, which is a critical infrastructure for the future of health research, regulation and policymaking. Several non-health EU policy objectives (cohesion policies, European Pillar of Social rights, economic governance) are linked to the performance of health systems. A common understanding on how to measure this performance would inform these policies in a consistent way. Moreover favourable health outcomes in the EU have not reduced health inequalities, which remain high between and within EU countries. Monitoring of health inequalities, including those related to access to and quality of healthcare, should be improved as an initial step.
Topic:
Health, European Union, Regional Integration, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Better pensions for the European Union’s self-employed

Author:
Rebecca Christie, Monika Grzegorczyk, and Diane Mulcahy
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Self-employed workers are taking on a larger role in the European economy, particularly workers who operate as independent contractors rather than as small-business owners with their own workforce. Becoming self-employed offers flexibility and entrepreneurial potential, but can limit access to state-sponsored pension schemes. We assess the current state of pension policy across the European Union and take a more detailed look at five countries to see how independent workers are treated compared with their traditionally employed counterparts. We consider how policymakers might adjust or even overhaul their pension offerings to improve opportunities for the self-employed, while being mindful of the broader policy context in areas like innovation and overall tax burdens. In assessing policy options, it is useful to determine whether government, companies or individuals will be primarily responsible for paying for better pensions, and we structure our suggestions accordingly. Governments can make programmes more widely available, more consistent for all types of work and easier to understand and take part in. Companies can be encouraged to make pension contributions for all their workers, not just those they hire full-time. Individuals can be encouraged to set aside more for retirement with tax incentives, benefits flexibility and other policy measures. Access to pensions for low-income, more vulnerable self-employed workers should be considered separately from access for higher-paid workers. The current system does not facilitate this and indeed inhibits it in jurisdictions where a minimum income is required to join self-employment pension schemes.
Topic:
Labor Issues, European Union, Economy, and Self-Employment
Political Geography:
Europe

11. Beating burnout: identifying bad jobs and improving job quality

Author:
Mia Hoffmann and Laura Nurski
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
While European-wide information on burnout is scarce, national statistics show that stress-related absenteeism is on the rise, generating significant costs for firms and welfare states, while reducing worker wellbeing. Although manifested at the individual level, burnout is an occupational phenomenon, predicted most clearly by imbalances in job content (high workloads and low autonomy) and the social environment at work – two under-explored aspects of job quality. While the economy and society as a whole would benefit from a healthier workforce, market failures drive job quality below an optimal level, necessitating attention from policymakers. Measuring and intervening in job content is not straightforward, however, and has not been a main policy domain in Europe. Policy frameworks and interventions therefore tend to focus on other areas of job quality, such as the physical and contractual working conditions. To manage the burnout epidemic and mitigate the impact of the changing nature of work, job-quality policy needs to focus on the job-content aspects as well. Wellbeing outcomes of low job quality, such as burnout, need to be monitored at European level and can serve to evaluate the effectiveness of policy interventions in job quality.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Employment, Economic Growth, Inclusion, Workforce, and Well-Being
Political Geography:
Europe

12. How to make the EU Energy Platform an effective emergency tool

Author:
Walter Boltz, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Uncertainty about the supply of Russian natural gas is causing extremely high and volatile European gas and electricity prices. European Union countries may struggle to import sufficient volumes of natural gas at reasonable prices. During the summer, the imperatives are to fill storage sites sufficiently in a coordinated manner and to organise sufficient import volumes to replace a substantial share of gas that might no longer come from Russia. Coordination is essential to ensure that disruptions during difficult winter months do not lead to a break-up of the EU internal gas market with potentially serious political repercussions. One part of the EU response is establishment of an EU Energy Platform for the purchase of gas, LNG and hydrogen. This aims to pool demand to leverage the bloc’s economic clout, international outreach to reliable partners and efficient use of existing infrastructure. EU leaders have backed the plan but it has not yet been translated into a feasible scheme. The platform should be developed into an effective emergency tool to safeguard gas supply in case Russian flows stop. We detail two complementary proposals to achieve this. First, there should be EU-wide auctioning of remuneration for filling storage sites in specific regions. Companies would remain responsible for all stages of the value chain, benefitting from remuneration and in return offering the market operator some control over how this gas is released during winter months. Second, EU demand for additional LNG quantities, and the sourcing of this on international markets, should be coordinated through a platform, creating a transparent market for these volumes. These mechanisms would resolve the prevention paradox and prevent free-riding. If EU countries buy gas jointly, they will find it much easier to let markets allocate scarce volumes across borders in case of a complete stop to Russian supplies. . This would reduce the risk of energy market fragmentation, as well as the subsequent energy security, economic and political impacts of a shock that would hit member states very differently.
Topic:
Oil, European Union, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. An analysis of central bank decision-making

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Catarina Martina, and Nicola Viegi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The process by which central banks take decisions has evolved over the years, with a tendency towards independence and decisions taken by committees rather than individuals. Monetary policy committees can be set up formally in different ways, traditionally falling into one of two categories: individualistic or collegial. Individualistic committees reach decisions by voting and publish the votes of each of their members, while in collegial committees, decisions are typically reached collectively. The European Central Bank is an example of the latter, while the Bank of England follows an individualistic approach. Focusing on decision-making, a relevant question is whether the formal set-up in practice leads to different ways of deliberating and reaching monetary policy decisions. We look at decisions taken by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank over more than 20 years to evaluate how different the decision-making process is in these three central banks. The results indicate that, irrespective of the committee type, their approach to consensus building when they take decisions is similar. The three central banks seem to value reaching decisions by unanimity, both on interest rates – the prime monetary policy instrument by definition – and on asset purchases. Decisions to tighten monetary policy are more often taken unanimously than decisions to ease monetary policy. When maintaining policy unchanged, decisions are usually backed by most committee members.
Topic:
Federal Reserve, Finance, Central Bank, European Central Bank, Decision-Making, and Bank of England
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

14. Legal options for a green golden rule in the European Union’s fiscal framework

Author:
Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Achieving the European Union’s climate goals and decoupling from Russian energy will require a massive increase in green public spending, which will be difficult when EU fiscal rules requiring fiscal consolidation are reinstated. The two major proposals to address the conflicting goals of fiscal consolidation and increased green public investment needs are a possible new European climate investment fund and a green golden rule. The latter would exclude any increase in net green public investment from the fiscal indicators used to measure compliance with fiscal rules, for countries with sound public finances. An EU climate fund and a well-designed green golden rule would be equivalent in terms of project selection, implementation and control procedures. If the climate fund does not involve redistribution across member states, then the treatment of related spending and consequent borrowing in national fiscal indicators and in the EU’s fiscal framework would be the same. New regulations would be needed to set up both the climate fund and the green golden rule. Special legislation would be needed to exempt the subsequent climate expenditures from EU fiscal rules in both cases. A climate fund financed by EU borrowing with redistributive effects across countries would likely result in the exclusion of the fund’s activities from national fiscal indicators and EU fiscal rules without any legislative changes. There are question marks about the desirability and political feasibility of redistribution across the EU for climate purposes. An EU climate fund, irrespective of whether or not it involves redistribution, would mainly benefit southern and eastern EU countries. An instrument is needed to foster green public investment in western and northern EU countries as well. The green golden rule would be such an instrument. While there are some pragmatic options to mimic a green golden rule in the current EU fiscal framework, such as amending the so-called ‘investment clause’ and adjusting the medium-term objective for the structural balance, ultimately, elements of the 2011 Six-Pack legislation and the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance should be revised to include a green golden rules.
Topic:
Climate Change, Law, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

15. Don’t look only to Brussels to increase the supply of safe assets in the European Union

Author:
Francesco Papadia and Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A sufficient supply of safe assets denominated in euros is critical if the European Union is to achieve full banking and capital markets union while fostering the euro’s international role. The European debate on developing the supply of safe assets has so far focused on the possible creation of a common safe asset. This has tended to underplay the potential contribution of sovereign assets. Expanding the supply of national safe assets, notably through the gradual implementation of fiscal and growth-oriented structural policies in euro-area countries, leading to upgrading of their sovereign ratings, provides a promising, and perhaps more feasible, option. An upgrade to triple A of those euro-area countries that are currently rated double A could produce substantially more safe assets than most common safe asset proposals, including those based on the development of ‘synthetic’ safe assets. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of supranational assets in the stock of euro-based safe assets since 2008, reflecting downgrades in sovereign ratings and the EU’s financial responses to the euro-area crisis and the pandemic. However, safe assets in euro remain dominated by those issued by euro-area governments. Although common safe assets have certain advantages over national safe assets, reflecting their built-in risk diversification properties, there is currently not much political appetite for such proposals. Meanwhile, sovereign safe assets already offer many of the advantages of common safe assets. Sound fiscal policies and growth-stimulating reforms, which are in any case desirable, should be implemented to improve the credit ratings of euro-area sovereigns. This might not be politically feasible in the short-term, given the difficult economic environment currently faced by the EU, but it should be a key component of the EU’s medium-term safe asset strategy. Should the political consensus be found to create a common safe asset, such an asset could be incorporated into the euro area’s existing safe asset system, reinforcing its positive effects.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

16. Which mergers should the European Commission review under the Digital Markets Act?

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large digital platforms acquired 1149 firms in various economic sectors between 1987 and July 2022. The European Commission reviewed only 21 of these mergers as most did not meet the European Union merger control turnover threshold. This suggests under-enforcement, with some problematic mergers escaping merger review and thus posing competition risks. The EU Digital Markets Act, which entered into force in November 2022, imposes obligations on firms that are considered ‘gatekeepers’ in relation to some core platform services, such as online search engines. In particular, these firms must now inform the Commission of all their intended acquisitions. This, in combination with Commission guidance on referrals by EU national competition authorities of mergers for review, should ensure more merger reviews in the digital sector. Current European Commission guidance on referring cases for merger review is flexible but impractical as it relies on theories of harm rather than clear and objective criteria. Without clarification, there could be over-enforcement in which unproblematic mergers are reviewed, human resources are allocated inefficiently and legal uncertainty persists. The Commission should issue new guidance on which digital mergers are likely to be problematic, thus triggering referral for merger review. This is likely to be the case when the target’s user base overlaps with that of the acquirer, when the target is a leader in a future critical market and when the target is active in a core platform service.
Topic:
Economy, Innovation, European Commission, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

17. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:
Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:
European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. How to implement the self-preferencing ban in the European Union’s Digital Markets Act

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large online platforms are intermediaries between end-users and business users. They sometimes propose their own products and services alongside those of rivals. This can lead to platforms promoting their offers over those of competitors in so-called self-preferencing. The European Union Digital Markets Act (DMA) bans large online platforms under its scope from treating their own products and services more favourably that those of rivals when ranking, crawling and indexing. Platforms – or gatekeepers in the DMA definition – should apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory conditions when ranking products and services. However, the identification, detection, compliance with and monitoring of self-preferencing is complex and resource-intensive. It requires a case-by-case approach and access to and analysis of platform data and algorithms. The DMA allows gatekeepers to promote their own products and services if rivals are subject to the same treatment. Nonetheless, the DMA neither defines equal treatment nor the main elements of self-preferencing, thus preventing platforms within the DMA’s scope from correctly applying the prohibition. To ease enforcement, the European Commission should issue guidance on what constitutes self-preferencing under the DMA, outlining two main principles. First, gatekeepers should use objective and unbiased parameters to determine ranking, indexing and crawling. Second, gatekeepers should demonstrate equal treatment. The guidance will make compliance easier. The Commission should then monitor compliance by appointing and ensuring sufficient rotation of external auditors to avoid capture by gatekeepers. The Commission should also work with competent national authorities that develop technological tools. When monitoring flags a risk of non-compliance, the Commission should then further specify the ban on self-preferencing on a case-by-case basis.
Topic:
European Union, Digital Economy, Economy, Innovation, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

19. Promotion of high capacity broadband to rebuild and recover from the pandemic

Author:
J. Scott Marcus, Alicia Garcia-Herrero, and Lionel Guetta-Jeanrenaud
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Promoting high-quality fixed and mobile broadband for all, at an affordable price, is an important enabler of the digital transformation of society and will help close the digital divide. This became clearer than ever during the pandemic, when broadband access was a crucial enabler of remote work, distance learning, telemedicine and e-commerce. It has always been challenging to provide broadband access to all at an affordable price. The pandemic, global geopolitical tension and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have exacerbated supply-chain disruptions in ways that make this even more difficult and potentially expensive. Promotion of broadband deployment, adoption and use are all important for both fixed and mobile broadband; however, different policy levers are needed in each case, on both the supply and demand sides. The market will not always deliver complete solutions. Consequently, there is a role for regulation, targeted industrial policy and public finance. Promotion of competition, combined with prompt and efficient provision of access to resources such as electromagnetic spectrum and access to land and rights of way, can be particularly important. G20 countries and others now seek a future-proof, sustainable and equitable recovery, meaning new sources of public revenues need to be considered. Broadband can be boosted by judicious use of recovery funds and expected new tax revenues arising from global tax reforms agreed within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Digital Economy, Innovation, COVID-19, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

20. Completing Europe’s banking union: economic requirements and legal conditions

Author:
Thorsten Beck, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Philippe Martin, Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Tobias Tröger, Beatrice di Mauro, Nicolas Veron, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s banking union project started in mid-2012 in response to the euro-area crisis, with the goal of breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle. The objective was also to restore private liability in banking and to move towards an integrated supranational market for banking services. For all the progress achieved in the past decade, particularly in banking supervision, these aims have not yet been accomplished. This Policy Contribution analyses the deficiencies of the current framework and identifies possible responses, in line with three levels of reform ambition. We label these ‘incremental’ (broadening the scope for private-sector burden-sharing in future cases of bank failures), ‘real’ (effectively breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle), and ‘cosmic’ (a single, seamlessly integrated banking market). European policymakers should set their sights on the second level, which we view as achievable within the current decade, requiring new EU legislation but no change to the European treaties.
Topic:
Regulation, Economy, Crisis Management, European Central Bank, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Lessons for Europe from China’s quest for semiconductor self-reliance

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Semiconductors are a critical input to production of information and communication technology and many other goods. The major economies want to be able to produce chips at home to avoid excessive dependence on supply chains in an increasingly unpredictable world, where trade is being compromised because of national security concerns. China was first in terms of timing and scale of funding to support its its semiconductor industry. Since 2015, China has spent $150 billion upgrading its semiconductor industry. Success, however, has been limited. China’s massive industrial policy effort has been most successful in increasing capacity for assembly of chips, though that is also the least value-added part of the semiconductor supply chain. Progress on chip design and fabrication in China remain underwhelming. The United States has also started implementing its $50 billion package to support the production of chips. The European Union, meanwhile, has not yet fully finalised its main semiconductor initiative, the European Chips Act. China’s experience offers a number of lessons. First, chip fabrication requires massive fixed asset investment and, therefore, large subsidies, but with no guarantee of success. Second, one reason for the underwhelming results of China’s semiconductor policy is US containment, through export controls and other measures. In this respect, the EU should find it easier than China to upgrade its chips industry but, given the costs, focusing on the highest-end part of the supply chain would be the best approach. Assembly and production of lower-end semiconductors already face overcapacity, given the financial resources already invested by China.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Economy, Trade Policy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China and Europe

22. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets

Author:
Conall Heussaff, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale prices for electricity and gas in the European Union have risen five to fifteen-fold, with severe impacts for households and businesses. The crisis is also creating liquidity problems for energy companies, with contagion risks for the financial sector. In response, European governments have taken a range of actions. Some have introduced measures at retail level, while others have introduced windfall-profit taxes on energy companies. Some countries have provided emergency liquidity to energy companies facing soaring collateral costs. Some energy companies have even been nationalised. Emergency-intervention proposals should be evaluated against three principles. First, energy supply must meet demand at prices that do not cause major damage to the European economy. Second, the most vulnerable consumers must be protected. Third, measures should be consistent with the case for investment in a sustainable energy system, in order to safeguard Europe’s ability to decouple structurally from fossil-fuel imports. Gas price caps have been proposed as an emergency measure in different forms: a cap on Russian gas only, a cap on gas used in electricity generation, a cap on all wholesale gas. All entail significant risks. The first might lead to a full stop of Russian gas into the EU. The second might increase gas demand from the electricity sector. The third might raise gas demand and also undermine Europe’s ability to attract much-needed gas supplies. Instead of capping gas prices, the EU should engage collectively with external gas suppliers and negotiate new long-term contracts with provisions to limit price volatility. A September 2022 European Commission proposal involving electricity demand reduction, a revenue cap on inframarginal generation, solidarity payments from fossil-fuel companies and consumer support measures, is broadly positive, notably because it emphasises demand reduction. However, it is not sufficient. A more comprehensive plan needs to ensure that all countries bring forward every available supply-side flexibility, make real efforts to reduce gas and electricity demand, keep their energy markets open and pool demand to get a better deal from external gas suppliers. In the longer term, measures to split the markets for energy generated from renewables and fossil fuels should be examined.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Energy Sector, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

24. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:
Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:
Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Enlarging and deepening: giving substance to the European Political Community

Author:
Franz Mayer, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Daniela Schwarzer, and Shahin Vallée
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
France’s President Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz have stressed the geopolitical emergency of re-designing the European Union’s relationship with its neighbourhood. Both acknowledge that EU enlargement is necessary, but also emphasise that profound EU institutional reform is required beforehand, though deepening and widening the EU are complex processes that veto players could block. The geopolitical challenges mean it is in the critical interest of the EU to bring stability to its neighbourhood by ensuring geopolitical alignment with the EU, limiting the blackmailing power of external, authoritarian states, supporting more resilient democracies and strengthening the rule of law. Meanwhile, the EU’s neighbours are seeking a political space in which challenges to collective security and stability can be addressed and concrete policies decided. Given the urgency, it is not enough to rely on lengthy EU accession processes. A ‘European Political Community’ (EPC), which will have its first summit on 6 October 2022, could act both as a bridge to an eventual larger EU and as a framework for continental-scale partnership. Leaders should use the summit to start the building of a platform that can combine political dialogue with policy delivery in a quick and flexible way, and will thus structure more impactfully the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood. The EPC could start as a soft law agreement between states and the EU. It would work with existing institutions as far as possible, while aiming at more effective decision-making than currently in the EU. For instance it could function without vetoes and could work in geopolitically relevant areas that are not yet EU competences. An ambitious EPC would provide financial resources for deeper cooperation on energy and climate, security and defence, and economic and social convergence. The EPC would not be, and should not be, regarded as a substitute for EU accession, but should be designed in such a way that it can work as an accelerator. For countries not seeking to join the EU, it would provide an ongoing framework that sustains structured cooperation with the EU.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Governance, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

26. A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe’s energy system faces unprecedented physical and institutional stress. The policy response so far has been excessively nationally focussed and could undermine the goals of calming energy markets over the next 18 months and achieving ambitious decarbonisation targets. At the basis of the crisis is a post-COVID-19 global energy imbalance. While demand bounced back quickly as economies re-opened, supply did not. A particular challenge is that the reducing supply of fossil fuels in line with climate targets has not been matched by a commensurate reduction of fossil-fuel demand. Russian manipulation of European natural gas markets since summer 2021, exploiting its significant market power, has deepened the crisis. Finally, events including weak French nuclear output and the ongoing drought, which has cut hydropower generation, have further escalated the situation. In response to high and volatile prices and forced demand reduction, European governments have tended to opt for narrow and uncoordinated measures that prioritise national security of supply and affordability over an integrated European approach. Subsidising energy consumption instead of demand reduction has been a common and misguided approach. Governments run the risk that energy consumption subsidies become unsustainable, eroding trust in energy markets, slowing action in sanctioning Russia and increasing the cost of the net-zero transition. An integrated European approach and a coordinated plan is essential to address the crisis. European Union leaders must strike a grand energy bargain based on four broad principles: (i) all countries bringing forward every available supply-side flexibility, (ii) all countries making comprehensive efforts to reduce demand, (iii) a political committing to maintain energy markets and cross-border flows, (iv) compensation for the most vulnerable consumers. This grand bargain can be the first step on a new course towards united energy policy at EU level.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

27. The risks from climate change to sovereign debt in Europe

Author:
Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The exposure of European Union sovereigns to climate risks can be acute, from extreme weather, or chronic, from the productivity effects of gradual temperature increase, increased sea levels and the transition to a low-carbon economy that results in repricing of assets. Climate-related innovations can also spur growth. These risks are priced by investors and can affect sovereign credit ratings. Governments and fiscal stability authorities have an interest in the sovereign-debt implications of climate change being transparent. To this end, we look at the exposure of EU sovereigns to climate risks, study international best practices, and describe the transmission channels from climate change to public finance. European union institutions and national fiscal authorities should mainstream climate risk analysis in public finance. Stress testing of debt dynamic requires a link between regional climate scenarios and country debt dynamics. We argue for the adoption of an architecture of narrative climate scenarios, to guide national policymaking. Narrative Scenarios can be generated using integrated assessment models. As an illustration, we apply two prominent models to generate rough bounds on the extent of the risk for Italian debt from climate change. This raises issues about the models used. Coordination by EU institutions to develop regional scenarios will ensure acceptability, raise ambitions in dealing with climate risks and encourage the fiscal authorities to think of solutions. A network for climate-proofing public finance will bring together EU and member-state institutions. We also recommend budgeting for climate expenditures and contingent liabilities, and using risk-sharing instruments, with disclosure of the risks to public finance from climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Government, European Union, Fiscal Policy, and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Europe

28. A new direction for the European Union’s half-hearted semiconductor strategy

Author:
Niclas Poitiers and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A basic component in electronic devices, semiconductors are essential to the production of many products, from smartphones to cars. Securing reliable supplies of semiconductors to safeguard the production lines of a range of industries has thus become an important policy goal, especially in the context of an increasingly confrontational international environment in which high-technology leadership is also associated with military power and geopolitical reach. The semiconductor sector is highly concentrated, capital- and R&D-intensive, and particularly exposed to bottlenecks and political risks. High-end chip fabrication is centred in Asia, dominated by the duopoly of Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung. In other parts of the supply chain, companies in the United States and Europe hold relative monopolies that have been leveraged for trade sanctions. The United States has taken steps to block the supply of chips and components to emerging tech giants in China, and to contain China’s ambitions of building its own cutting-edge chip production capacities. Heavy United states and Chinese investment poses a challenge to the European Union, which in response has set the goal of increasing European production beyond domestic demand. To increase its presence in this strategic and thriving sector, the EU needs a more targeted strategy that builds on its existing strengths while accommodating its relatively low domestic needs. Instead of investing public funds in a subsidy war over fabrication capacity, the EU should focus on inputs and chip design. However, no economy can hope to fully achieve independence in the sector and ensuring sustainable supply through diplomatic means should therefore also be a priority. Lastly, Europe’s small role in global semiconductor production is symptomatic of shortcomings in the European environment for high-tech innovation. These shortcomings should be addressed.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

29. A green fiscal pact: climate investment in times of budget consolidation

Author:
Zsolt Darvas and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The additional public investment need required to meet the European Union’s climate goals is between 0.5 percent and 1 percent of GDP annually during this decade. Increasing green public investment while consolidating deficits will be a major challenge. While our simulations show that budget consolidation can be done at a moderate pace in line with EU rules if those rules are interpreted flexibly, past consolidation episodes resulted in major public investment cuts. This time, there is a need for a major increase in investment. A ‘green golden rule’ (excluding net green investment from the fiscal indicators used to measure fiscal rule compliance) is the most promising option to address this tension. Relaxing the strictness of the EU fiscal framework beyond its existing flexibility and the proposed green golden rule does not appear necessary in the next few years. The uncertain growth impact of green public spending and the risks to growth from climate change create difficult trade offs in fiscally weaker countries. In any case, better regulatory policy and a higher price on emissions should incentivise private green investment and reduce public costs. These ingredients should be combined to form a ‘green fiscal pact’.
Topic:
Climate Change, Budget, European Union, and Public Investment
Political Geography:
Europe

30. Biometric technologies at work: a proposed use-based taxonomy

Author:
Mario Mariniello and Mia Hoffmann
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Biometric technologies have in principle the potential to significantly improve worker productivity, security and safety. However, they are also a source of new risks, including exposure to potential personal data abuse or the psychological distress caused by permanent monitoring. The European Union lacks a coherent regulatory framework on the mitigation of risks arising from the use of biometric technologies in the workplace. We propose a taxonomy to underpin the use of artificial intelligence-powered biometric technologies in the workplace. Technologies can be classified into four broad categories based on their main function: (1) security, (2) recruitment, (3) monitoring, (4) safety and well-being. We identify the benefits and risks linked to each category. To be more effective, EU regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) in the workplace should integrate more detail on technology use. It should also address the current scarcity of granular data by sourcing information from users of AI technologies, not only providers. There is an untapped potential for technology to address workplace health hazards. Policymakers should design incentive mechanisms to encourage adoption of the technologies with the greatest potential to benefit workers. Artificial intelligence users, in particular bigger companies, should be required to assess the effect of AI adoption on work processes, with the active participation of their workforces.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Biometrics
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

31. What is holding back artificial intelligence adoption in Europe?

Author:
Mia Hoffmann and Laura Nurski
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI) is considered a key driver of future economic development, expected to increase labour productivity and economic growth worldwide. To realise these gains, AI technologies need to be adopted by companies and integrated into their operations. However, it is unclear what the current level of AI adoption by European firms actually is. Estimates vary widely because of uneven data collection and lack of a standard definition and taxonomy of AI. What is clear is that AI adoption in Europe is low and likely running behind other parts of the world. Discussions on the barriers to AI advancement often mix up different stages of innovation – research, development and adoption. Each stage is constrained by the availability of skills, data and financing in the European market, but there are nuances in how these barriers arise in each of the three stages. This policy contribution focuses on the final stage, AI adoption. We discuss theoretical and empirical evidence of the drivers of AI adoption. We outline the relevant barriers to adoption for European firms in terms of human capital, data availability and funding, and make international comparisons where possible. To accelerate the roll-out of AI technology across the European Union, policymakers should alleviate constraints to adoption faced by firms, both in the environmental context – labour market, financial market and regulation – and in the technological context – data availability, basic digitisation of businesses and technological uncertainty.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Development, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe

32. Commercialisation contracts: European support for low-carbon technology deployment

Author:
Ben McWilliams and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Many of the technologies that can help the European Union become a net-zero emissions economy by 2050 have been shown to work but are not yet commercially competitive with incumbent fossil-fuel technologies. There is not enough private investment to drive the deployment of new low-carbon alternatives. This is primarily because carbon prices are neither high enough nor stable. There are a number of benefits from the deployment of low-carbon technologies that private firms do not factor in. These include the benefits of decreasing industry-wide costs over time, and the global climate benefits from the development of low-carbon technologies within the EU that can subsequently be exported. The result is an investment level below the socially optimal value in the EU. Commercialisation contracts could be implemented as a temporary measure to remove the risk associated with uncertain carbon prices for ambitious low-carbon projects. The aim of the contracts would be to increase private investment to the socially optimal level. Contracts would be allocated through auctions in which fixed prices for abated emissions over a fixed duration would be agreed on a project-by-project basis. On an annual basis, public subsidies amounting to the difference between the agreed carbon price and the actual EU carbon price would be provided to investors, depending on the total carbon emissions abated. As long as EU carbon prices are low, investors would receive larger subsidies to ensure their competitiveness. Contracts would be auctioned at EU level. This would generate increased competition compared to national auctions, leading to more efficient outcomes and preventing fragmentation of the single market. From about €3 billion to €6 billion would be provided to the main industrial emitting sectors annually, with the amount reducing as the EU carbon price rises and low-carbon technologies become competitive without subsidy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Investment, Trade, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Europe

33. Europe should not neglect its capital markets union

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Lionel Guetta-Jeanrenaud
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s capital markets remain very underdeveloped compared to the United States. The market for equity, as measured as the size of the total market capitalisation of listed domestic firms relative to GDP, is much larger in the US and in Japan than in Europe.
Topic:
European Union, GDP, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, and United States of America

34. Blending the physical and virtual: a hybrid model for the future of work

Author:
Monika Grzegorczyk, Mario Mariniello, Laura Nurski, and Tom Schraepen
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic has shown that many workers can efficiently work remotely, with benefits for wellbeing and even productivity. The European Union should develop a framework to facilitate hybrid work.
Topic:
European Union, Work Culture, Innovation, Strategic Competition, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

35. The great COVID-19 divergence: managing a sustainable and equitable recovery in the European Union

Author:
Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Maria Demertzis, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the biggest global recession since the Second World War. Forecasts show the European Union underperforming economically relative to the United States and China during 2019-2023. Southern European countries have been particularly strongly affected. While the ICT sector has benefitted from the COVID-19 crisis, tourism, travel and services have suffered. Business insolvencies have, paradoxically, fallen. While total employment has almost recovered, the young and those with low-level qualifications have suffered employment losses. Inequality could rise. The pandemic may lead to medium to long-term changes in the economy, with more teleworking, possibly higher productivity growth and changed consumer behaviour. Policymakers must act to prevent lasting divergence within the EU and to prevent scarring from the fallout from the pandemic. The first priority is tackling the global health emergency. Second, we warn against premature fiscal tightening and recommend instead additional short-term support from national budgets. Over the medium term, fiscal policymakers will need to gradually move away from supporting companies through subsidies, towards tax incentives for corporate investment. A review of the European fiscal framework is needed to achieve the EU’s green goals more rapidly. The quality of public finances, how policymakers spend resources and the associated reforms are of central importance to prevent scarring. Improving the efficiency of insolvency procedures will be crucial for speedy and effective recovery. Targeted labour market policies for the young and less-qualified are needed. As teleworking becomes a more permanent feature of the EU’s labour markets, it will be crucial to adapt social security and taxation systems in the context of the single market for labour. The EU should resist protectionist calls in the wake of the pandemic. Rigorous competition policy enforcement and an integrated EU market have been beneficial for European convergence and growth. Capital markets have an important role to play in a speedy recovery.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Inequality, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

36. How difficult is China’s business environment for European and American companies?

Author:
Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Despite tensions over China’s discriminatory business practices, China’s trade continues to thrive, and the country has taken over from the United States as the first destination for foreign investment. American and European businesses continue to be engaged in China’s large and growing market, even amid a trade war between China and the United States. Drawing on surveys of companies and international comparisons, we show that – contrary to the prevailing narrative – China’s business practices have improved significantly in recent years. China’s business environment is today generally more favourable than that in other large countries at similar levels of development and, in some though certainly not all aspects, is in line with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average. Differences over geopolitics and human rights must be addressed, but it is clear that trade and investment agreements conditioned on accelerated reforms in China would yield substantial dividends. The benefits of such deals would accrue not only to foreign investors in China and exporters to China, but also to consumers and importers in the European Union and, especially, in the US, where punitive tariffs on China remain in effect. Critical aspects in the negotiations would include better access for American and European investors to China’s market for services and improved enforcement of rules and regulations in China. As in many middle-income countries, uneven enforcement of the law (rather than the law itself) remains a critical problem in China.
Topic:
Development, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Business, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. Accounting for climate policies in Europe’s sovereign debt market

Author:
Marta Dominguez-Jimenez and Alexander Lehmann
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
International debt investors increasingly demand assets that are aligned with environmental, social and governance objectives. Sovereign debt is being belatedly swept up in this change. This huge asset class represents a uniquely long-term claim and funds a wide range of public expenditure, both brown and green. Public capital expenditures will be a central part of the roughly €3 trillion investment budget needed to pay for the European Green Deal. European Union countries have so far met investor appetite for climate-aligned assets through sovereign green bonds, the issuance of which has rapidly grown since 2017. The EU itself will also issue green bonds in large volumes. However, because of some inherent flaws in such instruments and as their still-weak frameworks, these bonds are unlikely to meet the environmental criteria demanded by investors, and will complicate established principles in sovereign debt management. Much more comprehensive information is needed on the climate related aspects of the public budgets of EU countries. Greater transparency in this respect would support stability and improve the functioning of capital markets, given that sovereign debt plays a pivotal role in all investor portfolios and also in regulatory and monetary policy. Adoption by sovereign issuers of green budgeting principles, based on a common taxonomy of sustainable activities, would enhance transparency. It could also be driven by investors who, under new EU rules, must disclose the climate-related aspects of all financial instruments offered in the capital market.
Topic:
Climate Change, Debt, Markets, Sovereignty, European Union, Finance, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

38. Navigating through hydrogen

Author:
Ben McWilliams and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Hydrogen is seen as a means to decarbonise sectors with greenhouse gas emissions that are hard to reduce, as a medium for energy storage, and as a fallback in case halted fossil-fuel imports lead to energy shortages. Hydrogen is likely to play at least some role in the European Union’s achievement by 2050 of a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target. However, production of hydrogen in the EU is currently emissions intensive. Hydrogen supply could be decarbonised if produced via electrolysis based on electricity from renewable sources, or produced from natural gas with carbon, capture, and storage. The theoretical production potential of low-carbon hydrogen is virtually unlimited and production volumes will thus depend only on demand and supply cost. Estimates of final hydrogen demand in 2050 range from levels similar to today’s in a low-demand scenario, to ten times today’s level in a high-demand scenario. Hydrogen is used as either a chemical feedstock or an energy source. A base level of 2050 demand can be derived from looking at sectors that already consume hydrogen and others that are likely to adopt hydrogen. The use of hydrogen in many sectors has been demonstrated. Whether use will increase depends on the complex interplay between competing energy supplies, public policy, technological and systems innovation, and consumer preferences. Policymakers must address the need to displace carbon-intensive hydrogen with low-carbon hydrogen, and incentivise the uptake of hydrogen as a means to decarbonise sectors with hard-to-reduce emissions. Certain key principles can be followed without regret: driving down supply costs of low-carbon hydrogen production; accelerating initial deployment with public support to test the economic viability and enable learning; and continued strengthening of climate policies such as the EU emissions trading system to stimulate the growth of hydrogen-based solutions in the areas for which hydrogen is most suitable.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

39. Is the European Union’s investment agreement with China underrated?

Author:
Uri Dadush and André Sapir
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union is very open to foreign direct investment. By comparison, despite considerable liberalisation in the past two decades, foreign investors in China’s markets still face significant restrictions, especially in services sectors. Given this imbalance, the EU has long sought to improve the situation for its companies operating or wanting to operate in China. After eight years of negotiations, the EU and China concluded in December 2020 a bilateral Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). The text awaiting ratification aims to give foreign investors greater market access, enforceable via state-to-state dispute settlement. It does not yet, however, cover investor protection (such as against expropriation). Meanwhile, investor protection is covered by bilateral investment treaties between EU countries and China, which remain in force. The CAI has been met in some quarters with scepticism on economic and geopolitical grounds. The main criticism is that it provides little new market access in China, and that this small economic gain for the EU comes at the price of breaking ranks with its main political ally, the United States. Our assessment, which focuses on the economic implications, is different. It is true the CAI provides only modest new market access in China, but this is because China has already made progress in recent years in liberalising its foreign investment regulations unilaterally. The CAI binds this progress under an international treaty, marking an improvement for EU firms insofar as their market access rights can be effectively enforced. Most important, the CAI includes new rules on subsidies, state-owned enterprises, technology transfer and transparency, which will improve effective market access for EU firms operating in China. These bilateral new rules could also pave the way for reform of the multilateral rules under the World Trade Organisation, with the aim of better integrating China into the international trading and investment system – a goal shared by the EU, the United States and other like-minded countries. From an economic viewpoint therefore, the CAI is an important agreement, and one worth having. However, its ratification by the European Parliament is unlikely while China continues to apply sanctions against some members of the European Parliament and other critics of China’s human rights record.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Investment, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
China and Europe

40. A whole-economy carbon price for Europe and how to get there

Author:
Ottmar Edenhofer, Mirjam Kosch, Michael Pahle, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Putting carbon pricing at the centre of the EU climate policy architecture would provide major benefits. Obtaining these benefits requires a uniform, credible and durable carbon price – the economic first-best solution, however, several preconditions required to attain this solution are not yet met. This paper proposes a sequenced approach to ensure convergence of the policy mix on the first-best in the long run.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Europe

41. Low interest rates in Europe and the US: one trend, two stories

Author:
Maria Demertzis and Nicola Viegi
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In both Europe and the United States, interest rates have been declining for more than fifteen years. For much of this period, real interest rates have been negative and they are expected to remain negative for at least another decade. The literature associates this decline in interest rates with a similarly protracted decline in productivity. But the decline in productivity appears paradoxical given major technological advances. The decline in the price of capital is underpinned by the factors that have caused a decline in demand for capital, as well as a relative increase in its supply. On the supply side, aging and an increase in overall macroeconomic risk since the financial crisis have both led to increased savings. On the demand side, the increase in the importance of intangible capital in production has reduced the demand for physical capital. Nevertheless, for the US, the literature has identified the increase in market concentration as the biggest factor responsible for the reduction in the overall demand for capital. Digital innovation has led to the creation of champion firms that have captured big market shares and have been able to prevent others from entering not only the US market, but markets globally. This has dampened investment. Europe is affected by US digital dominance, but other factors, including aging and increased risk, are more prominent in sustaining the downward pressure on interest rates. In particular, the lack of risk capital, in the context of capital markets, contributes to this downward pressure in the EU. As the knowledge economy relies increasingly on intangible capital, a bank-based system that requires collateral is not well suited to finance investments. A lack of suitable finance will remain an important factor in the downward pressure on interest rates. The structural factors behind the downward pressure on interest rates imply that macroeconomic policy will have a reduced role in managing aggregate demand. Monetary policy in the euro area will be more about preventing financial fragmentation and less about stimulating demand. Equally, fiscal policy will have more of a supporting rather than stimulating role. Tackling the structural decline in market dynamism and therefore in real rates will require structural policies to reduce market power globally and ensure the creation of capital markets in the EU.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Governance, European Union, Finance, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

42. The geopolitics of the European Green Deal

Author:
Mark Leonard, Jeremy Shapiro, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Simone Tagliapietra, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Green Deal is a plan to decarbonise the EU economy by 2050, revolutionise the EU’s energy system, profoundly transform the economy and inspire efforts to combat climate change. But the plan will also have profound geopolitical repercussions. The Green Deal will affect geopolitics through its impact on the EU energy balance and global markets; on oil and gas-producing countries in the EU neighbourhood; on European energy security; and on global trade patterns, notably via the carbon border adjustment mechanism. At least some of these changes are likely to impact partner countries adversely. The EU needs to wake up to the consequences abroad of its domestic decisions. It should prepare to help manage the geopolitical aspects of the European Green Deal. Relationships with important neighbourhood countries such as Russia and Algeria, and with global players including the United States, China and Saudi Arabia, are central to this effort, which can be structured around seven actions: Help neighbouring oil and gas-exporting countries manage the repercussions of the European Green Deal. The EU should engage with these countries to foster their economic diversification, including into renewable energy and green hydrogen that could in the future be exported to Europe. Improve the security of critical raw materials supply and limit dependence, first and foremost on China. Essential measures include greater supply diversification, increased recycling volumes and substitution of critical materials. Work with the US and other partners to establish a ‘climate club’ whose members will apply similar carbon border adjustment measures. All countries, including China, would be welcome to join if they commit to abide by the club’s objectives and rules. Become a global standard-setter for the energy transition, particularly in hydrogen and green bonds. Requiring compliance with strict environmental regulations as a condition to access the EU market will be strong encouragement to go green for all countries. Internationalise the European Green Deal by mobilising the EU budget, the EU Recovery and Resilience Fund, and EU development policy. Promote global coalitions for climate change mitigation, for example through a global coalition for the permafrost, which would fund measures to contain the permafrost thaw. Promote a global platform on the new economics of climate action to share lessons learned and best practices.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe

43. The productivity paradox: policy lessons from MICROPROD

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Maria Demertzis
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Productivity growth in Europe has been on a downward trend for several decades. Given that productivity growth is a crucial source of output growth, particularly in an aging society like the European Union, it is crucial to understand what is driving this slowdown and what the potential consequences are for our economic model and for citizens’ welfare. Some explanations for this trend are global in nature, but there are also significant differences in country structures in Europe that have led to different outcomes and that need to be accounted for before policy prescriptions can be made. The objective of MICROPROD, an EU-wide research project that runs until the end of 2021, is to contribute to this research strand by using data from various European countries to study the microeconomic mechanisms behind this macroeconomic phenomenon. In particular, the aim is to understand the challenges posed to Europe by the fourth industrial revolution and its impact on productivity in the context of globalisation and digitalisation, and to recommend policies to address these challenges. MICROPROD researchers have so far delivered 20 papers on four broad issues relevant for today’s policy debates: the measurement and effects of intangible capital on productivity; the impact of globalisation, international trade and the integration of global value chains (GVCs) on productivity; factor allocation and allocative efficiency; and finally the social consequences of the two structural shocks Europe has faced in the last two decades: globalisation and technological progress. This Policy Contribution reviews the main conclusions of these 20 MICROPROD papers and how they inform policy debates. However, the mid-point of the three-year MICROPROD project also coincided with the start of the COVID-19 crisis, which might have accelerated some trends or possibly reversed others. We therefore discuss how some of the messages of MICROPROD research may contribute to our understanding of the current crisis and its aftermath.
Topic:
Globalization, Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, Productivity, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe

44. Economic crisis in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Marek Dabrowski and Marta Dominguez-Jimenez
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the 2010s, the economic situation in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) deteriorated as a result of lower oil and other commodity prices, a new round of domestic political instability, continuous intra-regional conflicts, stalled economic and governance reforms and, finally, the COVID-19 pandemic. The growth of real GDP, which slowed after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, further decelerated in the second half of the 2010s and became negative in 2020 as result of the COVID-19 shock. Fiscal balances have deteriorated, even in the oil-exporting countries, and public debt has grown rapidly. MENA countries continue to face numerous long-term socio-economic and institutional challenges including high unemployment (especially youth unemployment), low female labour-market participation rates, the poor quality of education, costly and ineffective public sectors, high military and security spending, high energy subsidies and trade protectionism. Only comprehensive long-term reform programmes can address these challenges. The European Union is MENA’s second largest trading partner after the region itself, and is one of two main sources of foreign direct investment and a major aid donor. However, given the critical importance of the MENA region to its own security and stability, the EU’s engagement in conflict resolution and in supporting economic and political transformation of the region is insufficient and should be intensified. The EU should also update and upgrade its existing association agreements with the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, including their free trade provisions.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Governance, European Union, Trade, COVID-19, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

45. The nonsense of Next Generation EU net balance calculations

Author:
Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The estimation of payments from the European Union’s COVID-19 economic recovery fund, Next Generation EU (NGEU), to each EU country in 2021-2026 involves uncertainties, yet the overall magnitudes can be estimated with a reasonable degree of precision. In contrast, estimating member states’ contributions to the repayment of EU debt (which will be issued to finance NGEU spending) is burdened with enormous difficulties, primarily related to the uncertainty of gross national income projections up to 2058. Some numerical scenarios can be put forward to illustrate the difficulties in estimating the amounts of such future contributions.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

46. Is the COVID-19 crisis an opportunity to boost the euro as a global currency?

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The euro never challenged the US dollar, and its international status declined with the euro crisis. Faced with a US administration willing to use its hegemonic currency to extend its domestic policies beyond its borders, Europe is reflecting on how to promote it currency on the global stage to ensure its autonomy. But promoting a more prominent role for the euro is difficult and involves far-reaching changes to the fabric of the monetary union.
Topic:
Health, European Union, Currency, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

47. Should Denmark and Sweden join the banking Union?

Author:
Dirk Schoenmaker and Svend E. Hougaard Jensen
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Though outside the euro area, Denmark and Sweden could benefit from joining the European Union’s banking union. It would provide protection in case of any need to resolve at national level a large bank with a Scandinavian footprint, and would mark a choice in favour of more cross-border banking. But joining the banking union would also involve some loss of decision-making power.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Banks
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Sweden

48. Six years after Ukraine’s Euromaidan: reforms and challenges ahead

Author:
Marek Dabrowski, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), Ukraine has had two presidents and four governments. In a difficult environment of external aggression, they have initiated various reforms aimed at bringing the country closer to the European Union and boosting growth. Progress has been partial and relies on international backing, with limited domestic appetite for reform.
Topic:
Corruption, Privatization, Foreign Aid, Governance, Reform, European Union, Finance, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

49. The financial fragility of European households in the time of COVID-19

Author:
Maria Demertzis, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Annamaria Lusardi
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The concept of household financial fragility emerged in the United States after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. It grew out of the need to understand whether households’ lack of capacity to face shocks could itself become a source of financial instability.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

50. Greening the recovery by greening the fiscal consolidation

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the wake of COVID-19, some economic recovery policies will help green the economy – for example, energy renovation of buildings. But there are limits to the share of stimulus that can be explicitly green. The European Union should therefore also green the fiscal consolidation by setting out the path to much higher carbon prices than today. This would guide investment and provide revenues to help the fiscal consolidation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Economy, Renewable Energy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

51. An effective economic response to the Coronavirus in Europe

Author:
Maria Demertzis, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
'Whatever it takes' needs to be the motto to preserve lives and reduce the impact on the economy of the epidemic.
Topic:
Governance, Economy, Central Bank, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

52. Racing against COVID-19: a vaccines strategy for Europe

Author:
Reinhilde Veugelers and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This Policy Contribution proposes a staged support scheme to tackle the COVID-19 vaccine challenge and a moon shot programme to meet the challenge of future pandemics.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Innovation, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

53. The European Union’s post-Brexit reckoning with financial markets

Author:
Rebecca Christie and Thomas Wieser
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom over their future relationship, we see a high probability of a weak contractual outcome, given the dominance of politics over considerations of market efficiency.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Europe, Brexit, Negotiation, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

54. Rebooting Europe: a framework for a post COVID-19 economic recovery

Author:
Julia Anderson, Simone Tagliapietra, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
COVID-19 has triggered a severe recession and policymakers in European Union countries are providing generous, largely indiscriminate, support to companies. As the recession gets deeper, a more comprehensive strategy is needed. This should be based on four principles: viability of supported entities, fairness, achieving societal goals, and giving society a share in future profits. The effort should be structured around equity and recovery funds with borrowing at EU level.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Global Recession, European Union, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

55. The European Central Bank in the COVID-19 crisis: whatever it takes, within its mandate

Author:
Gregory Claeys
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
To keep the euro-area economy afloat, the European Central Bank has put in place a large number of measures since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis. This response has triggered fears of a future increase in inflation. However, the ECB's new measures and the resulting increase in the size of its balance sheet, even if it were to be permanent, should not restrict its ability to achieve its price-stability mandate, within its legal obligations.
Topic:
Governance, Central Bank, Macroeconomics, Judiciary, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

56. COVID-19’s reality shock for external-funding dependent emerging economies

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
COVID-19 is by far the biggest challenge policymakers in emerging economies have had to deal with in recent history. Beyond the potentially large negative impact on these countries’ fiscal accounts, and the related solvency issues, worsening conditions for these countries’ external funding are a major challenge.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Latin America

57. A European carbon border tax: much pain, little gain

Author:
Ben McWilliams and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Commission should not make the implementation of a carbon border adjustment mechanism into a must-have element of its climate policy. There is little in the way of strong empirical evidence that would justify a carbon-adjustment measure. Moreover, significant logistical, legal and political challenges will arise during the design. The EU should instead focus upon the implementation of measures to trigger the development of a competitive low-carbon industry in Europe.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, European Union, Trade Policy, and Carbon Tax
Political Geography:
Europe

58. How good is the European Commission’s Just Transition Fund proposal?

Author:
Alienor Cameron, Gregory Claeys, Catarina Midoes, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
On 14 January 2020, the European Commission published its proposal for a Just Transition Mechanism, intended to provide support to territories facing serious socioeconomic challenges related to the transition towards climate neutrality. This brief provides an overview and a critical assessment of the first pillar of this Mechanism, the Just Transition Fund (JTF).
Topic:
Climate Change, Governance, Budget, European Union, Macroeconomics, Renewable Energy, and Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

59. FDI another day: Russian reliance on European investment

Author:
Marta Dominguez-Jimenez and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Most foreign direct investment into Russia originates in the European Union: European investors own between 55 percent and 75 percent of Russian FDI stock. This points to a Russian dependence on European investment, making the EU paramount for Russian medium-term growth. Even if we consider ‘phantom’ FDI that transits through Europe, the EU remains the primary investor in Russia. Most phantom FDI into Russia is believed to originate from Russia itself and thus is by construction not foreign.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

60. From climate change to cyber attacks: Incipient financial-stability risks for the euro area

Author:
Zsolt Darvas, Marta Dominguez-Jimenez, and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Central Bank’s November 2019 Financial Stability Review highlighted the risks to growth in an environment of global uncertainty. On the whole, the ECB report is comprehensive and covers the main risks to euro-area financial stability, we highlight issues that deserve more attention.
Topic:
Governance, Finance, Central Bank, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe

61. Market versus policy Europeanisation: has an imbalance grown over time?

Author:
Leonardo Cadamuro and Francesco Papadia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This Policy Contribution tests the hypothesis that an imbalance has grown in Europe over the last few decades because markets have integrated to a greater extent than European-level policymaking, potentially creating difficulties for the democratic process in managing the economy. This hypothesis has been put forward by several authors but not so far tested empirically.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Democracy, Regional Integration, Macroeconomics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

62. Financing the European Union: New Context, New Responses

Author:
Clemens Fuest and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Roughly two thirds of the European Union’s budget is financed out of member states’ national tax revenues. These resources, based on gross national incomes, are transparent, fair and in line with the principle of subsidiarity but they lead to political debates that emphasise the cost of EU spending rather than the benefits, and add to the perception of the EU budget in terms of net balances, rather than value added. The financing of the EU budget must be reassessed in the light of the July 2020 decision to launch the Next Generation EU programme. Budget resources could include a plastics charge, a carbon border adjustment mechanism, a digital tax, revenues from emissions trading and a financial transactions tax. We evaluate these options against four criteria: whether the origin of the revenue can be assigned to a particular member state; whether the revenue can be raised in isolation or requires pan-European tax coordination; whether the new resource can help reduce tax distortions in the EU; and whether the resource is related to EU policies. Revenues from emissions allowances fit these criteria best. Carbon emissions do not primarily cause damage only where they occur. Taking the EU cap on emissions as a given, additional emissions in a particular member state should be regarded as a negative externality on other member states. Emission reduction objectives are set at EU level. Whoever auctions off an allowance, wherever the corresponding emission occurs in the EU, and wherever the resulting good or service is consumed, the impact on common policy outcomes is the same. In this regard, proceeds from the sale of emissions trading system allowances are not that different from customs duties. Compared to the ETS, the other candidates for EU own resources are less convincing. Carbon border adjustments are intended to limit international competitive distortions rather than to generate revenue. Digital taxes and minimum corporate taxes are best left to the process underway in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. On a financial transactions tax there is no agreement within the EU. Total ETS revenues up to 2050 would approach €800 billion in a realistic scenario and possibly even €1.5 trillion assuming the scope of the ETS and the share of auctioned permits are increased. ETS revenues therefore would be largely sufficient to repay the Next Generation EU debt. However they would generate distributional effects, and so part of the revenues should finance grandfathered rights that would accrue to the member states. The EU can tackle the distributional issues involved in the reform of own resources.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Finance, Tax Systems, COVID-19, Decarbonization, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe

63. Emerging Europe and the capital markets union

Author:
Alexander Lehmann
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s capital markets union (CMU) plan is in urgent need of a revamp. Because of Brexit, EU capital markets and supervision need to become more integrated. The ongoing deep recession increases the need for equity finance mobilised by capital markets. The eleven EU countries in central and south-eastern Europe which joined the EU in 2004 and after (EU11) are particularly affected by the ongoing consolidation of exchanges, which has diminished liquidity in smaller markets and in the traded securities of mid-sized companies. Corporate funding remains even more bank-dependent in the EU11 than in the rest of the EU. Equity capital, whether in the form of listed shares or directly supplied by investment funds, is particularly underdeveloped. Even though the sustained and superior growth record in the region compared to the rest of the EU should be a magnet for investors, cross-border exposure to traded equity in the region remains very limited. To gain broader acceptance in all EU countries, CMU will need to support more forcefully funding for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and foster market integration throughout the single market, including outside the euro area. The immediate priorities for the EU should be to revise market regulation and facilitate capital market access by smaller firms. Lighter standards in dedicated SME markets should be widened for newly-listed companies, but should not be available to more mature listed companies. In this way, high standards of transparency and integrity, which have been bolstered by post-financial crisis regulation, will be preserved. The EU11 countries need to embrace corporate governance rules and greater transparency of company financial data, which would facilitate equity finance. They must also attract investors who will seek disclosure of environmental, social and governance performance of issuers. Much could be done to foster liquidity on national exchanges, including by embracing the inevitable further consolidation of exchanges and other infrastructure.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Business, Capital, Corporate Governance, and Private Equity
Political Geography:
Europe

64. Why has COVID-19 hit different European Union economies so differently?

Author:
André Sapir
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
All European Union countries are undergoing severe output losses as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, but some have been hurt more than others. In response to the crisis, EU leaders have agreed on a Recovery and Resilience Fund (RFF), which will help all EU countries, but those hit hardest will benefit most. This Policy Contribution explores why some countries have been hit economically more than others by COVID-19. Using statistical techniques described in the technical appendices, several potential explanations were examined: the severity of lockdown measures, the structure of national economies, the fiscal capacity of governments to counter the collapse in economic activity, and the quality of governance in different countries. We found that the strictness of lockdown measures, the share of tourism in the economy and the quality of governance all play a significant role in explaining differences in economic losses in different EU countries. However, public indebtedness has not played a role, suggesting that that the European Central Bank’s pandemic emergency purchase programme has been effective. We used our results to explore why some southern EU countries have been more affected by the COVID-19 crisis than some northern countries. Depending on the pairs of countries or country groupings that we compared, we found that differences in GDP losses were between 30 and 50 percent down to lockdown strictness, between 35 and 45 percent to the quality of governance and between 15 and 25 percent down to tourism. This could have implications for the allocation of the RRF between recovery and resilience expenditures. Supporting the recovery through a combination of demand and supply initiatives is important to ensure that countries rebound as quickly as possible from the COVID-19 crisis, without leaving too much permanent damage to their economies. But in many countries, especially some of the southern countries hit hardest by the COVID-19 crisis, resilience is a major sticking point. Too often, in some of these countries, the poor quality of governance has had a negative impact on their resilience, as the relatively large size of their GDP shocks has demonstrated. It is crucial therefore that RRF programmes devote sufficient attention (and resources) to improving the quality of governance in these countries.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

65. European Union recovery funds: strings attached, but not tied up in knots

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s plan for aiding recovery in member states hit by the coronavirus crisis has been rightly hailed as a major breakthrough for the bloc. But there is much less clarity on the plan’s economic aims, its priorities and the content of the contractual arrangements it should entail between the EU and member countries. The plan’s main plank, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is widely seen as a short-term Keynesian stimulus. The EU debt is expected to be repaid through contributions from member states, but this has not stopped the resulting transfers as being seen, including by national governments, as money from heaven. There has also been controversy over the conditions attached to grants and loans. Such fuzziness over objectives and overloaded procedures can derail the RRF. The EU needs to make an effort to provide clarity from the outset and put the plan on the right track. It should acknowledge and emphasise that the main goal of the RRF is not to contribute to immediate relief or a Keynesian stimulus, but to foster structural transformation, especially in less-advanced and harder-hit member states. The EU should hold back from trying to impose through overall policy conditionality its reform agenda on the member states. Instead, there should be a narrow-conditionality approach in which reforms that strongly complement intended investments should be identified and bundled with that investment. A grant aimed at encouraging decarbonisation in the transport sector, for example, would, be made conditional on the elimination of transport fuel subsidies. Therefore, in national recovery and resilience plans, each bundle of investments and reforms should be focused on the limited set of policy measures that need to be implemented to maximise the impact of EU-financed investment. Meanwhile, complementarity across objectives should be addressed through a dialogue with each member state on the sectoral allocation of EU funding and the overall architecture of their recovery and resilience plans. And the EU should emphasise when relevant the cross-border dimension of investment plans and find ways to encourage member states to cooperate on the design and the implementation of their plans.
Topic:
Governance, Budget, European Union, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

66. Can EU competition law address market distortions caused by state-controlled enterprises?

Author:
Matthew Heim
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
This Policy Contribution considers whether European competition law could be applied more directly to state owned enterprises that create an unlevel playing field in Europe due to the support they receive from their home governments. This issue is now a priority for many Member States and the European Commission given the impact on European economic autonomy. Competition law may not be the appropriate tool for addressing the granting of illegal subsidies or other forms of support in third countries but it may be more effective than previously thought in dealing with the effect of state-owned entities that distort the internal market. If SOEs are not be resource-constrained or even profit maximising, such SOEs could be unconstrained by competitive pressures and therefore possess a de facto level of market power. By evolving existing exclusionary antitrust theories of harm, such as predatory pricing, to fit the specificities of SOEs, this Policy Contribution argues that it should be possible to add further tools to the EU’s toolbox. In any event, as part of its efforts to address the distortive effects of foreign state ownership and subsidies in the internal market, the Commission should develop a coherent and proactive competition policy to provide guidance to the market.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Macroeconomics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

67. Bridging the divide: new evidence about firms and digitalisation

Author:
Reinhilde De Veugelers
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Using new evidence on the digitalisation activities of firms in the European Union and the United States, we document a trend towards digital polarisation based on firms’ use of the latest digital technologies and their plans for future investment in digitalisation. A substantial share of firms are not implementing any state-of-the-art digital technologies and do not have plans to invest in digitalisation. However, there is also a substantial share of firms that are already partially or even fully implementing state-of-the-art digital technologies in their businesses and that plan to further increase their digitalisation investments. Small Manufacturing firms and old small firms in services are significantly more likely to be and remain non-active in terms of digitalisation. Our results do not provide any evidence that EU firms are more likely than their US counterparts to be stuck on the wrong side of the digitalisation divide. Taking into account firm size and firm age, there are no significant differences between the EU and the US in terms of having more or fewer persistently non-digital firms. As persistently digitally-inactive firms are also less likely to be innovative, to add employees or to command higher mark-ups, it is important for policymaking to remove barriers that trap these firms in persistent digital inactivity. Lack of access to finance is a major barrier for EU firms compared to their US counterparts, particularly for the EU’s persistently non-digital firms, and especially for older, smaller companies in services. Improving their access to finance might therefore go a long way towards addressing the corporate digitalisation divide in the EU.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Digital Revolution
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

68. The European Union-Russia-China energy triangle

Author:
Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
We argue that energy relations between the EU and Russia and between China and Russia influence each other. We analyse their interactions in terms of four areas: oil and gas trading, electricity exchanges, energy technology exports and energy investments. We discuss five key hypotheses that describe the likely developments in these four areas in the next decade and their potential impact on Europe: 1. There is no direct competition between the EU and China for Russian oil and gas 2. China and the EU both have an interest in curbing excessive Russian energy rents 3. The EU, Russia and China compete on the global energy technology market, but specialise in different technologies 4. Intercontinental electricity exchange is unlikely 5. Russia seems more worried about Chinese energy investments with strategic/political goals, than about EU investments We find no evidence of a negative spillover for the EU from the developing Russia-China energy relationship. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Oil, and Europe Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

69. The next generation of digital currencies: in search of stability

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Maria Demertzis
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Four major developments have challenged the status quo and reopened the debate on the forms that money will take in the future: 1) use of cash as a medium of exchange has declined; 2) distributed ledger technology (DLT) has led to the emergence of thousands of digital cryptocurrencies; 3) some global tech giants are planning to provide private digital currencies to their billions of users in the form of stablecoins; and 4) in turn, public authorities are thinking about providing their own digital currencies to the general public. These developments raise questions about the implications for financial stability, the transmission of monetary policy and financial intermediation. This Policy Contribution focuses on the consequences stablecoins and central bank digital currencies could have. Stablecoins, such as Facebook’s Libra, differ from earlier generations of cryptocurrencies in three fundamental ways. First, they would start with large networks of users and global accessibility, two pivotal features for the critical uptake of a new currency. Second, given the current limitations of DLT, including in terms of energy efficiency, new stablecoins would rely on (more) centralised systems to validate transactions. Third, stablecoins would focus particularly on reducing the volatility in the value of the new currency. These new features of stablecoins attempt to correct some of the critical deficiencies identified in first-generation cryptocurrencies, which meant they did not acquire the main functions of money. However, new stablecoins raise other questions and potentially create new problems. One issue could arise from the more centralised (permissioned) validation system, which could lead to collusion problems. Another issue could arise from the reserve system that is supposed to ensure the stability of stablecoins, such as Libra, which could be incompatible with the profit maximisation behaviour of a private issuer. Facebook’s Libra plan has been a wake-up call to central banks and governments which, afraid of losing their monetary sovereignty, have renewed their interest in central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) as a potential solution. CBDCs could make private digital currencies less attractive and slow down their adoption. But there are other reasons to give the general public access to central bank liabilities. One important reason to provide CBDCs to citizens is that if cash disappears, citizens will lose direct access to sovereign money. Another benefit of the introduction of CBDCs is that monetary policy could be strengthened by transmitting it directly to the general public. However, the introduction of CBDCs could also be disruptive and create risks. In particular, CBDCs could have major consequences for financial intermediation. These risks would have to be evaluated by policymakers before any decisions are taken. If CBDCs are introduced, central banks would have to carefully calibrate their properties to minimise these risks. But, eventually, if these risks – and in particular the risk of structural financial disintermediation – do materialise, central banks would have various instruments to counter them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Central Bank, Currency, Cryptocurrencies, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe

70. Crisis management for euro-area banks in central Europe

Author:
Alexander Lehmann
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The deep involvement of a number of euro-area banking groups in central and southeastern Europe has benefitted the host countries and has strengthened the resilience of those banking groups. But this integration has become less close because of post-financial crisis national rules that require banks to hold more capital at home, or other ring-fencing measures. There is a risk integration might be undermined further by bank resolution planning, which is now gathering pace. Regulators and banks will need to decide between two distinct models for crisis resolution, and this choice will redefine banking networks. Most efficient in terms of preserving capital and the close integration of subsidiary operations would be if the Single Resolution Board – the banking union’s central resolution authority – takes the lead for the entire banking group. However, this will require parent banks to hold the subordinated debts of their subsidiaries. Persistent barriers to intra-group capital mobility – or the option for home or host authorities to impose such restrictions – will ultimately render such schemes unworkable. The second model would involve independent local intervention schemes, which European Union countries outside the banking union are likely to call for. This will require building capacity in local debt markets, and clarifying creditor hierarchies. Exposure to banking risks will ultimately need to be borne by host-country investors. Bail-in capital issued by subsidiaries to their parents cannot be a substitute because it would expose the home country to financial contagion from the host. To sustain cross-border linkages, banking groups and their supervisors will need to make bank recovery plans more credible, and to strengthen cooperation in resolution colleges (platforms that bring together all relevant parties in resolution planning and execution). Within the banking union there is no justification for the various ring-fencing measures that have impeded the flow of capital and liquidity within banking groups.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Regulation, Banks, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe