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101. Thirty years of Visegrád Group

Author:
Ivan Iliev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In February 1991, at a meeting of the Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian presidents, the decision to create an alliance of three Central European countries was made. In 1993, the division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and the establishment of in 1335, attended by King of Bohemia, King of Hungary and King of Poland. Hundreds of years later, former Communist-bloc countries in Central Europe desired to overcome historical animosities between states and nations in this region, believing that joint efforts of relatively small countries would make their goals more achievable. The V4 was also established because post-Communist countries realized that they the independent Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic transformed the tripartite cooperation into a four-party alliance - V4. The name refers to a meeting, which took place near Budapest (at the castle in Visegrád), Hungary, could together boost the socio-economic transformation and join the European Union. Indeed, the V4 has accelerated cooperation and boosted the friendship among the Central European states throughout the years. Today, V4 is a regional structure of four EU and NATO member states that in general share similar economic, cultural and social values. V4 members recognize it as the alliance that strengthens the coordination mechanism to find similar positions on European policy, foreign policy, economic or cultural cooperation, and regional development. Visegrád Group, or shortly called the V4, marks 30 years of existence this year. This unique sort of cooperation has achieved some crucial goals but also failed in reaching cooperation on some EU topics. In the following lines, we will look at these achievements and failures, but will also explain where Visegrád is today and what should be done in order to make this alliance of Central European countries functioning better.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic

102. The Era of German Chancellor Angela Merkel: What Was and What Remains?

Author:
Thomas Brey
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
After the general election in Germany at the end of September, Angela Merkel will step down as Chancellor at the age of 67. She held this most important political office in Germany for almost exactly 16 years (2005-2021). She will thus equal the record of her former political mentor and Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- 1998). In 2021, she was named “Most PowerfulForbes for the tenth time in a row. In 2015, the US magazine Time named her “Person of the Year” on its cover. Merkel has received the highest state honors from Italy to Peru, from Portugal to Israel. In 2011, she was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom - one of the two highest state decorations in the USA. The world’s honorary doctorates are legion. Merkel had a picture-perfect professional career, although by today’s standards she became politically active for the first time relatively late, at the age of 35. In the final phase of the GDR, she became involved in the opposition. As “Kohl’s girl” (“Kohls Mädchen”) she became Minister for Women’s Affairs as early as 1989, then Minister for the Environment (1994-1998), CDU General Secretary (1998-2000) and finally Party Chair (until 2018). She completed her studies in East Germany with a highly praised dissertation. When she became Chancellor in 2005, she was the first woman to hold the office and the first Chancellor from East Germany.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

103. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:
Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

104. AUKUS Security Pact: Setting the Rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known by the acronym AUKUS, intended to enhance cooperation between the three countries in the Indo- Pacific region in defense and security, has sent shockwaves throughout the world, especially the UK for the Royal Navy of Australia. The nuclear fueled submarines will be armed by conventional weapons, the number of acquired vessels will be at least eight, and as a typically Australian request, part of the vessels will be constructed in Australia’s naval shipyards. So far, the US, the UK, Russia, China, France in China and Europe. The key element of the AUKUS pact, signed on 15th September 2021, is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from the US and and India are the only six countries that have commissioned nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, before signing the AUKUS pact, the UK was the only country in the world with which the US was sharing the nuclear propulsion technology, under the Mutual Defense Agreement signed back in 1958. The supply of Australia with British and American nuclear-powered attack submarines, as the most delicate part of the AUKUS pact, attracted by far the most of media attention and provoked China’s aggressive reaction. Even more, the three nations security pact, which is in principal intended to bring “enhanced trilateral security partnership for the 21st century”, has made Beijing particularly worried as China fears that this triple alliance is pointed directly against it. The three countries intend to step up their cooperation in the security and defense sector, and apart from cooperation in industrial production of new military equipment, AUKUS also envisages a broad cooperation in the fields where the three countries feel particularly threatened by China’s staggering growth, and they include cyber security, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Alliance, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
United States, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Australia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

105. At the Nexus of Participation and Protection: Protection-Related Barriers to Women’s Participation in Northern Ireland

Author:
Catherine Turner and Aisling Swaine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The protection of women in armed conflict and their participation in peace and security activities are central pillars of the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Overall, however, the WPS agenda has overlooked the relationship between participation and protection. This perpetuates a false binary between the participation of women as leaders with agency and the protection of women as victims of conflict. It also misses the gendered, context-specific, and conflict-related protection risks that accompany women’s participation. Finally, it overlooks the critical link between the harms women experience and their low levels of representation. This paper considers the intersection between women’s participation and protection in the context of Northern Ireland. While often assumed to be free of “global policy” concerns such as WPS, Northern Ireland starkly illustrates the intrinsic connections and tensions between women’s leadership and protection in conflict and post-conflict situations. After providing an overview of these connections and tensions more broadly, this paper examines the participation and protection of women in Northern Ireland since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It draws from twenty-five semi-structured interviews with women in leadership positions in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes that gender inequalities and gendered insecurities intersect with sectarianism, the legacy of violence, and political crises arising from power-sharing arrangements under the peace agreement. These, in turn, intersect with emerging technologies such as social media to stymy women’s participation across all areas of post-conflict political life. While these findings underscore the continued relevance of the WPS agenda, they also signify that deeper engagement with gendered protection issues is required if the agenda is to substantively advance women’s equality and participation in the longer term.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe and Northern Ireland

106. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:
Andris Banka
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

107. Providing security in Iraq - what do Iraqis think?

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Denmark

108. Small states’ security strategies need an international energy dimension: What can be learned from the Danish Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe negotiations?

Author:
Trine Villumsen Berling
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. RECOMMENDATIONS: Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Baltic States

109. European strategic autonomy: From misconceived to useful concept what can we learn from the Northern outlook?

Author:
Christine Nissen and Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ is girdled by myths and resistance. These common misconceptions can be overcome by member states to strengthen the EU in the face of today’s challenging security environment. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ways forward for the concept of strategic autonomy: Level of ambition: strategic autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself but as a means to protect and promote common values and interests across strategically important EU policy areas. Geography: strategic autonomy should enable the EU to undertake activities, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood. Policy scope: strategic autonomy should encompass the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy, and not just defence.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

110. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

111. Greenland obviously has its own defense policy

Author:
Sara Olsvig and Urik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Historically, Danish decisions have not always put Greenlandic interests first. Although defense policy is formally under Danish jurisdiction, decisions only have the legitimacy necessary if Greenland participates in the decision-making processes. Because in Greenland, military activities and installations interfere intimately with civic society. Increased rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic produces challenging issues for the constitutional community consisting of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland must make the role they each want to play in the international community clear and rethink the responsibilities and coordination procedures of the community. Otherwise, Greenland and Denmark risk contributing to increased tension in the Arctic – and Greenland risks missing out on potential gains from the growing attention from the great powers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Greenland

112. Global rivalry in the Red Sea: A ‘Geopolitical’ European Union should encourage cooperation in the Red Sea region

Author:
Fabrizzio Tassinari and Mehari Taddele Maru
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Geopolitical competition in Africa is here to stay, and the question for the EU is not if but how to position itself in this global competition. In the case of the Red Sea region, the EU should support regional initiatives to build effective regional maritime governance and promote global public goods such as maritime security and the blue economy. Under the Presidency of Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission has branded itself a ‘Geopolitical Commission’. With regard to geopolitics, the Red Sea has for years been seen as a primary focus of action, a point the European Council stressed in July 2021, when it identified the region as a ‘geostrategic priority’. In 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, finding that there was ‘renewed geopolitical competition on both shores of the Red Sea’. The EU further stressed that ‘at stake are the preservation of the security of the Bab el Mandeb maritime route through which a significant proportion of trade to and from Europe passes; the harnessing of irregular migration flows; the containment of terrorist threats; and the prevention of instability in the EU’s wider neighbourhood’.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, International Organization, Governance, European Union, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and Red Sea

113. EU sets new course for the Arctic

Author:
Laurent Mayet
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union's strengthened engagement in the Arctic, presented on 13 October, marks two new directions in the Union's diplomatic positioning: a strategic and security turn, and the absolute priority given to the fight against climate change.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

114. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?

Author:
Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

115. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

116. Climate change and Finnish comprehensive security: Insights into enhanced preparedness

Author:
Emma Hakala
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Climate change is already threatening the security and stability of societies in various ways, and the impacts will only be exacerbated in the future. The security consequences of climate change can be broadly categorised into direct, cascading and transition impacts. Direct impacts refer to the damage to people and infrastructure caused by extreme weather and other climate phenomena, while in cascading impacts climate change is combined with political, economic and cross-border effects. Transition impacts are linked to the adverse consequences of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It is increasingly imperative to comprehensively integrate climate change into foresight and preparedness activities. In addition to the identification of individual climate security impacts, it is also necessary to identify and continuously monitor broader political and economic developments relevant to climate security. Cooperation across national borders is important for advancing the climate security agenda. International organisations and individual countries should coordinate and exchange information in order to develop preparedness mechanisms and practices.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

117. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

118. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:
Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

119. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

120. NDC@70: more relevant than ever

Author:
Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The information revolution put brick and mortar academic institutions under pressure to adapt, and the COVID pandemic has increased atten- tion on higher education models – business, intellectu- al, and philosophical. As the NATO Defense College (NDC) turns 70, and the Alliance ponders a new Stra- tegic Concept, it is worth reviewing the NDC model and value of education more broadly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower created the College in 1951 to prepare military and civilian officials for duty in NATO posts or in NATO-related positions in their capitals. War col- leges in France, the United States, and the United King- dom provided the conceptual basis for the NDC, but the NATO equivalent would have two differences: the NATO College would focus on Alliance issues more than national colleges, and consensus-building would be a key part of its education method. Seventy years later, the College still prepares military and civilian officials to assume positions of responsibility within NATO and that preparation has always included acquiring geo-stra- tegic knowledge and building relationships. NDC@70 means reflecting on how senior leaders acquire knowl- edge, develop skills, and strengthen relationships in to- day’s challenging period with rapid rates of technologi- cal change and increasingly segmented societies.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

121. Partners Across the Globe and NATO’s Strategic Concept

Author:
Gorana Grgic
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s history is one of continuous adapta- tion in the aftermath of critical junctures both 1 during and after the Cold War. The most recent push to transform the Alliance is embodied in laying out the groundworks towards the new Strategic Concept and the institutional campaign “NATO 2030” which calls for the Alliance to become more political- ly active and global in reach, along with strengthening its military power.2 Among the issues this effort has spotlighted are NATO’s global partnerships which at the moment include Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan, i.e. NATO’s Partners Across the Globe (PAG). This Policy Brief assesses the value of NATO’s Part- ners Across the Globe in light of the new security challenges and argues that preserving the status quo vis-à-vis global partnerships is not advisable since it is incompatible with the changing strategic goals. In pro- viding the recommendations moving forward, it argues the Alliance has two options. First, the Alliance could overhaul the PAG grouping and distinguish between the types of partners with whom it can establish deeper cooperation. Namely, this would involve elevating the Asia-Pacific Four into an institutionalised grouping, rather than having it remain an informal platform for cooperation. Alternatively, NATO could do away with the existing PAG nomenclature and keep the partner- ships flexible and issue specific. It could thus follow the “NATO 30+n” model, which would include working with a set group of partners on different issues.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

122. European allies and the forthcoming NATO strategic concept

Author:
Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept will primarily serve the purpose of adapting the definition of the Alliance’s core tasks to 21st century realities. This includes an updated threat analysis, as well as a widening of priorities to include matters and domains such as cybersecurity and soci- etal resilience. It will, in many ways, also reflect the considerable changes European security underwent since the publication of its preceding Strategic Con- cept in 2010. It will therefore be the first post-Crimea Strategic Concept, and mark the end of a cooperative security approach to Russia. The new text will also be the first post-Trump administration document, one elaborated after a period of profound doubts over US commitment to the Alliance. Finally, the new Strate- gic Concept will be adopted after years of sometimes heated debates on European security, particularly on the notion of European strategic autonomy. While a consensus on this concept and its implications for the Atlantic Alliance has thus far proved elusive, it seems clear that Europeans increasingly understand the need for a stronger, and in many ways more independent Europe. To some, recent events in Afghanistan may also have been a wake-up call. In reality, however, most of these developments are structural in nature, and have persisted for some time.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

123. Give Lisbon a chance: How to improve EU foreign policy

Author:
Fraser Cameron
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
After almost three decades of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a decade since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is high time to assess whether EU foreign policy has indeed become “more visible, more coherent and more effective”, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite most media and experts having a rather disdainful view, there have been some successes. And the increasingly bleak geopolitical situation has a led to growing recognition in EU member states that they must try and work together if Europe is to become an international actor, defend multilateralism and maximise its influence on the world stage. But that understanding has not always been on display in recent years. Clearly, there remain significant challenges in coordinating the foreign policies of 27 member states, each with their own interests, traditions and capabilities. Fraser Cameron (EPC Senior Adviser), therefore, argues that the EU should have more modest ambitions. Instead of harbouring grand ideas, it could take small yet concrete steps in the direction of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. In this Policy Brief, he puts forward ten practical ideas.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe

124. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe

125. Transatlantic relations and European strategic autonomy in the Biden era: Neglect, primacy or reform?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The relief in Europe following Joe Biden’s election has been tempered by uncertainty as to how the new administration might approach transatlantic relations. This paper lays out three paths that the US could take. The benign neglect model assumes that Washington will be consumed by domestic challenges and competition with Beijing, de facto downgrading Europe as a priority. In the primacy model, the US sees its leadership as indispensable for sustaining the international order and battling authoritarianism. The US would expect Europe to follow its lead, while old reservations about European strategic autonomy would resurface. The major reform model would see a humbler US foreign policy, understanding that it cannot repair the fragile international liberal order alone. Supporting European strategic autonomy would be key in devising a new transatlantic division of labor. Domestic challenges and ingrained policy habits mean that the US will likely gravitate toward neglect or primacy in its dealings with Europe. A major reform of the transatlantic relationship, while desirable, would require significant political will and investment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, Transatlantic Relations, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

126. The Eastern Mediterranean conflict: From Turkey-Greece confrontation to regional power struggles

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For several decades, the Eastern Mediterranean confict consisted of a three-part struggle over territorial wa- ters, sovereignty and exclusionary national narratives between Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Its origins can be traced as far back as the Greek War of Independence in the 1830s, the Lausanne Peace Trea- ty determining the current borders of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and the failed bicommunal federal state established in Cyprus in 1960. Regarding the Cyprus confict, the best – but ultimately lost – opportunity to resolve the issue was the 2004 Annan Plan for a bicom- munal federal state. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean confict is a multi-level and multi-actor power strug- gle that is unlikely to wane any time soon. In addition to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, it also includes actors such as France, Italy, Libya, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Tis Briefng Paper frst identifes the main actors involved, and then proceeds to analyze the key de- terminants of the confict. Te paper concludes that tension in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue in the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is unlikely, however, as NATO can provide a necessary platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation. Tis is likely to prevent an actual war, but will not be enough to produce any lasting solution in the increasingly confict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean regional power struggle.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

127. Ukraine’s Half-Hearted Reforms: What Needs to Change in the West’s Approach?

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Comprehensive internal reforms, along with security cooperation, are a key pillar of West-Ukraine interaction. Thus far, however, the Western effort has not sufficed to overcome the resistance of the local elites and make the reforms irreversible. High hopes raised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s election as Ukraine’s president in 2019 were short-lived. In three priority areas – anti-corruption, the judiciary and the economy – reforms have stalled. Instead, Zelensky has started to adapt the same socio-political system that the West aims to transform to his own political purposes. Western support – or even leadership – is once again becoming crucial in keeping Ukraine on the reform track. Ongoing domestic developments seriously challenge Zelensky’s administration, creating a window of opportunity for a more successful application of reform conditionality. In turn, a new US administration may be much more capable of using this emerging opportunity than its predecessor. If they are to promote reforms more efficiently, Western actors should go beyond the technocratic approach and recognize their own “ownership” of the process. Progress with reforms requires direct and high-level political engagement to enforce the implementation of agreements and to empower pro-reform forces inside the country.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Reform, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

128. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

129. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

130. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

131. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

132. Expanding the Reach of the Special Forces with a Gender-Mixed Deep Development Capability (DDC): Identifying Challenges and Lessons Learned

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Driven by the need to adapt to a changing security environment, the Belgian Special Forces Group has developed a new gender- mixed capability in 2020, including female soldiers in the operational detachment of the unit for the first time. This brief examines the development and implementation of the project and identifies challenges for future similar capacities. It points to the need for clarification of tasks and employment conditions, while attracting male candidates is necessary to maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have been successful and the creation of the capability is a first step in the direction to diversify the composition of the Special Forces, a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a complex security context.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Gender Issues, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

133. Breaking the Law of Opposite Effects: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Revived Transatlantic Partnership

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have been marked by something akin to the law of opposite effects. When the relationship is vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, Europeans pull themselves together to advance their security and defence interests. During the Clinton presidency, Europeans comfortably outsourced military crisis management in the Balkans to Washington. In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the Iraq war during the Bush administration triggered the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military operations under the banner of the European Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations were back on an even keel during the Obama era, the time when Europeans haphazardly reduced their defence budgets and lost a great share of their military capabilities. Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies in decades, Europeans re-energized their defence integration with a set of new initiatives, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore somewhat logical and far from unexpected that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet again a heightened risk that Europeans would fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of dependency on the US military shield. Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and avoiding European complacency is crucial for a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it requires concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

134. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

135. What Belgium Can Do: Proposals for the National Security Strategy

Author:
Sven Biscop and Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgium has never had a National Security Strategy: a single strategic vision outlining how to safeguard its national interests from external threats and challenges and to prevent the exploitation of its internal vulnerabilities. Many in Belgium intuitively feel that none is needed: Are we not shielded by the EU and NATO? And what could the world expect from this small country anyway? But the fact is that the Kingdom of Belgium is not such a small player. The geopolitical heart, and the host, of the EU, it ranks 9th out of 27 in terms of population and GDP; worldwide, it is the 12th exporting country. Hence recurring tensions between Belgium’s own – often low – level of ambition as a security actor and the expectations of its allies and partners.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

136. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

137. A New Start for EU-US relations?

Author:
Jim Cloos
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The election of President Biden was greeted by sighs of relief across Europe and offered the promise of a renewed relationship. The first hundred days in the office have been impressive. The tone vis-à-vis the EU has changed radically. New perspectives of cooperation are opening up, as set out in the Commission’s December communication on “EU-US: A new transatlantic agenda for global change”. For this to be fruitful two conditions need to be met. The first and most important one is linked to the capacity of the EU to deliver and to do what it takes to be a credible and strong partner. In this sense the future of the transatlantic partnership depends more on the European side than the American one. America is a super power and will remain one. And super powers only listen to other powers that are serious. But there is also a need for changes on the U.S side. The quiet assumption, so prevalent in the U.S, that it is natural for it to lead on all major issues and for the Europeans to follow will not stand up to the requirements of today. A strong partner can and will at times have different views and even different interests and should be allowed to defend them without being accused of jeopardizing the relationship.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

138. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

139. The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, must generate immediate action. The best way of ensuring that is to prepare new capability initiatives and, potentially, new operational engagements now, so that they can be launched simultaneously with the Strategic Compass. In that light, “the development of an initial-entry force as a pool of Member State forces that train and exercise together and are made available to the EU” (as summarised in an EEAS working paper), is one of the most promising ideas on the table. How to make it work?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

140. Seven Steps to European Defence, Transatlantic Equilibrium, and Global Europe

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Panta rhei – everything flows (Heraclitus). Once again, geopolitics is in transition, and a new crossroads is being approached. While we already knew that global leadership is beyond any single country, now it appears to be beyond even any single continent – beyond an alliance of two continents even. This means that the old strategic truth, that the power that has Europe on its side has the potential to dominate the world, no longer holds. Europe no longer is the kingmaker. And that changes a lot, for the EU, the US, and the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

141. Readiness as a Mission: Implications for Belgian Defence

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Readiness reflects the ability of the armed forces to accomplish their assigned tasks in time. Like many European counterparts, Belgian Defence disposes of some high readiness assets, but is lacking in readiness overall. This impacts its contribution to collective defence and its wider ability to support societal resilience. This Egmont Security Policy Brief explains the concept of readiness as a question of resource management and applies this to the ongoing defence review. Treating readiness as a meta- mission implies not only balancing the budgetary input parameters – investing in personnel, training, equipment and maintenance simultaneously – but also taking a selective approach towards operational engagement. Doing so will enable the force to regenerate as rapidly as possible, and boost Belgium’s ability to act both at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

142. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO

Author:
Justyna Gotkowska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

143. #NATO2030: NATO’s Force Structure and Posture

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The forces and capabilities that will be available for NATO operations in 2030 have, to a great extent, already been decided through the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is now up to individual Allies to deliver on their commitments. In the third of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Martin Hurt of the ICDS looks at how NATO’s force structure and posture have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and outlines the challenges of the further modernisation necessary if NATO is to keep pace with an evolving security environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

144. Advancing the Role of the OSCE in the Field of Climate Security

Author:
Niklas Bremberg and Anniek Barnhoorn
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Policy Brief assesses the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of climate security, in terms of its current and possible future commitments. Despite growing political momentum among most OSCE participating states about the need to address the issue of climate security, there appear to be divergent views on how to move forward on this important issue. Based on an assessment of recent OSCE activities linked to climate-related security risks and interviews with representatives from OSCE participating states, this policy brief suggests four avenues for the OSCE to advance its role in the field of climate security: (a) agree to new commitments; (b) engage in agenda setting; (c) strengthen the mandate of institutions; and (d) develop existing resources.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

145. European defence: Specialisation by capability groups

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In many professions specialisation is regarded as a virtue. In a hospital the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the nurse have specialised skills. Together they engage in teamwork to cure patients. Yet, when it comes to defence, specialisation has a negative connotation. Contrary to the hospital’s operating theatre, dependency on each other’s armed forces is regarded as a serious, if not unacceptable risk, as a country has to be able to defend itself without relying on capabilities to be provided by other states. In reality, however, interdependence is a fact: European countries have relied on the nuclear deterrent of the United States since the 1950s and with regard to conventional forces, no single European country can provide all necessary capabilities. The question is how European interdependence can be made more effective. The answer must partly lie in specialisation. This Policy Brief addresses specialisation in security and defence from the perspective of the ‘Team Europe’ approach of distributing tasks and operating with varying coalitions of European countries in order to make the EU (and in this case also NATO) more effective. It presents a model of structuring European armed forces in specialised groups – an idea that has been proposed in a Clingendael report published earlier this year. First, the Policy Brief lays out the playing field by explaining the model of European capability groups. Next, several options for European capability groups will be proposed. It concludes with listing the implications for the Netherlands.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Specialization
Political Geography:
Europe

146. Towards More Effective Deradicalization: Urgent Recommendations for Addressing Violent Islamist Extremism

Author:
Sofia Koller
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Violent Islamist extremism is still one of the biggest threats to internal security as well as societal cohesion in the EU. As a crucial part of any comprehensive counterstrategy, tertiary prevention encompasses measures designed to encourage and support (violent) extremists in prison and in society to leave their milieus, deradicalize, decriminalize, and reintegrate into society.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, European Union, Islamism, and Deradicalization
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

147. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America

148. Russia’s exotic nuclear weapons and implications for the United States and NATO

Author:
Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced five new nuclear-capable, strategic weapons systems. These systems include a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile and a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarine drone. What does Russia have to gain from developing these novel and exotic nuclear weapons? And what should the United States and NATO do about it? This new Atlantic Council issue brief, Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO, answers these questions. Informed by a workshop convened by the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Los Alamos National Laboratory, authors Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti evaluate the potential utility, motivations, and consequences of these new systems. Among other conclusions, the most significant may be that great-power competition has returned, and with it, the importance of nuclear weapons in international politics.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Power, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

149. Small States can Take Small but Important Steps to Improve UN Peacekeeping: Action needed for peacekeeping in distress

Author:
Louise Riis Andersen and Richard Gowan
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
UN peacekeeping is in need of change. Missions struggle to fulfil ambitious mandates in hostile environments. To improve performance and regain global trust, the UN needs tangible support and engagement from its member states, including smaller states with specialized military capabilities. RECOMMENDATIONS Smaller member states can contribute to UN peacekeeping operations by: ■ offering critical enablers (intelligence expertise, tactical air transport, medical services) and working with larger troop contributors to enhance their capacity in these areas. ■ developing guidance materials, technological tools and additional training for troop contributors, e.g. on medical support, prevention of sexual abuse and data analysis. ■ if aid donors, triangulate with the UN and the World Bank to identify projects to sustain security in countries where UN forces are drawing down.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Global Focus

150. Asia Beyond China: Developing a European Indo-Pacific Strategy for a Changing Global Order

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Much of Europe’s attention to Asia is currently being captured by China. However, if the European Union and its member states are serious about maintaining a rules-based global order and advancing multilateralism and connectivity, it should increase its work in building partnerships across Asia, particularly in the Indo-Pacific super-region. To save multilateralism, go to the Indo-Pacific. RECOMMENDATIONS: ■ Multilateralism first. Unpack and differentiate where the United States and China support the rules-based order and where not, but also look to new trade deals and security pacts with India and Southeast Asia partners. ■ Targeted connectivity. The EU should continue to offer support to existing regional infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. ■ Work in small groups. EU unanimity on China and Indo-Pacific policy is ideal, but not always necessary to get things done. ■ Asia specialists wanted. Invest in and develop career paths for Asia specialists in foreign and defence ministries and intelligence services.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, International Organization, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia