Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography Taiwan Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 10 Years

1. PLA Airborne Capabilities and Paratrooper Doctrine for Taiwan

Author:
Daniel Fu
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In the event of a Taiwan contingency, PLA airborne troops are likely to assume a substantial role. Decapitation strike scenarios and the prospects of an airborne invasion are widely discussed by analysts, scholars, and policy practitioners in both the US and Taiwan. Despite PLA ambitions to rapidly expand their airborne capabilities, there are a growing number voices that downplay the threat or likelihood of an airborne assault across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese security analysts such as Liu Tai-ying (劉泰英), founder of the Taiwan Research Institute, have stated that “if paratroopers were used, the losses for China would be very high” and minimized their threat by stating that there are few landing spots available to PLA airborne forces (Taipei Times, September 26, 2022). Notably, many of these conclusions revolve around the viewpoint held by a growing number of military experts, who contend that “mass airborne operations are a thing of the past” (Modern War Institute, December 10, 2016). These views, however, fail to consider the robust drive on part of the PLA to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of its airborne troops. They also ignore substantial progress the PLA has already made towards that goal, both in terms of the training and preparation of its paratroopers and in decisive factors such as heavy airlift. In short, documenting the progress of PLA airborne troops’ capabilities may play a crucial role in assessing Chinese deployment strategies during a potential Taiwan invasion scenario.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

2. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:
Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:
Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Strategic Ambiguity in US-Taiwan Relations During the Donald Trump Administration

Author:
Filip Grzegorzewski
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Strategic ambiguity, or the deliberate policy of uncertainty as to whether the United States would use force to defend Taiwan against an invasion by the People's Republic of China, has been the centrepiece of US policy towards the Taiwan issue for decades. This paper discusses the factors driving the redefinition of strategic ambiguity and its recalibration throughout Donald Trump's presidency (2017–2021). The fundamental driver of this change was to balance the rising power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The paper applied offensive realism as a theoretical framework for its analysis. Under President Donald Trump, Washington modified its policy of strategic ambiguity, explicitly framing relations with Taiwan within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. While the US retained key elements of strategic ambiguity, including the 'One China' policy, it added new features to deploy it offensively against Beijing's growing regional hegemony. The increased dynamism and unpredictability of relations with Taiwan were matched by a welcoming attitude towards strengthening Taiwanese identity and highlighting the systemic differences between communist China and democratic Taiwan. America stepped up arms sales and encouraged Taiwan to build its self-defence capabilities. Washington engaged in countering Chinese attempts to isolate Taiwan internationally and included it in restructuring global supply chains. Although the United States has not formally revised the boundaries of the 'One China' policy, the modification of strategic ambiguity increased Taiwan's prominence in US-China power competition and pushed back the prospect of peaceful unification.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. The “One China” Issue in U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Zhiqun Zhu
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Armenia in September 2022 caused some limited geopolitical commotion, as most readers of Baku Dialogues are keenly aware. Without downplaying its regional significance in the slightest, it was, however, her visit to Taiwan in August 2022 that made global headlines and triggered a new round of tensions in the Taiwan Strait. At the core of that controversy is the status of Taiwan. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) condemned the visit as a violation of the “one China principle,” the U.S. government and Pelosi herself insisted that it was consistent with America’s “one China policy.” Five decades after U.S. President Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China, the Taiwan issue remains the most difficult and potentially most explosive dispute between the United States and China. While Beijing maintains that the “one China principle,” with the PRC representing all of China, is the foundation of U.S.‑China relations, Washington emphasizes that its “one China policy” treats Taiwan as a separate entity from the PRC. Meanwhile, Taipei, under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has asserted that Taiwan is already independent and the two sides across the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other. As the U.S.‑China rivalry intensifies, Taiwan has quickly re‑emerged as the biggest hot‑button issue between the two great powers. The Taiwan issue is so serious that it routinely tops the agenda of meetings and phone calls between Chinese and U.S. officials, including calls between PRC President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden. Shortly before Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, Xi warned that “those who play with fire will get burned” during a phone call with Biden.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Leadership, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence

Author:
Ian D. Henry
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Leaders often believe that states that demonstrate disloyalty toward an ally will acquire a reputation for disloyalty, and thus damage other alliances. But in some circumstances, excessive loyalty to one ally can damage—perhaps even destroy—other alliances. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) shows that alliance interdependence is governed not by a reputation for loyalty, but by assessments of allied reliability.
Topic:
Security, History, Partnerships, Alliance, and State
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Beijing Piles More Pressure on Taiwan after a Historic Victory by Tsai Ing-Wen

Author:
Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
How will Beijing react to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s resounding re-election victory on January 11, when she garnered a historic 8 million votes, or 57.13 percent of the electorate? So far, Beijing’s response to this triumph by the candidate of the theoretically pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has been relatively non-belligerent. The spokesman of the cabinet-level Taiwan Affairs Office said a few hours after the polls that Beijing would “insist on the basic objective of ‘peaceful unification and one country, two systems’,” even though he also indicated that Beijing would not tolerate “any form of ‘Taiwan independence’.” Another post-election commentary by the official Xinhua News Agency said that “the mainland firmly holds the initiative in bilateral relations.” In an article in the usually hawkish Global Times, Editor-in-Chief Hu Xijin said Chinese society was “prepared for war with Taiwan independence,” but that it was not yet ready for “immediate warfare” (Xinhua, January 12; Phoenix TV News, January 12; Global Times, January 11; South China Morning Post, January 11). Observers of Taiwan Strait dynamics have noted that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, the highest-ranking decision-maker on Taiwan issues, was bitterly unhappy about the margin of Tsai’s victory; and that the commander-in-chief will likely order a series of measures to boost “war preparation,” squeeze Taiwan’s diplomatic space, suppress Taiwan’s economy, and nurture the so-called “fifth column” in Taiwan society (Chinatimes.com, January 12; HK01.com, January 11). The fifth column is a reference to Taiwanese politicians and businesspeople who, while professing to defend their island against Communist aggression, are proposing more communication and even “pro-unification talks” with Beijing as a result of their dependence (financial or otherwise) on the CCP.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

7. Adrift Without Dialogue

Author:
David G. Brown and Kevin Scott
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Comparative Connections
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In February, President Trump told President Xi Jinping that the US would honor its one-China policy. This eased concern that the new administration would radically change US policy toward Taiwan, but it remains unclear how the Trump administration will deal with specific Taiwan issues. Relations between Beijing and Taipei have continued to be in an unstable but calm state in the early months of 2017. The formal channels of dialogue remain closed and no significant effort has been made to reopen them. In the meantime, practical issues have been dealt with, sometimes constructively but often in ways that exacerbate the lack of trust. This unstable and risky situation will likely continue in the months ahead.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Full Issue: Emerging Domains of Security

Author:
Meg Guliford, Thomas McCarthy, Alison Russell, Michael M. Tsai, Po-Chang Huang, Feng-tai Hwang, Ian Easton, Matthew Testerman, Nikolas Ott, Anthony Gilgis, Todd Diamond, Michael Wackenreuter, Sebastian Bruns, Andrew Mark Spencer, Wendy A. Wayman, and Charles Cleveland
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The theme of this special edition is “Emerging Domains of Security.” Coupled with previously unpublished work developed under a prior “Winning Without War” theme, the articles therein honor Professor Martel’s diverse, yet forward-leaning, research interests. This edition maintains the journal’s four traditional sections of policy, history, interviews, and current affairs. Our authors include established academics and practitioners as well as two Fletcher students, Nikolas Ott and Michael Wackenreuter. Each of the articles analyzes critical issues in the study and practice of international security, and our authors make salient arguments about an array of security-related issues. The articles are borne out of countless hours of work by FSR’s dedicated editorial staff. I deeply appreciate the time and effort they devoted to the publication of this volume. They are full-time graduate students who masterfully balanced a host of responsibilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, International Cooperation, International Law, History, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Cybersecurity, Navy, Conflict, Space, Interview, Army, Baath Party, and Norms
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, Europe, Middle East, Taiwan, Germany, Asia-Pacific, Global Focus, and United States of America

9. The Strategic Duel over Taiwan

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
The United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are firmly entrenched in what will be a long and intense strategic competition for dominance over the Pacific Rim. American strategists Andrew Marshall, Robert Kaplan, and Aaron Friedberg began foretelling of this great power struggle over a decade ago.[1]. They recognized before anyone else that there are strong forces underpinning the U.S.-China rivalry. The two countries’ political systems and national interests stand in fundamental opposition. This is why, despite Washington’s reluctance to officially admit it, strategic competition between the U.S. and the PRC is unavoidable. ​ The United States, while an imperfect democracy, is an inspiration to people everywhere who yearn for the freedom and dignity that comes from having a representative government, independent legal system, and market economy. In the PRC, on the other hand, power is monopolized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a political organization that is directly responsible for more human suffering than possibly any other regime past or present, anywhere in the world.[2] Numerous State Department reports detail the past and continuing human rights violations occurring under the watch of the CCP.[3] ​ For all its much ballyhooed economic reforms, China’s economy is still largely controlled by massive state-owned corporations, making it a mercantilist country, not a capitalist one.[4] Much of Beijing’s economic power ultimately stems from its remarkable ability to lure foreign business elites with promises of access to its huge market. Once the hook is set, China pockets their investments, steals their intellectual property, and undercuts their market competitiveness.[5] ​ Yet it is not the PRC’s unsavory political or economic practices that will ensure sustained U.S.-China competition over the coming decades, although future American presidents, like Barack Obama, will undoubtedly be tempted to paper over ideological differences for expedience sake. Rather, Beijing’s insecure and aggressive nature is at the root of the problem. In recent years, China has stoked maritime tensions with Japan and the Philippines, both treaty allies of the United States; provoked border clashes with India, a democratic nation and American security partner; and enabled nuclear missile proliferation amongst its friends: North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran.[6] Track records tell a compelling story. The PRC’s track record indicates that a growing number of geostrategic issues could eventually result in a clash between the United States and China... ​
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Economy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

10. China’s United Front Strategy and its Impacts on the Security of Taiwan and Asia-Pacific Region

Author:
Michael M. Tsai and Po-Chang Huang
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 1949, Mao Zedong, leader of the Communist Party of China (CCP), defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) troops and succeeded in establishing the communist dictatorship of the People’s Republic of China out of the “barrel of a gun.” At the beginning of its rule, the CCP believed that the use of violent instruments as provided by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was in and of itself sufficient to both suppress “reactionaries” at home and defeat “invaders” from abroad. ​ In this vein, during the Korean War of the early 1950s, the CCP regime sent a million-strong “Volunteer Army” into the Korean Peninsula and fought against the U.S.-led United Nations forces, thus cementing the political division of Korea and its complications that linger to this day. Between 1958 and 1960, PLA troops heavily bombarded the Chiang Kai-shek-controlled island of Kinmen, resulting in significant casualties on both sides. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the PLA and militia troops engaged in a series of border conflicts and clashes with the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. Throughout this period, the CCP regime still believed that military force alone was sufficient to serve as the primary bargaining chip and policy instrument in its dealing with other states.[1] ​ However, from the late 1980s to 1990s, the collapse of Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc marked the end of Cold War and the confrontation between two global superpowers. The CCP’s strategy in the international arena evolved from an overreliance on hard military force to one that utilizes both “soft power” and the “carrot and stick.” ​ From the Chinese perspective, the concept of “soft power” encompasses the exploitation of any policy or tool outside the traditional definition of “hard” military power to achieve its desired political, economic, and diplomatic objectives. Such exploitation takes place via political, societal, commercial, economic, legal, psychological, cultural, and other means. Mass media and even tourist groups could all be used as a means of penetration to funnel and support Chinese agents deep inside enemy territory and to create conditions that are conducive to achieving China’s desired outcome. This is the essence of China’s strategy of the “United Front.” ​ This article examines the United Front strategy and the ways in which China’s deployment of this strategy impacts the national security of Taiwan as well as neighboring countries such as Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and even the United States.[2] The article concludes with proposed policy recommendations for how Taiwan can counter such strategies...
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, History, Military Strategy, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Taiwan, Soviet Union, Vietnam, Philippines, and United States of America