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12. Back to the Russia-U.S.-China “Triangle”?
- Author:
- S. Trush
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- FOr SeVeral MONThS, the world expert community has been actively discussing the obvious resurgence of the russia-the U.S.-China “triangle.” This happens every time when the key, or even “sacral,” prob- lem of international interaction – the problem of security – comes to the fore. The high level of confrontation inside two of the three sides of the “triangle” – the U.S. vs. russia and China vs. the U.S. – predetermined this resurgence against the background of donald Trump’s non-orthodox and unyielding foreign policy. he brought to the white house his “no-nonsense” approach to add more prominence to the traditional efforts of american pragmatists to keep russia and China apart. his obvious preference for Moscow and his clear intention to rely on it to oppose China were defused by an unprece- dented attack launched against him by the anti-Trump opposition inside the United States. due to the internal balance of power, russia was cho- sen as the potentially most promising target with the best foreign policy dividends perfectly suited to the task of either pushing the president out of the white house or at least, narrowing down his political leeway. This attack and the fairly painful Korean issue created a pause in the america-China relations obvious in the first year of the new administra- tion that ended late in 2017 by the “tough and realistic” description in the National Security Strategy of the United States of “revisionist powers of russia and China.... that challenge american power.” This launched an aggressive trade war with China; today, it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the exacerbated systemic confrontation with China over economic, technological and military leadership.
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
13. A Frank Conversation About War and Peace
- Author:
- S Ryabkov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- This interview discusses the diplomacy and military affairs between Russia and the United States.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
14. Strategic Stability in the Early 21st Century
- Author:
- A. Orlov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- one hunDReD YeaRs ago, mankind entered the 20th century as the “golden age” of realized ideals of freedom and humanism. Reality proved to be different: this was the cruelest and the bloodiest period in the histo- ry of modern civilization. The new generation of political dreamers, with anglo-saxon roots in the first place, expected the 21st century to become a period of a more or less stable development of the world led by the united states with the help of its closest satellites. In his The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Zbigniew Brzezinski (who together with henry Kissinger can be described as a “classic” of the contemporary geopoliti- cal thought) wrote that since the end of the Cold War the united states “assumed the unique global security role” and “america’s global socio- cultural celebrity makes it the world’s center of attention.”1 he arrived here at a fairly debatable (as later developments showed) conclusion that “america’s role in ensuring the security of its allies ... justifies it in seek- ing more security for itself than is predictably attainable by other states.”2 This trend of military-political thinking that dominated across the ocean in the 1990s and early 2000s has not changed in fifteen years that elapsed since the time when the maître of american political science wrote the lines quoted above. Formally a Democrat and President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor in the latter half of the 1970s, he nur- tured the ideas that differ but little from those of the present master of the White house, a conservative Republican determined to “make america great again,” that is, to restore its role of the unquestioned world leader in all trends and in all hypostases. nothing what President Trump has said so far clarifies when, in his opinion, america lost its greatness. It seems that he piles the accusations on Democrat obama whom he called a “softy” and who allegedly allowed the adversaries to push america into a tight corner from which the country is scrambling out under his guid- ance. let’s go several decades back. The end of the Cold War, the victory in which Washington arrogant- ly “appropriated” and its rise, at least in its own eyes, became a watershed of sorts in american understanding of the contemporary realities and of certain basic postulates that for a long time remained the cornerstone of the perception of the world by Washington and Moscow. This relates, first and foremost, to the strategic security concept. Brzezinski admitted: “It was until the late 1950s and perhaps not even until the Cuban Missile Crisis that america was jarred into recognition that modern technology has made vulnerable a thing of the past.”3 “The intense national debate on these issues [in the united states] eventually led to a consensus that a relationship of stable deterrence with the soviet union was attainable only through mutual restraint.”4 henry Kissinger fully agrees with the above. In his World Order, he has written: “strategic stability was defined as a balance in which neither side would use its weapons of mass destruction because the adversary was always able to inflict an unacceptable level of destruction in retalia- tion.”5 This adds special importance to what anatoly Dobrynin, soviet ambassador to the u.s., had to say in his book In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to Six Cold War Presidents about his talk to Robert Mcnamara, united states secretary of Defense, in april 1967: “Mcnamara explained that u.s. nuclear doctrine was grounded in the idea that the united states should be ready to absorb a surprise nuclear- missile strike while preserving its capability to hit back and cause irreparable damage to the enemy. as far as he could understand, Mcnamara said, the soviet military doctrine was based on the same prin- ciple. he was convinced that both sides possessed such capability. It was precisely this factor that in a peculiar way provided the stability and ade- quately guaranteed that neither of the two great powers would attack the other, because each well knew that an attack on the other meant suicide.”6 Colonel-general Yury Baluyevsky, a prominent soviet and Russian military theoretician who served as Chief of the general staff of the armed Forces of the Russian Federation, has pointed out the fol- lowing: “[The] term strategic stability has been used for a fairly long time to assess the situation in the world. at first it was limited to the relations between the two superpowers – the soviet union and the united states – and described them as the mutually assured destruction of the sides and the rest of the world in a global nuclear war.... This stability is a product of nuclear arms race that resulted in the parity of strategic offensive armaments of the ussR and the u.s. and the situation of the so-called nuclear stalemate.”
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Political stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
15. Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Partners or Rivals?
- Author:
- Grigory Karasin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- This interview discusses Russia's relationships with its neighbours.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldavia
16. U.S. Complicity in the 2014 Coup in Kiev as a Violation of International Law
- Author:
- A. Vyleghanin and K. Kritsky
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- FIVE YEARS AGO, a coup d’état took place in Kiev. Following demon- strations and arson attacks, a mob seized several government institutions, including the administration building and residence of the constitutional- ly elected president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich. Some members of the Ukrainian president’s security detail who were protecting his residence from illegal seizure were wounded and killed.1 Alexander Turchinov, one of the coup leaders, began serving as the president of Ukraine even though no Ukrainian presidential election had been held. The coup in Kiev led primarily to the U.S. assuming a leading role in Ukraine’s governance – something it had neither during the period of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet era. The February 2014 overthrow of the president in Kiev that took place without elections and in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution de facto divided the country into regions that recognized the new authorities in Kiev and those that opposed the coup (primarily the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine). This occurred not only because the Ukrainian presi- dent was unconstitutionally removed from power but primarily because the “installation” of the putschist government was accompanied by vio- lence, and ethnic and linguistic persecution. In March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea left the new, “post-coup” Ukraine in accordance with the provision of the UN Charter on the right of peoples to self-determination. Subsequently, following a referendum in Crimea, a treaty on Crimea’s reunification with Russia was signed. A confrontation between the new regime in Kiev* and residents of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions turned into a protracted armed conflict. The forcible replacement in Kiev of a constitutionally elected head of state (Yanukovich) with an unconstitutional leader (Turchinov) directly impacted Russia’s national interests. Russians and Ukrainians lived together within a single state, the Russian Empire, from the 17th century until 1917. During the Soviet period, the border between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did not have international legal significance. It was an administrative bor- der. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent UN member states (Russia and Ukraine) that replaced them continued to maintain close economic and other ties. Their continued integration, including through joint participation in the Customs Union, objectively met the strategic interests of Ukraine and Russia. A friendly Ukraine is also important to Russia from a national securi- ty standpoint, considering NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders that began in the early 1990s – i.e., NATO’s absorption of all former member states of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland and even the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Russia’s leadership has repeatedly stressed the inadmissibility of dragging Ukraine into NATO. Words about “fraternal” relations between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine are no exaggeration: Millions of family members (both Russians and Ukrainians) live on opposite sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border,2 and at least one-third of Ukraine’s population speaks Russian as a native language. In this context, it is not surprising that Moscow considered the U.S.- orchestrated seizure of power from the head of state in Kiev an event affecting its vital interests. Something else is remarkable: The U.S. administration said that the events in Ukraine, far away from the American mainland, “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”4 Westerners promulgated a very different assessment of the forced ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. The U.S. called it a “people’s rev- olution” and said that the mob action organized in part by the U.S. ambas- sador in Kiev (including the killing of Berkut fighters, the state guard of the Ukrainian president) was a legitimate way of expressing the will of the “Ukrainian people.”
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, International Law, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, South America, Syria, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America
17. Russia in the Middle East and the Palestinian Problem
- Author:
- B. Dolgov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- The Palestinian Problem is one of the worst headaches of the middle east and one of the greatest geopolitical challenges. The Soviet Union/Russia, which was present when it originated, was one of the countries that tried to resolve problems related, among other things, to Israeli and Palestinian statehood and the fact that Palestine is the cradle of three world religions – Christianity, Islam and Judaism.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Religion, Territorial Disputes, and Statehood
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
18. Effectiveness of Russia’s Foreign Policy Information Support in Its Confrontation With the United States
- Author:
- M. Kovshar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- ONE FEATURE of the modern system of international relations is the increased influence on it of the information component. The transnation- al nature of the media space is being actively utilized by world actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives, leading to a clash of their interests and the beginning of information confrontation. The goal of modern-day confrontations is not only to fight for resources or territory but to fight for control over minds and public loyalty. In that respect, today it is strategi- cally important to all states that they be viewed positively by the interna- tional community and successfully get the mass audience to form a favor- able perception of their positions on the world stage, achieving under- standing and acceptance of their actions and objectives. Modern Russian scholarship does not have a well-established concept of information confrontation. The term is defined in the individual works of various authors [7, p. 18]. In general terms, it can be understood as a relationship of opposition and rivalry between several information enti- ties that are influencing the information space of an adversary through various means and methods. Researchers identify two areas of information confrontation: techni- cal, which affects an enemy’s technical means, and psychological, which impacts consciousness and public opinion [5, p. 23]. While the main goal of the former is to inflict maximal material losses on the enemy, the goal of the latter is to undermine state stability from within. The simplest and most affordable platform for waging psychological warfare is the mass media. That is why the meia space is considered a major tool of foreign policy pressure today.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Media, Information Age, and Propaganda
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America
19. From Eastward Pivot to Greater Eurasia
- Author:
- S. Karaganov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- The current stage of russia’s pivot to the east is the product of the second half of the 2000s largely as a belated economic response to the rise of asia, which opened new opportunities for the country’s devel- opment, especially for it eastern part. That rise made it possible to turn the ural region and the russian Far east from a mainly imperial burden – or a logistics base in confrontation with the West, sometimes a front line in rivalry with Japan or china – into a potential territory of develop- ment for the entire country. The expediency of making the pivot was substantiated by the fore- casted imminent economic slowdown of its main traditional partner, europe, and the deterioration of relations with europe and the West as a whole. The need for the diversification of economic ties and outside sources of development was becoming increasingly obvious. These assessments were backed up by a number of pronounced trends in the recent decade. First, these are the disintegration and crisis of the global order that the West has been trying to impose on the world since what it saw as its final victory. second is the process of relative de- globalization and the regionalization of the global economy and politics. and the third is the accelerating trend – related to the previous one – toward the politicization of economic ties, which made interdependence and dependence on one market comparatively less beneficial, if not sim- ply dangerous. Finally, the “asia for asia” trend prevailed over the “asia for the world” trend. Development in asia, especially in china, began to be increasingly oriented toward domestic and regional markets. Meanwhile, the process of spiritual and ideological emancipation of the formerly great asian civilizations, which in the past two centuries had been in colonial or semi-colonial dependence on the West, began to gain momen- tum. asian countries gained access to many achievements of the West, took advantage of the liberal global economic order that it created, became stronger, and began to claim a more appropriate place for them- selves on the world’s ideological and strategic map. The inevitability of the u.s. moving away (at least temporarily) from the role of a global hegemon, which came with a hefty price tag, became evident. Barack Obama set a course for domestic revival. however, old elites and inertia did not allow him to abandon costly and ineffective interventionism. Donald Trump strengthened the “self-isolation” trend. The u.s. has turned into a dangerous amalgam of residual intervention- ism and semi-isolationism. It is becoming increasingly evident that the u.s. seeks to create its own center, casting off some of its disadvanta- geous global commitments. a trend has evolved toward the formation of a hypothetically bipolar world through a multi-polar world with its inevitable chaos. One of its poles is based around the u.s. and the other is in eurasia. china seems to be its economic center, but the eurasian center will only materialize if Beijing does not claim the role of hegemon. however, whatever the case may be, it has turned out that once it has finally made a pivot to the east, russia has discovered many unexpected opportunities for itself.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Hegemony, Empire, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia
20. Russia’s Position on Territorial Conflicts in East Asia
- Author:
- Dmitry Streltsov
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
- Institution:
- East View Information Services
- Abstract:
- ruSSiA’S poSition on territorial and border conflicts in east Asia arouses great interest. Most of these conflicts have deep roots in and are consequences of the cold War, primarily stemming from legal gaps in the system of interstate borders that is based on the San Francisco peace treaty. these conflicts include disputes over the South Kuril islands (“northern territories”), the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, and the tokto (takeshima) islands. in addition, there are numerous conflicts in the South china Sea (disputes over territories including the paracel and Spratly islands) that have more complicated histories and go further back into the past, including the colonial era. russia is involved in only one of east Asia’s territorial disputes, one with Japan, and is just an observer in the rest of them. russia’s line on those conflicts is very important from the point of view of its political and economic interests, which are determined by its trade and investment relations with the countries that are parties to those disputes. Many of the most acute conflicts are sovereignty disputes over islands and sea borders. essentially, they are disputes over economic con- trol of vast water areas in the east china Sea and South china Sea, which are rich in mineral and biological resources and are part of key interna- tional maritime communication lines. For russia, however, those com- munications are not as important as they are, for example, for Japan or South Korea, or even for china. russia is more reliant on the transit facilities of its eastern ports. the latter are used in shipping along the northern Sea route and in trans- portation to and from china more than they are in handling cargo transportation between east Asia and europe along the southern route passing through the Strait of Malacca. it was no accident that russia focused on that southern route in setting the agenda for the Asia- pacific economic cooperation (Apec) summit in vladivostok in 2012. As an outside observer in east Asian territorial conflicts with none of its geographical or economic interests affected by them, russia takes a more neutral position on them than countries to which such conflicts pose a direct threat of armed confrontation. the russian position is also determined by the economic develop- ment priorities of Siberia and the russian Far east as set by its “eastward turn” doctrine. Strategically speaking, russia needs good and stable eco- nomic, and hence political, relations with all key countries involved in east Asian processes of integration, processes that encompass all east Asian countries except north Korea. however, practically all east Asian countries with which russia is determined to maintain trade and investment partnership, including china, Japan, South Korea, and key Southeast Asian states such as vietnam, are embroiled in territorial or border conflicts. obviously, by siding with one of the parties to any of these conflicts, russia would jeop- ardize its relations with the other. russia cannot afford to make friends with one country by estranging another. it needs, showing the utmost discretion and delicacy, to achieve a subtle balance in its relations with various actors and to seek at least a fragile regional status quo. neither can russia ignore the fact that, by joining ad hoc blocs or coalitions formed to deal with territorial conflicts, it would risk being drawn into a conflict that might grow into war any moment.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia