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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Russia Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 10 Years

31. Policy or Pique? Trump and the Turn to Great Power Competition

Author:
Deborah Welch Larson
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
DEBORAH WELCH LARSON analyzes Donald Trump’s policy toward China and Russia and the return of great power competition. She argues that Trump’s personalization of foreign policy undermined his trade war with China, and efforts to improve relations with Russia and that the Joe Biden administration will continue to compete but seek cooperation in areas of shared interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Trade Wars, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Turkey and Russia in Syrian war: Hostile friendship

Author:
Cemil Doğaç İpek and Mehmet Çağatay Güler
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This study considers Russian-Turkish relations within the context of the Syrian war. We elaborate on both Russia’s and Turkey’s strategies and their understanding of the Syrian War, and consider how the two countries have managed to stay on the same page despite conflictual strategies and geopolitical interests in Syria. The current literature does not address this question and does not thoroughly compare their actions and engagements in the field. This article aims to clarify Turkey-Russia relations in the Syria and provides evidence of how they are in conflict and cooperate at the same time. In this regard, it is argued that the available evidence indicates that Turkey-Russia relations in Syria operate on the “compartmentalisation” strategy. In order to test this argument, the qualitative research method based on secondary resources is used while the theoretical framework previously formulated by Onis and Yilmaz (2015) is adopted. They conceptualise Turkey-Russia relations as if they do “compartmentalise economic issues and geopolitical rivalries in order to avoid the negative spillover of certain disagreements into areas of bilateral cooperation.” Furthermore, they claim that compartmentalisation can be hindered if there are deepening security concerns in an area like Syria. However, this article underscores that compartmentalisation does not only work by separating the economic issue from geopolitical rivalries; it also makes Turkey and Russia able to cooperate and conflict in a specific and fundamentally conflictual geopolitical issue such as Syria. The convergences and divergences that occurred in the Syrian field are conceptualised under the strategy of compartmentalisation. In this context, the cooperation – the signed agreements and established mechanisms, conflicts, and clashes in the field, are acknowledged as the consequences of the compartmentalisation strategy in Syria. The compartmentalisation strategy is specifically used in Syria in order to avoid the negative impacts of direct clashes in bilateral cooperation and agreements. It can therefore be concluded that the deepening divergence in security related issue does not necessarily prevent compartmentalisation; on the contrary, compartmentalisation paves the way for stabilisation of such deepening divergence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Syrian War, and Compartmentalization
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

33. Assessments and foreign policy implications of the national security of the Republic of Serbia

Author:
Miroslav Mitrovic
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
National security determines the degree to which endangering national interests that sublimate national values is absent. With a review of the genesis and framework of the modern interpretation of national security, the paper discusses its approaches to endangerment. A retrospective of the ideas of endangerment in the paradigm of the changed physiognomy of contemporary conflicts and dynamic geopolitical movements creates the need for an innovative approach and prediction in national security strategic assessments. The paper provides an overview of the internal and external political aspects of national security and a framework for the actions of prominent entities according to the perceived foreign policy interests of importance for the Republic of Serbia’s security. By analysing common and conflicting interests of Serbia and forces that have geopolitical interests in the Western Balkans, it is possible to establish the most objective framework for predicting the trend of relationship development and the vector of influence. The paper analyses Serbia’s interactions with Russia, the United States, and the EU. The findings point to a complex situation regarding Serbia’s national security, where Russia seeks to maintain its strong soft power presence, the United States wants close cooperation and insistence on recognising Kosovo’s independence, and the EU does not vigorously stimulate or promote Serbia’s European integration. In that way, a concrete contribution is made to the developing of strategic assessments of possible trends of importance for the Republic of Serbia’s security, as well as to the achievement of declared national goals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, Balkans, and United States of America

34. Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus

Author:
Farid Shafiyev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Caucasus Strategic Perspectives
Institution:
Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center)
Abstract:
The current issue of the Caucasus Strategic Perspectives (CSP) journal entitled “Pax Caucasia: Prospects of Peace and Cooperation in South Caucasus” is dedicated to the possible cooperation opportunities in the aftermath of latest 44-days war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 with focus on different views from various countries. The CSP’s new issue includes 5 articles, 2 commentaries and 1 book review. In the framework of post-war cooperation situation, the CSP’s current authors analysed the economic difficulties of Armenia, Azerbaijan’s enhancing role in the region and existing geopolitical confrontations, performance of peacekeeping activities, as well as economic cooperation opportunities emerged in the post-war period.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, War, Peacekeeping, Geopolitics, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, South Caucasus, United States of America, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Guam

35. The Importance of Middle East in Russian Foreign Policy

Author:
Sansz Rostamjabri, Seyed Javad EmamJomehzadeh, and Mahnaz Goodarzi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower in the Cold War, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new Russia was formed. To achieve the hegemony of power, Russia's security document was given priority. In the first term, Vladimir Putin focused on pragmatism and emphasized the power of domestic politics and the revival of the Russian economy. In his second term, Putin focused on the politics of realism to gain power on the international stage and return to what Moscow is interested in. In his second term, Putin pursued a political (power expansion), security (avoiding differences), and economic (strengthening Russia) view Middle East. Therefore, in this study, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and its importance The question for this study is: what factors in Russian foreign policy made the Middle East region important for Russia? And the hypothesis for this question: Russia's concern about Islamic fundamentalism (security), economic and political reasons are among the most important factors in directing its foreign policy to the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Middle East

36. The Russo-U.S. National Identity Gap and the Indo-Pacific in 2021

Author:
Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The start of the Biden administration demonstrated how far Russo-U.S. relations had sunk. On the heels of the massive cyber-hacking of U.S. government files, attributed to Russia, hearings for Biden’s appointees showcased harsh accusations. These were compounded by the arrest of Aleksey Navalny on his return to Moscow from convalescence in Germany after a near fatal poisoning in Russia, arousing severe rebukes in the U.S. Meanwhile, Russian officials and news sources attacked Biden personally as senile or a figurehead, a flawed U.S. system of democracy as a farce and dysfunctional, and U.S. plotting through Navalny as aimed at taking down Putin. Mutual accusations intensified in mid-March 2021 when Biden responded to a query whether he considered Putin a killer by saying, “I do,” which reverberated in sharp retorts by Putin and from many in Russia. In late April, as Russia massed troops on Ukraine’s border, Biden placed new sanctions on Russia, and Russian language grew even more threatening, relations had sunk even further. If there was no direct focus on the Indo-Pacific in such vitriolic exchanges, that can be seen elsewhere, especially in a further tilt toward China in a reputed “strategic triangle.” The Indo-Pacific is where relations between Moscow and Washington have the most potential, spared of the quandaries of NATO expansion and Soviet nostalgia over a sphere of influence or Middle East intrigues leading to shifting alliances. Many in Washington thought that a win-win scenario could be achieved if Moscow accepted integration into a dynamic region, a balance of power welcoming Beijing’s rise but preventing it from domination, the denuclearization and stabilization of Pyongyang, and breakthroughs in bilateral relations with Tokyo and Seoul. All of these objectives appeared consistent with Russian aspirations in the early 1990s, but they were thwarted by the national identity that was being reconstructed in the following quarter century, especially under Vladimir Putin from the mid-2000s. Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific proved to be a casualty of Russian thinking toward the United States, most of all, but also toward China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and India. The Russo-U.S. identity gap has widened further in 2021. As Dmitry Medvedev wrote on January 16, the relations of Moscow and Beijing with the new U.S. administration are likely to remain extremely cold after years in which the trajectory of relations between Washington and Moscow had already been heading steadfastly downhill. Russo-U.S. bilateral relations and conflicting agendas in Europe and the Middle East draw avid interest, but the Indo-Pacific appears to be an inconsequential factor in their sharp rivalry. Nor do their differences in this region appear to have much significance for the development of the area, where China casts a broad shadow and U.S. alliances and partnerships are being renewed. To argue to the contrary leads one down several possible pathways: 1) this is the one promising arena for rebuilding relations; 2) Russia has a special role to play, distinct from China’s, due to its ties to India, North Korea, or ASEAN; 3) continued strengthening of Sino-Russian ties adds an element of concern for U.S. policies in the Indo-Pacific; or 4) Russia’s animus toward the U.S. may find an unexpected outlet in this region. Whichever pathway is explored, it is important to grasp how Russians perceive this region and its various sub-regions, while keeping in mind the context of the broader clash of national identities severely affecting the Russo-U.S. relationship. In this chapter, I offer an overview of the Russo-U.S. identity gap, turn to Russian thinking about the Biden administration, review Russian national identity, focus on aspects of Sino-Russian ties and their identity gap, subsequently shift to how Russians have viewed other parts of Asia of late, and conclude with an assessment of the prospects for Russo-U.S. relations in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Culture, Domestic Politics, and Identity
Political Geography:
Russia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

37. “The Political Striptease Show Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic Is Unattractive, Off-Putting”

Author:
Sergey Ryabkov
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Interview with Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, World Health Organization, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

38. A U.S. Strategy to Engage and Contain Putin's Russia

Author:
Michael McFaul
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
President-elect Joseph R. Biden has an opportunity to forge a bipartisan, sustained grand U.S. strategy for Russia. With decades of experience in foreign affairs, especially transatlantic relations, he knows Russia, he knows Vladimir Putin and, equally important, he knows the region. When I worked at the National Security Council during the Barack Obama administration, I traveled with then-Vice President Biden to Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Unlike his immediate predecessor, President Biden rightfully will not try to befriend Putin. He and his expert team of foreign policy advisors understand that the central objective in U.S. policy towards Russia today is to contain Putin’s belligerent behavior abroad. At the same time, the incoming Biden administration offers the U.S. a chance to develop a more predictable pattern of bilateral relations with the Russian government and Russian people, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike. After relations with China, competing with Russia is the second-greatest foreign policy challenge of our time, complicated by the fact that China and Russia today are closer to each other now than they were during the Cold War. To successfully achieve American objectives will require the implementation of a comprehensive, sophisticated and nuanced strategy for containing Putin’s belligerent actions abroad and simultaneously cooperating with Moscow on a small set of issues of mutual benefit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

39. Putin’s Strategic Framework for Northeast Asia

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses the strategic framework for Russia’s policies toward Northeast Asia, placing it in the context of Moscow’s geopolitical repositioning after the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing confrontation with the United States, and the alienation from Europe. After 2014, the Ukraine crisis put an end to Russia’s quarter-century-long attempt to integrate with the West and become part of a Greater Europe and the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time and in the same place (Ukraine), Russia’s attempt to build a power center in the former Soviet space came to an end. Ukraine was not the cause of either failure, but it was the trigger of both. The conclusion was clear. Russia was not fit for integration into something that was bigger than Russia, and Russia was no longer capable of integrating former borderlands. Two-plus decades after the break-up of the former Soviet Union, Russia stood alone—but also free. Such was the end of a grand illusion linked to the West, and also the end of three centuries of empire-building.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

40. Reconsidering Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Author:
Teimuraz Papaskiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The Russian occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014, marked the beginning of a new phase of tension between the Western world and Russia. Although it was predicted several years prior to the conflict that Ukraine would be Russia’s next victim,1 nobody paid much attention to these warnings. Thus, the Russian moves proved surprising for most Western societies, especially for the leaders of Western countries. It effectively ended the inefficient policy of “reset”, which was actually stillborn, because of the inability of the American administration to understand Vladimir Putin’s person and his goals. In June 2001, Putin met US President George W. Bush, who said after this meeting: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country.”2 President Bush was ridiculed for these words, yet even nine years later, he did not acknowledge his mistake. In 2010, he said: “I did not make a mistake in [my] assessment of Russian leader Vladimir Putin [...] Putin became a different person [...] I think, to a certain extent, he changed.”3 It seems that George W. Bush was not able to figure out that it was not Putin who had changed. It was the fact that U.S. and Eu- ropean leaders did not grasp which country Vladimir Putin was “deeply committed” to. For the Russian president, “his country” meant the Soviet Union, not the Russian Federation. He even officially declared that, “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopo- litical catastrophe of the century”.4 (Emphasis added – T.P.) This phrase was not just mere nostalgia for the “good old times”, otherwise no one in his right mind would ever call the break-up of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” When talking about the 20th century, during which two world wars cost more than 80 million lives combined, the break-up of one empire with nearly no casualties cannot be considered “the greatest catastrophe.” Therefore, those words meant that Putin’s intention was to re- store, at least, to some extent, the “old greatness” of the Soviet Empire.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Empire, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe