Content Type: Journal Article / Political Geography: Japan / Publication Year: within 5 Years

1. Global IR Research Programme: From Perplexities to Progressions

Author:: Deepshikha Shahi
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Our basic expectations vis-à-vis ‘the international’ have turned our phenomenal existence into two seemingly irreconcilable cognitive prisons: ‘one world’ with homogenizing propensities (dominated by the West) and ‘many worlds’ with heterogenizing predispositions (embodied by the non-West). Every so often, these cognitive prisons—oscillating between the extreme homogenizing propensities of the West and heterogenizing predispositions of the non-West— become obstacles in implementing effective global partnerships that are required to tackle the challenges thrown by global crisis-situations, e.g., the likelihoods of world war, financial crisis, climate change, pandemic, and the like. The agenda of the ‘Global IR research programme’ has emerged to demolish these cognitive prisons. To this end, this agenda finds rational support from multiple auxiliary theories that derive stimulus from hitherto denigrated knowledge-forms thriving in different corners of the world: e.g., Tianxia (all-under-heaven) from China, Advaita (non-duality) from India, and Mu No Basho (place of nothingness) from Japan. Nevertheless, the conditioned reflexes of many IR researchers compel them to receive the emergent knowledge-forms by correlating their ‘source’ and ‘scope’: generally, the knowledge-forms having their source in the West are granted a global scope, whereas the knowledge-forms having their source in the non-West are given a local scope; it is often suspected that the local non-Western knowledge-forms cannot grasp the larger global scenario. Philosophically, these conditioned reflexes emanate from Kantian dualism, which forms disconnected opposites of phenomena-noumena, science-metaphysics, West–non-West etc. This article reveals how the Global IR research programme—inspired by the Chinese, Indian and Japanese cosmovisions—strives to demolish the cognitive prisons of ‘one world versus many worlds’, thereby ensuring the prospective progressions of this research programme.
Topic:: International Relations and Research
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, and Global Focus

2. Japan’s Border Measures during Covid-19: How the Crisis Shaped ‘Others’ to Protect the ‘Stability of Self’

Author:: Vuslat Nur Şahin Temel and Zhao Xiru
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic has prompted countries to implement a wide range of specific cross-border security measures. The fear and anxiety induced by this crisis have rapidly expanded and contracted countries’ understanding of ‘self’ and ‘other’. This study examines Japan’s shift from liberal pre- Covid-19 border policies to the most stringent border closure measures among the G7 countries during the pandemic. In this study, we argue that the pandemic-induced fear increased anxiety in Japan’s public health safety identity, rapidly reshaping the conceptualization of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ in crisis scenarios. This shift aligns with Japan’s historical narrative of combating unprecedented threats to public health.
Topic:: Borders, Public Health, Human Security, COVID-19, Isolation, Ontological Security, and Anxiety
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

3. A Future Projection of Post-Covid-19 in Japan: Universal Values and International Cooperation

Author:: Yukio Sakurai
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: This essay aims to clarify the most popular impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine a future projection of Post-COVID-19 in Japan. This is based on interdisciplinary studies, particularly the literature survey on global governance in English and Japanese. Japan has consistently lived after WWII under the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Given the challenges caused by the pandemic, it is unpredictable how much conflict between multiple powers will hinder national security and economic globalization. The following five actions should be executed: Japan should participate in international research activities to envision a future society, Japan should adopt a unique future concept to address ageing populations and social security reform in their international cooperation, a review of neoliberalism, construction of a society that can respond to societal risks, and political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with serious social risks should be championed.
Topic:: Health, Governance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

4. Great Power Politics: The Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the Global South

Author:: Kei Koga
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 marks the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, and there are expectations that their relationship will be upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” Given the good diplomatic, security, and economic relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, ties are likely to be strengthened. However, Japan is now taking a more competitive strategy toward China, as indicated in the three security documents issued in December 2022, while Southeast Asian states generally continued the same strategic posture by which they have good relations with all great powers in the Indo-Pacific region. Also, while Japan issued the “New Plan for the Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that emphasizes the “Global South,” it remained silent about ASEAN centrality and unity in the Indo-Pacific, and it was unclear what roles Japan expects ASEAN to play. Although both Japan and Southeast Asian states need to adjust their roles in the Indo-Pacific region, it remains to be seen whether the 50th anniversary becomes an opportunity for clarification.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Power Politics, and ASEAN
Political Geography:: Japan, Southeast Asia, and Indo-Pacific

5. The Return of Shuttle Diplomacy

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In March 2023, Japan and South Korea had a long-awaited breakthrough in their bilateral relations, which many viewed as being at the lowest point since the 1965 normalization. On March 16, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio held a summit in Tokyo and agreed to resume “shuttle diplomacy,” a crucial mechanism of bilateral cooperation that had been halted for about a decade. Behind the positive developments was President Yoon’s political decision on the issue of compensating wartime forced laborers. The two leaders took steps to bring ties back to the level that existed prior to actions in 2018 and 2019, which precipitated the downward spiral in their relationship. Japan decided to lift the export controls it placed on its neighbor following the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on forced labor in 2018. South Korea withdrew its complaint with the World Trade Organization on Japan’s export controls. Less than a week after the summit, Seoul officially fully restored the information sharing agreement (GSOMIA) that it had with Tokyo. They also resumed high-level bilateral foreign and security dialogues to discuss ways to navigate the changing international environment together as partners. The big question now is whether this trend of restoring and expanding bilateral cooperation would continue throughout and beyond the Yoon presidency. In South Korea, critics argue that his handling of the forced labor issue is not a lasting solution to historical issues with Japan. The breakthrough was not a product of any major change in South Korean public sentiment toward Japan’s past wrongdoings. Nor was it a product of changes in the Japanese position on outstanding bilateral historical and territorial issues. Both the Japanese and South Korean governments, however, feel the urgent need to cooperate for their own national security, and for economic reasons. Whether the advances in the first four months of 2023 will be short-lived or the start of a new partnership and reconciliation will likely depend on how much understanding they both show in seeing things from the other’s perspective and how willing they will be in accommodating the other’s political needs.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

6. The US and Japan Build Multilateral Momentum

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: 2023 brings a renewed focus on the US-Japan partnership as a fulcrum of global and regional diplomacy. With an eye to the G7 Summit in Hiroshima in mid-May, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio began the year with visits to G7 counterparts in Europe and North America. Later in the spring, he toured Africa in an effort to gain understanding from countries of the Global South. The Joe Biden administration looks ahead to a lively economic agenda, as it hosts the APEC Summit in November on the heels of the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan laid out in detail the economic ambitions of the Biden national strategy on April 27, giving further clarity to how the administration’s foreign policy will meet the needs of the American middle class. Regional collaboration continues to expand. Both leaders will gather in Australia on May 24 as Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hosts the third in-person meeting of the leaders of the Quad. Also noteworthy in this first quarter of 2023 is the progress in ties between Japan and South Korea. Trilateral consultations began early in the Biden administration, and after the election of President Yoon Suk Yeol last spring, the groundwork for resolving the many difficulties in the bilateral relationship began. This spring, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida revealed their progress in a set of visits to each other’s capitals. A trilateral summit is planned for the G7 Summit, which Yoon will attend as an observer. Overshadowing this active multilateral calendar is the continuing war in Ukraine. Both Kishida and Biden have visited President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his capitol. The United States and Japan remain stalwart supporters of the Ukrainian defense effort as Ukrainians prepare for the spring counteroffensive against Russian forces. Yet questions have arisen within the US Congress over the scale and duration of military aide provided to Zelenskyy. Interestingly, there remains little doubt about the Kishida Cabinet’s support of Ukraine. While Japan does not provide lethal aid, it has joined in solidarity with European nations to contribute to the complex humanitarian relief needed by the Ukrainian people. Political choices will also shape the remainder of the year. President Biden on April 25 announced his run for a second term in the 2024 election. The Republican field of candidates begins to emerge with former UN Ambassador Nikki Haley officially declaring her candidacy on Feb. 14, and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, while not yet official, has been the center of media attention. Former President Donald Trump has already begun his rallies, having announced his candidacy on Nov. 15. In Tokyo, talk of a national snap election continues, with the latest rumors suggesting that Kishida, coming off his party’s good showing in local elections in April, might opt for a ballot after the G7 Summit in Hiroshima.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Multilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Japan and South Korea as Like-Minded Partners in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ji-Young Lee and Andy Lim
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them. Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Indo-Pacific

8. Japan-China Relations: A Period of Cold Peace?

Author:: June Teufel Dreyer
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the sole high-level meeting in the reporting period, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Bangkok in November, General Secretary/President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio essentially talked past each other. At an earlier ASEAN+3 meeting in Phnom Penh, Premier Li Keqiang and Kishida not only talked past each other but pointedly walked past each other. There was no resolution of major issues: the Chinese position is and remains that Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC in which Japan must not interfere. Japan counters that a Chinese invasion would be an emergency for Japan. On the islands known to the Chinese as the Diaoyu and to the Japanese as the Senkaku, Tokyo considers them an integral part of Japan on the basis of history and international law while China says the islands are part of China. On jurisdiction in the East China Sea, Japan says that demarcation should be based on the median line and that China’s efforts at unilateral development of oil and gas resources on its side of the median are illegal. Beijing does not recognize the validity of the median line. Economically, a number of Japanese industries have been decoupling from China out of concern for the integrity of their supply chains and for security reasons while others are planning to expand operations there. Both sides continued their respective defense buildups while accusing the other of military expansionism.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

9. US-Japan Relations: Ramping Up Diplomacy and Defense Cooperation

Author:: Sheila A. Smith and Charles McClean
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Comparative Connections
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: In the wake of the death of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fall brought unexpectedly turbulent politics for Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. In the United States, however, President Joe Biden welcomed the relatively positive outcome of the midterm elections, with Democrats retaining control over the Senate and losing less than the expected number of seats in the House. Diplomacy continued to be centered on various impacts of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but both Biden and Kishida focused their attention on a series of Asian diplomatic gatherings to improve ties. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the G20 Meeting in Bali and APEC gathering in Bangkok proffered the opportunity finally for in-person bilateral meetings for both leaders. Finally, Japan’s long awaited strategic documents were unveiled in December. A new National Security Strategy (NSS) took a far more sober look at China’s growing influence and included ongoing concerns over North Korea as well as a growing awareness of Japan’s increasingly difficult relationship with Russia. Accompanying the NSS is a 10-year defense plan, with a five-year build-up commitment, that gave evidence that Kishida and his ruling coalition were serious about their aim to spend 2% of Japan’s GDP on its security. The desire for greater lethality was also there, with the inclusion of conventional strike investment.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL ISLANDS IN 1884-1945: AN APPROACH FROM THE RIVALRY BETWEEN FRANCE, CHINA, AND JAPAN

Author:: Quyet Luu and Nguyet Nguyen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:: Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:: The Paracel Islands are situated in the South China Sea geographic center and have an important strategic location for the military and the economy. Since 1884, France has represented the Vietnamese state as a protectorate to manage the archipelago. In the context of France seeking to expand its influence into the Asia-Pacific region, disputes over sovereignty over the Paracel Islands occurred during the colonial period between France (representing Vietnam), China, and Japan. The article aims to analyze the importance of the Paracel Islands in the policies of France, China, and Japan in general. Moreover, the specific activities of France in the struggle with China and Japan to affirm and protect sovereignty over the Paracel Islands would also be analyzed. Based on primary and secondary data, along with historical research methods, research methods in international relations, and other interdisciplinary research strategies, the article concludes that the Paracel Islands play an important role in the strategies of France, China, and Japan. Hence, the Paracel issue in this period has gone beyond the framework of traditional territorial disputes, becoming "internationalization” with consequences that persist to the present day. France's policy to exploit and administer the Paracel Islands was persistent, thorough, and systematic in the military, economic, political, and diplomatic spheres.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Sovereignty, History, Territorial Disputes, and Internationalization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, France, Asia-Pacific, South China Sea, and Paracel Islands

11. Russia-Ukraine War Compels Japan to Reassess China Challenge, Shift Course on Security

Author:: Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Against the backdrop of the grisly Russia-Ukraine war, the security situation in East Asia may appear conducive to the continuation of the long peace that the region has enjoyed for decades. However, the devastating European war has cast a long shadow eastward. While Russia’s military presence in Asia is deeply curtailed as most of its conventional capabilities are redeployed to the Donbas front in Ukraine, the behavior of maverick North Korea has become more reckless and China’s policy has become less predictable and more assertive. As a result, Japan has adopted a more proactive approach to its international security environment predicated on enhancing its military capabilities and deepening security cooperation with key allies and partners, starting with, but not limited to, the U.S.
Topic:: Security, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

12. China’s Interests in North Korean Denuclearization: Reducing the Northeast Asian Security Dilemma

Author:: Debalina Ghoshal
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The existential North Korean nuclear and missile threats negatively impact the Asia-Pacific security environment for the United States, South Korea, Japan and Australia. In response, these countries have taken countermeasures to defend themselves against the growing danger from North Korea. As a result, North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities indirectly worsen China’s “security dilemma” by spurring the U.S. and its allies to devote greater resources to maintaining a strong security presence in Northeast Asia. This situation is illustrated by Beijing’s consistent criticism of Seoul for allowing the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defense system in South Korea since 2017. Although South Korea has sought to reassure China that the system is aimed at counteracting the threat from North Korea, Beijing has maintained that the presence of the U.S. THAAD in Korea “clearly undermines China’s strategic security interests” (PRC Ministry Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], August 10, 2022). Although China has been accused of not putting enough effort into the denuclearization process, achieving success in eliminating nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would serve China’s security interests in several ways, including by removing a powerful justification for the U.S. and China’s neighbors to devote resources to regional security. In part due to North Korea’s growing missile capabilities, South Korea, Japan and Australia have all recent strengthened their respective missile development programs. In 2021, the United States also lifted the restrictions it had imposed on South Korea limiting the range and payload of its ballistic missiles. According to previous South Korea president Moon Jae, this has removed “security shackles”—allowing South Korea to regain its missile autonomy (Korea Herald, May 22, 2021).
Topic:: Weapons, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

13. The Deficiency of Disparity: The Limits of Systemic Theory and the Need for Strategic Studies in Power Transition Theory

Author:: Athahn Steinback and Steven Childs
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: This article synthesizes power transition theory (PTT) at the grand strategic scale with military studies methods at lower levels of analysis. We analyze the Russo-Japanese War, the recent Afghan War, and the ongoing war in Ukraine as conflicts where political-military specificities enabled outmatched powers to win or force a stalemate. These cases demonstrate the decisive influence of power projection, doctrine, geopolitical constraints, and readiness on conflict outcomes. Finally, the authors operationalize PTT at the grand strategic scale alongside military studies methods at the operational level to propose U.S. responses to Chinese regional revisionism.
Topic:: Geopolitics, History, Grand Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Japan, China, South Asia, Ukraine, and Taiwan

14. Korean Newspapers, Korean Sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo, and Early Japanese Intrusions

Author:: Kyu-hyun Jo
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: Contrary to the Japanese Foreign Ministry's claim that Koreans never demonstrated any clear basis for its claims that it had taken effective control over Dokdo (Takeshima) before 1905, the Ministry ignores the critical role of the Korean media, especially major Korean newspapers such as the Hwangsŏng Newspaper and Dongnip Sinmun (Independent), in publicizing and mobilizing Korean nationalism through a sustained assertion of Korean sovereignty over Dokdo. By publishing articles which officially denounced Japanese intrusion into Dokdo or the Japanese government's feigned ignorance and disregard for such an act, or articles which explicitly discussed the long history of Korea's recognition of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as her nascent territories, Korean newspapers not only expressed Korean nationalism by incorporating anti-Japanese sentiment. They also emphasized Korea's ancient consciousness of national unity by clearly declaring that at the heart of such nationalism and rhetoric was a strong identification of Dokdo and Ulleungdo as Korea's historic territories. Korean newspapers were instrumental in publicizing Korean consciousness about Dokdo and Ulleungdo by not only reporting on Japanese intrusions into Dokdo, educating the Korean public on the ancient history of Dokdo and Ulleungdo, but also serve as crucial evidence proving that Japan willfully ignored Korea's national sovereignty and judicial authority to wrest away Korean sovereignty over Dokdo and Ulleungdo.
Topic:: Sovereignty, History, Newspapers, and Intrusion
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korea

15. China’s Role in Korean Security Issues

Author:: Gordon G. Chang
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: China’s great power over North Korea eroded when COVID-19 control measures ended most trade with the Kim regime. Moreover, China’s conflicts with various countries mean Beijing cannot afford to alienate any friend, and Kim Jong Un knows that. Beijing is still influential in Seoul, but it lost much of its clout when the conservative-leaning candidate prevailed in the March 2022 presidential election. China will also suffer a loss in standing because it is paying less attention to Korean affairs and is closing itself off to the world.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Elections, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

16. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) through economic diplomacy strategy. Study of Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

Author:: Shanti Darmastuti, Arry Bainus, Widya Setiabudi, and Dudy Heryadi
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Free trade is considered to make a positive contribution to both domestic and international economy because of the removal of trade barriers. The importance of free trade can be seen from the increasing free trade agreements between developed and developing countries. The involvement of developing countries in free trade agreements enables them to make efficiency and maximize the benefits of implementing free trade agreements. Developing countries however often do not get results that are as expected in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). For example, Indonesia has not yet obtained the outcomes that were expected in the implementation of the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). The results highlight that one fundamental factor for obtaining optimal benefits from a trade agreement is internal coordination prior to the negotiation process.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Economy, Policy Implementation, and Free Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, Indonesia, and Asia

17. Japanese Non-State Actors’ Under-Recognised Contributions to the International Anti-Nuclear Weapons Movement

Author:: Lili Chin, Geetha Govindasamy, and Md Nasrudin Md Akhir
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:: Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:: Since the 1950s, Japanese non-state actors in the international anti-nuclear weapons movement have disseminated the dangers of nuclear weapons, tied to Japanese experiences of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Coming from the only country that has experienced nuclear attacks, they provide much needed evidence of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons. These actors include survivors of the atomic bombings, commonly known as hibakusha, who have initiated and persistently maintained the humanitarian focus on nuclear discourse for decades. This paper examines their contributions to eyewitness testimonies on the impacts of nuclear weapons and their efforts leading to major milestones in international efforts for nuclear abolition. It also focuses on the roles played by the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization (Nihon Hidankyo) and the Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA), which made tremendous contributions facilitating the success of the World Court Project in the 1990s and the Humanitarian Initiative in the 2010s that led to the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Non-state Japanese contributions were, unfortunately, under-recognised, and the successes of international nuclear abolition were often attributed to other international actors. Hence, this paper recognises the contributions of non-state Japanese actors in sustaining the international anti-nuclear weapons movement and achieving the nuclear ban treaty.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Non State Actors, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

18. The Pandemic and its Impact on the South Korea-Japan Identity Clash

Author:: Scott Snyder
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The global pandemic caused by the onset of the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 has tested governance at both the national and international levels by challenging the capacity of nations to provide effective public health solutions to protect their citizenry. The pandemic has deepened preexisting international rivalries while also creating diplomatic opportunities to promote international cooperation and public diplomacy. Rather than serving as a turning point for a new era in international relations, the pandemic and the global response appear primarily to have accelerated preexisting trends. In Northeast Asia, the pandemic has accelerated deepening rivalry between the United States and China, reinforced political paralysis between Japan and South Korea, primarily by providing a pretext for privileging domestic concerns and constituencies at the expense of international relations, and has generated heightened new foreign policy challenges resulting from deepening identity-based major power rivalries. This chapter reviews the deepening of identity-based challenges facing Japan-South Korea relations prior to 2020, examines the conditions generated by leadership responses in both countries to the pandemic, identifies missed opportunities for pandemic-related cooperation between the two countries, and addresses challenges and opportunities facing the Japan-South Korea relationship in the context of anticipated recovery from the pandemic as well as the shifting geopolitical environment as tensions mount between China and the United States.
Topic:: Culture, Domestic Politics, COVID-19, and Identity
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

19. The Pandemic as a Geopolitical Game Changer in the Indo-Pacific: The View from Japan

Author:: Glen S. Fukushima
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The coronavirus pandemic that struck in late 2019 has affected the world profoundly, and Japan is no exception. But the direct impact on Japan has been relatively small considering the number of cases of infections and deaths relative to the size of Japan’s population, particularly considering its elderly population and high density. For instance, among the G7 countries, Japan has had the fewest cases of infections (4,690 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 32,276 in Canada, 40,620 in Germany, 64,804 in the United Kingdom, 66,828 in Italy, 86,283 in France, and 99,652 in the United States. Similarly, among the G7 countries, Japan has had by far the fewest number of deaths (81 per million population as of May 2, 2021) compared to 638 in Canada, 996 in Germany, 1,601 in France, 1,776 in the United States, 1,870 in the United Kingdom, and 2,004 in Italy. This chapter argues that although the direct disruptions to Japan resulting from the pandemic have been less than to the other G7 countries, the effect of the pandemic on other nations with strong geopolitical importance to Japan—in particular, the United States and China—coupled with changes in Japan’s domestic political and economic environment have accelerated changes in geopolitical posture and direction that were already in progress in Japan. The fundamental geopolitical challenge facing Japan is how to ensure its military security, political independence, and economic prosperity in the face of a less reliable and less predictable United States and a more powerful and more assertive China. For Japan, the ideal resolution of this challenge is to maintain positive and constructive relations with both countries, while recognizing the reality that even as economic ties with China—whether in trade, investment, finance, tourism, or the exchange of people—are growing relative to ties with the United States, political and security ties (and the sharing of common values) with the United States remain the centerpiece of Japan’s foreign policy. Given this context, it is only natural that Japan would seek to diversify and strengthen its relationships with other countries, regions, economic arrangements, and international organizations and institutions. This diversification, which could be seen since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, has gained momentum in recent years, and the pandemic has served only to accelerate it. The analysis proceeds through the examination of the following: 1) pandemic chronology; 2) Japan’s domestic politics; 3) relations with the United States; 4) relations with China; 5) Japan’s diversification strategy; and 6) conclusions.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

20. The Big Squeeze: Japanese Supply Chains and Great Power Competition

Author:: Mireya Solis
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Japan led, and was transformed, by the global supply chain revolution. Facing growing protectionism in industrialized markets and reeling from sharp yen appreciation in the aftermath of the 1985 Plaza Accord, Japanese firms responded with a drastic increase in their overseas investment activities. In so doing, many of these companies spearheaded the movement towards the fragmentation of production across national boundaries that sought efficiency gains by pooling the competitive advantages of different locations. Japan’s experience with the first supply chain revolution was transformative. It altered its export-led model with important implications for its foreign policy. Japanese investments in the United States helped abate trade frictions; integrated production was at the heart of the project to rebuild relations with China, and Japan’s lead as foreign investor in Southeast Asia has been a pillar of its blueprint for regional integration. The strains in the rules-based international trade order, however, have raised questions about the ability of global supply chains to continue to operate effectively. The U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry has manifested in a damaging trade war, and moves to restrict tech flows are creating decoupling pressures. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these trends with lockdowns that disrupt supply chains while export protectionism and calls to renationalize production are on the rise. The intensified risk environment could lead to a second supply chain revolution with a greater emphasis on redundancy and diversification and bifurcation of productive chains. How will Japan respond to the challenges to international production, a central engine of its economic prosperity, and with what consequences for its relations with major powers? To provide greater clarity on this overarching question, this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the central role of Japanese firms in the emergence and deepening of regional production networks. Although Japan’s overall share of intra-regional trade has decreased in the 21st century—in tandem with China’s rise as regional hub- Japanese firms have retained their central role in GVCs (Global Value Chains) through their advanced manufacturing capabilities. Section 2 offers a glimpse of past and recent supply chain shocks—China’s embargo of rare earth metals, the Great East Japan Earthquake in Tohoku, and the Japan-Korea export control dispute—to illustrate both sources of vulnerability and resilience of Japanese GVCs. Section 3 assesses the systemic shift brought about by revived great power competition, and identifies some early adjustment responses from Japanese firms to a new normal of heightened geopolitical tension.
Topic:: Economics, Strategic Competition, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

21. Medical Security, Covid Challenge and the U.S. - Japan Alliance

Author:: Kent Calder
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Fletcher Security Review
Institution:: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:: National security has been classically conceived as a narrowly military and state-centric concept, especially in the Western industrial world. Security is, generations of strategists and statesmen have told us, a matter of defending core nation-state values and interests by force of arms. Two world wars across the first half of the twentieth century, and a long nuclear confrontation to follow, engrained this military and state-centric conception deeply into global consciousness and public discourse. The tragic COVID-19 crisis now confronting us suggests that this logic may be flawed, or at least oversimplified. Over 2.3 million people worldwide died in the first year of this global pandemic, with well over 100 million infected. These figures are likely understated.44 Untold millions of people continue to suffer from “long COVID” maladies around the world.
Topic:: Economics, Health, National Security, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda

Author:: James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America

23. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Special Issue on Strategic Culture

Author:: Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, Evan Kerrane, Matthew Brummer, Eitan Oren, Katie C. Finlinson, Mark Briskey, Ben Connable, Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, Jeffrey Taylor, and Dr. Jose de Arimateia da Cruz
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: An ironic feature of U.S. strategic culture is a rather distinctive disinterest in the study of our own or others’ strategic cultures. The U.S. security institutions find themselves energized about cultural study during irregular conflicts in which the cost of cultural ignorance is made plain, but they persist in under developing the ability to apply that same cultural acumen to great power conflict and key relationships with allies. During the last 100 years of fighting, U.S. defense institutions have repeated a pattern of investing in cultural study during short bursts of counterinsurgency fighting and then abandoning it along with its lessons learned at the termination of conflict. As a consequence, U.S. planning efforts—including those now being designed for future great power conflict—suffer from an unnecessarily narrow optic and fail to account for the full range of perspectives and plausible courses of action considered by an adversary. America’s allies know it and are frustrated by it. More importantly, U.S. adversaries know it and plan to exploit it. The study of strategic culture accounts for the ways in which the culture of a group, whether it be the constructed culture of a nascent terrorist organization or the enduring culture of a nation, impacts thinking and decision making regarding defensive and offensive approaches to security. Within a complex state like Russia or China, one must account for sweeping national narratives that cultivate collective mentalities and impact decision making but must also include the internal cultures of key organizations within the nation’s security community. These organizations often develop distinctive identities, values, perceptions, and habits of practice that can be consequential in moments when the organization’s leaders wield instruments of state power. In the first section of this special edition of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) on strategic culture, Drs. Ali Parchami, Ofer Fridman, Neil Munro, W. A. Rivera, and Major Evan Kerrane provide strategic culture profiles on key U.S. adversaries: Iran, Russia, and China. Their work reflects the complexity involved in identifying and analyzing the narratives and drivers that compete for dominance across these three strategic culture landscapes. Acquainting ourselves with the multivariate and often-contested internal constructs that produce the behavior of our adversaries helps expand our own thinking about the range of possible and plausible competitive strategies we are likely to see from them. The second section of this issue highlights the utility of understanding not only U.S. adversaries but also American allies and partners. Drs. Matthew Brummer and Eitan Oren examine the effort by Japan’s military leaders to shift their own strategic culture through an influence campaign aimed at altering domestic perceptions concerning the appropriate role for the military and thereby expanding its ability to more actively cooperate with the United States in maintaining peace and stability in Asia. Whether they are successful has direct implications for U.S. alliance constructs in the Pacific and the action that might be reasonably expected from Japan should U.S. conflict with China become kinetic. Katie C. Finlinson offers analysis that benefits U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation efforts. She employs a two-tiered research approach— leveraging both strategic culture and analysis of national role conception—as a useful framework for assessing the propensity of the United Arab Emirates to consider weaponizing civilian nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. Finlinson offers an approach repeatable for other potential over-the-horizon states and demonstrates the interplay between a state’s strategic culture and powerful exogenous factors—like security assurances from the United States and potential nuclear acquisition by Iran—in determining outcomes. Finally, Dr. Mark Briskey offers a look at the aspects of Pakistan’s strategic culture that exist as an outgrowth of its army’s most formative historic experiences and have resulted in deeply entrenched perceptions of self, of key adversaries, and perceptions of the past that must be understood by Western partners seeking Pakistan’s cooperation and partnership in the region. Our third section offers a close look at the ways in which cultural analysis can illuminate policy options on particularly difficult problem sets. One of these is assessing will to fight on the part of both allies and adversaries. Dr. Ben Connable recommends a diagnostic tool developed and trialed by the Rand Corporation that demonstrates promise in advancing the ability of defense institutions to anticipate will to fight in kinetic conflicts but also will to act in consequential ways by great powers engaged in strategic competition. Benjamin Potter, Emilee Matheson, and Jeffrey Taylor follow with applications of the Cultural Topography Framework, an approach to cultural data assessment and application that benefits from the insights supplied by the sort of comprehensive strategic culture profiles offered in section one of this issue and translates these into actionable intelligence against discrete problem sets. Their work, respectively, illuminates policy options for containing a potentially escalatory situation in Transnistria, decreasing violence and looting through a more effective reintegration strategy for former members of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa, and reexamining the value of technological advances in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, which may be having a deleterious impact on its deterrence strategy. The special issue concludes with a review essay by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, which offers readers critical analysis of three volumes of strategic culture scholarship. The articles collected for the special issue demonstrate a range of ways in which the study of strategic culture delivers critical insights to policy planners and strategists. Understanding other great powers on their own terms—the identities they seek to establish or defend, the values that inform their policies, the norms of strategic competition or warfighting that they deem acceptable and effective, and the worldview they espouse (whether an accurate fit with objective realities or not)—prepares policy makers to craft plans and strategies in ways that are tailored for maximum advantage vis-à-vis a particular adversary. Given the steady shutdown of cultural inquiry labs and training facilities across the U.S. defense and security community, it is worth issuing a stern reminder that the advantage of knowing one’s enemy is far more consequential when engaged in great power conflict than in the irregular conflicts in which U.S. institutions have learned its worth. This issue of JAMS is provided as a resource to both reinforce that point and supply a wealth of initial material in advancing it.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, War, History, Power Politics, Realism, Strategic Competition, Resistance, Identity, and Strategic Culture
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Russia, Japan, Iran, Middle East, India, United Arab Emirates, and United States of America

24. Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?

Author:: Bahadir Pehlivanturk
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan’s potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Legislation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

25. From Panda to Dragon: An Analysis of China’s Maritime Actions and Reactions in the East China Sea and Their Implications since 2012

Author:: Alana Camoca Goncalves de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: In the 21st century, China’s rise has been shifting global and regional geopolitical scenari- os. Faced with its growth and fears of being perceived as a threat, China sought to associate its eco- nomic and political emergence with the preservation of the current international system, empha- sizing speeches about a peaceful development and harmonious world in which it would be an actor who wants to grow and accommodate the world order. However, changes in the balance of power and its continued rise have caused China’s behaviour to change in its own region, especially regard- ing maritime disputes and affecting other countries’ perceptions. By applying Neoclassical Realism, this paper analyses the Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century, elucidating its behaviour in terms of the country’s action and reactions regarding the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and shows the perceptions of other countries to that behaviour. The article concludes that perceptions concerning the balance of power, Chinese capabilities, nationalism, regime legitimacy, and on lead- ership images affect the intensity of Beijing’s responses and foreign policy about maritime territorial disputes. Also, the article shows that China’s growing assertiveness in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea is pushing countries that have territorial disputes with China to grow closer
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, and South China Sea

26. Mobilizing Resources and Signaling Intentions: a Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Japan’s Domestic and International Instrumentalization of the Senkaku Islands Dispute and China’s Maritime Assertiveness

Author:: Alana Camoca Gonclaves de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Using a neoclassical realist model, this paper builds an analytical model to understand how countries are able to change or adjust their security and foreign policies. The article analyzes Japan’s foreign and security policies under the Shinzo Abe government, exploring how the Japanese government’s internal and international propaganda on Chinese maritime assertiveness and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue influenced the government’s capacity to mobilize resources in order to transform security policies and legitimize Japan’s military role in the Asia Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Theory, Military Strategy, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

27. Buddhism and the Question of Relationality in International Relations

Author:: Kosuke Shimizu
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: Relationality seems to have attracted a broader audience in international relations (IR) in the last decade. Unlike other approaches of the relational turn that concentrate more on analyzing or stabilizing the international order, the Buddhist theory of IR is mainly concerned with the political practice of the liberation and healing of people. In this article, I will illustrate how Mahāyāna Buddhist teachings can contribute to IR by using case studies. The cases to investigate include the Okinawa base issue, Denmark’s ‘light in the darkness’, and South Korea-Japan diplomatic relations.
Topic:: Religion, Ethics, International Relations Theory, and Buddhism
Political Geography:: Japan, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and Denmark

28. The Clash of Japan’s FOIP and China’s BRI?

Author:: Daisuke Akimoto
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:: Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:: Since the late 2010s, the concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has been becoming increasingly significant in the international political arena. In August 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a policy of “Free and Open Indo- Pacific” (FOIP) as Japan’s new diplomatic vision at the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) VI held in Kenya. The FOIP strategy was supported by the Donald Trump administration followed by the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. However, China has viewed the FOIP as a containment strategy against the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The FOIP vision is unclear for general observers, and it might cause a security dilemma with the Chinese BRI. Is it possible for the FOIP vision to coexist with China’s BRI, or are these two strategic visions destined to clash with each other? In an attempt to answer these questions, the article aims to provide multiple perspectives of the FOIP concept by applying international relations (IR) theory. This article warns that the FOIP and the BRI are likely to bring about diplomatic tension that could be escalated into a military skirmish over the territorial dispute. In order to avoid the possible military clash, it finally seeks to explore possible future pathways of the peaceful coexistence of the two visions in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

29. The image of Chinese and Japanese Theatre in selected popular and artistic press printed in Poland in 1930s

Author:: Katarzyna Michalewicz
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:: Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:: Journalists who described Oriental theatres usually based their narrative on personal experience. Both specialist, mass and popular press paid particular attention to elements that distinguished Japanese and Chinese theatre from their European counterpart. The length of performance, innovative technical solutions, different acting style were the elements that received most attention. Nonetheless, sometimes it was impossible to explain the origins of those differences. Furthermore, the above-mentioned differences usually spoke against Chinese theatre. It was criticized for different music, moveable stage scenery, exaggerated acting that was hard to understand. Such attitude was the result of lack of understanding of Chinese opera’s conventions. On the other hand, press eagerly commended the richness of Chinese actors’ costumes and ,,shadow puppet theatre”. Moreover, Polish press also stressed that both classical and modern Chinese theatre enjoyed immense popularity among Chinese people. Polish press went easy on theatrical art in Japan depicting differences that were in many cases the same as in Chinese theatre as something neutral, even positive as it gave the play magical touch. Sometimes it was emphasized that Japanese theatre could become a source of inspiration for its European counterpart. It was praised for masks, costumes, moveable stage scenery and music. It is interesting that in the last two instances Chinese theatre was looked down on. Polish press also spoke favourably of puppet theatre and ,,Takarazuka” performances. On the other hand, magazines’ opinions on acting varied.
Topic:: History, Arts, Media, and Theater
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

30. The Diplomatic Conflict between South Korea and Japan: Has the Candlelight Revolution become the Curse of Liberal Democracy?

Author:: Jaejun Sung
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: This article will analyze why Moon’s administration have caused the current conflict with Japan and how the government has exploited the situation. In particular, this paper will examine the reason why Moon’s administration denies the “Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea” which was signed in 1965 and doggedly insists that Japan is responsible for this conflict. As the conclusion of this paper, we can see the issues occurring in South Korea regarding Japan can be attributable to the ideological basis.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Democracy, Conflict, Ideology, and Liberalism
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

31. Is Japan the “Britain” of East Asia? A Geopolitical Analysis of Japan’s Long-term Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Young-Hwan Shin
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:: Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:: Japan’s geographical location is often compared to that of the United Kingdom in Europe, and its strategic role is expected to correspond to Britain’s as a balancer that has endeavored to keep the European world from being dominated by a hegemony or hegemonic coalition of powers. his geographical resemblance infers that Japan will play the role of a British balancer in East Asia. However, Japan differs from the UK geopolitically. If it were a balancer, Japan would welcome a more stable Korean Peninsula able to manage unexpected provocation from the North. Instead, Japan is skeptical about today’s changing inter-Korean situation, following the Panmunjom Declaration on 27 April 2018. It needs to be understood that Japan has lain within a different geopolitical environment from Britain in Europe, which influenced different strategic choices in the history of East Asia.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Seapower, and Insularity
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korean Peninsula

32. Spring 2020 edition of Contemporary Eurasia

Author:: Vahram Ter–Matevosyan
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contemporary Eurasia
Institution:: Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia
Abstract:: CONTENTS LILIT HARUTYUNYAN THE NEW IMAGE OF THE BUSINESS ELITE IN LEBANESE POLITICS: RAFIK AND SAAD HARIRI, NAJIB MIKATI AND ISSAM FARES .......................................................................................... 4 YEVA HARUTYUNYAN JAPAN’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY IN CENTRAL ASIA ........................................................................................................ 25 LILIT MAYILYAN UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS OF TURKISHAZERBAIJANI RELATIONS: “ONE NATION, TWO STATES?” ...... 39 ASTGHIK HAYRAPETYAN MANIFESTATIONS OF NEOCONSERVATISM IN US MIDDLE EAST POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (2001-2009) ............................................................................ 68 AUTHORS LIST .................................................................................... 87 ANNEX ................................................................................................... 88
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Business, Economic Cooperation, and Neoconservatism
Political Geography:: Japan, Central Asia, Eurasia, Turkey, Armenia, and Lebanon

33. Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 2020

Author:: Gilbert Rozman, Mark Tokola, Gilbert Rozman, Dmitri V. Trenin, Yuki Tatsumi, Kathryn Botto, Rush Doshi, Scott W. Harold, See-Won Byun, Cheol Hee Park, Brad Glosserman, Charles W. Boustany Jr., Matthew Goodman, Wonho Yeon, and Kitti Prasirtsuk
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The experts in this volume have thoughtfully addressed themes that are pervasive throughout Asia and are timely for the U.S.-Korea alliance. With the future of Northeast Asia in flux, political leaders are hoping to transform their respective visions into the path forward for the region. Authors in the first section analyze the frameworks of U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in to discern the currents underlying geopolitical developments in the region. The second section examines the role of national identity in key bilateral Indo-Pacific relationships where geopolitical fault lines have become clearer. Chapters in this section cover the India-China, U.S.-China, South Korea-China, and South Korea-Japan dyads. The final section provides insights into how several of China’s neighbors and the United States are responding to its economic rise, which, of course, are also guided by strategic concerns. Considering how COVID-19 has exacerbated the rivalry between Washington and Beijing as well as the influence this relationship carries in shaping the future of the region, the contributions here are particularly relevant and timely.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Economics, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

34. Strategic Ambivalence: Japan’s Conflicted Response

Author:: Matthew Goodman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Abe administration has adopted a strategy that combines three main lines of effort: enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement with Beijing; hedging and balancing, including deepening integration with other countries of the Indo-Pacific region and attempting to keep the United States engaged in the Indo-Pacific region; and leadership on regional and global economic rule-making. The main strands of this approach are likely to continue after Abe leaves office, though uncertainty surrounds them all.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

35. Japanese Views of South Korea: Enough is Enough

Author:: Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: While the sources of contention are deep and enduring, relations between Japan and South Korea have been especially troubled in the last few years. The two countries are grappling with deeply entrenched, emotional legacies that have been inflamed by recent controversies, rendering history both immediate and real. This chapter explores Japan’s perception of and reaction to those events. While it aims to provide an objective assessment of Japanese thinking, it does not purport to be even-handed or balanced. It is an analysis of the Japanese view of the relationship with South Korea. To be brief and blunt, Japanese are frustrated with and angered by South Koreans. Frustrated because they have been unable to build a future with them that rests on a foundation of shared concerns and values; domestic politics continues to override strategic interests. Angry because Korean complaints deny the many changes that have occurred in Japan since the end of World War II. Japanese do not deny that atrocities took place, but they are offended when they are laid at the feet of current generations. A growing number of Japanese believe that Koreans prefer to occupy the moral high ground over building a mutually beneficial long-term partnership. This belief increasingly colors the way that Korean actions and statements are interpreted.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

36. South Korean Views of Japan: A Polarizing Split in Coverage

Author:: Cheol Hee Park
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: South Korean views of Japan are neither uniform nor unified. Considering that national strategic identities are competing even within a single country, it is not strange at all that South Koreans have complex and fragmented views of Japan. Depending on their ideological and dispositional orientations, South Koreans hold varying perceptions about Japan. It is much more so in the age of ideological polarization. Not only in the United States, but also in South Korea, identity politics more and more dominate. Widespread social networking service communications made tribal communications, instead of mass communications, permeate the society, which strengthened the trend of polarization. Increasingly people do not cross over ideological divides or social cleavage lines, creating islands of tribes to convince themselves in a particular way. The combination of ideological divide and tribal communications opens an unexplored political domain of contending views in a society. This chapter aims to delineate the development of complex and divided South Korean views of Japan, especially under the Moon administration. It shows South Korea divided within. Then it analyzes the rise of anti-Japanese elements in Moon’s handling of Japan affairs after 2017. Careful analysis of the Moon government’s posture toward Japan reveals that such aspects can be visibly identified. I also analyze the political background of rising anti- Japanese elements within the ruling party of South Korea, while attempting to show that alternative views of Japan are widely available despite the Moon government’s generally negative posture toward Japan. Based on a review of newspaper columns and civic initiatives for reconciling with Japan, this study further illustrates the existence of modest alternative views that are different from the government position. This clearly reflects that South Korea’s discursive space remains relatively democratic and plural. Finally, I address the question of whether political and diplomatic tensions would increase or decrease in the process of South Korean and Japanese interactions. Prescriptions are highly conditional in a sense that the level of tensions will be determined by the way interactions address the issues in contention. I take the position that there is not a single view but multiple and divided views of Japan in South Korea, particularly under the Moon administration. Although the Moon government contains a strong anti-Japanese and nationalist orientation, conservative intellectuals keep a moderate, cooperative stance toward Japan. One can find increasing diversity despite intense bilateral controversies over contemporary and past issues. I conclude that tensions between South Korea and Japan originate from political elites, rather than the general populace. Narrowing the perception gap between political leaders may be easier to do in bettering the relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

37. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

38. Tariffs and Monetary Policy: A Toxic Mix

Author:: Michael D Bordo and Mickey D. Levy
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Cato Journal
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The ratcheting up of tariffs and the Fed’s discretionary conduct of monetary policy are a toxic mix for economic performance. Escalating tariffs and President Trump’s erratic and unpredictable trade policy and threats are harming global economic performance, distorting monetary policy, and undermining the Fed’s credibility and independence. President Trump’s objectives to force China to open access to its markets for international trade, reduce capital controls, modify unfair treatment of intellectual property, and address cybersecurity issues and other U.S. national security issues are laudable goals with sizable benefits. However, the costs of escalating tariffs are mounting, and the tactic of relying exclusively on barriers to trade and protectionism is misguided and potentially dangerous. The economic costs to the United States so far have been relatively modest, dampening exports, industrial production, and business investment. However, the tariffs and policy uncertainties have had a significantly larger impact on China, accentuating its structural economic slowdown, and are disrupting and distorting global supply chains. This is harming other nations that have significant exposure to international trade and investment overseas, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Germany. As a result, global trade volumes and industrial production are falling. Weaker global growth is reflected in a combination of a reduction in aggregate demand and constraints on aggregate supply.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, Economic Growth, Tariffs, and Industry
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, Germany, North America, and United States of America

39. The Relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan: 1950 to 2018

Author:: Michael MacArthur Bosack
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United Nations Command is the multinational headquarters that led the allied forces in the Korean War. The command’s Military Armistice Commission supervises the Armistice Agreement. While the United Nations Command and its activities are common knowledge in the Republic of Korea, the command’s long-standing organization and functions in Japan are less well known. This relationship began in 1950 and is codified in the 1954 United Nations-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. The command’s rear area headquarters, the aptly named United Nations Command-Rear Headquarters, has managed this relationship since 1957. After decades of few changes, the United Nations Command and its Sending States broadened traditional roles and missions from Japan beginning in the early 2000s. This led to expanded activities within the legal framework and security mandate governing the United Nations Command’s relationship with Japan, strengthening Japan’s ties with the command’s member states, and supporting the “maximum pressure” campaign against North Korea. This paper examines the relationship between the United Nations Command and Japan, beginning with the institutions and interests underpinning the relationship. Next, it describes the Status of Forces Agreement and how the relationship functions. The paper concludes with a discussion of relevant policy issues, limitations to greater cooperation, and opportunities for expanded roles within the framework of the relationship.
Topic:: International Relations, History, Military Affairs, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, United Nations, and United States of America

40. The Origins of the Korean Language: A Linguist’s Perspective

Author:: J. Marshall Unger
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: On the basis of the comparative method, developed over more than two centuries of empirical study, the best results to date are that the presentday Korean and Japanese languages had a common source, called protoKorean-Japanese. Korean and Japanese are more similar to one another than either is to any of the languages spoken in adjacent parts of Asia. That is as far as pure linguistics takes us at present. Other scientific disciplines must be utilized to determine when and where proto-Korean-Japanese was spoken, when its speakers separated into pre-Korean and pre-Japanese groups, and when the descendants of those groups resumed contact on the Korean peninsula prior to the migration of most pre-Japanese speakers to Japan.
Topic:: Migration, History, Linguistics, and Language
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Korea

41. Wartime Experiences and Indigenous Identities in the Japanese Empire

Author:: Lin Poyer and Futuru Tsai
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Further research on the operations of empire and on Indigenous histories offers the opportunity to examine how Indigenous communities in the Japanese Empire experienced competing currents of loyalty and identity during the Pacific War. This article examines how three Indigenous populations—Ainu, Indigenous Taiwanese and Micronesian Islanders—survived the ideological and social pressures of an empire at war and, despite the intense assimilationist demands of Japan’s kōminka program and traumatic wartime experiences, retained cultural identities sufficiently robust to allow expression at the end of the century in the form of action to maintain community lives apart from, while engaged with, the nation-state.
Topic:: Culture, Empire, World War II, and Indigenous
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

42. Japanese Media: Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next?

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Japanese coverage of the diplomacy between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un as well as the broader spectrum of international relations over North Korea has been intensive over the first months of 2019. Assessments of what to expect and then what really happened involve interpretations of North Korean intentions, the character of U.S. diplomacy, the role of South Korean diplomacy, the impact of China, and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia. Each development over this period has been scrutinized closely, often with an addendum: What does it mean for Japan? The fate of North Korea looms very large for a nation fearful of a missile attack from it, cognizant of the absence of any settlement after 1945 of its claims against Japan’s occupational conduct, and nervous about the regional balance of power and U.S. trustworthiness as an ally and nuclear umbrella, when the United States itself is quickly coming under threat from the North’s nuclear weapons. Below, the views on the political right range from Sankei Shimbun to the establishmentoriented Yomiuri Shimbun, and on the political left from Asahi Shimbun to Tokyo Shimbun. While editorials figure heavily into the analysis, much of the regular news coverage also serves to differentiate Japanese sources. What negative outcomes does Japan fear from the success or failure of ongoing diplomacy over North Korea? In recent coverage we can identify at least eight worrisome outcomes: 1) failure of the talks resulting in a war scare beyond what occurred in 2017; 2) suspension of U.S.-DPRK talks and China as well as Russia breaking with the UN sanctions regime, fueling prospects of three-way coordination with China taking the lead; 3) discord about how to proceed with damaging U.S.-ROK relations, weakening the U.S. military presence in South Korea at a cost to Japan’s defense; 4) South Korea splitting with the U.S. on the North and raising the specter of inter-Korean nationalism deemed hostile to Japan; 5) success of the talks based on “America First,” agreeing to a deal on denuclearization (as a process) that leaves Japan’s concerns about missiles and abductees aside, isolating Japan; 6) success of the talks leading toward reunification, also strengthening national identity versus Japan; 7) a new geopolitical framework replacing the talks, as the U.S. retreats from the region; and 8) a period of instability, where Trump only delays making decisions and Japan is left frustrated. Four general responses to the Hanoi Summit and its early aftermath could be discerned in Japanese publications: 1) Trump outfoxed Kim, has a strategy reassuring to Japan, and the outcome in sight is positive; 2) Trump erred in his diplomacy but has been brought to his senses and now will follow a course welcome in Japan, however uncertain the outcome; 3) the situation is growing more dangerous, Trump does not know what to do, and Japan has to keep its eyes on the other players; and 4) Trump will renew diplomacy, keeping Japan off balance in coordinating with the U.S. as Japan struggles with its isolation in this diplomacy. When anticipating what should come next, sources understandably suggest what their own government should do. Many in Japan emphasize the abductions issue and willingness to offer economic assistance when that along with denuclearization and missiles is addressed. One can discern how Abe Shinzo should proceed in diplomacy with each of the leaders active in the region. Of course, most attention centers on how he should deal with Trump or the alliance.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and North Korea

43. Why Did the Hanoi Summit Fail and What Comes Next? Coverage in Four Countries

Author:: Gilbert Rozman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The summit on February 27-28 in Hanoi between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un ended on a sour note, casting doubt on the one-year old diplomatic process that had produced an upbeat summit between the two in Singapore the previous June. Much speculation followed on what had gone wrong, who was to blame, and how diplomacy could be put back on track. Given the importance of the four countries caught between the U.S. and North Korea in setting the course for addressing the North Korean challenge, their media and journal coverage of the state of diplomacy after the Hanoi summit merits close attention, which is provided below. The following chapters examine how the South Korean, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian media and journal articles have covered the Hanoi summit and its immediate aftermath. They tell us about the hopes and concerns of four countries and point to differences in thinking about the nature of the diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea and the expectations for what will follow. Coverage ranges from anticipation of the summit in the first two months of 2019 to immediate reporting on what transpired on February 27-28 to interpretations over the next month or longer of the impact of the summit for U.S. and North Korean policy and for the geopolitics of Northeast Asia and, specifically, the foreign policies of each of the four countries. Each chapter pays special heed to the apprehensions related to the talks or how they could leave one’s country in dire straits, and to the range of responses to what is transpiring. Close attention is given to what one’s own country should do either if progress is made in diplomacy or if a breakdown occurs. Also of interest is whether coordination with other states is sought.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

44. Redefining U.S.-Japan Trade Relations Under Trump

Author:: Shihoko Goto
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Trump administration has had no qualms about going against conventional U.S. policy norms and long-established rules of engagement. Thinking outside of the box has not been without its merits; it has certainly led to much-needed reassessment of practices that could benefit from change. The greatest risk of such change, however, is when policy shifts are sudden, unexpected, and unexplained, especially with long-established partner nations. In the two years since President Donald Trump took office, the single biggest challenge for key U.S. allies has been to scramble to adapt to those drastic changes. That, in turn, has led them to reexamine and even alter their own longer-term strategies. For Japan, the pressure to adapt to such changes has been particularly intense, given its continued dependence on the United States for security in an increasingly unstable region on the one hand, and its reliance on robust trade relations with the world’s largest economy on the other. At the midway point of the Trump administration, Japan has actually emerged stronger over the past two years, at least on the trade front. Against the odds and defying expectations, it has succeeded in strengthening its position as a stabilizing force amid ongoing uncertainties in global trade rules. Yet, its success so far does not mean that the latter half of Trump’s tenure will be smooth sailing for Tokyo. In fact, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s balancing act of managing robust relations with the United States while ensuring Japan’s own economic interests may prove to be more difficult. The challenge is to further the gains it has made as an economic stabilizer, even as that outcome will redefine its broader role as a champion of the liberal international order, which has been put on shakier ground.
Topic:: Economics, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and United States of America

45. Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and Korean Strategies for Northeast Asian Cross-Border Energy Connectivity

Author:: Gaye Christoffersen
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In 2018, research was underway in Northeast Asia on several trilateral and multilateral initiatives for cross-border infrastructure connectivity involving China, Russia, both Koreas, and Japan. Infrastructure included railway lines, cross-border oil and gas pipelines, and power grids. Although most discussions of infrastructure group energy and railroad infrastructure together, energy infrastructure differs from rail transport due to a greater potential for asymmetrical dependence. Reviewing these projects, this chapter analyzes and compares the strategies of the five parties in the region that are exploring new connectivity.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and Korea

46. Japan's Strategy to Keep the North Koreans and Chinese Down, the Americans in, and the Russians Neutral

Author:: James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Japanese government makes no secret of its intensifying security concerns. The Ministry of Defense’s most recent annual white paper includes the assessment that, “The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.” The report is also explicit about the source of these challenges. The most immediate danger is identified as North Korea, whose “military development such as its nuclear and missile development constitute unprecedented, serious and imminent threats to the security of Japan.” Second on the list is China, which is singled out for the non-transparent strengthening of its armed forces, as well as the increase in its military activities in the vicinity of Japan. Lastly, the white paper notes that “Russia has been modernizing its forces including its nuclear capability not only in the Europe region but in the periphery of Japan,” and that close attention needs to be paid to these developments. The country faces not only the individual security challenges posed by North Korea, China, and Russia, but also the danger of increased cooperation between these three nuclear-armed neighbors. What is more, at just the time when Tokyo needs reliable partners, it finds itself dealing with a South Korean government that it considers chronically untrustworthy and a U.S. administration that often seems less like a loyal friend and more like an increasingly expensive supplier of commercial security services. Having identified the nature of this problem, the remainder of this essay focuses on explaining Japan’s strategy for addressing it. It does so by adapting Lord Ismay’s famous description of the fundamental goal of NATO as being to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”13 Correspondingly, Japan’s current strategy can be characterized as aiming to keep the North Koreans and Chinese down, the Americans in, and the Russians neutral. After outlining the details of each part of this strategy, the essay will identify the main challenges to overcome in its implementation.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and National Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, North Korea, and United States of America

47. Japan: A Nuclear State?

Author:: Henrique Altemani de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Japan is often seen as pacifist and as a defender of nuclear disarmament. This article, though, sustains that Japan is basing its security on extended nuclear deterrence, and on the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. In the first part of the article, the role of extended deterrence in the relationship with the U.S. is analyzed, and in the second, the history of the Japanese nuclear option since the end of the Second World War is reassessed.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

48. Hidden Memory and Memorials The Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb and the Remembrance of Korean Victims

Author:: Olga Barbasiewicz
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: During World War II, Americans dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Due to this atrocity, around 140,000 human beings lost their lives. Almost 20% of them were Koreans. It resulted in the sudden capitulation of Japan and caused the so called higaisha ishiki (awareness of being a victim) among Japanese society. Unfortunately, the question of Korean atomic blast victims has been forgotten and the Monument raised in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb was placed in the peripheries of the Park. The aim of this paper is to analyze Hiroshima Memorial Park monuments, as locations that serve as political tools, with special emphasis on the issue of the Monument in Memory of Korean Victims of the A-bomb, which characterizes Japanese politics of remembrance towards Korea.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Memory, World War II, and Remembrance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

49. Japan and the United States: The Future of Global Partnership

Author:: H.E. Shinsuke J. Sugiyama
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: When I was appointed as Japan’s Ambassador to the United States in early 2018, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other political leaders had very clear instructions to me: they told me to go outside of the Capital Beltway as often as possible to explore the many communities that make up the United States of America. Following this instruction, I have visited nearly 30 states so far. As a diplomat who has frequently interacted with the United States during my career, even I was surprised by the depth of my feelings during these visits. I am finding that this is truly the “United” States of America! In city after city, even as people express worries about the current state of the world, they also mention that the Japan-U.S. alliance and the ties between our people have become a stable constant in these unsettled times. I believe that this full maturation of the Japan-U.S. relationship into a global partnership will allow us to build a more peaceful and prosperous world together.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. The 10th Special Measures Agreement between the U.S. and South Korea: Analysis and Implications for Northeast Asia

Author:: Elton J. Chun
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:: International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:: The United States and the Republic of Korea concluded the 10th Special Measures Agreement on February 10, 2019. The two countries agreed to a one-year agreement after difficult negotiations in which Washington demanded that Seoul increase the amount paid to offset the costs of stationing American forces in Korea. Since 1991, Washington and Seoul have concluded 10 Special Measures Agreements. Unlike the previous five-year agreement, the 10th SMA was a “stopgap deal” that covered a one year of bilateral defense budgets with an option of extending the agreement for an additional year; it was the first SMA negotiated by the Trump administration. This article examines the 10th Special Measures Agreement, exploring the history of defense cost sharing between the two countries, effects on South Korea, implications for coordinating policy on North Korea, and influences on Japan, Russia, and China. The article concludes with an assessment on how the 10th Special Measures Agreement and other factors will affect future agreements.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS