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Begin New Search Topic Communism Political Geography Europe Content Type Journal Article Publication Year within 25 Years

1. The Georgian Herald Samizdat Journal

Author:
Aleksandra Gryzlak
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
From the very beginnings of Soviet rule in Georgia, the communists were not very popular throughout Georgian society and treated as occupants. Almost all active forms of resistance ceased to exist after the bloody suppression of the August Uprising of 19241. The massive purge of the Georgian intelligentsia that followed deprived the nation of its patriotic elites. Only after the death of Stalin and in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech in 1956, did the situation change. Khrushchev’s words of accusation and criticism, leveled at Stalin for his cult of personality and other mistakes, were treated in Georgia as an attack on their nation and an element of Russian chauvinism. It gave rise to a series of mass protests in Tbilisi in March 1956, that were brutally dispersed by the army. Approxi- mately 150 people died as a result2. During the 1950s and 60s, Vasilii Mzhavanadze was the leader of the Georgian Com- munist Party. In keeping with Khrushchev’s strategy of somewhat reduced control over the national republics, one could observe a consolidation of power by the ruling elite in Geor- gia3. This led to the spread of corruption, bribery and other illegal economic operations. Despite a weak economy, according to official statistics, the average Georgian’s savings in the 1970s were nearly twice that of the average Russian. Also, during this time, a very high number of educated specialists – who while graduating, did not take job assignments were still able to live reasonably well. Another phenomenon characteristic for the 1950s and 60s was a growing sense of nationalism. Symptoms of this included a relatively small number of national minority representatives able to gain access to higher education in the Georgian Republic, as well as clear-cut Georgian control over local and national party structures. The situation did not change after the fall of Khrushchev.4 Only in the early 1970s, did things start to change. In 1972, the key position of the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party was passed to the former Minister of the Inte- rior – Eduard Shevardnadze, who began his rule with a broad campaign against corruption, overgrown bureaucracy, nepotism, and the so-called “second economy” (black market). Harsh administrative methods used in this campaign brought some positive effects – especially in the agricultural sector – but also resulted in a negative reaction from Georgian society5. Shevardnadze was also supposed to fight against growing Georgian nationalism. Campaigns, that condemned such things as reluctance to learn Russian lan- guage and promotion of national chauvinism in culture, were initiated. The teaching cur- riculum of the subject of history was also put under siege by the new authorities.
Topic:
Agriculture, Communism, Corruption, Human Rights, Nationalism, and Culture
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and Georgia

2. Introduction to the Round Table on Building a Modern and Robust Banking System: Poland’s Experience after 1989

Author:
Stefan Kawalec
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Poland was the first country of the Soviet bloc in which a non-communist government was created following the period of the cold war. This was the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki called into being on September 12, 1989. The government announced imme- diately that the economic system would be changed. The government did not propose a third way. It said that a market economy would be introduced, based on private ownership with a freely exchangeable currency. After this transformation of the socialist economy into a capitalist economy was announced, the government acted very quickly to realize this goal. The change of the economic system entailed a great undertaking, consisting of the creation of a banking system adapted to the needs of a market economy. In the socialist economy, there was no money in the true sense of the word. Money served only a certain limited purpose related to the distribution of consumer goods, but not for all such goods. A significant portion of consumer goods were distributed through the use of ration cards, special coupons or through informal channels such as sales made under the counter. En- terprises had their inputs and outputs rationed. The simple fact that an enterprise had złotys on its account did not give the enterprise the right to buy the necessary goods, if the rights to obtain such goods were not included in the appropriate distribution list. Having złotys was also insufficient for purchasing goods from abroad. For that one needed foreign currency -- which also was rationed in accordance with the distribution lists.
Topic:
Communism, Democracy, Finance, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

3. The Rebirth of Polishness in the Baltic States as a Result of the Crisis and the Collapse of the USSR: The Case of Lithuania

Author:
Marcin Wakar
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In turn, the term glasnost’, that is transparency, referred to various areas of life, but above all to media policy. The top-down pressures as well as personnel changes in the leading editorial offices led to the disclosure of information that has been censored so far. However, as noted by Canadian historian David Roger Marples: “In general, more progres- sive reportages could be found in the central press rather than in individual republics, with a notable exception to the Baltic states”8. Although perestroika in the initial years contained processes with varying effects, it finally ended in defeat. The failure of perestroika cou- pled with the success of glasnost, therefore made it impossible to cover up the first one. Additionally, it all happened during a lack of political unity in the Kremlin9. What’s more, Gorbachev’s policy led to a situation in which: „A sense of national identity was growing significantly in each of the republics belonging to the USSR. It also had a huge impact on the mood of all groups of national minorities, reflected in the desire to revive and preserve their mother tongue and national traditions”10. Thus, an increase in the consciousness of belonging to a particular nation was, on one hand, a factor leading to the desire for independence by societies of individual republics, and on the other hand, had a decisive influence on the revival of the identity of national minorities in their territory.
Topic:
Communism, Nationalism, Minorities, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Poland, and Soviet Union

4. Party Education, Propaganda Instrument for the Collectivization in Romania. Case Study: Argeș Region (1950–1952)

Author:
Antonio Manuel Tudorache
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Hiperboreea
Institution:
Balkan History Association
Abstract:
Party education had an important role in the dynamics of the collectivization process in Romania. The enrolment and “education” of a large number of officers, who were willing to implement by any means necessary the policy of the party, were an essential factor in the success of the collectivization campaign. In the meantime, the progress of party education in the rural areas was used in many communities. As such, they were compelled to reorganise their own social and economic mechanisms so that they would correspond to the ones that the communist regime would accept.
Topic:
Communism, History, Medieval History, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Europe and Romania

5. Revolution, Civil War, and the 'Long' First World War in Russia

Author:
Evan Mawdsley
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This essay has two related themes. The first is the causal link between the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The second is the periodization of Russia’s crisis; in particular the essay examines the ‘continuum’ between the First World War, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War of 1917-20 which formed, for Russia at least, a ‘long’ First World War. The link between war and revolution is important, especially as Imperial Russia was the only major participant in the Great War to fall victim to radical political overturn during the conflict, and the only one which continued to fight in 1917 after a drastic change of government. One of the most famous documents relating to the war-revolution link was a memorandum written by P. I. Durnovo to Emperor Nicholas II in February 1914, six months before the outbreak of the Great War. Durnovo had been Minister of the Interior during the 1905 Revolution; following his ministerial appointment he was one of the leaders of the State Council. The 1914 memorandum warned about the extreme danger of becoming involved in a war with Germany. [I]n the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable .... [I]t will start with the blaming of the government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against [the government] will begin, followed by revolutionary manifestations throughout the country, with socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the complete division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the opposition parties of the intelligentsia, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless of stem the popular tide, aroused in fact by themselves, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the end-result of which cannot be foreseen.1 Durnovo died in 1915 and did not live to see how closely his fears would correspond to reality. However, since his Memorandum was published by the Soviet historians in 1922 it has been noted for its predictive quality; a recent Russian biography was published with the title ‘Russian Nostradamus’.2 Meanwhile, the notion of continuum has recently become an important theme in the study of early twentieth-century Russia, as the centenary of those events is reached. A major international research project, ‘Russia's Great War & Revolution’, is currently under development; it aims to ‘fundamentally transform understanding of Russia's “continuum of crisis” during the years 1914-1922’. The key phrase comes from the subtitle (Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921) of a 2002 book by Peter Holquist’s on the Don region.3 To make more sense of both the link between war and revolution and the continuum, the period 1914-1920 can be divided into four periods - 1914-1917, 1917, 1917-18, and 1918-20.
Topic:
Communism, World War I, Revolution, and Russian Revolution
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

6. Cosmos, chaos: finance, power and conflict

Author:
Harold James
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Institution:
Chatham House
Abstract:
A spectre is haunting the world: 1914. The approaching centenary of the outbreak of the First World War is a reminder of how the instability produced by changes in the relative balance of power in an integrated or globalized world may produce cataclysmic events. Jean-Claude Juncker, the veteran Prime Minister of Luxem-bourg and chair of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, started 2013 by warning journalists that they should take note of the parallels with 1913, the last year of European peace. He was referring explicitly to new national animosities fanned by the European economic crisis, with a growing polarization between North and South. Historically, the aftermath and the consequences of such cataclysms have been extreme. George Kennan strikingly termed the 1914–18 conflict 'the great seminal catastrophe of this century'. Without it, fascism, communism, the Great Depression and the Second World War are all almost impossible to imagine.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Communism, Economics, Politics, and War
Political Geography:
Europe