Sino-Iranian economic ties have grown increasingly robust over the past 40 years despite efforts by the international community to strengthen the diplomatic and economic isolation of Iran vis-à-vis an ever-intensifying sanctions regime. As other nations retreat from their interactions with Iran, China benefits from consistent access to its oil and gas reserves in an environment of minimal international competition. Through this relationship, Iran finds a market for its vast oil and gas assets, as well as a partner through which to obtain support for infrastructure projects. It also benefits from importing China's refined gasoline for internal consumption, as Iran does not possess the internal capacity to produce refined petroleum in sufficient quantities to meet internal demand.
What impact does ideology have on American attitudes and policy preferences toward China? Based on two large N surveys, we first utilize exploratory factor analysis to uncover six distinct American ideological dimensions and two distinct dimensions of attitudes toward China that distinguish between its government and its people. We then utilize structural equation modeling to explore how attitudes toward the Chinese people (i.e. prejudice) and attitudes toward the Chinese government differentially mediate relationships between ideological beliefs, on the one hand, and Americans' China policy preferences, on the other. Results suggest both direct and indirect effects of ideology on policy preferences, with the latter effects being differentially mediated by prejudice and attitudes toward the Chinese government.
This study sets out to analyze strategic relations of two major donors – the United States and China – in delivering food aid to North Korea in the 1990s. By reviewing the historical evolution of US–China strategic relations in line with food aid and adopting a game model to verify historical findings, it addresses two significant observations. First, the North Korean food aid dynamics were constructed and crystallized by donors' strategic interactions, rather than humanitarian intention to save the famine-stricken North Korea. Both donors first took into account strategic interests in aid dynamics, and then utilized food aid as a strategic instrument for their own purposes. Second, any multilateral cooperation for delivering food aid to North Korea dooms to failure, despite the potential of aid coordination among donor states. Donors' competition for the primacy in the region of Northeast Asia hampered policy coordination for institutionalizing aid networks. It is concluded that the two donors were bound to strategize food aid as a logical outgrowth of their own interests in the wake of North Korea's humanitarian disasters.
Political Geography:
United States, China, North Korea, and Northeast Asia