Search

Begin New Search Topic Bilateral Relations Political Geography China Content Type Journal Article

21. Deciphering Pakistan Navy’s Role in CPEC Security: A Comprehensive Security Approach

Author:
Shabana Fayyaz and Nabeel Hussain
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Contemporary geo-political and geo-economics potentialities creates new horizons for the bilateral relations between states. These potential arrangements require security as a pre-requisite, both traditional and nontraditional domain. Pakistan Navy is dealing with these security threats from a comprehensive security approach. Through Task Force-88 and Task Force-150 as well as the Force Protection Battalion (FPB) for the security of CPEC from foreign actors, it has made enormous efforts to protect the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) from new challenges and threats. This demonstrates that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Pakistan Navy might accomplish compressive security through joint efforts. The protection and defence of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and the maritime-based economy are also enshrined in Pakistan's maritime doctrine. The Pakistan Navy's active engagement in Pakistan's security sector has also opened doors for the improvement of bilateral ties between various countries through the AMAN Exercises, a global collaboration of 45 nations to combat rising security threats.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Non-Traditional Threats, and CPEC
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, and South Asia

22. Sino-Iranian Relations and Their Impact on South and Central Asia

Author:
Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In July 2020, a draft text of a series of Sino‑Iranian agreements outlining a comprehensive 25‑year strategic partnership between Iran and China was leaked. The leaked text accords presaged the formal accords signed in 2021 whose text has not been released. These agreements fundamentally transformed Sino‑Iranian relations and also converted the Middle East into another theater of the global Sino‑American confrontation. That latter consideration shows that the significance of these accords transcends the Middle East. Although most Western commentary naturally emphasize the Sino‑American and Middle Eastern repercussions of these accords, we cannot neglect their no less enormous impact on Central and South Asia and focus on those unduly neglected issues. China’s agreement to the terms, as leaked—$400 billion in investments in Iran over 25 years, particularly in large scale transportation energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, projects, and access to Iranian ports—signified a vast expansion of China’s policy of forming a global network of partnerships with countries wary of American dominance. Even if this is more a declaration of intent than what will actually happen, the parties’ intentions are clearly serious. The agreements also stipulated that these programs would come under the administrative rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s signature policy, and very much a Chinese‑directed series of projects. Commitments on this scale also clearly denote a major new strategic orientation by China and Iran. Even observers who underplay these revelations like Jonathan Fulton, a Non‑Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, concede their dramatic impact on Sino‑Iranian relations and world politics more generally. This is particularly significant as China does not cavalierly establish comprehensive strategic partnerships (CSP) with other states. For example, China has signed such agreements with other Gulf states like Saudi Arabia—so signing one with Riyadh’s main Middle Eastern revival cannot have been a routine or impulsive decision. Neither will its impact be restricted to the Gulf and Middle East. A CSP is (or was, before the February 2022 agreement with Russia) the highest level in China’s hierarchy of diplomatic relations. In a CSP, the partner states commit to the “full pursuit of cooperation and development on regional and international affairs.” Since Beijing does not offer this level of partnership easily, as Fulton has also observed, a state receiving that status must be perceived by China as playing an important political and economic role internationally, and the bilateral relationship must already feature a high level of political trust, dense economic relations, and a strong, well‑established relationship in other areas.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

23. U.S. Relations With China: DACOR Conference Summary

Author:
Keith McCormick and Emma W. Sandifer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
As relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) loom ever larger for the U.S., DACOR’s annual conference in 2022 focused on “Balancing Competing Interests in U.S. Relations With China.” The Washington-based organization of foreign affairs professionals brought together diplomats and academics to explore the idea that U.S. policy toward China needs to pursue cooperation in some areas and competition in others while simultaneously confronting Beijing and preparing to deter or win a conflict, if it comes to war. The hybrid conference, with some attendees present at the historic DACOR-Bacon house and others joining online, was conducted under Chatham House Rules. The keynote address, by Ambassador (ret.) J. Stapleton Roy, was live-streamed to a classroom of political science faculty and students at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Bilateral Relations, Trade, and Conference
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Meloni at the Helm: What Does Italy’s New Government Mean for Sino-Italian Relations?

Author:
Andrew R. Novo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Questions about the unity of Italy’s new government on several key foreign policy issues persist, ranging from the extent of its support for Ukraine to its commitment to various European Union institutions. However, on the issue of China, the new government of Prime Minister (PM) Giorgia Meloni appears united. This bodes well for transatlantic cooperation and could spell trouble for Beijing, which not too long ago entertained ideas of using Italy as a friendly counterweight in Europe. Under Meloni, Italian foreign policy, particularly toward China, is unlikely to chart a dramatically new course. This is largely because the current government has prioritized its commitment to NATO and needs to focus on domestic issues rather than risk upsetting the international arena. While openings remain for Sino-Italian cooperation in economic terms, such cooperation will be geared toward supporting Italy’s domestic challenges and is unlikely to provide Beijing with the significant foothold that it has long hoped to gain in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, Bilateral Relations, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

25. China Increases Support for Pakistan’s Naval Modernization with an Eye on the Indian Ocean

Author:
Syed Fazl-e-Haider
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In mid-July, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the Pakistan Navy (PN) held the “Sea Guardians-2” exercise in the waters off Shanghai (China Brief, October 4; Pakistan Television, July 12). The joint naval drills focused on neutralizing maritime security threats, particularly those that might jeopardize strategic sea lanes. The bilateral exercise also included joint target practice, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-missile drills (China Military Online [CMO], July 10). The drills built on the first iteration of the exercise, Sea Guardians-1, which was held in January 2020 in the North Arabian Sea off Karachi, Pakistan. The participation in these exercises of the guided missile frigate Taimur, which is the most advanced warship built by China for the PN, demonstrates the increasing level of Chinese support for the training and modernization of Pakistan’s naval forces (Global Times, July 10). Bilateral military ties, which are a mainstay of the China-Pakistan all-weather friendship and strategic partnership, have strengthened in recent years. China is the main supplier of military equipment to Pakistan, which from 2017-2021 absorbed nearly 47 percent of all Chinese arms exports (China Brief, March 25). In a move to further deepen defense ties, China provided Pakistan with J-10C multi-role fighters in late 2021 (South Asian Voices , April 12). In June, a high-powered Pakistani delegation comprising top brass from the army, navy and air force paid a visit to China at a time when tensions between China and the West were on the rise (CMO, June 12). The visit was part of the Pakistan-China Joint Military Cooperation Committee (PCJMCC), which is the highest body involved in facilitating bilateral defense cooperation. Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa also attended the top-level committee’s meeting, along with senior-most counterparts in the PLA. Both countries vowed to further deepen their strategic partnership in challenging times and enhance their joint military cooperation in training, technology and counterterrorism (Express Tribune , June 12).
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Navy, Modernization, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, Asia, and Indian Ocean

26. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

27. Beijing Makes a Big Long-term Bet on Nuclear Power

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last fall, China suffered extensive power outages due to a combination of surging electricity demand and tight supply. A confluence of factors contributed to the energy supply shortage, but nearly all traced back to China’s struggle to manage its overdependence on coal for power generation: rising global coal prices; shuttering of old power plants as part of a push to enhance energy efficiency; emission-reduction efforts; an “unofficial” embargo on Australian coal imports due to geopolitical strife between Beijing and Canberra; and disparities in government price controls (power plants must purchase coal at market rates, but consumer prices are set in a narrow band) that incentivized plants to cease or slow operations rather than produce electricity at a financial loss (Caixin, October 12, 2021; Zaobao, July 14). In 2022, China has avoided a replay of last year’s energy crunch despite the supply shocks in the energy markets induced by the Ukraine conflict by increasing domestic coal production, exploiting the opportunity to import Russian oil and coal at discounted rates and continuing to steadily increase its renewable energy capacity. Boosting domestic coal production has been particularly essential to meet demand. This month, the National Energy Administration (NEA) reported that during the second quarter, China’s raw coal output rose 10 percent year-on-year, which the NEA highlighted as particularly noteworthy given it came on the basis of 16 percent growth in coal output in the same quarter last year (NEA, August 2). Another mitigating factor for China on the energy front has been heavy spring rainfall in many areas of the country that has increased hydropower output over 20 percent in the first half of this year—a substantial boost as hydroelectricity already accounts for about 15 percent of China’s overall energy mix (NEA, August 2; Global Times, May 5).
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

28. With an Eye on Tibet, China Reacts Warily to Warming U.S.-Nepal Ties

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights Uzra Zeya’s three-day visit to Nepal in May evoked a strong reaction from China. During the visit, Zeya, who is also President Joseph Biden’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, met with an array of high-level Nepali officials, including Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba as well as Nepali human rights activists. She also visited two Tibetan refugee settlements in Nepal where she interacted with refugees and enquired about their problems (Kathmandu Post, May 22). Zeya had arrived in Kathmandu after meeting the Dalai Lama, senior officials of the Tibetan exile government as well as officials and representatives of the Tibetan refugee community in India (The Hindu, May 18). The Chinese response was swift. The U.S. “should stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Tibet-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique,” People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian said in a press conference (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 19). At the 14th meeting of the Nepal-China Bilateral Consultative Mechanism, which was held a few days after Zeya’s visit, Chinese officials reportedly expressed their misgivings over her engagements to their Nepali counterparts (Kathmandu Post, August 4). Then in July, Liu Jianchao, the head of the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Kathmandu, where at meetings with leaders of Nepal’s major political parties, he asked them to reaffirm their commitment to the ‘One-China’ policy (Nepal Foreign Affairs, July 14).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Nepal, and Tibet

29. Will the China-Pakistan Corridor Get a Boost with a New Government in Islamabad?

Author:
Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On June 10, the Foreign Office in Islamabad received a diplomatic communication from the Pakistani ambassador in Beijing (The News, June 13). China assured Prime Minister (PM) Shehbaz Sharif, who replaced former PM Imran Khan in April, that it is eager to work with the present government (PRC Foreign Ministry [FMPRC], June 17). China also confirmed the rollover of a $2.3 billion loan to Pakistan at a reduced rate, which is a great help to the cash-strapped nation (The Express Tribune, June 22). Furthermore, China agreed to extend additional financial assistance between $2.5 to $2.8 billion, and pledged to support Pakistan’s fragile economy through the multi-billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Business Standard, June 29). Chinese leadership also urged the present government to reinvigorate CPEC projects, which were neglected under Imran Khan’s government (The News, June 13; Business Recorder, June 15). However, PM Sharif’s government has inherited a plethora of problems and issues plaguing progress and causing delays in the execution of projects that fall under the umbrella of CPEC.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

30. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia