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Begin New Search Topic Conflict Political Geography Central Asia Content Type Journal Article

1. MILITARY SANCTIONS: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE CASE OF UZBEKISTAN

Author:
Jonathan Honig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
States frequently find themselves disbursing or receiving military aid, cooperation, and access to military products. Using foreign policy options like "military sanctions" (the suspension of military projects, aid, cooperation, and access) is a desirable, widely publicized way for one state to express its discontent to another while presumably influencing desired policy changes in the client state. However, the small amount of evidence on military sanctions indicates that they are ineffective, short-lived, and may even be counterproductive. This analysis attempted to elucidate this subject by advancing a theory stating that states will impose military sanctions in response to domestic audience pressures shortly after high-profile examples of undesirable behavior by client states. However, military sanctions will be eased as time progresses and public attention has waned. This analysis qualitatively examined Uzbekistan and its relationship with the US, finding support for this theory. It concluded that following high-profile incidents and periods of undesirable behavior by an aid-recipient state, military sanctions would likely be employed by the state providing the military aid and programs. Further, military sanctions are eased or scrapped as time moves from public incidents and attention involving human rights abuses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, War on Terror, and Military
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Uzbekistan

2. The CSTO Intervention in Kazakhstan Implication for Regional and World Order

Author:
Filppo Costa Buranelli
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
In the first two weeks of 2022, Kazakhstan was ravaged by an unprecedented scale of protests, violence, and repression. While it is still very much difficult to know what exactly caused the clashes, what seems to be the case is that it involved the meeting of two different and separated dynamics. The first was peaceful protest, which originated in the west of the country because of the doubling of LPG prices alongside the solidarity expressed with the protesters in other parts of the country, i.e., in the north as well as in the east and the south. The second was the presence of violent bandits, criminals, and hooligans that in less than perfect coordination set ablaze Almaty, Taraz, Shymkent, and other centers in the south, which led to the bloodiest clashes in the history of independent Kazakhstan. In a series of rapid escalations, which even those inside the Central Asian nation are still struggling to understand, the initially peaceful marches descended into violence. On 5 January 2022, the Kazakhstani authorities, fearing for the collapse of the constitutional order and for the state to spiral into country‑wide bloodshed, decided to request the intervention of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to protect sensitive and strategic infrastructural objectives such as power grids and airports so to allow to the internal security forces to repress and quell the violence. On 6 January 2022, the CSTO Collective Security Council issued a statement indicating its decision to “send the CSTO Collective Peacekeeping Forces to the Republic of Kazakhstan for a limited period of time to stabilize and normalize the situation in that country.” The same day, these forces began to arrive in Kazakhstan. On 19 January 2022, the CSTO Secretary General informed the CSTO Collective Security Council that all contingents of its Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been withdrawn from the territory of Kazakhstan. Much ink has been spilled in writing about why these events took place, what caused them, who was behind them, and who or what favored them. Most of what has appeared in print has not been particularly coherent or accurate. The truth is that too little is known at the moment: much time will need to pass for scholars to gain a clear understanding of what exactly happened within the Kazakhstani security and elite apparatus so that these violent dynamics could be unleashed.
Topic:
Conflict, Protests, Violence, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

3. Repatriating Azerbaijani IDPs Policy Priorities and Recommendations

Author:
Fariz Ismailzade
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The conflict over Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which started in 1988 and resulted in the occupation of some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories, produced a massive humanitarian catastrophe in the region. Around 350,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the Republic of Armenia in 1988‑1989, becoming refugees in the Republic of Azerbaijan. At the same time, the armed conflict in and around the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) resulted in the ethnic cleansing of an additional 650,000 ethnicAzerbaijanis from their homes in 1992‑1993. By some estimates, back in 1993 Azerbaijan was one of the largest refugee‑ and IDPhosting countries in the world, given that 1 out of every 7 of the country’s Azerbaijani population fell into one of those two categories. In addition to that, Azerbaijan also hosted large numbers of Chechen, Afghan, and Meskheti Turks. Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs mostly came from towns and villages outside the former NKAO part of the Karabakh region. Forcibly driven from their homes, they first settled in temporary tent camps, railway wagons, university dormitories, public buildings, and old sanatoriums. After being ethnically cleansed, their houses in Karabakh were looted and destroyed by Armenian occupational forces. Towns like Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Agdam, Gubadly, and Zangelan were entirely raised to the ground. During the last 30 years, refugees and IDPs received significant humanitarian assistance from various foreign donors, a plethora of national charity organizations, and, of course, the Azerbaijani government. The latter had even launched a housing program for them with the funds accrued by the State Oil Fund, the country’s sovereign wealth fund, which enabled many families to move from tent camps into purpose‑built single‑family home developments that oftentimes included land plots for agricultural activities. When Ilham Aliyev first ran for president in 2003, he had promised to eliminate the need for all tent camps in the country—a promise that he fulfilled in 2007 thanks to the priority allocation of resources from increasing oil revenues. Nevertheless, large number of refugees and IDPs continued to live in temporary housing in Baku and other urban centers that sometimes had significant safety issues and subpar sanitation facilities. Despite the fact that refugees and IDPs receive many welfare benefits from the government of Azerbaijan (e.g., free education, free utilities, monthly remuneration for food and other social payments), their living standards remain suboptimal, and the rate of poverty, health risks, and other social problems among the refugee and IDP community remains higher than the country’s average. At the same time, serious concerns remain regarding the employability and religious education of young people belonging to refugee and IDP communities, with many analysts fearing that this part of the population can be more susceptible to recruitment by foreign radical sects and similar such groups.
Topic:
Ethnic Cleansing, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Asia, and Azerbaijan

4. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 11 Issue 01: Annual Threat Assessment

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna, Mahfuh Bin Haji Halimi, Muhammad Saiful Alam Shah Bin Sudiman, Nur Aziemah Azman, and Mohammed Sinan Siyech
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The January issue focuses on an overview of the terrorist and violent extremist threats in key countries and conflict zones in the Asia-Pacific throughout 2018. The articles discuss the regional terrorism threat and responses in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Middle East. Thematically, the articles also analyse online extremism and the counter-ideology dimensions of terrorism and violent extremism in 2019. The lead article argues that global terrorist and extremist threat is likely to persist in 2019 as the Islamic State (IS) is going through a phase of readaptation and decentralisation. The group has established clandestine and underground structures to survive in Iraq and Syria. Its ideology is still intact and continues to be propagated in the cyber space. In the provinces, groups, networks and cells which have pledged allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi are radicalising Muslims and conducting attacks. Harnessing both the physical and virtual space, IS continues to present an enduring threat worldwide. Although the apex of IS leadership and many of the directing figures are on the run and might be eliminated in 2019, the penultimate leadership enabling the fight and supporting the infrastructure will continue to operate in the shadows as they become agile and more cunning. The IS and Al-Qaeda (AQ)-centric threats are likely to remain given the lack of an effective global counter terrorism plan and strategy, the continuation of superpower and geopolitical rivalry, and the failure to resolve the underlying causes of extremism and terrorism.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Syria, and Southeast Asia

5. Diagnosing the First Democratic Regime in Afghanistan: Human Rights Perspective

Author:
Satnam Singh Deol and Amandeep Kaur Sandhu
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
South Asian Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
The constant presence of undemocratic regimes, insurgencies and political instability in Afghanistan has continuously resulted into the miserable status of civil and political human rights. Furthermore, the heterogeneous nature of Afghan society and economic under development have deprived the people of social, cultural and economic rights. In 2004, democratic government had been established in Afghanistan under the presidentship of Hamid Karzai. Very obviously, the people at domestic level as well as the international community expected from the democratically elected regime to take concrete initiatives for the promotion and protection of human rights. The study observes that the pioneer democratically elected government of Afghanistan had taken all constitutional measures and legal provisions for the promotion and protection of human rights in Afghanistan which can be expected from a democratic nation. But several political, socio-ethnic and socio-economic circumstances such as frequent violence due to insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, dearth of popular legitimacy to the regime, challenges to political instability along with the orthodox and heterogeneous society, facing acute economic underdevelopment have hampered the actual process of the promotion and protection of human rights in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Human Rights, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Taliban, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, Central Asia, and Punjab

6. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 10, Issue 01: Global Threat Assessment

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna, Iftekharul Bashar, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, Remy Mahzam, and Nodirbek Soliev
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The global terrorism threat has become decentralised, unpredictable, hard-to-detect and resilient with regenerative capacities. The global jihadist movements, principally the so-called Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda, have glocalised to exploit indigenous grievances, recruit aspiring jihadists and fight for local and global causes. Overall, both IS and Al-Qaeda have become underground terror networks which will allow them to sustain themselves for longer and perpetrate more violent attacks. With a radical Islamist jihadist ideology, multiple wilayat (provinces), sleeper cells, lone-wolves, online radicalisation and skilful exploitation of modern technologies, the terrorism threat remains challenging despite the successful expulsion of IS from its heartlands in Iraq and Syria in 2017. Moving forward, in 2018, the terrorist threat will be characterised by attacks mounted by politico-religious, ethnic-political and left/right wing groups. The major risk to the West, the Middle East, Africa and Asia will come from Islamist extremist groups with radicalised segments of migrant and diaspora communities perpetrating attacks in North America, Europe and Australia. Notwithstanding the operational and military setbacks IS and Al-Qaeda have suffered over the years, their affiliates in the global south will continue to mount attacks against military, diplomatic, political and economic targets. Despite security measures, threat groups will seek to hit aviation, maritime and land transportation targets. In addition, self-radicalised and directed attacks will focus on populated locations for large-scale impact, with suicide attacks as the preferred tactic. The favoured modus operandi of IS-inspired and directed jihadists in the West will be low-end terrorism relying on vehicle-ramming and stabbing as witnessed throughout 2017. Broadly, the world has witnessed the rise of three generations of global terrorist movements. ‘Global Jihad 1.0’ emerged after Al-Qaeda attacked the US in September 2001 and captured the imagination of multiple militant groups in Asia, Africa, Middle East and the Caucasus. The second generation, ‘Global Jihad 2.0’, emerged after al-Baghdadi declared a ‘caliphate’ and announced the formation of the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) on 29 June 2014. The third generation, ‘Global Jihad 3.0’, represents the global expansion of IS outside Iraq and Syria. IS now relies on its wilayat as its operational bases in the Middle East, Africa, Caucasus and Asia. IS and its affiliates control territorial space in varying degrees in countries with active conflict zones, and maintain a presence in cyber space. The group’s strength also lies in affiliated and linked groups, networks, cells and dedicated jihadists who are willing to fight and die for IS.
Topic:
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Middle East, North Africa, Singapore, and Southeast Asia

7. The Water Resources Management in Central Asia – The Political and Economic Contradictions as a Source of Inefficiency

Author:
Tomasz Waskiel
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The issue of access to water in Central Asia has a centuries-old history and it is an exceptionally complex issue. The Central Asian republics, for twenty – six years of their sovereignty, have not been able to create an effective water resource management system. This state of affairs causes constant disputes and controversies, as well as various threats – social, economic and environmental. The article explores the genesis of the problem, especially from the period of Soviet power, when huge irrigation system was created and based on two rivers: the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya. These powerful investments combined with extensive farming are the root causes of today’s problems. The countries of the region tried to regulate the issue of managing the water resources by signing regional agreements in this matter, the most important are these signed in: Almaty, Kyzyl–Orda and Ashgabat. Bilateral or tripartite agreements between states were also concluded. Unfortunately, most of them were ineffective, contractual provisions remained only in writing. One could say that the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the rivers Chu and Talas is the only positive example. The contradictory economic and political interests of Central Asian countries were recognized as the main source of the water management system inefficiency. Relations between the states are often suspicious and fueled by nationalism. Central Asia is a region that is not internally integrated, in which it is difficult to develop inter-state agreements. The author concludes that the shift in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy may support developing a new regional compromise in the long term perspective.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, Natural Resources, Water, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Uzbekistan

8. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 04: ‘Countering Jihadist Ideology: The Crucial Battlefront’

Author:
Muhammad Haniff Hassan, Nodirbek Soliev, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, and Mohd Mizan bin Mohammad Aslam
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Islamic State (IS) terrorist group faces setbacks on several fronts as it continues to come under heavy pressure from the US-led coalition forces, the Russians and Syrians. On the military front in Iraq, it is slowly losing western Mosul while in Syria, its de facto capital Raqqa is being surrounded for the inevitable showdown. On the propaganda front, it is experiencing a decline in the output and quality of its media products, such as videos and publications. It fares no better on the religious front where it remains marginalised within the Islamic world and faces continuous denunciations from mainstream religious leaders for its exploitation and misrepresentation of Islam. It has failed to gain legitimacy and has in fact been branded as un-Islamic, deviant, even heretical. As IS loses its lustre and appeal with the loss of territories and impending collapse of its so-called caliphate, counter-ideology efforts should be intensified to further delegitimise IS’ theology of violence and debunk its misinterpretations of religious texts. IS’ hard-core ideology encompassing violent jihad, suicide bombing, takfirism (excommunication) and hijrah (migration), among others, have to be exposed as unquestionably flawed, transgressing Islamic legal principles and juristic process and methodology. This issue of CTTA features a critical examination of one of the principal tenets of IS’ jihadist ideology – takfirism – by Dr Muhammad Haniff Hassan. His article contrasts IS takfiri doctrine with mainstream Sunni position on the subject, exposing IS’ deceptions and deviations from true Islamic teachings. Despite the evident errors and distortions, IS ideology has gained some traction among the disillusioned and alienated. This issue is examined by Mohd Mizan bin Mohammad Aslam who focuses on the impact of IS ideology on some university students in Malaysia. He explores what causes students to join or sympathise with an extremist group such as IS, and how the government should respond to this phenomenon. Social media platforms and chat applications as well as religious discussion groups are among tools used by IS to cajole and lure students to IS activities. The author proposes the formation of a critical partnership between the government, security officials and parents to curb the radicalisation of students. Mohamed Sinan Siyech in his article analyses the relatively syncretic nature of Salafism in India and stresses the need to distinguish such Salafist groups from those that preach extremism and violence. Established Salafist organisations and non-Salafist groups are facing challenges from the spread of intolerant strands imported from the Middle East and coming through the Internet. He calls for greater attention to be paid to self-radicalised social media-savvy youngsters who are divorced from their community, draw inspiration from IS ideologues online, and take orders from IS operators in Syria and elsewhere. From India the focus shifts to Turkey where in the last one year, it has become the central target of IS’ overseas terrorist campaign; Turkey suffered the largest number of IS attacks outside Iraq and Syria. Nodirbek Soliev argues that Turkey‘s capability to fight terrorism is crucial to contain the growing threat domestically and globally. Major and regional stakeholders should closely work with Ankara to boost the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts. In the long term, there is a need for sustained measures by Turkey to disrupt cross-border movement of foreign fighters and to dismantle IS supply and support networks in the country.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Middle East, East Asia, North Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Global Focus

9. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses (CTTA) – Volume 9, Issue 01: 'Annual Threat Assessment 2017'

Author:
Rohan Gunaratna, Remy Mahzam, Iftekharul Bashar, Mohammed Sinan Siyech, Abdul Basit, Sara Mahmood, Nodirbek Soliev, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, Vikram Rajakumar, and Shahzeb Ali Rathore
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
2016 saw the so-called Islamic State (IS) in retreat following sustained bombardment and military attacks and airstrikes by the US-led coalition as well as Russian and Syrian forces. It has conceded large swathes of territory, towns and cities, and lost some of its top commanders and strategists and more than 25,000 fighters. The group‘s revenue has declined and so has the flow of new fighters. It has to contend with desertions, in-fighting and scarce resources. Its fall-back wilayats (provinces) in Libya have been lost and many in the liberated areas of Iraq and Syria are jubilant at its ouster after holding sway for more than 20 months. Its declaration of the caliphate is rejected by the Muslim world, which has denounced its acts of violence and misreading of religious texts. Since its formation, IS remains the object of condemnation and denunciation by the whole world. Even so, the terrorist threat posed by IS and its decentralised networks in 2016 shows no sign of abatement. Throughout the year, IS‘ active worldwide networks demonstrated the ability to plan, direct, train, recruit and radicalise from abroad, operating with impunity and surpassing the threat from Al Qaeda‘s old guard. The year saw a number of IS-directed or IS-inspired attacks by terror cells or ‘lone wolves‘ in major cities like Brussels, Nice, Orlando, Istanbul, Dhaka, Jakarta and Berlin resulting in thousands of casualties. Its propaganda machinery and online presence remain formidable, exploiting technology for communications, recruitment, finance, training and terrorist operations. IS has caused the displacement of millions and triggered a humanitarian crisis among refugees and in the battle zones. The group‘s extremism and violence have contributed to inter-religious tensions and discord, and strengthened anti-Islamist movements in the West. The stage is therefore set for 2017 to be a portentous and decisive year for IS and countries afflicted by the threat of terrorism. As IS loses control of Mosul and Raqqa in coming months, it will change strategy, focus and priorities. How it will change and what the impact will be are issues addressed by Rohan Gunaratna in his article on Global Threat Forecast, as well as in accompanying articles on the terrorism situation in selected countries and regions. As IS continues to lose ground in Iraq and Syria, it will transform itself from a caliphate-building entity to a terrorist organisation. It will seek refuge in its many wilayats and enclaves, and consolidate, expand and use them as launching pads to mount terrorist attacks. The group will continue with its strategy of expanding the ‘battlefield‘ to the West and elsewhere, and hit ‘soft‘ and easy targets. Overall, the terrorist threat will endure in the New Year and will continue to require effective counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism and counter-violent extremism measures.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Iraq, South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, South America, Syria, Asia-Pacific, and North America