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Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Content Type Journal Article Publishing Institution Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Lenin, Trotsky, and Parvus in the Battle for Russian Unity

Author:
Elena V. Baraban
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In this paper I examine two popular Russian television series: the historical drama The Demon of the Revolution, or Parvus’s Memorandum (Demon revoliutsii, ili Memorandum Parvusa, dir. Vladimir Khotinenko, 2017) and the biopic Trotsky (Trotskii, dirs. Alexander Kott and Konstantin Statskii, 2017). These mini-series were released on Russia’s main television channels on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. Given their salience amidst otherwise subdued commemoration of the Revolution’s centenary in Russia, it is important to analyze these films in the current ideological and political context. What do they tell us about present-day Russia? What is their cultural significance? In what way does the negative depiction of the Revolution and its leaders in The Demon and Trotsky relate to the Russian authorities’ ideology concerning national unity and the nation’s steady development? This discussion is especially pertinent for understanding how the creation and circulation of such narratives shape the public opinion in today’s Russia. This, in turn, helps to understand current trends in the relation between power and culture.
Topic:
History, Ideology, Revolution, Lenin, and Trotsky
Political Geography:
Russia

2. The Modern Interfaces of Intermarium and the Fight against Destiny

Author:
Adrian Popa and Cristian Barna
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Russia’s recent buildup of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) forces in Crimea and Kaliningrad, coupled with its increasingly confronting rhetoric in the Black and Baltic Seas, pose a serious challenge for the NATO’s Eastern flank countries. While the mare sui generis status of the Black Sea might be altered under the expected inauguration of Canal Istanbul in 2023 as it would probably require the revision of the Montreux Convention, the mare liberum status of the Baltic Sea might also be questioned as Russia contests NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in this region. Facing this challenging geostrategic context, Pilsudski’s ideas of Intermarium seem to have revived within the Central and Eastern European countries under modern interfaces such as the Bucharest Nine and the Three Seas Initiative. This paper proposes a comparative analysis between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea in terms of their newly-emerged geostrategic context, discusses the feasibility of the recent endeavours to promote cooperation within the Central and Eastern European countries and not ultimately, highlights the utility of a regional military alliance in support of NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, International Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, Crimea, Baltic Sea, and Baltic States

3. The Logic of Geopolitics in American-Russian Relations

Author:
Allen C. Lynch
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
One of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s first requests as President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor in 1977 was to ask the Pentagon for its plans – including targets – for nuclear war against “Russia”. Brzezinski was outraged when he was presented with the plan for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. He could not believe that the U.S. military had no plans to spe- cifically weaken the Russian core of the Soviet empire. For the Pentagon planners, Russia and the Soviet Union were one and the same.1 I begin with this anecdote because it reflects well an enduring geopolitical logic to American-Russian relations: American policy toward Russia, whether it be in the Tsarist, Soviet, or post-Soviet period, has not been based on opposing a strong Russian state per se. (That state married to communist ideology was something else altogether.) In the after- math of the Russian Civil War, for instance, the United States delayed recognition of Baltic independence until 1922, two years after Soviet Russia had recognized the independence of Estonia in the Treaty of Tartu, on the grounds that Polish and Finnish independence apart nothing should be done to call into question the territorial continuity of the Russian Em- pire.2 Indeed, American officials seldom viewed the Soviet Union as an empire, as the Pen- tagon war plans just cited illustrate. Historically, the logic of geopolitics i.e., the influence of organization in space on international political relationships has often tended to frame American-Russian relations in terms of complementarities of interest. Of course, geopolitics is not the only logic in AmericanRussian relations; ideology, domestic politics, as well as vested institutional interests all play their role in varying degrees under varying circum- stances. But historically, insofar as geopolitical factors have prevailed, American-Russian relations have generally been harmonious, if also remote and indirect in nature. (By indirect I mean that each sees the other mainly in terms of other powers or processes, e.g., the state of the balance of power in Europe and/or Northeast Asia.) Let us recall that Russia, whether it be under Imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet auspices, is an essentially continental Eurasian power. Its primary state interest for centuries has been to build and consolidate a trans-continental, multi-national and imperial state while also man- aging international power politics with a series of powerful adversaries throughout Asia and Europe. Above all, Russia sought to ensure that no powerful coalition of external (and in Eu- rope technologically superior) powers could unite to challenge the Russian Empire’s territorial or political integrity. Russian diplomats and rulers thus learned to play the European balance of power with considerable finesse (e.g., the Treaty of Nystadt, 1721, under Peter the Great; the Congress of Vienna, 1815, under Alexander I; the Treaty of Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany, 1922; the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939; the Grand Alliance with the United States and Great Britain, 1941–45; and the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, to name just a few instances). As with Great Britain, maintaining a favorable European balance of power has been central to Russian statecraft.3 The United States, by contrast, is functionally an insular power (albeit on a continental scale) with respect to the rest of the world, surrounded as it is by two great oceans and militarily weak and isolated neighbors (i.e., Canada and Mexico). America’s primary foreign policy concern throughout most of its history has thus been, like Russia’s, to prevent the emergence of a hostile European hegemon that could threaten the country’s expansion in North America and its own hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Once the United States had stabilized its independence from Britain after the War of 1812, U.S. and British geopo- litical interests tended to coincide.4 In this context, American and Russian interests have more often been complementary than antagonistic. It has been primarily the intrusion of ideological elements, reflecting for example Americans’ global democratic aspirations or the Soviet Union’s ultimate objec- tive of the triumph of communism worldwide, that have rendered the bilateral relationship intransigent and even dangerous.5
Topic:
International Relations, Cold War, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Post Cold War, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Soviet Union, North America, and United States of America

4. Georgia’s Road to NATO: Everything but Membership?

Author:
Marion Kipiani
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to jolt the architectural plans of Euro-Atlantic security developed over the past 25 years. Predictions of a “new Cold War,” and anxiety over Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood, have led to calls for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to step up efforts to ensure security on the European continent and protect its newer members in close geographic proximity to the Russian Federation. After more than two decades, during which NATO was transforming into a military alliance fo- cused on out-of-area missions, the collective defense at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty has suddenly appeared to regain its relevance. Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region a year ago, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to the security of its Eastern European member states through reassurance measures that have included increased air and maritime patrols, as well as the rotation of ground forces. There are however countries partnering with NATO – but not covered by its collective defense protective umbrella – which fall into a gray zone of influence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic allies. These countries, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine itself, are particularly concerned by Russia’s strategic objective of keeping a sphere of i
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Georgia, and North America

5. Reconsidering Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century

Author:
Teimuraz Papaskiri
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The Russian occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014, marked the beginning of a new phase of tension between the Western world and Russia. Although it was predicted several years prior to the conflict that Ukraine would be Russia’s next victim,1 nobody paid much attention to these warnings. Thus, the Russian moves proved surprising for most Western societies, especially for the leaders of Western countries. It effectively ended the inefficient policy of “reset”, which was actually stillborn, because of the inability of the American administration to understand Vladimir Putin’s person and his goals. In June 2001, Putin met US President George W. Bush, who said after this meeting: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country.”2 President Bush was ridiculed for these words, yet even nine years later, he did not acknowledge his mistake. In 2010, he said: “I did not make a mistake in [my] assessment of Russian leader Vladimir Putin [...] Putin became a different person [...] I think, to a certain extent, he changed.”3 It seems that George W. Bush was not able to figure out that it was not Putin who had changed. It was the fact that U.S. and Eu- ropean leaders did not grasp which country Vladimir Putin was “deeply committed” to. For the Russian president, “his country” meant the Soviet Union, not the Russian Federation. He even officially declared that, “the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopo- litical catastrophe of the century”.4 (Emphasis added – T.P.) This phrase was not just mere nostalgia for the “good old times”, otherwise no one in his right mind would ever call the break-up of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.” When talking about the 20th century, during which two world wars cost more than 80 million lives combined, the break-up of one empire with nearly no casualties cannot be considered “the greatest catastrophe.” Therefore, those words meant that Putin’s intention was to re- store, at least, to some extent, the “old greatness” of the Soviet Empire.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Empire, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

6. Russia’s Peacekeeping Operations in the Post-Soviet Space: “Mirotvorchestvo” Applied

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
According to a general definition, a conflict is a process in which one party perceives that its interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party1. Conflict is manifested through adversarial social action involving two or more actors and the ex- pression of differences is often accompanied by intense hostilities. Most significantly, pro- tracted conflict arises from failure to manage an antagonistic relationship2. A special kind of conflict involves force being used by both parties to the conflict. Armed conflicts in the neighbourhood of Russia emerged during the disintegration of the USSR, when parts of former Soviet republics began to claim independence. This is when Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria decided to form inde- pendent states, thus infringing on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Mol- dova – all states with international recognition. The parties on both sides of these ethnic and political conflicts had been attempting to resolve these situations by themselves, but the management process was then joined by “third parties”: Russia, Iran, Turkey, CIS and other international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE, and, recently, also the EU.
Topic:
Hegemony, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

7. Price of Aggression: The Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy

Author:
Kazimier Dadak
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In late February of 2014, president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, a staunch ally of Russia, lost power. This event sent into motion a sequence of events that pitched Rus- sia against its neighbour and the West. Faced with the loss of influence, if not control, over Ukraine, Vladimir Putin immediately took steps that, in his mind, were to secure the interests of his country. First, in March 2014, Russia seized and annexed Crimea; soon af- terwards a Russian-inspired rebellion engulfed eastern Ukraine. These measures drastically increased Putin’s popularity at home, but made him a pa- riah abroad. Initially, the West, including the European Union, imposed diplomatic sanc- tions1. They had no effect on Russian behaviour and, in July, the West expanded punitive measures to the economy2. President Putin did not budge, and in September, the United States and the European Union increased the pressure by imposing additional sanctions on the financial sector3. As a result, Russian companies, including large banks, were effec- tively cut off from western financial markets. Past experience, such as the U.S. led sanc- tions on Iran, shows that this type of punishment is very effective and this paper illustrates that they exacted a price on the Russian economy as well.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

8. How the Socialist Economy was destroyed in the USSR (One reason for the collapse of the country)

Author:
Rudolf Pikhoia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
On 25 September 1990, one of the first meetings of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia was held in the building of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. The agenda consisted of the issue of ensuring the economic sovereignty of Russia in the USSR. Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Yuri Skokov, responsible for industrial policy, spoke with bitterness about his meeting with Minister of Metallurgy of the USSR Seraphim Baibakov: “We spoke to him about our sovereignty, and he said: ‘I’m sorry, but last year I became an owner of property and a legal successor of state property.’ Kolpakov became Krupp. Now he cre- ates 10-15 companies, leaving a small management structure. It is presidential rule in the steel-casting complex.” Frankly speaking, after I became familiar with the transcript of this meeting, it made me think. When assessing the reforms that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s it is, perhaps, the only question to which all representatives of Russian political science an- swer in the same fashion. Both supporters of radical reforms (we shall call them, conven- tionally, the E. T. Gaidar-Anatoly Chubai school) and their opponents in the wider political spectrum – from former Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov, to pre- sent Assistant to the President and scholar, S. Y. Glazyev, answer the question about the beginning period of privatisation and destruction of the public sector in the same manner. They are unanimous in recognising that privatisation dates back to the early 1990s, and is concentrated in the period from 1992 to 1996.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Empire, and State Building
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

9. Remarks on Regional Security

Author:
Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it’s really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia’s foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion has to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase? To try and understand Russia’s foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic eco- nomic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hy- drocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at $110pb or at $25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabi- lizing question is: “If not Putin, then whom?” There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia’s foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin’s presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

10. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives

Author:
Małgorzata Zawadzka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equip- ment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia’s “soft underbelly”, territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO’s or the European Union’s presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the Au- gust war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow’s surprise international public opinion did not follow the Kremlin narration of the events’ course. Rus- sia lost the war on information and is unable to dispose of the occupant-aggressor image.
Topic:
Hegemony, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Georgia