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351. The Inadequacy of Nepal’s Democracy for Marginalized Peoples

Author:
Pradip Pariyar
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
This May, the Nepalese government released its annual budget for the 2022-23 fiscal year and carried out the second iteration of local level elections since the institution of its new constitution in 2015. In the wake of these events, Pradip Payar, Executive Chairperson of the Samata Foundation, provides an overview of the current state of human rights for minorities and marginalized populations in Nepal, addressing caste-based discrimination against the Dalit population, ongoing challenges to transitional justice for victims of the People’s War, gender-based violence against women and girls, and issues affecting the LGBTQI+ community. Pariyar concludes that, though the new constitution provided hope for an improved future for Dalits and other marginalized communities, the reality of change has been woefully inadequate.
Topic:
War, Democracy, LGBT+, Marginalization, and Dalits
Political Geography:
South Asia and Nepal

352. Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Asia: Lessons Learned from Korea, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan

Author:
Hun Joon Kim
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In this issue briefing, Dr. Hun Joon Kim, professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University, provides an overview and analysis of the ADRN’s Working Paper Series on Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in Asia. He finds that in Sri Lanka, Korea, and Taiwan, past instances of human rights violations were complex and unique; perpetrators, international dynamics, and the inevitable “politicization” of justice efforts have each created unique obstacles to and nuances in the pursuit of justice. Kim argues, however, that a few conclusions can be drawn from the three cases: first, that the trend in Asia is towards justice and away from impunity; second, that the transitional justice process is gradual, winding, and cannot be solved in one fell swoop; and third, that transitional justice is not simply a state-led process-the pursuit of reconciliation involves the entire nation: government, civil society, and civilians.
Topic:
Human Rights, Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation, and Reparations
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, Sri Lanka, and Korea

353. The role of Nagorno-Karabakh in the shaping of Armenian and Azeri identity

Author:
Ricardo Juan Torres
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The paper discusses the effect of the 19th century rebirth of Armenian nationalism in the Ottoman or Western Armenia and Russian or Eastern Armenia and that of Azeri nationalism in Russian Azerbaijan with its ramifications in Iran and Ottoman Turkey on the formation of Armenian and Azeri identity from the late 1800s to the present and the key role of Nagorno-Karabakh - called Artsakh by the Armenians - from the beginning of the 20th century, using the theories of Anthony D. Smith.
Topic:
Nationalism, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

354. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*

Author:
Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Intervention, Crisis Management, International Order, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

355. Foresight and its application in ministries of foreign affairs

Author:
Javier Ignacio Santander
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
Based on previous research regarding foresight capabilities of ministries of foreign affairs, this work focuses on the modern concept of foresight and of its application to foreign relations. Specifically, it aims to provide a summary of similiarities observed in the way in which foreign affairs ministries have developed foresight capacity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Government, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

356. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

357. The 3+3 Regional Cooperation and Georgia: What Is at Stake?

Author:
Soso Dzamukashvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
During the past decades, many initiatives have been proposed for regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, mainly coming from Georgia and Turkey. In 1999, the then Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, conceived the idea of the ‘Peaceful Caucasus Initiative’ with an objective to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states in the region. In the following year, a similar proposal was laid down by the then Turkish Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel, who intended to create the ‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’ initiative. Later in 2008, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, floated plans to establish the ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ that would bring the three states of the South Caucasus together with Turkey and Russia in order to tap the sustainable economic development of the region. In 2010, the then Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, promoted the idea of the ‘United Caucasus’ platform (Kaleji 2021). Despite coming up with a plethora of ambitious cooperation initiatives, none of the leaders managed to push their initiatives to come into motion.
Topic:
Security, Development, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Georgia, and South Caucasus

358. Major Non-NATO Ally Status - Chance for Survival Or A Vision Doomed to Failure?

Author:
Nino Lezhava
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The ongoing war in Ukraine has confirmed that NATO as an institution of 30 members still lacks the readiness to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance, continuing to avoid confrontation with Russia.1 The unprecedented tragedy taking place in Ukraine was not a surprise and there were several lessons for the West to learn such as the August War in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the open letters and statements from Russia’s president drawing a new world order,2 Russian military drills and so-called peacekeepers in and around neighboring countries. Nevertheless, 14 years have passed since the NATO Bucharest Summit3 and Georgia and Ukraine are still paying for their independence and sovereignty with blood. Meanwhile, NATO’s promise of eventual membership for both countries is fading.4 Russia’s so-called “military operation” has revealed that the Kremlin does not need Casus Belli to start waging a full-scale war against independent countries and, now more than ever, Ukraine and Georgia5 need to strengthen their defense capabilities and search for an alternative foreign security policy until NATO provides well-deserved places for them. In this light, many believe that in the absence of NATO unity, the United States is the only strategic partner that can protect Ukraine and Georgia by designating them as Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA).6 Indeed, the impact of a timely provided designation could have a decisive political and practical role for Ukraine and Georgia’s security, especially when both countries7 are reliant on US defense sales and actively cooperate with the US while transforming their defense capabilities.8
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

359. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Author:
Badri Belkania
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia

360. Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process: Opportunities and Barriers

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Armenia-Turkey relations have experienced numerous tensions over the decades associated with both the historic issues between the two nations and contemporary regional developments. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the mass killings of Armenians as a genocide1 in the Ottoman Empire during World War I has long been an important difficulty in bilateral relations. However, relations significantly worsened during the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s. As a response to Armenia’s capture of the territories surrounding NagornoKarabakh, Turkey closed the border with Armenia in 1993 in support of its ally Azerbaijan.2 The attempts to normalize relations did not have any fruitful outcome in the past decades which resulted in the two countries not having diplomatic or commercial relations for almost 30 years.
Topic:
International Relations, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey and Armenia

361. Importance of Maintaining and Strengthening NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence: A Historical Overview

Author:
Megi Benia
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Nuclear deterrence is a core pillar of NATO’s defense and deterrence policy. At the same time, the Alliance, which is not a formal party to any arms control negotiation, has a long-standing commitment to an active policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The Alliance has been regularly conducting consultations in different fora - the North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defense Planning Committee – to constantly address the ongoing challenges of the arms control architecture. Currently, NATO successfully maintains the balance between its nuclear deterrence and disarmament aspirations. However, it does not represent an easy task for the organization of 30 member states. Over the years, NATO has suffered from a serious nuclear identity crisis. Many Allies tried to increase the Alliance’s arms-control profile while others gradually opposed any further changes in this direction. The positioning of NATO in this regard has been constantly shaped by significant shifts in the international security environment. Despite the contested view on maintaining NATO’s nuclear deterrence, the Alliance managed to evolve as a nuclear alliance, effectively ensuring peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, European security faces the biggest security challenge since World War II when one state wages an unprovoked and unjustified war against another sovereign and independent state on the doorsteps of NATO, threatening the world with the use of nuclear weapons. In this unprecedented environment, it is important for NATO to maintain and further strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture to ensure peace and stability for generations to come. Therefore, this article will demonstrate a historical overview of the evolution of NATO as a nuclear alliance and the importance of strengthened nuclear deterrence and conventional defense capabilities.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, History, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe

362. War, Censorship and Public Opinion in Russia: Putin’s Struggle at Home and Abroad

Author:
Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s “special military operation,” as the Kremlin calls its full-scale war against Ukraine, has been underway for the second month in a row. However, the Russian army has not been able to cope with the combat tasks as effectively as Kremlin leaders originally planned. The incredible resilience and courage of the Ukrainian nation has fascinated the world but it has become an additional challenge for the Putin regime. In addition to the fact that the Russian government had to radically change its officially declared military objectives, it also faced the need to tighten measures to maintain control over the situation inside the country. At this stage, the Kremlin has to take effective steps both inside and outside of the country in order to fulfill Putin’s imperialist ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Public Opinion, Censorship, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

363. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

364. Economic Consequences of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, coupled with Western political support for Ukraine, was followed by a tough economic response through an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia set forth by the West. Their decision to do so seeks to make Russia pay an economic price for its military aggression, aiming to reduce its economic and martial capabilities, which are currently costing the lives of thousands of innocent people. The sanctions have already had quite severe economic consequences for Russia, but it is interesting to see whether they will achieve the West’s political goals and push President Putin to suspend the military aggression. Generally, a medium- to long-term period is required to see the effects of sanctions, and, currently, despite heavy economic losses, Russia is managing to coexist with the restrictions. Today, Russia is experiencing its biggest economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product in Russia will reduce by 11% in 2022 (World Bank, 2022), while the International Monetary Fund forecasts this figure to be 8.5% (IMF, 2022). According to some estimates, the economic scale of the reduction may even reach 15% (IIF, 2022). Clearly, this largely depends on the potential consequences of the sanctions already imposed and the possibility of enacting new sanctions, including in terms of energy embargoes. As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is almost twice as high. Consequently, we can get some idea of its scale. The losses caused by sanctions will become more visible and tangible over time, resulting in much more severe social and economic effects in the coming years. According to the International Finance Institute, Russia will have lost the wealth it generated over the last 15 years by the end of 2023 (IIF, 2022). One of the main reasons for this will be reduced domestic demand, and if the trade-related sanction package is expanded, exports will fall further than expected, which in turn will lead to a sharp decline in budget revenues. Clearly, the Russian military aggression has also caused global economic consequences, such as rising prices for basic consumer goods, disruption of supply chains, and delays in international trade. However, since invading Ukraine, Russia’s financial losses have been high. It is interesting to take a look at what actual consequences the Russian Federation has faced in terms of sanctions, and how the country will be able to continue coexistence with the restrictions and expand its own aggressive foreign policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

365. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

366. Military Effects Of Economic Sanctions On Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military industry is a fundamental factor of its national power. The enterprises operating in its defense sector are largely state-owned. Consequently, Russia’s sizeable military corporations and their subsidiary organizations operate not on the principles of a competitive domestic market, which is one of the key foundations of technological progress, but their main goal is to pursue Moscow’s political interests and ensure the stability of the regime. Accordingly, along with military capabilities, having a powerful economic leverage in the form of energy resources, encourages Russia not only to pursue its own economic interests but also intimidate neighboring countries and extort their territories to satisfy its imperialist intentions. The responsibility of the defense industry in Moscow’s current governing model is exactly on what the Russian government itself has based its legitimacy - military modernization, restoring Russia’s strength and greatness. One of its ill-favored manifestations is the military aggression in Ukraine which is claiming the lives of thousands of innocent people. The unprecedented scale of sanctions imposed by the West will clearly affect Moscow’s defense capabilities but the only questions are - when and to what extent? Russian military production, on the one hand, helps the country to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and, on the other hand, arms exports are an important source of country’s budgetary revenues. At the same time, this allows it to exert political influence over the purchasing states. The collapse of the Russian attack on Ukraine may not only sacrifice the hegemonic goals of the latter but also lead to the loss of existing and potential customers of its military weapons. There is no doubt that Russia is experiencing colossal military losses as a result of the war and, at the same time, questions are being raised about the quality of its arms and heavy equipment. Until now, there has been a consensus that Russian armaments were a viable and affordable alternative to Western weapons, although this statement could also be another victim of the war. As a result of the sanctions, Russia faced not only financial but also technical problems. In addition to Western countries, Asia’s leading technology powers have restricted Russia’s access to critical components needed for military production. Existing restrictions apply to advanced technologies such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, software and encryption, microelectronics, aviation systems, oil extraction equipment and other manufacturing components. In this context, it is important to discuss the impact that economic sanctions may have on Russia’s military capabilities, its recovery prospects and its aggressive foreign policy in the future.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

367. Georgia and the Baltics: Relations Amidst the War in Ukraine

Author:
Nino Chanadiri
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Georgia and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – have a history of friendship that is strengthened through the common Soviet past and shared experiences of Russian influence and violence as well as by the common vision of the contemporary Russian threat towards Eastern Europe. All of this creates the shared desire in these countries to put themselves as far from the Russian sphere of influence as possible. The Baltic states along with Ukraine (and Belarus) are neighbors of Russia and the touch point between Europe and Russia1 while Georgia is located between Russia and Turkey and performs a significant role in linking them. The partnership between Georgia and the Baltic states in terms of decreasing Russian influence in Eastern Europe, as one of the joint aims, requires the cooperation to be on the highest of levels in order for it to be successful. The partnership not only stands on the common past of the four countries but also on their common security visions and shared values which can ultimately contribute to making the partnership stable and long lasting.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Regional Cooperation, and War
Political Geography:
Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and Baltic States

368. NATO-Georgian Relations in the Coming Decades

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
At the 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO unveiled its new Strategic Concept.1 The update of the 2010 Strategic Concept2 was naturally necessitated by the momentous developments seen in the 2010s such as, among others, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the more outward-looking and ambitiously rising China, Brexit, the election of Donald Trump and its attendant implications for transatlantic relations as well as the election of Joe Biden as the President of the United States and the reinvigoration of the transatlantic and the democracy agenda. The renewal of the Strategic Concept seemed apt amid Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that put NATO-Russian relations at a historic low. NATO was forced to let go of its desire to forge ‘a true strategic partnership’ with Russia and instead referred to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to the Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”3 NATO’s new agenda for 2030 is also full of issues that go beyond the immediate geopolitical challenges. Issues such as climate change, technology, healthcare, space and cyberspace are equally significant for the Alliance’s ability to meet the challenges of the new decade.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, and Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Caucasus and Georgia

369. Chinese Surveillance Devices: Coming to a Neighborhood Near You

Author:
Jayson Browder, Valerie Shen, and Mike Sexton
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The Chinese government conducts cyber espionage against the US on an unprecedented scale. Senior US intelligence officials have warned the “Internet of Things” is a US counterintelligence and cybersecurity vulnerability. Tens of billions of connected physical devices from Chinese-made webcams to “smart” appliances could be exploited at scale by the Chinese intelligence services. In 2016, the malware “Mirai” was able to weaponize more than half a million devices in a Denial-of-Service attack causing a massive East Coast Internet outage. Unaddressed, these threats will only increase as China exports surveillance devices around the world.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

370. Three Reasons Why CHIPS-plus is a Big Win for US National Security

Author:
Tom Klein
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
On August 9th, 2022, President Biden signed vital bipartisan legislation to compete with China. H.R. 4346, called the CHIPS and Science Act or “CHIPS-plus,” would pave the way for nearly $280 billion in incentives to boost US-based chip manufacturing, scientific research, technology standards setting, and STEM education. These initiatives directly protect our immediate security vulnerabilities in the US military and support our long-term national security competition with China by promoting democratic norms and spurring critical defense innovations.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and CHIPS
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

371. A Saudi-Pakistani Reset: Business as Usual?

Author:
Joshua Albin Cheyaden
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
“Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are back on track,” declared ʿAli ʿAwadh ʿAsseri, a former Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, following Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s state visit to Riyadh in May 2021.[1] Khan’s visit ended a two-year diplomatic rift that had marred a close relationship spanning seven decades.[2] The Pakistani Prime Minister’s visit reopened vital channels of communication that had been shut for almost a year and signaled a “reset” in Saudi-Pakistani relations.[3] The rift between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began in 2019 and peaked in 2020, while the year 2021 was marked by calls for a reset in their relations.[4] Saudi Arabia’s deepening ties with India remain at the heart of the Saudi-Pakistani split, and they are unlikely to change despite any presumptive diplomatic reset between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s increasing engagement with India as a key energy client is just one aspect of a broader transformation the Kingdom is experiencing under Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.[5] At the same time, Pakistan is in a deep economic crisis and is looking for foreign investment in major infrastructure projects to generate employment in the country.[6] In 2021, Pakistan declared its intention to pursue a foreign policy guided by its focus on economic security over its geopolitical interests.[7] Therefore, the long-term prospects for the Saudi-Pakistani reset depends on Pakistan’s ability to accept Saudi Arabia’s more even-handed India-Pakistan policy and the Saudis’ willingness to invest in an economic partnership with Pakistan.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, Middle East, India, and Saudi Arabia

372. The UAE Under Attack: A Foreign Policy Test

Author:
Moran Zaga
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
January 2022 was an exceptional month in Abu Dhabi’s history. For the first time, this peaceful city suffered casualties as a result of a direct airstrike on two strategic sites – a petroleum storage site and Abu Dhabi International Airport.[1] The January 17 attacks, associated with the Houthis in Yemen, were followed by several failed attempts to attack the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) capital again. After the initial shock, the UAE launched an international campaign, calling for a multinational response.[2] And indeed, a chain of Arab leaders arrived in Abu Dhabi through the same airport that was attacked just a few days earlier.[3] The goal of their visit was clear – to express their full support and affirm their countries' solidarity with the UAE, its leaders, and its people. For the UAE, these high-level visitors reinforced the Emirati message that it was not alone on this front. The expressions of solidarity with the Emiratis transcended the region - leaders from around the world reached out to the Emirati leaders with messages of support and through other diplomatic channels.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Political stability, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

373. Hizballah, Lebanon, and Reconciliation with the Gulf: The Impasse

Author:
Carl Yonker
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
On February 14, in Beirut’s southern, Hizballah-dominated suburb of Ghobeiry, Bahraini opposition groups marked the anniversary of the 2011 failed popular uprising in Bahrain. The gathering, organized by the Bahraini opposition group al-Wifaq, took place despite the Lebanese interior ministry’s orders to cancel it, which were issued in order to avoid offending Bahrain and its Gulf allies.[1] Lebanese ties with a quartet of Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – have been at an impasse since October 2021. The diplomatic crisis, which has yet to be resolved, was sparked by Lebanese Information Minister George Kurdahi's critical comments regarding Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen. At its core, however, the crisis in Lebanese-Gulf relations is a dispute over Hizballah and its growing political influence in Lebanon – a source of tension for several years.
Topic:
International Relations, Non State Actors, Hezbollah, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

374. Politics, War and Eastern Mediterranean Gas

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In the past two months, there have been several significant, interlocking developments regarding Eastern Mediterranean gas. In January, the Biden Administration withdrew American support for the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek EastMed gas pipeline. In February, U.S. officials shuttled between Israel and Lebanon for another round of talks to resolve the question of the maritime border and the exclusive rights to exploit gas in their disputed waters. Most importantly, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in late February, has transformed the long-discussed European need to reduce its dependence on Russian gas (and oil) into an urgent priority. It has also exposed the disconnect between optimistic policies that anticipated an imminent shift to renewable resources and the reality that the developed world will, in the short- to medium-term, remain dependent on fossil fuels. Confronted with this new reality, does Europe's need to rapidly diversify its sources of energy increase the strategic value of Eastern Mediterranean gas? And can the Eastern Mediterranean contribute meaningfully to reducing Europe's dependence on Russian gas?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Politics, War, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and United States of America

375. Tunisia’s Turbulence: On the Road to Economic and Political Collapse

Author:
Daniel Zisenwine
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Thousands of Tunisians took to the streets of the capital Tunis in mid-March, demonstrating against Tunisian president Kais Saied’s July 2021 power grab and the country’s ongoing economic crisis. Citing alleged threats to Tunisia’s political order, Saied dismissed the government on July 25, 2021, suspended parliament, and moved to rule by decree. Critics, including opposition Islamist parties but also the country’s powerful trade unions, civil society groups, and foreign experts have since assailed Saied’s moves, contending that he effectively re-imposed one-man rule on Tunisia, and secured unchecked control over all branches of government. This political crisis intensified in late March, after Saied dissolved the Tunisian parliament which convened online and voted to repeal his decrees. The March protest differed from previous ones, as it was organized by the anti-Islamist Free Destourian Party (FDP), which has been critical of democratic measures adopted in Tunisia after the 2011 revolution that overthrew Zayn al-ʾAbidin Ben ʿAli’s authoritarian regime. The protest, led by a right-wing party not unsympathetic to some of Saeid’s grievances, focused on the president and the deteriorating economic crisis.[1] It was another indication of Tunisia’s growing unrest.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Civil Unrest, Economic Crisis, and Instability
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

376. A Tale of Two Normalizations: Israeli Normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Part I

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
The “Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel” was signed on September 15, 2020. On the same day, Bahrain and Israel signed their “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations.” Since then, bilateral relations between the two states and Israel have progressed speedily, with many more issue-specific agreements signed and economic relations with the Emirates burgeoning. The Negev Conference on March 28, 2022, which was attended by the U.A.E., Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as the United States, symbolized a maturing and coalescence of the regional normalization processes between Israel and conservative Arab states. This paper will address recent developments in the foreign policy of U.A.E. that impact the current status of relations with Israel, as well as recent developments in relations between the two states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, United States of America, Gulf Nations, and UAE

377. A Tale of Two Normalizations: Israeli Normalization with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain – Part II

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
Bahrain and Israel signed their “Declaration of Peace, Cooperation, and Constructive Diplomatic and Friendly Relations” on September 15, 2020; the “Treaty of Peace, Diplomatic Relations and Full Normalization Between the United Arab Emirates and the State of Israel” was signed on the same day. Since then, bilateral relations between the two states and Israel have rapidly progressed, with many more issue-specific agreements signed. The Negev Summit on March 28, 2022, which was attended by Bahrain, U.A.E., Egypt, and Morocco, as well as the United States, symbolized a maturing and coalescence of the regional normalization processes between Israel and conservative Arab states. A follow-up to the Negev Summit took place in Manama on June 27, 2022 and the steering committee, which was chaired by Bahraini Undersecretary for Political Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, formed working groups on security, health, education, tourism, food and water security, and energy.[1] A previous paper addressed recent developments in the foreign policy of U.A.E. which impact on the current status of relations with Israel, as well as recent developments in the two states’ bilateral relations. This paper will look at the context and content of relations between Israel and Bahrain, and analyze the overall state of normalization in the region at this stage.[2]
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Abraham Accords
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Gulf Nations

378. Saudi Arabia’s New Nationalism: Embracing Jahiliyyah

Author:
Ilan Zalayat
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
For more than two-thousand years, the walled city of al-ʿUla has been laying peacefully in a northwestern oasis of the Arabian Peninsula. While in ancient times it was an important oasis on the Spice Route, in the modern era, only the approximately five-thousand inhabitants of this far-flung town on the Saudi periphery know it to be the home of well-preserved stone monuments made by Nabataean sculptors. Its relative anonymity stands in stark contrast to its world-renowned twin city in Petra of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. However, ever since the de-facto Saudi ruler, Prince Mohammed bin Salman (“MbS”), became Crown Prince in June 2017, Saudi Arabia has gone to great lengths to publicize forgotten al-ʿUla: The government has invested $15 billion on advertising and developing the site, attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors.[1] The government also used the site to host the Saudi reconciliation with Qatar in 2021. Al-ʿUla was also the setting for the first-ever movie that was shot and produced in Saudi Arabia.[2] The counterintuitive choice to feature pagan monuments as the new symbol of Saudi Arabia,[3] a country that has long touted itself as the custodian of Islam, epitomizes the kingdom's effort to reimagine its pre-Islamic history in a nationalist frame.
Topic:
Islam, Nationalism, History, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia and Gulf Nations

379. Is there anything new in Mansour Abbas’ declaration concerning the “Jewish State”?

Author:
Arik Rudnitzky
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
The current issue of Bayan includes two articles that discuss the ideological and political characteristics of the Ra’am party, which is the political arm of the Islamic Movement, headed by Mansour Abbas. Dr. Arik Rudnitzky's article examines the declaration by Abbas regarding the Jewish State from a historical point of view.
Topic:
Politics, History, Ideology, Arabs, and Mansour Abbas
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

380. A New and Better Security Order for Europe

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Far-reaching changes in the global balance of power and Europe’s security environment call for a new U.S. strategy toward Europe—for the benefit of Americans and Europeans alike. European states should take deliberate steps toward autonomy in defense, which the U.S. should foster by reducing its military presence in, and security commitments to, Europe, gradually and in coordination with its NATO allies. The eventual goal should be to eliminate permanent U.S. military deployments in Europe. Europe, particularly France and Germany, possesses the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. What Europe lacks is the motivation, something it will not acquire so long as it can count on a blanket, open-ended American commitment. Europe’s stability and security demand a regional order into which Russia—the continent’s strongest single military power—is eventually integrated, rather than one from which it has become progressively alienated. The post-Cold War crises over Ukraine arose from complex circumstances; but one of them has been the absence of a pan-European security order that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and contains provisions for engagement with Russia, including arms control and crisis management, as well as confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of war. Restructuring Europe’s security order to promote European strategic autonomy will improve, not harm, trans-Atlantic relations and cooperation. The U.S. and Canada are bound to Europe by centuries-old ties—historical, cultural, and economic. While the extent and nature of these ties will necessarily change over time, their existence does not depend on an American willingness to serve indefinitely as Europe’s prime defender.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

381. NATO Should Defend Europe, Not Pivot to Asia

Author:
Jan Gerber
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In 2021, the U.K., France, and Germany deployed 21 naval ships to the Indo-Pacific with a stated aim of helping the U.S. shoulder the burden of collective security and sustaining the “rules-based international order.” Naval deployments by the U.K., France, and Germany are symbolic and unlikely to affect the balance of power in Asia. A European pivot to the Indo-Pacific draws scarce attention and resources away from defense issues in Europe. Instead of encouraging Asian forays, the U.S. should encourage its European allies to assume primary responsibility for European security, freeing the United States to focus on the Pacific, if needed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, France, Germany, and Indo-Pacific

382. To Prevent War and Secure Ukraine, Make Ukraine Neutral

Author:
Stephen W. Van Evera
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S.-NATO-Russia-Ukraine crisis could be resolved by a grand bargain among the parties that defines Ukraine as a neutral state. Neutrality deals worked well in the past to forestall Franco-British conflict over Belgium in the 1830s and East-West conflict over Finland and Austria in the Cold War. The Belgian, Finnish, and Austrian neutrality deals enhanced the security of the states they made neutral. Neutrality was an asset for Belgium, Finland, and Austria, not a handicap. Major powers never calmly accept the close approach to their borders of unfriendly powers or alliances. Russia is no exception. It will not accept a settlement that leaves open the possibility of Ukraine in NATO or NATO in Ukraine. Hence, a neutrality solution is both sufficient and necessary to resolve the current crisis. Ukraine is not worth a costly confrontation for the U.S. Hence, U.S. leaders should be open to compromise. If compromise proves elusive, the U.S. should not pay high costs or run large risks to impose a deal on its terms, as it has higher priorities at home and elsewhere.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

383. Apply the Logic of the Afghanistan Withdrawal to Syria

Author:
Natalia Armbruster
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The logic President Biden used for removing U.S. troops from Afghanistan applies to Syria. Since a U.S. intervention should be defined by clear, achievable goals, and since long-range strikes, instead of occupying forces, can accomplish U.S. counterterrorism goals, there is no good case for keeping U.S. troops in Syria either. Around 900 U.S. forces currently occupy territory in eastern and southern Syria, risking conflict with Syrian forces and local militias, as well as Russian, Iranian, and Turkish forces. ISIS’s territorial caliphate in Syria was eliminated in 2019. The few, small, remote areas the remnants of ISIS now hold are largely within territory held by Syrian government forces. Local forces can fight the remnants of ISIS. None of the other standard rationales for keeping U.S. forces in Syria—protecting the Kurds, countering Iran and Russia, unseating the Assad regime—justifies keeping troops in Syria either.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islamic State, Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

384. The Wisdom of U.S. Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Author:
Andrew Doris
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Afghanistan was not Korea. False analogies to peacetime military garrisons cheapen war and conflate wildly different forms of “support” to U.S. allies. War in Afghanistan was costly—to taxpayers, to civilians, to American soft power, to democratic legitimacy, and to the West’s strategic attention. Thus, withdrawal saved a fortune, saved lives, aided America’s reputation, honored democratic and constitutional principles, and focused Western strategists. War was not protecting Americans from terrorism. Keeping troops in but one of many places terrorists may operate did not meaningfully reduce Americans’ microscopic risk of being harmed in a terrorist attack. War was not helping Afghanistan. Democracy is a strong word for what U.S. forces propped up. Far from maintaining stability, the continued presence of those forces only prolonged armed struggle against a corrupt rentier state, impeding organic or sustainable long-term development. Credibility is highly contextual and unaffected by admitting defeat after 20 years of futile effort. If anything, the resources freed up by withdrawal make the United States better able to honor other commitments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

385. Raising the Minimum: Explaining China’s Nuclear Buildup

Author:
Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
China’s nuclear buildup, consisting of new ICBMs, submarine-launched weapons, a new generation of strategic bombers, and advances in hypersonic weapons, implies a significant recalibration of Beijing’s traditional “minimum deterrence” strategy. Beijing deliberated for decades about whether to increase its nuclear arsenal, and it finally seems to be doing so, at least partially in response to the precipitous decline in U.S.-China relations, U.S. initiatives to develop ballistic missile defense, and U.S. nuclear doctrine. China is not bidding for numerical nuclear superiority against the United States with its buildup. Rather, China is likely looking to secure its “second strike” deterrence forces and negate any perception of U.S. nuclear predominance to avoid being coerced by the United States, especially with respect to Taiwan. China’s buildup reflects a strengthening of its deterrent and thus does not contradict China’s long-time policy of no first use (NFU). Beijing wants decision-makers in Washington to recognize its credible deterrent. The United States should both preserve strong nuclear deterrent forces and avoid an overreaction to China’s buildup. U.S. nuclear modernization should focus on survivability and be accompanied by attempts at dialogue, arms control, and the development of crisis management mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

386. How Militarily Useful Would Taiwan Be to China?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The military value of Taiwan to China should be viewed in the aggregate. There are detriments that could come with seizing the island in addition to advantages for China’s military position. Taiwan is likely to be of greater utility to China in consolidating its hold over the East and South China Seas, as opposed to projecting power deep into the Pacific Ocean. Basing sensors on Taiwan would enhance the effective range of China’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities against mobile targets, like U.S. aircraft carriers. The technical deficiencies of Chinese nuclear submarines will limit the advantages of occupying Taiwan in terms of undersea warfare, but there could be gains with respect to operation of China’s conventionally powered submarines. Depending on the depth of resistance China encounters, force requirements for permanently garrisoning Taiwan could place major stress on Chinese military and security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

387. Bases, Logistics, and the Problem of Temptation in the Middle East

Author:
Benjamin Denison
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The wisdom of making wars easier depends on the wisdom of the wars. Rapid military response to all global trouble may sound good, but it can tempt policymakers to intervene even for non-vital interests. U.S. military bases and logistics hubs in and near the Middle East are the primary examples—they make foolish wars too easy to start. Maintaining the ability to use rapid military force in the region has become an end unto itself, unmoored from any clear vital strategic interest. Closing bases will make wars more challenging to start, which will help spur public debate about potential interventions due to the transparent upfront costs required. This will give diplomacy an opportunity to return as the primary policy option in the region. This recommendation is consistent with the U.S. Constitution’s logic. Democracy’s benefit for foreign policymaking is its ability to consider many options and give more time to think through various proposals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

388. Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan: Upholding the Status Quo

Author:
Peter Harris
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The U.S. has a goal to avoid a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, but the overriding U.S. interest is to avoid a ruinous war with China. The imperative to avoid a conflict with China should take priority for U.S. leaders. Proposals to deter China by bolstering U.S. military deployments in the Western Pacific are unlikely to succeed and fraught with danger. China has advantages in terms of geographical proximity to Taiwan and superior commitment to resolving the issue on favorable terms. The United States should not commit to fighting a great-power war at a time of China’s choosing. The Taiwanese obviously have the strongest interest in deterring a Chinese invasion of their island. Regional powers such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have the next-strongest interests in preserving stability in East Asia. These actors should do the heavy lifting in deterring China. The U.S. should encourage Taiwan and other regional actors to develop their own means of deterring a Chinese invasion. Working with others, Taiwan has the capacity to inflict severe costs upon Beijing in the event of an armed attack. If calibrated correctly, Taiwan and others might convince Beijing that the various costs of invasion—economic sanctions, opprobrium, military balancing—outweigh the benefits and thus deter China from invading. America’s role should be to support Taiwanese-led efforts to deter China while working to convince all sides that the status quo is sustainable and the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding One China policy. This is the best chance of preventing a war in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Military, Status Quo, and Invasion
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

389. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

390. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

391. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe

392. At the End of Its Tether: U.S. Grand Strategy of Advancing Democracy

Author:
David C. Hendrickson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Over the past several decades, the United States has made the advance of democracy its great purpose in foreign policy. The Biden administration’s rhetoric about a global struggle between autocracy and democracy is the old habit in new form. U.S. leaders market this goal as consonant with the U.S. liberal tradition, but it in fact offends the nation’s founding ethos, especially in relegating state sovereignty and national independence to secondary status. In the older teaching, accepted even by liberal internationalists like President Woodrow Wilson and President Franklin Roosevelt, free institutions were to expand by example, not by force. After the Cold War, U.S. efforts to push states into becoming democracies by instruction, war, and sanctions have been an abject failure, in large part because they offended against the principle of national independence. Defining U.S. efforts today as the defense of democracy obscures vital problems in the U.S. alliance system, including its expansionist tendencies, its unfair sharing of burdens, and the risks it poses of a major war that would be detrimental to U.S. security. The U.S. should reject the revolutionary policy of regime change and return to the respect for national independence once embedded in the U.S. diplomatic tradition. Overturning autocratic governments is an aim that is antithetical to peace, the most favorable environment for the growth of liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Cold War, Democracy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

393. Implications of a Melting Arctic

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible, which in turn may affect three key issues in the region—militarization, maritime trade, and natural resource development. U.S. security interests in the Arctic remain deterring an attack on the United States and NATO allies and ensuring the lawful use of Arctic waters. The United States can secure both at minimum cost and risk. Greater accessibility does not increase threats emanating from the Arctic, so the United States does not need to do more militarily to ensure its security. Militarization absent threats could lead to a destabilizing security dilemma. Trans-Arctic maritime trade routes and natural resource development present potential economic opportunities; however, both still face significant challenges that limit their near-term viability. The United States should be vigilant to Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic and avoid overreacting or reflexively mirroring their behavior. A U.S. Arctic strategy built on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography, is the best avenue to protect U.S. interests and keep the Arctic at peace.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, Trade, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

394. War Is a Choice, Not a Trap: The Right Lessons from Thucydides

Author:
Michael C. Desch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
A careful reading of the Greek Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War suggests that a U.S.-China war is hardly inevitable. Such a war is a choice, not a trap, and selecting the appropriate U.S. grand strategy is the way to avoid it. China faces important geographical and technological obstacles to expanding its hegemonic position in the region. Thucydides’ fundamental lessons for the contemporary United States in its rivalry with China is that democratic Athens erred when it sought primacy by expanding its empire during the Peloponnesian War; today we do not need to preserve a position of primacy in East Asia but can instead rest content with maintaining a balance of power. Despite China’s rise, the United States and its regional allies are in a strong position to maintain a regional balance of power that keeps a peace and serve U.S. interests in Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, War, History, Alliance, and Geography
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

395. Spheres of Influence in a Multipolar World

Author:
Andrew Latham
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Throughout the modern era, great powers have routinely staked out geographic zones within which they have limited the autonomy of weaker states—often as buffer zones between themselves and potential adversaries or rival empires. Since the nineteenth century, these geopolitical spaces have typically been referred to as spheres of influence. The specific configuration of such spheres depends largely on the distribution of power in the international system. During moments of multi-polarity, multiple great powers will attempt to assert spheres of influence; during the Cold War era of bipolarity, the international order was defined by two superpower-dominated spheres; during the post-Cold War moment of unipolarity, the U.S. alone was able to assert a sphere of influence. Given this, it was inevitable that the return of multipolarity from the 2010s on would result in the crystallization of a new, multipolar, configuration of spheres of influence—one involving multiple great powers each asserting their own sphere. The relevant question now, therefore, is not if the transition to a world of multiple spheres of influence will take place (given the structural changes at the level of international order, it most certainly will), but how Washington should manage this development in ways that are both realistic and conducive to U.S. interests. The most realistic answer to this how question is to adopt a differentiated strategy that recognizes that, while the U.S. will not be able to prevent spheres of influence as a feature of international order tout court, it may be able to thwart specific spheres in certain specific circumstances.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Multipolarity, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

396. Semiconductors Are Not a Reason to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Taiwan’s dominance in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and rising U.S.-China tensions have produced alarm that a Chinese invasion or blockade of Taiwan could cause a major disruption of the global semiconductor supply chain. This has led some to claim that the U.S. should defend Taiwan in order to maintain its supply of advanced chips. Fears that China could seize Taiwan’s chip-manufacturing capacity and leapfrog the U.S. technologically are overblown. Interdependence cuts both ways; if China invaded Taiwan, it would be cut off from the vital inputs controlled by the U.S. or its allies, and therefore unable to resume chip production under new management. Others fear Taiwanese chips could be disrupted during a Chinese blockade or a protracted conflict and tend to recommend bolstering U.S. capabilities to deter China. However, there are strong reasons to doubt the U.S. can ultimately deter Beijing if it feels that force is its only option for national reunification. Further efforts by the U.S. to deter China may only present Beijing with a closing window, encouraging it to use force before its prospects worsen, and precipitating the very conflict the U.S. seeks to prevent; a war between the U.S. and China would be exponentially costlier than any potential semiconductor supply shock resulting from a cross-strait invasion. Instead, the U.S. should seek to dial down the temperature with Beijing in order to maintain the political and territorial status quo and buy the time needed to diversify its own semiconductor supplies by onshoring or “allyshoring” chip manufacturing. The U.S. should therefore avoid provoking Beijing unnecessarily, and reaffirm the substance of the One China Policy while seeking to develop a longer-term settlement with Beijing over the future of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Manufacturing, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

397. Who Is an Ally, and Why Does It Matter?

Author:
Natalie Armbruster and Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In addition to the 51 allies the United States is obligated by treaty to defend, it has a number of quasi-allies: states the United States is not committed to defend but to which it provides a substantial degree of military and political support. By creating uncertainty about U.S. commitments both at home and abroad, quasi-allies’ ambiguous status creates dangers for both the United States and the quasi-allies. For the United States, the danger is entanglement; having quasi-allies can pull the United States into trouble outside its core interests, creating needless cost, risk, and even war. Quasi-allies may suffer a kind of moral hazard; they may falsely believe they have U.S. military protection and fail to secure themselves sufficiently or become emboldened and dangerously provoke adversaries. U.S. leaders should be more wary of these dangers and avoid loose talk and policy acts that imply a commitment to non-allies’ defense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

398. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

399. Violent Fraternity: An Interview with Dr. Shruti Kapila

Author:
Shruti Kapila and Mahia Bashir
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Historical considerations of modern South Asia have been marked by a predisposition towards political, material and socio-cultural analyses. Seldom has the remit of ideas as autonomous objects taken centre stage in the historiography of modern South Asia. Shruti Kapila’s new book Violent Fraternityveers off this established trajectory and breaks new ground by looking at ideas as the wellspring of political innovation and fundamental to the republication foundations of the nations of India and Pakistan during what she terms the ‘Indian age’. A work of remarkable scope that defies easy summarisation, the premise of Violent Fraternity is that violence became fraternal in 20th-century India: it was the intimate kin rather than the colonial other that became the object of unprecedented violence. “Violence, fraternity and sovereignty,” Kapila writes, “made up an intimate, deadly and highly consequential triangle of concepts that produced what has been termed here the Indian Age” (p.4) India’s founding fathers, who as opposed to the conventional figure of the detached scholar-philosopher were also actively straddling echelons of the political world, repeatedly engaged with the question of how to forge life with others in an intimate context rife with hatred and violence. In seeking these answers, they authored a new canon of political thought that defied “fidelity to any given ideology, whether it be liberalism, Marxism or communism”. As Kapila demonstrates, global political thought of the Indian age departed from its western counterpart by reconceptualising the place and potential of violence. In the western canon, the state has been the natural habitus of violence. However, Indian political thinkers like Tilak and Gandhi dissociated violence from the orbit of state, and in a radical rewriting of established political vocabularies, posited violence as an individual capacity, thereby reconceptualising the notion of sovereignty and summoning a subject-centred political horizon. Dr. Shruti Kapila is an Associate Professor of Indian History and Global Political Thought at the University of Cambridge and presently the Co-Director of the Global Humanities Initiative. Her research centres on modern and contemporary India and on global political thought in the twentieth century. In her recent book Violent Fraternity and in her earlier work on intellectual history of modern India, Dr. Kapila has pushed the boundaries of the field beyond its conventional focus on the West. In our interview, we spoke about modern India’s founding fathers and their intellectual contributions, writing global intellectual histories of the non-west, the future of the field of global intellectual history and Dr. Kapila’s engagements beyond her illustrious academic career.
Topic:
Politics, History, Intellectual History, and Violence
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

400. How China’s Environments Changed its Modern History: An interview with Micah Muscolino

Author:
Micah Muscolino and Rustam Khan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
It is hard to imagine the environmental calamities of our age without invoking China today. The “world’s factory” – as it is colloquially and sometimes derogatively called – has come to forefront of many discussions about the need to avert the dangers of planetary degradation. Images such as the thick carpets of smog covering Beijing or gripping documentaries, such as Death by Design (AMBRICA, 2016) and Plastic China (Jiu-Liang Wang, 2016), have revealed how China’s social and natural landscapes have experienced the ‘Anthropocene’s’ coming of age. In such narratives, the environment in China is usually seen as the victim of unfettered industrial production and global consumption starting with the country’s ‘reform and opening up’ period in the late 1970s. But to what extent does this periodization and the logics of the Anthropocene that rest upon it make sense against the longer historical record? A wave of scholarship has scrutinized the abstract idea of the environment in China’s restless history over the past two centuries. Bracketing the origins of the today’s environmental crises exclusively within the globalization debate is to miss something important. Namely, ecological thinking featured prominently in the country’s experiences with modernization, colonialism, and nation-building starting in the long 19th century. Micah Muscolino’s work is a great example that rethinks the conventional framework of modern Chinese history. Muscolino shows how the making of Qing, National, and PRC rule were often built on its relationships to natural resources. He has also come to see many similarities between today’s environmentalist transformations and China’s past. China stands, as he asserts, at the heart of the world’s present-day predicaments. The Toynbee Prize Foundation had the pleasure of interviewing Professor Micah Muscolino. He is the author of two acclaimed monographs, Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial and Modern China (2009) and The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938-1950 (2015). With his Ph.D. in Chinese history from Harvard in hand, Muscolino taught at St. Mary’s College of California, Georgetown University, and the University of Oxford, before taking up the Pickowicz Endowed Chair in Modern Chinese History at UC San Diego in 2018. He took the time to tell us more about the China’s past and present entanglements with the environment.
Topic:
Environment, Globalization, History, Displacement, Ecology, and Food Crisis
Political Geography:
China and Asia