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Begin New Search Topic International Cooperation Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

31. The New US-EU Energy Security Agenda: Roundtable Report

Author:
Jonathan Elkind
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On June 3, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), in cooperation with the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the US, cohosted a private virtual roundtable focusing on energy security issues during a period of heightened action on climate goals. This document summarizes the June 3 roundtable, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Participants in the roundtable included just over 50 senior corporate executives, civil society representatives, academic and think tank experts, energy analysts, and government officials from the European Union and United States. In June 2021, President Joe Biden traveled to Europe, his first overseas trip since his inauguration as president, and he met with European heads of state and government in the context of a British-hosted G7 meeting, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and a US-EU Summit.[1] The journey signaled a concerted effort by the United States and the European Union to rebuild bilateral relations, which were battered during the Trump administration. Protecting the global climate and accelerating the transition to clean energy are objectives that unify top leaders on both sides of the Atlantic today. The European Union has a legislated mandate of climate neutrality by the year 2050 and is implementing its comprehensive European Green Deal and elaborating a corresponding legal and regulatory framework for an enhanced 2030 target. In the United States, the Biden administration reentered the Paris climate agreement and announced plans to reach net-zero emissions by midcentury, though climate protection still faces significant political challenges in the US Congress and in certain states. If the European Union and the United States proceed as these plans indicate, their energy systems face a period of accelerating, unprecedented, and sustained change—new technologies, new supply chains, new business models, and new interdependencies between economic sectors.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

32. Stronger International Safeguards as a Condition of Supply to Nuclear Energy Programs: Coming to Consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Matt Bowen
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Nations that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are not allowed nuclear weapons under the treaty (“non-nuclear-weapon states”) must have international safeguards applied to civil nuclear energy facilities if they pursue such programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies these safeguards and conducts inspections on nuclear energy programs, and determined in the 1990s that it needed additional capabilities to verify states were not engaging in secret (i.e., undeclared) nuclear activities. Subsequently, the IAEA developed a set of stronger safeguards measures, known as the Model Additional Protocol (“Additional Protocol”), which was approved in 1997. Today, most nations have an Additional Protocol in force, but a few dozen do not. The nations that do not may pose a concern if they pursue nuclear energy as a means of addressing energy and environmental challenges, such as decarbonization to meet climate goals. The greater reporting requirements and inspection measures in the Additional Protocol give the international community assurance that a nation’s declarations about its civil nuclear program are both correct and complete. The enhanced inspections in turn provide greater deterrence against states pursuing illicit nuclear activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—which comprises 48 governments, including those representing the major reactor vendor countries—maintains guidelines governing the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The NSG has been considering modifying those guidelines for many years to support more universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. But adoption has been hard to come by, in part because of potential disruptions to existing supply relationships given that not all countries participating in the NSG have Additional Protocols in force and some client states of countries participating in the NSG also do not have these upgraded inspections in place. There may be room for consensus building among NSG states, however, since most support requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to further the nonproliferation regime. The remaining governments may agree if measures are proffered to address challenges that have blocked acceptance to date. This commentary discusses a history of related policy developments in the NSG, examines some of the group’s roadblocks to consensus, and suggests options for making progress on adding stronger international safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear energy programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. The OSCE and Peacekeeping: Track Record and Outlook

Author:
Fred Tanner
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) is one of the OSCE’s few success stories in recent years. This civilian mission has been uniquely able to operate as a quasi-peacekeeping force in high-risk areas of Donbas, monitoring ceasefire compliance and facilitating dialogue and humanitarian action in support of those living in the conflict zone. In the history of the OSCE, there has been only one other ceasefire monitoring mission: the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). This contribution to OSCE Insights considers the track record of OSCE peace operations, with special attention to the abovementioned missions. All OSCE peace operations to date have been civilian missions, and this paper considers military OSCE mission to be unfeasible also for the future. The paper provides lessons learned and recommendations for future missions by the OSCE and other organizations operating in high-risk environments.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, Humanitarian Crisis, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. THE DIPLOMATIC BURDEN OF COVID-19

Author:
Benjamin E. Bagozzi and Ore Koren
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
At a time when global cooperation is needed more than ever, new research suggests that pandemics may weaken diplomatic connections between countries and lower the probability that nations will establish new diplomatic ties. Diplomacy is one of the most enduring forms of international political interaction. Administered through embassies, consulates, and their political and bureaucratic support staffs, on-the-ground diplomatic relations are a key tool for international political negotiation, cooperation, trade promotion, dispute settlement, foreign intelligence management, and cultural exchange.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Communications, Peacekeeping, Negotiation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

35. “Germany’s EU Presidency 2020: The Security Dimension and EU-NATO Cooperation”

Author:
Ralf Roloff
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
On July 1, 2020, Germany assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union for the second half of 2020. How Germany manages the EU Council presidency will be of utmost importance for the future of the European Union as well as for the transatlantic relationship. The German EU presidency faces two major challenges: first, containing the coronavirus crisis and working towards a European economic recovery and second, initiating a lasting dynamic towards European solidarity, and autonomy. How are the two challenges intertwined with security questions? Germany intends to promote closer EU-NATO security cooperation. The coronavirus pandemic has tested this envisaged cooperation, but also offered new opportunities. Hence, what is the pandemic’s impact on Germany’s ambitions for EU-NATO cooperation? On July 2, 2020, the Marshall Center brought together a group of experts and alumni from Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and the United States in a virtual workshop designed to share their expectations for Germany’s EU presidency as well as generate ideas about how to lay the groundwork for strengthening Euro-Atlantic security and EU-NATO cooperation going forward. The following takeaways are informed by the discussion.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

36. With the World in Turmoil, Transnational Organized Crime Sees Opportunity in Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Stephen Noguera and Kalliroi Ziavrou
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic poses a host of global health, economic, and security challenges, to include the continued challenge of combating transnational organized crime. While some believe this pandemic will disrupt and have a negative impact on the global operations of transnational organized criminal groups, the morbid reality is that these groups view the crisis as a lucrative opportunity. For the foreseeable future, we can expect organized criminal groups to quickly adapt in order to exploit the pandemic via various illicit schemes. In Italy, mafia groups are already demonstrating that they are intent on benefiting from the crime-related opportunities that the COVID-19 pandemic will present.1 There are numerous opportunities and illicit ventures transnational organized crime will seek to exploit as this pandemic runs its course. Perhaps most concerning are the activities associated with the manufacture and trafficking of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, including personal protection equipment (PPE).2 Since the outbreak of the crisis, the sale of these products has increased.3 Interpol is warning that one of the five global threats from the coronavirus is the fraudulent and counterfeit trade in personal protective equipment and anti-viral pharmaceuticals.4 Moreover, during this crisis counterfeiters will most probably use shortages in the supply of some products to provide counterfeit alternatives.5 The European Medicines Agency (EMA) is urging the general public not to buy medicines from unauthorized websites and other vendors aiming to exploit fears and concerns during the ongoing pandemic of COVID-19. Such products are likely to be falsified medicines.6 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “falsified” medicines are medical products that deliberately/fraudulently misrepresent their identity, composition, or source.7 For counterfeit products, the WHO is also using the terminology “substandard” (also called “out of specification”), for authorized medical products that fail to meet either their quality standards or specifications, or both, and “unregistered/unlicensed” for medical products that have not undergone evaluation and/or approval by the National or Regional Regulatory Authority (NRRA) for the market in which they are marketed/distributed or used, subject to permitted conditions under national or regional regulation and legislation.8
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Europe

37. The United States and the World Health Organization

Author:
Theodore M. Brown
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
A little more than two months ago, U.S. President Donald Trump began to lash out at the World Health Organization, blaming it for what he claimed were missteps, failures, and prevarications in its handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Then, on April 14, after several days of threats, he announced that U.S. funding for the WHO would be frozen for sixty to ninety days while his administration conducted a review to “assess the World Health Organization’s role in severely mismanaging and covering up the spread of coronavirus.” Widely seen as a transparent attempt to deflect attention from his own inconsistent, incompetent, and irresponsible response to the crisis, Trump’s threatened withdrawal of funds from the WHO at a critical moment drew widespread condemnation from medical and public health leaders. Richard Horton, the editor-in-chief of Lancet, called Trump’s decision a “crime against humanity.” Dr. Georges Benjamin, the executive director of the American Public Health Association, “denounced” the Trump administration’s decision to halt U.S. contributions to the WHO, which, he said, would “cripple the world’s response to COVID-19 and would harm the health and lives of thousands of Americans.”
Topic:
International Cooperation, World Health Organization, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

38. The Australia–India Strategic Partnership: Accelerating Security Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific

Author:
Dhruva Jaishankar
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
India and Australia have successfully managed to overcome prior inhibitions about security cooperation. Since 2000, the two countries have significantly improved their strategic coordination, military interoperability, and maritime cooperation, motivated by China’s rise and behaviour, faltering regional security institutions, and uncertainty about the United States’ role. Today, India–Australia security relations comprise regular military exercises, professional exchanges, operational coordination, and nascent defence technology cooperation. But the two countries’ different capabilities, priorities, and strategic circumstances will have to be overcome if relations are to deepen. Future priorities should include institutionalising bilateral and multilateral coordination mechanisms, improving military interoperability, deepening defence technology collaboration, and broadening relations to give ballast to the security relationship.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, India, Australia, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

39. Global Trade Cooperation after COVID-19: What is the WTO's Future?

Author:
Peter Draper
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
International trade cooperation has been under growing strains since at least the turn of the twenty-first century. Forces promoting global trade integration were in the ascendancy for most of the first decade. They were anchored on com- plex production specialisation mediated through cross-border value chains, underpinned by con- sumer demand for a variety of cost-effective prod- ucts, and cemented through regional and bilateral trade agreements. However, since 2008, succes- sive shocks unleashed cumulative disintegrative forces that counter-balanced and now threaten to overwhelm the forces of integration. These com- prise rising nationalism, associated desires for sovereignty, growing concerns over uneven distri- bution of the benefits of economic globalisation, shifting international power balances and associ- ated security concerns. These disintegrative forces threaten to unravel the World Trade Organization (WTO). COVID-19 mostly accelerates this trajec- tory, rendering WTO reform and restoration to its central role at the apex of the global trading sys- tem increasingly challenging. But all is not lost, as the forces of global trade integration have not dissipated and every crisis also presents reform opportunities.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, World Trade Organization, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

40. International and Regional Laws and Instruments Related to Gender Equality and the Security and Justice Sector

Author:
Nenad Galic and Megan Bastick
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
This Annex is part of the DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN Women Gender and Security Toolkit. It compiles regional and international laws and policies related to gender and the security and justice sectors and is meant to accompany Tools and Policy Briefs found in the Toolkit.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Law, Justice, and Equality
Political Geography:
Global Focus