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1. Six Takeaways from Two Years of Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine from the North, East and South in order to control the whole country through direct military occupation and/or a proxy government. Moscow assumed a rapid collapse or surrender of the Ukrainian state and planned a relatively fast war of manoeuvre coupled with air assaults and/or amphibious operations to take over major cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa. Ukraine – which had prepared to some extent for a Russian invasion since 2014 – resisted and rolled back invading forces from its major cities in 2022, including from Kherson despite its illegal annexation to the Russian Federation. In late spring 2023, Kyiv launched a counter-offensive aimed at liberating territories south of Zaporizhzhia, but unfortunately Russian forces were able to hold most of the ground previously gained. A high level of attrition has now been experienced by both sides for several months, with more than half a million troops deployed by belligerents. Over the last six months, the war has turned into a bloody stalemate. It witnesses continuous and indiscriminate air campaigns by Russia – including the use of bombs, missiles and drones –, tailored raids by Ukraine on the occupied territories and across the Black Sea, and above all fierce land battles over a highly fortified frontline with a systematic, mutual shelling and massive use of drones. Two years after the beginning of the invasion, Russian armed forces control the land corridor that connects the Crimea peninsula to Donbas – two areas already directly or indirectly under Moscow influence since 2014 – and the whole Azov Sea: a region accounting for slightly less than 20 per cent of Ukrainian territory. Still, Ukraine continues to access the Black Sea and export its goods. Such an occupation has cost so far dozens of thousands of military casualties in both countries, the lives of thousands of Ukrainian civilians, as well as huge numbers of injured people and millions of displaced citizens – plus the material destruction brought by the conflict. What does this dramatic watershed for Ukraine mean for Europe as a whole? At least six takeaways can be gained for the armed forces of European countries, NATO and EU defence initiatives, with a view to deterring Moscow from further aggressions and if necessary defending Europe from them.
Topic:
Defense Industry, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for the European Defence Industry

Author:
Michele Nones
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Two years after the Russian attack on Ukraine, it is clear to everyone that the European Defence Technological and Industrial Basis (EDITB) was ill-equipped to face the consequences of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict on the Old Continent. The war changed three decades of procurement policies, production and technological trends that had previously shaped (not only) Europe’s approach to defence hardware. From the 1990s onwards, the preference for fewer, precise, highly advanced weapon systems over the massive employment of low-medium tech solutions had a double effect on the EDITB. First, it led European markets to partially consolidate, and individual companies to strive for increased efficiency. This meant not investing/maintaining redundant production sites, divesting from relatively low profitable and low demand segments such as the manufacturing of artillery shells and pursuing research and development (R&D) investment in high-end products. Second, the emphasis on technological prowess also shaped the way the European Union tried to jumpstart defence cooperation and integration among member states, first and foremost through the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. NATO’s Posture vis-a-vis Russia: Features and Challenges

Author:
Elio Calcagno and Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Russian war against Ukraine has had multiple impacts on NATO’s deterrence and defence stance vis-à-vis Moscow, which today presents a number of challenges to allies – particularly European ones. The 2022 Madrid summit and the resulting Strategic Concept signalled a substantial departure for the alliance in terms of focus and posture.[1] First, the new Concept represents an unequivocal return to a Russia policy based first and foremost on deterrence and defence, rather than calls for cooperation that had been typical between the end of the Cold War and the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.[2] The 2022 Concept stands in stark contrast with this period of détente and instead explicitly points to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.[3] This new focus on deterrence and defence is accompanied with an enhancement of NATO’s military presence along the northern and eastern flanks.[4]
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Pyongyang in Search of a New Cold War Strategy

Author:
Jihwan Hwang
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Jihwan Hwang, a professor at the University of Seoul, predicts that the strengthening alliance between North Korea, China, and Russia could enable North Korea to overcome its international isolation, weakening the influence of the US-South Korea alliance and increasing China’s leverage over the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Hwang points out that even without the establishment of a new Cold War order, the strengthened cooperation among the authoritarian regimes will pose a significant strategic challenge to South Korea. As Seoul’s approach to Pyongyang has been based on a unipolar system led by Washington, Dr. Hwang highlights the need for South Korea to explore new approaches to address the changing security environment.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

5. Russia’s Stance on the North Korean Narrative of a New Cold War

Author:
Seho Jang
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Seho Jang, a research fellow in the Institute for National Security Strategy, states that North Korea is promoting strategic solidarity with China and Russia to achieve its goal of dismantling US hegemony. While Russia also shares the perception that the US-centered unipolar order is not conducive to attaining its national interests, it rarely uses the term “new Cold War” in official foreign policy discourse, reflecting its apprehension about the concept and its potential implications. He evaluates that this caution possibly originated from Russia’s historical trauma as a loser of the Cold War, making it highly likely to be opposed to the emergence of the new Cold War order led by Washington and Beijing. Dr. Chang suggests that this subtle difference could become an important inflection point as Washington’s clout in international politics decreases in the future.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Multipolarity, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North Korea, and United States of America

6. Will Spring Ever Come? Security Landscape of Northeast Asia in 2023

Author:
Kyung-joo Jeon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Kyung-Joo Jeon, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, predicts that the Korean peninsula might repeat the days of fire and fury in 2017 this year. North Korea will likely turn to its military provocation tactics ahead of the ROK-US Freedom Shield Exercises in mid-March, DPRK’s 70th Anniversary of The Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War in July, and another ROK-US joint military drill in August. Dr. Jeon suggests that Seoul should increase its strategic value as an essential global player while Washington seeks a stronger alliance network in the Indo-Pacific region if South Korea wants to live up to its policy goal of the “Global Pivotal State.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

7. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept: war against Ukraine, confrontation with the west, and continuation of the tradition of imperialism

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On March 31, 2023, the sixth Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was published (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). The document was updated for the first time in six years, the main reason for which is the deteriorating international situation for Moscow amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. The text of the concept is highlighted by harsh and revanchist calls against the West and especially the USA. The document almost entirely refers to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the same time, the concept shows that the current war is only one part of Russia’s confrontation with the Western world. The concept contains a number of statements inconsistent with the real policy of Russia and even lies, but despite the absurd, propagandistic content of the new document, it is important to find out how the new concept differs from its predecessor, and also what factors Russia relies on in the current difficult international situation? Based on the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia the impact of Russia’s imperialist worldview on its foreign policy in the light of full-scale military intervention in Ukraine, the changed attitude towards the West, the prospects of Russia-West relations, Russia’s attempt to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, and finally, threats from Russia to Georgia are discussed in this publication.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, and United States of America

8. The Zeitenwende in German Foreign Policy And The Eastern Partnership

Author:
Mariam Macharashvili
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This paper aims to analyze Germany’s approach to the Eastern Partnership against the backdrop of the “turning point” (Zeitwende) in German foreign policy announced by Olaf Scholz in February 2022. The deviation from the previous policy came as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which disrupted the European collective security system and called into question the main characteristics of German foreign policy. The outbreak of the war on the territory of Europe showed the German leadership that the use of non-military means in the foreign policy, as well as their policy of openness and normalization towards the East (Ostpolitik), which largely implies Russia, turned out to be wrong. Russia’s war in Ukraine also became the basis for the rethinking of yet another political concept - change through trade (Wandel durch Handel), according to which trade and economic interdependence with Russia will facilitate its integration into Europe and push it towards peaceful mutual cooperation. Germany’s dependence on Russian natural resources on the one hand gave Russia a lever of political influence, and on the other made the German economy vulnerable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

9. Salome’s Choice: Europe and Ivanishvili?

Author:
Emma Smeyers
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
While Georgian Dream (GD) has been attempting to normatively balance between the collective West and Russia for years, the latter’s re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought increased pressure on the ruling party— ultimately resulting in internal shifts among the elite, and bringing about party-wide discursive change. In the most high-profile case, President Salome Zurabishvili—for the first time since she took office in 2018—was seen openly defying the leadership, and directly contradicting the party line. She has since publicly engaged in several quarrels with the party’s leadership, with one causing the announcement of a lawsuit against her for alleged violations of the Constitution. Despite these disputes, Zurabishvili remains willing to side with Bidzina Ivanishvili, GD founder and former Prime Minister. She openly blamed GD leadership for taking insufficient measures to preemptively shield the oligarch from the possibility of personal sanctions. Zurabishvili’s sudden ‘turn’ against Georgian Dream, though creating some intrigue, remains unsystematically explored. This paper engages in a scenario-outlining exercise, wherein three potential explanations are presented. First, Zurabishvili’s ‘turn’ might have stemmed from valuebased disagreement, with the war in Ukraine revealing the incompatibility of the President’s and GD elites’ values. Second, her ‘turn’ could have been part of a communication strategy, orchestrated to create the illusion of a ‘fragmented leadership’ for public legitimation purposes. Finally, the possibility of patterns of intra-regime (dis)loyalty, alliance-forming, and elite defection being at play is explored. Such patterns are expected to supervene in informal, authoritarian modes of governance and are likely to supervene during heightened crises1 .
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Domestic Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, and Georgia

10. After Ostpolitik: A New Russia and Eastern Europe Policy Based on Lessons from the Past

Author:
Stefan Meister and Wilfried Jilge
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The large-scale Russian war of aggression against Ukraine that began in February 2022 demonstrates both the failure of Germany’s cooperative Ostpolitik of the last 30 years and the need for energy policy disentanglement. Russia has become the greatest security risk in Europe. To safeguard national and European security, Germany’s ruling coalition must learn lessons from the past, initiate a radical new beginning in Germany’s policy on Russia and Eastern Europe, and assume a leadership role in Europe.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Governance, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, and Ukraine

11. Tech Sanctions Against Russia: Turning the West’s Assumptions Into Lessons

Author:
Alena Epifanova
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The West assumed that its unprecedented tech sanctions would be the response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that would hurt the country most. While their impact took different routes than expected, Russia has been forced to scale back its goals for technological advancement and become more dependent on third countries than ever. As Russia is preparing to wage a protracted war, the EU must make unity and coordination on tech among its member states and partners its ongoing priority. Implementing the restrictive measures and closing loopholes is essential.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia

12. The War against Ukraine and Russia’s Position in Europe’s Security Order

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s aggressions against its neighbours since 2008 – first Georgia, then Ukraine twice – impel the urgent reconstruction of European security. While articulating a post-war European security order and Russia’s place there is easy, implementing it is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, in Ukraine, Russia has unilaterally, and unprovokedly, violated or broken at least eight major international treaties and accords, ranging from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, according to which Moscow had pledged to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.[1] It has also broken NATO’s (and especially Washington’s) conventional deterrence.[2]
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Turkey vis-à-vis Russia’s War against Ukraine

Author:
Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Characterising Turkey’s policy towards Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an easy task. Elements of both support for Ukraine and neutrality have emerged in the past year. An analysis of the fundamentals of Turkey–US relations and Russia–Turkey relations is thus helpful.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

14. Diplomacy and the War against Ukraine

Author:
Ferdinando Nelli Feroci
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Normally, diplomacy is meant as the set of rules and processes that preside over international relations to prevent or resolve disputes and conflicts, or even as a special skill in dealing with complex issues and finding compromises. If this is the case, one may be tempted to conclude that diplomacy has so far failed with respect to the year-long conflict in Ukraine. But perhaps it is worth analysing the issue more closely.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. The War against Ukraine and Its Lessons for NATO Militaries: Food for Thought

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
One year of full-fledged conventional war fought on the European continent between two large countries, including a nuclear power, is obviously a historical watershed for NATO and the whole Euro-Atlantic area, whose strategic implications are yet to be fully assessed. The conflict has already destroyed a number of expectations widely shared in Western Europe, including the ideas that Putin would not have invaded the whole of Ukraine, that Western sanctions would have paralysed his ability to wage a prolonged military campaign, or that Europeans would have diminished their military support to Ukraine over the first wartime winter. Given the ongoing “fog of war” and uncertainty about future scenarios, it is perhaps too early to identify lessons for allies and their militaries. Still, the following elements may be considered food for thought for the Western defence policy communities, cum grano salis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. The Existential Value of Ukraine’s Freedom

Author:
Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned the international spotlight back onto the value of democracy and the contrast between liberal democracies and authoritarian systems. However, it has done so by adding nuance and emotional power to what was previously a rather sterile debate. When Joe Biden was elected President of the United States, putting an end – at least for the time being – to the traumatic years for US democracy epitomised by Donald Trump’s presidency, international politics reacquired a distinctively normative, if not ideological, taste. Powers like Russia and China should be opposed, not “only” because of their aggressive or unfair behaviour – be it in the South China Sea, Taiwan, Ukraine, cyber, energy, technology or trade – but because that malign behaviour, so the argument went, is intrinsically linked to the nature of their political systems: it’s democracy versus autocracy, stupid.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Freedom, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Italy’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In line with the EU’s policy, former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have taken a strong stance in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine by firmly condemning the invasion and offering their full support for Kyiv’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

18. WHY DEMOCRACIES AREN’T MORE RELIABLE ALLIANCE PARTNERS

Author:
Mark Nieman and Doug Gibler
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
ussia’s invasion of Ukraine set off a security spiral in Europe. Despite US President Biden’s pledge to “defend every inch of NATO territory,” Poland increased its military budget by a whopping 60 percent and asked to have US nuclear weapons based on its territory. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia also announced sizable defense increases, with Latvia re-instating compulsory military training. Why didn’t Biden’s pledge reassure these NATO members? Is the alliance’s famed Article 5 promise—that an attack on one member is an attack on all—a less than ironclad guarantee?
Topic:
NATO, Democracy, Alliance, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

19. POWER, NOT PEACE: THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

Author:
Timothy D. Sisk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The row between International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky over potential Russian and Belarussian athlete participation at Paris 2024 exposes the Achilles’ Heel of the Olympic Games: the peace-promising celebrations are inescapably ensnared in nation-state power politics. The IOC announced on January 25 a proposal to facilitate participation in the 2024 Olympic Games for individual athletes from Russia (and close ally Belarus) individually and neutrally in the Paris games. The statement reversed an IOC Executive Board decision from February 28, 2022, to impose more sweeping participation sanctions on Russia following the Ukraine invasion.
Topic:
Sports, Olympics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

20. War in Ukraine: One Year On, Nowhere Safe

Author:
Nichita Gurcov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery, and missile strikes mostly affecting the northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. Quantifying the civilian toll of the conflict presents a challenge – especially in areas continuously engulfed by violence, like eastern Ukraine. In areas under Russian occupation, reports of abductions, forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial executions have been widespread, though the scale of violence against civilians becomes known only upon the liberation of territories, evidenced in the case of northern Ukraine and especially the Kyiv suburbs. Meanwhile, long-range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure, pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities even farther afield from the frontline.
Topic:
War Crimes, Conflict, Civilians, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. ACLED Year in Review Global Disorder in 2022

Author:
Timothy Lay
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine escalated the war to a level that dwarfed all other conflicts in 2022, both in the sheer scale of violence and its deadliness. It also obscured a significant overall deterioration of the security situation in most other regions worldwide. Driven by heightened levels of conflict in both new and longstanding hotspots, political violence increased substantially over the course of the year. While 2022 saw some positive developments – including a significant reduction in total violent events in places like Afghanistan and Yemen after years of war – these gains only represent qualified improvements. Despite the aggregate decline in events in Afghanistan and Yemen, for example, they remain home to two of the most complex and severe conflict environments in the world. Globally, political violence targeting civilians became not only more common but also more deadly in 2022, underscoring the fact that it is civilian communities that are increasingly shouldering the burden of rising conflict levels around the world.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Global Focus

22. The Ukraine effect: demise or rebirth of the global order?

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sharpened the commitment of Western governments to a liberal vision of international order. But it is a different story elsewhere. Many countries, particularly in the Global South, regard the rules-based order as an artificial Western construct, and the Ukraine war as a matter of geopolitics rather than norms and principles. Events in Ukraine have reinforced Washington’s views about two competing visions of global order — one democratic, the other autocratic. However, such binarism has little resonance beyond the West. For the Global South, the divide that matters is with the Global North. This is not only about relative influence and status in the international system, but also diverging priorities. A rules-based international order is achievable, but not as commonly imagined in the West. The post-Cold War template of unalloyed US global leadership and Western-dominated institutions is no longer tenable. The only viable order is one that is more inclusive and representative, reflecting a world where power is increasingly diffuse, and global cooperation is critical in meeting threats such as climate change and human insecurity.
Topic:
Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

23. One Year After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The geopolitical struggle is not where you think it is

Author:
Roshni Menon and Faiza Shaheen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
When Russia invaded Ukraine one year ago, there were immediate concerns about the effects on food and energy security, and on geopolitical alignment in other countries. The world was right to be concerned, but the repercussions have been much wider and deeper than many predicted. There are two main ways in which conflict dynamics have shifted, neither of them solely caused by the war but both exacerbated by it: Russian’s war on Ukraine has shone the lens on inter-state conflict and proxy war Compounding the pandemic and climate change, a war started in one corner of the world has resulted in a global cost-of-living crisis and increasing debt for almost every country worldwide—countries that had no hand in Russia’s invasion or in the failure to respond to public health and socio-economic crisis. This analysis looks at the multiple and cascading crises (increasingly referred to as the polycrisis), and how we can take action in the face of polycrisis,
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Political stability, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

25. Russia Is Down, But Not Out, in Central Asia

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has weakened its influence in Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. Russia is no longer a regional hegemon, which may increase regional instability. Tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially dangerous. Despite Moscow’s diminished influence in Central Asia, regional states cannot afford to completely ignore Russian interests. Western hopes for Central Asian gas resources to be pumped westwards and circumvent Russia remain unlikely to be fulfilled.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Gas, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

26. Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia

Author:
Olga Khvostunova
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Debates about the nature of the Putin regime have intensified in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some experts argue that Russia has turned fascist. While such claims are understandable in the face of Russian aggression, they obfuscate the complexity of the problem and distract from identifying the regime’s actual ideological predisposition. In fact, the Putin regime is conservative, authoritarian, and reactionary, and its core beliefs include anti-Americanism, ressentiment, and Russian messianism. These beliefs operate under the guise of patriotism, Russia’s official national idea, which is used by the regime to rally public support and secure its grip on power.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, Ideology, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

27. Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A debate over the nature of the China-Russia relationship has raged for almost two decades. One side believes the two are strategic partners; the other believes their ties are an “axis of convenience” lacking depth. Understanding the true nature of their relationship is of vital importance to U.S. national security. A true strategic partnership represents a grave threat; less robust ties between the two give the U.S. more latitude in dealing with them. We can gain a deeper, more nuanced understanding of China-Russia ties by observing how they interact in regions of the world where they both have important interests at stake. Four regions emerge as key here: Central Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, and East Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

28. When Diplomats Are Undiplomatic

Author:
Charles Ray
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US ambassador to South Africa recently accused South Africa of shipping arms to Russia. The ambassador was criticized by some—including the South African government—for breaking with diplomatic protocol by so openly condemning his host government. However, maintaining an effective working relationship does not mean that a diplomat must never say or do anything that the host country might not like. Far from it. Effective diplomacy is built on trust, honesty, and respect, and the diplomat who never disagrees or who comes across as a sycophant, will be neither trusted nor respected. On the other hand, a diplomat who is consistently honest, but who strives to be polite and considerate, might not be universally liked, but will earn respect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Africa, and United States of America

29. Russian Disinformation in Africa: No Door on this Barn

Author:
Dan Whitman
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Recent gains by Russian disinformation in Africa make up one of the quickest propaganda victories in history. Wagner Group-Kremlin narratives work to Russia’s material advantage, and to Africa’s strong disadvantage. Understandably, Western governments are skittish toward employing underhanded tactics to counter Russian lies. An alternative to inaction could be to marry Western government resources with the work of non-governmental organizations in Africa and elsewhere. As is sometimes said about climate change, it may already be “too late” to mount efforts to remedy the situation. But that is hardly a reason for doing nothing.
Topic:
Climate Change, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eurasia

30. Biden’s Bombs: The Dance of Ethics and Interests

Author:
Dominic Tierney
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On the same day in July 2023, the Biden administration destroyed America’s last chemical weapon, and also, controversially, announced the supply of cluster bombs to Ukraine. The story of the two bombs shows how America’s view of ethics in war is shaped by an underlying strategic logic. The focus on humanizing war by banning certain weapons may do more to help America on the battlefield than to protect civilian lives.
Topic:
Ethics, Weapons, Civilians, Joe Biden, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

31. Wagner’s Head is Dead, Now Bury the Body

Author:
Marcel Plichta, Christopher Faulkner, and Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The core of Wagner leadership was effectively decapitated with the deaths of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitri Uktin, but the group’s fingerprints won’t disappear quickly. Although the Kremlin may attempt to appoint new leadership, semi-nationalize Wagner, or attempt a full takeover, a Wagner descendant organization will continue causing problems for the West. The Wagner model of weaponizing private military companies to use as a foreign policy tool, will continue as well. U.S. and European authorities should avoid complacency by intensifying efforts to counter Wagner and its employees, so that Wagner members cannot slip into anonymity amidst Russian gray zone warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

32. The Eagle in the South Caucasus: Armenia Tests Alternative Geopolitical Waters

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The US-Armenia “Eagle Partner” joint military exercise from September 11–20 may signal the beginning of a shift in the foreign policy direction of Armenia, historically a close ally to Russia. Armenia has been growing frustrated at the lackluster response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to its appeals for assistance in the deepening conflict with Azerbaijan. However, it would be difficult to imagine a wholesale change in the geopolitical orientation in Yerevan, given the strong military, economic, energy, and cultural ties between Armenia and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, North America, South Caucasus, and United States of America

33. Why the West Should Stick with Conventional Arms Control in Europe for Now

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez and Alexander Graef
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Arms Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) formally enters into force on November 7, 2023, the remaining twenty-nine member states need to decide whether they want to keep the Treaty or dissolve it for good. The CFE Treaty no longer corresponds to the present state of European security, but its transparency and verification regime can still provide limited security advantages for NATO members and strengthen deterrence. A formal dissolution of the Treaty would undermine Western normative commitments to military transparency. In the long run, it could lead to a loss of expertise on how to conduct inspections and information exchange, which might become relevant again in the context of ending Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. Russia’s Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military spending by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. Russia’s total military expenditure has increased since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgeted military spending in 2023 can be estimated at 6648 billion roubles. This represents 4.4 per cent of forecast Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any unusual surge. The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to minimize the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of policy goals set before the invasion. The Russian economy can afford this level of spending notwithstanding severe sanctions, while leaving open the possibility of increased war-related funding if the government considers it necessary in the future.
Topic:
War, Budget, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. Cyber Crossover and Its Escalatory Risks for Europe

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The crossover between cybercrime and cyberwarfare has intensified in recent years, particularly against the backdrop of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and mounting tensions between China, Russia and the United States. This paper delves into specific cyber incidents that employ cybercrime tactics with cyberwarfare objectives, allegedly involving Chinese, Russian or US actors. It examines responses within and among the private sector, the public sector and international forums. Although not directly involved in all of the cases, the European Union (EU) was impacted in a variety of ways, including as a result of spillover effects and intentional targeting. Drawing on an examination of cyber incidents, this paper highlights how emerging trends in actors, means and responses present escalatory risks for the EU and emphasizes the pressing need to bolster cybersecurity measures.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Risk, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

36. Assessing Realist and Liberal Explanations for the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Christopher McCallion
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Many commentators have claimed that the Russo-Ukrainian War invalidates or refutes core aspects of realist international relations (IR) theory. However, the opposite is the case: many realists correctly predicted the war, and realism offers a compelling explanation for its causes, while explanations based on liberal IR theory are weak and often inconsistent with the evidence. By focusing on factors like the balance of power and the security dilemma, the realist explanation for the Russo-Ukrainian War emphasizes Russian security concerns in the face of NATO expansion and Western-sponsored regime change. Liberal explanations, by focusing on the internal attributes of states and their decision-makers, instead attribute the war to the pathologies of the Russian government. The dominant liberal narratives regarding the causes of the war are that Russian President Vladimir Putin has always been intent on reincorporating Ukraine into Russia and/or that the democratic example set by post-Maidan Ukraine would threaten President Putin’s own autocratic rule at home. Neither of these explanations stand up to scrutiny. For decades, a long list of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars warned against Western encroachment on Russia’s borders and cautioned that a crisis like the current war could erupt due to continued NATO enlargement. These predictions are consistent with realist theory and the explanations for the war offered by realists. Liberal IR theory encourages a crusading, messianic, and highly militarized foreign policy that consistently produces outcomes inimical to U.S. interests. Realist IR theory offers a better framework through which to understand international politics and encourages a more prudent foreign policy that defends fundamental U.S. security interests while avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other powers.
Topic:
International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. The Restraining Effect of Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
William D'Ambruoso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Recent developments in international affairs and military technology have led some analysts to conclude that the nuclear revolution, which purportedly prevents war between nuclear powers, no longer has much effect—that the world is getting safer for nuclear war or conventional war beneath the nuclear umbrella. This conclusion is wrong; technological change has not meaningfully shifted the political calculus pacifying relations between nuclear weapons states. The war in Ukraine demonstrates the continued strength of nuclear restraint: while Russian President Vladimir Putin is risk-acceptant and brutal, he did not attack a country protected by U.S.-extended deterrence, and, like NATO members, he appears deterred by the possibility that a Russia-NATO war could escalate out of control. North Korea provides another example of the endurance of mutual deterrence: Despite heated rhetoric and a barrage of missile tests, North Korea remains deterrable, and its small arsenal has also been able to deter the United States. Because the chances of nuclear war are usually low but never zero, the nuclear age should continue to be an era of great power restraint. Traditional foreign policy approaches emphasizing strategic ambiguity and arms control, including with China, remain useful tools to help keep the peace.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, International Affairs, Deterrence, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

38. Neutrality Not NATO: Assessing Security Options for Ukraine

Author:
Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether via the NATO alliance or some lesser means. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security serves no major U.S. interest and would increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and nuclear escalation. Those dangers are why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia today, and they would induce similar caution if the United States guaranteed Ukraine’s security. Lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine will be unserious and unbelievable. Fake security guarantees for Ukraine might have some deterrent value, despite their lack of credibility, given the terrible risks involved for Russia in testing those promises. However, fake security guarantees would likely degrade Ukraine’s security on balance, both by preserving a cause of the war and by encouraging Ukrainian leaders to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. Announcing plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security once the war ends would encourage Russia to continue fighting. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees or fighting for Ukraine and sparking an immediate nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Deterrence, Neutrality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

39. New Bahrain Poll Reveals Support for Russia, Entente with Iran, Split on Israel

Author:
David Pollock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On Iran, Bahrainis (especially among the country’s Shia majority) mostly favor rapprochement, and oppose military action or cooperation with Israel against it. Popular acceptance of business ties with Israel is steady, at around 40% in this small yet strategic island nation that joined the Abraham Accords in late 2020. But other measures show strong anti-Israel sentiment, probably in part because the survey was taken during Ramadan, a time of heightened tension with the Palestinians.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Public Opinion, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Israel, Bahrain, and Gulf Nations

40. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

41. Niger Coup Threatens U.S. Strategy on Counterterrorism and Russia

Author:
Ben Fishman, Anna Borshchevskaya, and Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On July 26, Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum was detained by members of his special guard and put under house arrest, where he remains under harsh conditions. Gen. Abdourahmane Tchiani has since declared himself head of the so-called “National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland” and appointed a twenty-one-person cabinet on August 8. The coup comes in the wake of military takeovers in Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Sudan over the past three years, demonstrating regional anti-democratic trends amid trans-regional instability. Diplomatic efforts to quell the crisis have failed to date. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken has made repeated calls to Bazoum, reflecting a commitment to securing his release and returning to “constitutional order.” Bazoum was a close American security partner prior to his arrest and was accorded a prominent role during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington last December. Blinken has also reached out to former president Mahamadou Issoufou, who has better personal ties to the junta; he was once an ally of Bazoum but had recently broken with his successor’s anti-corruption initiatives. This call followed Acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland’s unsuccessful August 8 visit to Niamey, where she was prohibited from meeting with Bazoum or Tchiani. Instead, she spoke with Gen. Moussa Salaou Barmou, a longtime U.S. security partner who serves as the military’s new chief of staff but would not offer so much as an assurance of Barzoum’s safety, let alone his release or restoration. With the junta rejecting all U.S. and regional diplomatic initiatives, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention. The alliance’s leaders met on August 10 and agreed to deploy a standby force, though how quickly it can be assembled remains unclear. In neighboring Algeria, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune strongly condemned the junta but said any military intervention in Niger would represent “a direct threat” to his country, declaring, “There will be no solution without us. We are the first people affected.” In Libya—another neighbor keenly attuned to Niger’s stability given persistent smuggling—the Government of National Unity condemned the junta, while the eastern-based warlord Khalifa Haftar condemned the threats by ECOWAS. Elsewhere, Egypt has remained largely silent about the crisis, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates quickly denounced the coup and called for Bazoum’s restoration (in part because he is Niger’s first Arab president). The UAE also sent some military vehicles to neighboring Chad, providing additional border security and signaling their growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Competition, and Wagner Group
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, West Africa, Niger, and United States of America

42. Fact Sheet: Global Demonstrations Against the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Sam Jones
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Following the Russian invasion, a wave of demonstrations in solidarity with Ukraine spread around the world. Between 24 February and 4 March, ACLED records more than 1,800 demonstrations in support of Ukraine and against Russian aggression globally. During this time, demonstrations were reported across at least 93 countries and territories (see map below). Nearly all of these demonstrations — over 99% — were peaceful (i.e. protesters engaged in neither violence nor destructive activity).
Topic:
Solidarity, Conflict, Demonstrations, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

43. The Return of US Leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia Crisis

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In dealing with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has put up a powerful display of competent crisis management. While it may not be enough to stop President Vladimir Putin from escalating, Biden’s policy has nonetheless re-affirmed US leadership in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

44. Europe’s Post-Cold War Order Is No More

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to recognise the independence of the self-styled separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas may very well be the beginning of the end of Ukraine as an independent nation. For Ukraine, a nation of almost 44 million people, catastrophe looms large on the horizon. For Europe, these events are the harbinger of the end of an era. Europe’s post-Cold War order is no more.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Caucasus, Balkans, and United States of America

45. Putin’s Use and Abuse of History: Back to the 19th Century?

Author:
Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
“Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” This is how Putin introduced the “decisions being made” in his 55-minute address to the nation on 21 February 2022, which paved the way for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several commentators noted how Putin’s speech was replete with historical references: as historian Benjamin Nathans pointed out, Vladimir Putin seems to be “quite obsessed with history. So part of our attention […] should be looking at how Putin is using history”. Indeed, almost one-quarter of Putin’s speech was devoted to a rather erratic and convoluted discussion of pre-1991 Russian and Soviet history, departing from the assumption that this was necessary “to explain the motives behind Russia’s actions and what we aim to achieve”.
Topic:
Nationalism, History, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, and Balkans

46. The Russia-Ukraine War and North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Seung-soo Hyun
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
What is the impact of the war in Ukraine on North Korea’s unprecedented military provocations? Seung-soo Hyun, a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification, points out that Moscow’s defense of Pyongyang at the UN Security Council has emboldened North Korea. However, considering the low economic compatibility between the two countries and tight international sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine, the bilateral economic cooperation would hardly help Pyongyang to develop its economy. Dr. Hyun claims that conflicts between Northeast Asian countries show signs of polarization and highlights the importance of monitoring how the war in Ukraine will reshape global strategic dynamics among Russia, China, and the U.S.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

47. President Yoon's Trip to Madrid: Rethinking Seoul's Policies toward Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and Pyongyang

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at the East Asia Institute (EAI), explains the objectives behind the U.S.’ invitation of its key allies the Indo-Pacific to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit. He posits that the U.S. aims to establish a highly institutionalized cooperative mechanism that combines the capacities of existing alliances among like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the author stresses the need for South Korea to address the implications of the Russia-Ukraine War, the emerging Chinese threat, and reestablish ROK-Japan relations. Lastly, Dr. Kim proposes that the administration should carefully consider how it might restore international cooperation on the North Korea issue and resume the denuclearization process.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Denuclearization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

48. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:
Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

49. WILL NATO MILITARY EXERCISES DETER RUSSIAN EXPANSION?

Author:
Brian Blankenship
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
As concerns that Russia might try to seize additional territory from Ukraine have mounted in recent weeks, policymakers in the United States and NATO have considered how best to shore up the alliance and discourage a Russian offensive. These efforts are hardly new. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the NATO alliance has attempted to dissuade Russia from further attempts to encroach on the territory of neighboring countries. These attempts have included the creation of a “Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” capable of deploying to crisis areas within 72 hours, as well as the “Enhanced Forward Presence” consisting of four multinational battalions stationed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland on a rotational basis. Additionally, NATO members have conducted a variety of military exercises with members around the alliance’s eastern flank, as well as some with Ukraine itself.
Topic:
NATO, Deterrence, Vladimir Putin, Joe Biden, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, United States of America, and Baltic States

50. ARE RUSSIA’S THREATS CREDIBLE?

Author:
Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The current crisis in Europe is a head-to-head battle of policies of coercive diplomacy: compellence by Russia and deterrence by the West. Russia’s demands focus on permanently reversing the expansion of Western military power into Ukraine, backed by the threat of military attack on Ukraine in the absence of compliance. Western policy seeks to deter such an attack by threatening painful economic sanctions and arming Ukraine to make such an attack more costly to Russia. How credible is the Russian threat?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

51. HOW GERMANY’S COALITION CHANGE CONTRIBUTED TO PUTIN’S STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION IN UKRAINE

Author:
Debra Leiter and Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin almost certainly failed to anticipate that Germany would be willing to sacrifice the benefits of cheaper Russian gas to punish Russian aggression in Ukraine. But Tuesday, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz indefinitely paused certification of the completed Nord Stream 2 pipeline to “reassess” the situation. While the move didn’t stop Putin from invading Ukraine—by that point Putin already had too much skin in the game to risk the loss of face from backing down—it has substantially raised the costs for Russia. Why did Germany do this, and why didn’t Putin see it coming?
Topic:
NATO, Oil, War, Gas, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

52. CONTAINMENT 2.0: SANCTIONS FOR THE LONG HAUL

Author:
David A. Lake
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The West is not imposing coercive sanctions on Russia to stop its current aggression. No one seriously expects that the sanctions will cause President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine. NATO made clear before the war that its members will not defend Ukraine with military force. The European members have also, as expected, carved out exceptions to the sanctions regime for oil and gas so as not to impose too much pain on their own economies. Putin anticipated the general scope of the sanctions likely to be imposed on Russia and decided it was worth invading Ukraine anyways. While he may have been surprised by the extent of the sanctions and unity of NATO so far, this is not enough to alter his calculus. Indeed, he is doubling down on the original plan. He also knows that he has other weapons and forms of coercion against the West up his sleeve. Rather, we are seeing the birth of a possible Containment 2.0, a forced decoupling of Russia from the Western international economy. This is a long-term, not a short-term, strategy. The point is to undermine the Russian economy, stifle its technological progress, deny Russians a standard of living comparable to that of the West, and break support for the regime over time. In doing so, the West undermines Russia’s ability to compete militarily, aiming to forestall further Ukraines, and weakens Putin’s hand at home and abroad.
Topic:
NATO, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Economy, and Containment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Global Focus, and United States of America

53. WILL NATO FIGHT RUSSIA OVER UKRAINE? THE STABILITY-INSTABILITY PARADOX SAYS NO

Author:
Andrew Kydd
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Many observers of the current war between Russia and Ukraine have expressed concern that NATO support for Ukraine could escalate the conflict to a direct major conventional war between NATO and Russia, and that from there it could easily escalate to a nuclear war. A group of foreign policy experts have proposed that NATO impose a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine, while other analysts have decried the escalatory potential of such a move. In a recent poll of international relations scholars, 40 percent thought a no-fly zone would lead to large-scale conventional war between NATO and Russia and 13 percent thought it could lead to nuclear war.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, War, Escalation, and Instability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. CAN ISRAEL REMAIN BOTH NEUTRAL AND PART OF THE WEST?

Author:
Michael Barnett
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Israel is getting some unwanted attention because of its reluctance to outrightly condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine. No one believes that the failure to condemn translates into support for the attack. But Israel’s reticence has placed it in an awkward situation—one that might, in fact, translate into a loss of support from Western countries when Israel needs it most.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, Neutrality, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, and Eastern Europe

55. WHY A SETTLEMENT IN UKRAINE REMAINS OUT OF REACH

Author:
Valerie Sticher
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The Russian invasion and unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine show the limits of diplomacy. Despite warning of an impending invasion, efforts to stop the war failed. And despite the high costs on all sides, efforts to stop this horrific war remain elusive. Why is this the case?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

56. HOW HISTORICAL ANALOGIES WOKE UP THE WEST

Author:
Eric Mosinger
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Policymakers, activists, and ordinary people often make analogies between past and present, for example, by labeling 9/11 “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century.” In doing so, people hope to better understand surprising events and develop a plan of action for themselves and others. Vladimir Putin employed historical analogies to justify his invasion of Ukraine, while Western leaders drew on their own understanding of World War II history to mobilize a surprisingly muscular response to Russian aggression.
Topic:
War, History, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

57. WHY OFFSHORE FINANCE LIMITS U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

Author:
Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
More than 1,000 individuals and entities have now been targeted with sanctions since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including more than 50 oligarchs close to Putin and their families. These measures include the freezing of assets in international banks, seizure of yachts, private jets, and luxury real estate, and travel bans. Western policymakers hope that targeting a wide network of Russian political and economic elites, including oil executives, steel tycoons, media moguls and high-level intelligence officers will isolate Putin and pressure him to reverse course. The million-dollar question is, can these targeted measures actually hurt Russian oligarchs, let alone pressure Putin?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Sanctions, Offshore Finance, and Shell Companies
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

58. Energy Markets and the Design of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Christof Ruhl
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions against the citizens, institutions, and products of the Russian Federation are evolving rapidly. Energy sanctions started late, but the number of countries embargoing oil, gas, or coal imports from Russia is expanding. These sanctions are likely to increase global fuel prices while depressing the price of the sanctioned fuel. The experience to date suggests that the current, gradual approach of reducing oil and gas imports from Russia one country at a time may have room to go further. Before the invasion of Ukraine, the sweeping and unprecedented sanctions promised in the event of a Russian invasion were often conceived as a two-pronged pincer movement. The idea was to isolate Russia from the global financial system while limiting its commodity and energy exports. Both moves were aimed at the source of the financial strength of “fortress Russia,” namely, its persistent balance of payment surplus.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Financial Markets, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

59. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:
Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. Hypotheses on the Implications of the Ukraine-Russia War

Author:
Barry R. Posen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Structural realism is a useful tool to examine the implications of the war in Ukraine for global politics. Because structural realism emphasizes the anarchic nature of international relations, it suggests the war is unsurprising, a reminder that states still compete for security, sometimes violently, and the prudent will prepare for it with tools for self-preservation. The realist lens also sees lessons for nuclear deterrence: The prospect of mutual nuclear destruction constrains great power war and has limited U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine. Other states may take note and seek their own nuclear deterrents. The war demonstrates some limits of economic interdependence, which not only failed to pacify Russia, but also left Russia exposed to economic coercion, in a way both it and China may look to avoid in the future. Other important lessons for states from a realist perspective include the importance of military power—large, capable armies and the enduring advantages of defensive warfare, especially when infused with nationalism. The war leaves the “liberal international order,” a byproduct of the eroding post-Cold War U.S. power position, looking threadbare, but it is thus far reviving the U.S. Cold War coalition—a less liberal grouping—which could prove useful in dealing with China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

61. Ukraine-Russia War Military Analysis

Author:
Daniel L. Davis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russian armed forces made major errors in both the operational and tactical realm, costing the lives of thousands of its troops. Ukraine, by contrast, performed well above expectations and brought the Russian offensive against Kyiv and Kharkiv to a halt. Russia subsequently redeployed a major portion of its combat power, away from Kyiv and Kharkiv, to reinforce its attack on Donbas. This shift plays to Russia’s strengths and exposes Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to greater risk. Russian forces have made slow but methodical progress on the northern shoulder of the Battle of Donbas, putting 10,000 UAF at risk of encirclement in the Sievierodonetsk pocket, like the loss they suffered at Mariupol. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky declared Ukraine will not stop fighting until all Ukrainian territory has been liberated.1 To have a chance of accomplishing that objective, Ukraine would likely need to recruit and train an additional 100,000 troops, at least, a task that would take 12–18 months, and equip its forces with a comprehensive set of modern, heavy weaponry, provided by the West, numbering in the thousands of armored vehicles and associated weaponry. There is great risk for Ukraine in undertaking such an attempt. It is unclear whether NATO will provide sufficient modern weapons or whether Ukraine can successfully hold off Russia while also recruiting and training so many more troops. If Russia defeats Ukraine in the Battle of Donbas, Kyiv will face a difficult choice: (1) to dig in and continue fighting, even though much of its most effective forces will have been captured or killed, and risk steadily losing more territory or (2) negotiating with Russia to trade territory lost since 2014 for peace to stanch further losses of Ukrainian lives and land.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

62. Implications of a Melting Arctic

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible, which in turn may affect three key issues in the region—militarization, maritime trade, and natural resource development. U.S. security interests in the Arctic remain deterring an attack on the United States and NATO allies and ensuring the lawful use of Arctic waters. The United States can secure both at minimum cost and risk. Greater accessibility does not increase threats emanating from the Arctic, so the United States does not need to do more militarily to ensure its security. Militarization absent threats could lead to a destabilizing security dilemma. Trans-Arctic maritime trade routes and natural resource development present potential economic opportunities; however, both still face significant challenges that limit their near-term viability. The United States should be vigilant to Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic and avoid overreacting or reflexively mirroring their behavior. A U.S. Arctic strategy built on the reality that the United States enjoys a strong conventional and nuclear deterrent, a robust network of Arctic allies, and favorable geography, is the best avenue to protect U.S. interests and keep the Arctic at peace.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Natural Resources, Trade, and Militarization
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

63. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine

Author:
Sascha Glaeser
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

64. Which kind of realism should drive Western support for Ukraine?

Author:
Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Realist foreign-policy pundits have become synonymous with ‘neorealists’, who prefer a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war to restore stability to the relationship between great powers in the international system. However, realism cannot be treated as a monolithic theory of international relations. It includes also ‘classical realism’, which derives state conduct from domestic politics rather than international structure. This CEPS Explainer highlights several qualitative insights about the war derived from classical realism, which seem more relevant to the conduct of Western foreign policy. These insights make a convincing case for continuing and perhaps increasing the military support to enable Ukraine to liberate further territory. The first is the acknowledgement that the Western nations have a significant interest in enforcing the principle of non-aggression and restore deterrence to the European security system, which Russia seeks to overthrow. The second insight is into the psychology of the Kremlin’s escalation potential, which depends on the Russian people’s willingness to sacrifice and on diplomatic pressure exerted by China (and India). The third is that the military investment in Ukraine pays off with very high dividends and with the degradation of Russia’s fighting power as an additional benefit to NATO.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Realism, International System, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

65. The EU vis-à-vis Turmoil in Burkina Faso: Towards Europeanisation?

Author:
Francesca Lenzi
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In late September 2022, Burkina Faso experienced its second coup in eight months. In the name of national security, Captain Ibrahim Traoré took control of the country on 30 September, deposing Paul-Henri Damiba, who had come to power through his own coup in January. Insecurity and the inability of the political class to deal with the jihadist threat are among the determining factors that led to two coups in such a short time. The coups unfolded in a context marked by competition between the European Union (EU) – initially led by France, the traditional European hegemon in the region – and Russia for influence in the Sahel.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Coup
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Burkina Faso

66. Italians and Defence at the Time of the Ukraine War: Winds of Change

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2022, Italians have become more concerned about tensions between Russia and the West – but not more pro-American. They rather largely trust the European Union as a security actor, or lean towards an autonomous national defence policy – quite a change for the Italian public opinion. Italians are mostly supportive of military operations abroad and do not rule out the use of force, especially when national security is directly at stake, thus confirming the post-Cold War evolution of Italy’s strategic culture.[1] Notably, in the year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the majority in favour of defending a NATO ally under attack has risen by 9 per cent, showing an unprecedented awareness of the importance of Euro-Atlantic collective defence. These are the main novelties in Italians’ views of defence issues at a time marked by a full-fledged war in Europe and its multiple consequences for national interests, as highlighted by the 2022 edition of the periodic IAI-LAPS survey on Italy’s foreign and defence policy.[2]
Topic:
Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

67. NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Novelties and Priorities

Author:
Alessandro Marrone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Alliance in a mid-term perspective. Adopted on 29 June in Madrid, the Concept outlines a number of priorities stemming from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but also puts forward relevant novelties concerning China and the Indo-Pacific. During the NATO Summit in Madrid, alliance members affirmed that Russia can no longer be considered a partner, effectively internalising the geopolitical earthquake represented by the return of a major conventional and multi-domain war on European soil.[1] The Strategic Concept also identifies deterrence and defence as the Alliance’s number one priority, in comparison to the other core tasks: crisis prevention and management and cooperative security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

68. Sense and Nonsense behind Energy Price Caps

Author:
Daniel Gros and Nathalie Tocci
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In official circles at the highest level, from the G7 to the European Council, a tense debate is taking place on what to do about spiralling gas and oil prices, which have either broken or have come dangerously close to breaking record territory. In Europe, a special meeting of the European Council on energy was originally scheduled for the fall, but is now being brought forward, while the European Commission is working on an emergency plan to prepare for a complete cut-off of Russian gas. Energy prices dominate the agenda of our leaders. Yet it is a confused and often confusing debate that is worth unpacking.
Topic:
Climate Change, Oil, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

69. Not Yet Time for Diplomacy. Lessons from Italy’s Ill-Conceived Peace Plan for Ukraine

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro and Nona Mikhelidze
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Few may have noticed, but Italy recently advanced its own diplomatic proposal for a resolution of the war in Ukraine. Rome’s ambitious peace plan[1] received little international recognition, although it was reportedly shared with the Quint – an informal consultation group comprising the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy – and formally presented to UN Secretary General António Guterres on 18 May 2022.[2] Crucially, the plan failed to impress the leaderships in both Ukraine[3] and Russia,[4] leading Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio to put it aside on the grounds that circumstances are not “ripe” for such an initiative.[5]
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

70. The EU and the Ukraine War: Making Sense of the Rise of a “Geopolitical” Union

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
By ordering Russian armed forces into Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has arguably made the greatest blunder of his twenty-two-year long rule. The Russian president seems to have underestimated not just Ukraine’s capacity to resist the invasion, but also the resolve of the United States and its partners to oppose it.[1] If that is indeed the case, the greatest surprise must have come from the European Union.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

71. Russian Energy Exports and the Conflict in Ukraine: What Options for Italy and the EU?

Author:
Margherita Bianchi and Pier Paolo Raimondi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Putin’s war on Ukraine has shaken the European Union to its core. Implications will be long lasting in numerous domains, but it is in the security and energy dimensions that concrete changes are already becoming evident as the EU fast tracks its strategy for energy diversification. The Russian invasion has drastically changed the European energy paradigm, with the new political absolute being a fast reduction of Europe’s overdependence on Russian gas. Diversifying energy supplies away from Russia is a means to tighten the economic noose around Putin, seeking to deprive the Kremlin of billions in energy revenue given that Russia continues to export oil, gas and coal to Europe at very high prices.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

72. Russia–Ukraine Talks and the Indispensable Role of the US and Europe

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s imperialist war of conquest in Ukraine is about to enter its fifth week. Russia’s failure to shock and awe Ukraine’s government and armed forces into submission through a poorly executed Blitzkrieg has morphed into a slow and ever more brutal three-front campaign. While Russian forces struggle to make strides in the north and east, they have been more successful in the south, where they are about to deprive Ukraine from access to the Sea of Azov.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

73. The Mian Channu Incident and the Enduring Risk of Nuclear Escalation between India and Pakistan

Author:
Manuel Herrera
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In an international context characterised by increasing concern over the risk of nuclear war triggered by the conflict in Ukraine, it is worth noting that incidents in other regions could also lead to nuclear escalation, either by design or miscalculation. A recent incident involving India and Pakistan is a case in point, albeit the event did not receive ample coverage, overshadowed by the news of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, and India

74. Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Putin’s war in Ukraine has highlighted the resilience but also the limitations of Sino–Russian partnership. Far from being an “arc of autocracy”, this is an interests-based relationship between strategically autonomous powers. Foreign policy coordination between China and Russia is limited by their different views of global order. Beijing is invested in a stable international system, albeit one skewed in its favour, whereas Moscow thrives on disorder and uncertainty. Xi Jinping aims to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while maintaining ties with the West. But Beijing’s balancing act will become harder to sustain as the war continues. The balance of power within the bilateral relationship has tilted sharply towards Beijing. Russia is more reliant on China than ever. The long-term outlook for the relationship is unpromising.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Conflict, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Ukraine

75. After Deterrence: Implications of the Russia-Ukraine War for East Asia

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Notwithstanding explicit warnings of the U.S. and its European allies, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th. In this Commentary, Yang Gyu Kim, Executive Director at the East Asia Institute (EAI), identifies the Russia-Ukraine war as a case of deterrence failure from the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s perspective. He points out weakened U.S. feasibility of military and political punishments against Russia’s Fait Accompli Strategy as the cause behind the escalation of the crisis. Additionally, the author underscores the importance of maintaining the feasibility of punishment in order to deter China and North Korea from launching provocations in East Asia by misperceiving the credibility of the U.S. alliance system’s deterrence posture in East Asia.
Topic:
NATO, War, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and North Korea

76. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine*

Author:
Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Intervention, Crisis Management, International Order, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

77. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

78. Major Non-NATO Ally Status - Chance for Survival Or A Vision Doomed to Failure?

Author:
Nino Lezhava
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The ongoing war in Ukraine has confirmed that NATO as an institution of 30 members still lacks the readiness to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the Alliance, continuing to avoid confrontation with Russia.1 The unprecedented tragedy taking place in Ukraine was not a surprise and there were several lessons for the West to learn such as the August War in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, the open letters and statements from Russia’s president drawing a new world order,2 Russian military drills and so-called peacekeepers in and around neighboring countries. Nevertheless, 14 years have passed since the NATO Bucharest Summit3 and Georgia and Ukraine are still paying for their independence and sovereignty with blood. Meanwhile, NATO’s promise of eventual membership for both countries is fading.4 Russia’s so-called “military operation” has revealed that the Kremlin does not need Casus Belli to start waging a full-scale war against independent countries and, now more than ever, Ukraine and Georgia5 need to strengthen their defense capabilities and search for an alternative foreign security policy until NATO provides well-deserved places for them. In this light, many believe that in the absence of NATO unity, the United States is the only strategic partner that can protect Ukraine and Georgia by designating them as Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA).6 Indeed, the impact of a timely provided designation could have a decisive political and practical role for Ukraine and Georgia’s security, especially when both countries7 are reliant on US defense sales and actively cooperate with the US while transforming their defense capabilities.8
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

79. How Russia’s War Against Ukraine Will Affect Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region

Author:
Badri Belkania
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On February 21, 2022, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Lenta, 2022) which was officially supported by the de facto leaders of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. The de facto leadership of the Tskhinvali region, which recognized the DNR and LNR back in 2014, hailed President Putin’s decision of February 21 as an «expected, reasonable and justified» step (RIA Novosti, 2022). Russia’s move was also lauded by the de facto President of Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, who said the decision was «fair, geopolitically adequate» and in line with modern challenges and threats (TASS, 2022). In a few days, the de facto leader of Abkhazia signed the document recognizing independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (Ekho Kavkaza, 2022). The recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk is in itself a remarkable geopolitical step on the part of Russia which also brings significant changes in terms of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, within days of its recognition, it became clear that Moscow needed the move as a launch pad for war in Ukraine. Consequently, the recognition of the de facto republics was accompanied by a Russian military aggression in Ukraine which, from the prospective of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, changes even more than just the recognition of the Donbas region. As the domestic and foreign policy characteristics of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali differ, both will be discussed separately in this article.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Abkhazia

80. War, Censorship and Public Opinion in Russia: Putin’s Struggle at Home and Abroad

Author:
Eka Javakhishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s “special military operation,” as the Kremlin calls its full-scale war against Ukraine, has been underway for the second month in a row. However, the Russian army has not been able to cope with the combat tasks as effectively as Kremlin leaders originally planned. The incredible resilience and courage of the Ukrainian nation has fascinated the world but it has become an additional challenge for the Putin regime. In addition to the fact that the Russian government had to radically change its officially declared military objectives, it also faced the need to tighten measures to maintain control over the situation inside the country. At this stage, the Kremlin has to take effective steps both inside and outside of the country in order to fulfill Putin’s imperialist ambitions.
Topic:
Security, War, Public Opinion, Censorship, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

81. China - A Non-neutral Party in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the Russo-Ukrainian war, we cannot call the position of one of the main challenges of the 21st century, communist China, “neutral”. Beijing’s position was obvious even before the war: it is pro-Russian, clearly antiWestern, and especially anti-American. China does not condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, nor does it call it an invasion. At the same time, reports have emerged of the prospect of Beijing providing military assistance to Moscow, and it is not beyond imagination that China will also help Moscow avoid the sanctions. The course of the war, and time, will show China’s level of support for its strategic partner, Russia. However, despite Moscow’s support and negative attitude towards the West, Beijing will still act according to its long-term strategic goals, and if China distances itself from Russia on specific issues, it will not be because of solidarity with Ukraine, but for its own strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

82. Economic Consequences of Sanctions on Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, coupled with Western political support for Ukraine, was followed by a tough economic response through an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia set forth by the West. Their decision to do so seeks to make Russia pay an economic price for its military aggression, aiming to reduce its economic and martial capabilities, which are currently costing the lives of thousands of innocent people. The sanctions have already had quite severe economic consequences for Russia, but it is interesting to see whether they will achieve the West’s political goals and push President Putin to suspend the military aggression. Generally, a medium- to long-term period is required to see the effects of sanctions, and, currently, despite heavy economic losses, Russia is managing to coexist with the restrictions. Today, Russia is experiencing its biggest economic downturn since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank estimates that gross domestic product in Russia will reduce by 11% in 2022 (World Bank, 2022), while the International Monetary Fund forecasts this figure to be 8.5% (IMF, 2022). According to some estimates, the economic scale of the reduction may even reach 15% (IIF, 2022). Clearly, this largely depends on the potential consequences of the sanctions already imposed and the possibility of enacting new sanctions, including in terms of energy embargoes. As a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, the Russian economy shrank by about 8%, and now this figure is almost twice as high. Consequently, we can get some idea of its scale. The losses caused by sanctions will become more visible and tangible over time, resulting in much more severe social and economic effects in the coming years. According to the International Finance Institute, Russia will have lost the wealth it generated over the last 15 years by the end of 2023 (IIF, 2022). One of the main reasons for this will be reduced domestic demand, and if the trade-related sanction package is expanded, exports will fall further than expected, which in turn will lead to a sharp decline in budget revenues. Clearly, the Russian military aggression has also caused global economic consequences, such as rising prices for basic consumer goods, disruption of supply chains, and delays in international trade. However, since invading Ukraine, Russia’s financial losses have been high. It is interesting to take a look at what actual consequences the Russian Federation has faced in terms of sanctions, and how the country will be able to continue coexistence with the restrictions and expand its own aggressive foreign policy.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

83. Putin’s Infantrymen: Kadyrov’s Involvement in the 2022 Ukrainian Conflict

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze and Cerwyn Moore
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
External involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, particularly pro-Russian volunteerism, has been a prominent feature of the Russian war effort. Chechen involvement in the conflict is more complex than is often reported. Pro-Russian groups known as kadyrovtsy serve a number of functions, including bolstering Kadyrov’s cult of personality in Chechnya, although their military significance is negligible. Chechen volunteer groups are involved in support of the Ukrainian military: this raises issues about the role of foreign fighters and volunteerism. The political implications of pro-Kremlin Chechen volunteerism in Ukraine are linked to fierce institutional infighting within Russia.
Topic:
Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Foreign Fighters, Russia-Ukraine War, and Ramzan Kadyrov
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Chechnya

84. Military Effects Of Economic Sanctions On Russia

Author:
Davit Shatakishvili
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Russia’s military industry is a fundamental factor of its national power. The enterprises operating in its defense sector are largely state-owned. Consequently, Russia’s sizeable military corporations and their subsidiary organizations operate not on the principles of a competitive domestic market, which is one of the key foundations of technological progress, but their main goal is to pursue Moscow’s political interests and ensure the stability of the regime. Accordingly, along with military capabilities, having a powerful economic leverage in the form of energy resources, encourages Russia not only to pursue its own economic interests but also intimidate neighboring countries and extort their territories to satisfy its imperialist intentions. The responsibility of the defense industry in Moscow’s current governing model is exactly on what the Russian government itself has based its legitimacy - military modernization, restoring Russia’s strength and greatness. One of its ill-favored manifestations is the military aggression in Ukraine which is claiming the lives of thousands of innocent people. The unprecedented scale of sanctions imposed by the West will clearly affect Moscow’s defense capabilities but the only questions are - when and to what extent? Russian military production, on the one hand, helps the country to pursue an aggressive foreign policy and, on the other hand, arms exports are an important source of country’s budgetary revenues. At the same time, this allows it to exert political influence over the purchasing states. The collapse of the Russian attack on Ukraine may not only sacrifice the hegemonic goals of the latter but also lead to the loss of existing and potential customers of its military weapons. There is no doubt that Russia is experiencing colossal military losses as a result of the war and, at the same time, questions are being raised about the quality of its arms and heavy equipment. Until now, there has been a consensus that Russian armaments were a viable and affordable alternative to Western weapons, although this statement could also be another victim of the war. As a result of the sanctions, Russia faced not only financial but also technical problems. In addition to Western countries, Asia’s leading technology powers have restricted Russia’s access to critical components needed for military production. Existing restrictions apply to advanced technologies such as semiconductors, telecommunications equipment, software and encryption, microelectronics, aviation systems, oil extraction equipment and other manufacturing components. In this context, it is important to discuss the impact that economic sanctions may have on Russia’s military capabilities, its recovery prospects and its aggressive foreign policy in the future.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

85. Ukraine War and Food Security: How Should ASEAN Respond?

Author:
Jose M. L. Montesclaros and Mely Caballero-Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
ASEAN should come together and assess what regional mechanisms it can leverage in addressing the looming threat of food trade protectionism within the region, amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Violence, Regionalism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and ASEAN

86. REVISITING THE EMBOLDENING POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Author:
Kyungwon Suh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Do nuclear weapons make their possessors more aggressive? A series of high-profile aggressive actions by some nuclear-armed states appear to substantiate the argument that nuclear weapons enable aggressive behavior. Since its all-out invasion of Ukraine in February, Russia has continued to conduct brutal, coercive operations, including missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and population centers. North Korea has continued to test launch a wide array of missiles, one of which recently landed close to South Korea’s territorial waters. Policymakers also echo the view that nuclear weapons are more than simply defensive weapons. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review argues that Russian leaders have exploited their nuclear arsenal as a “shield” behind which they launched military aggression against Ukraine. When he was CIA Director, Formal Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that Pyongyang could use nuclear weapons “beyond self-preservation.”
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Russia-Ukraine War, and Mike Pompeo
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Ukraine, Middle East, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

87. CAN DEBT RELIEF CONSTRAIN REPRESSIVE GOVERNMENTS?

Author:
Brett L. Carter
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
The African continent is confronting the prospect of a new debt crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic wreaked havoc on government finances. The Russian government’s war against Ukraine has increased the cost of food and energy, and compelled investors to sell off government bonds in emerging markets. Rising interest rates in the United States will increase the cost of borrowing. The Chinese economy is struggling under the weight of Xi Jinping’s “Zero COVID” policy and accumulated real estate debt. In 2015, the International Monetary Fund announced that eight countries were in debt distress. By March 2022, 23 were. In June, public debt ratios reached a 20-year high. Africa’s debt-distressed governments “are unlikely to default” in 2022,” The Economist observed, “but face trouble by 2024.” There is some evidence that the debt crisis is especially acute for Africa’s non-democracies. The impending debt crisis coincides with a general sense that Africa is experiencing a democratic recession. Voters are increasingly subject to intimidation and violence. Incumbent presidents are removing term limits. The longstanding norm against military coups is fading.
Topic:
Cold War, Debt, World Bank, GDP, Repression, and IMF
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and United States of America

88. WHO ATTACKED MONTENEGRO? THE MORAL AND STRATEGIC HAZARDS OF MISASSIGNING BLAME

Author:
Erica Lonergan and Maggie Smith
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A few weeks ago, Montenegro—a NATO member—was hit with a cyber attack that targeted government servers. Montenegro’s outgoing Prime Minister, Dritan Abazovic, initially hedged about potential responsibility for the attack, stating on August 26: “We do not have clear information about the organizers… Security sector authorities couldn’t confirm that there is an individual, a group, a state behind [the attack].” Nevertheless, later that same day officials from Montenegro’s national intelligence agency attributed the attack to Russia. They also implied that the attack was related to Montenegro’s support for Ukraine and push for membership in the European Union. Yet, the extent of Russian involvement in the cyber attack remains ambiguous, which poses significant political and strategic challenges.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, Montenegro, and United States of America

89. DOES THE GLOBAL CONSENSUS ON APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA HOLD CLUES FOR THE UYGHURS?

Author:
Maria Lotito
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
A new report from the United Nations finds that China may have committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and that human rights violations are ongoing. The abuse flows from China’s “Strike Hard” campaign, executed to counter separatism and extremism, subjecting Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities to mass detentions, forced labor and sterilizations, cultural suppression, and surveillance. The report comes months after the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, before which some governments sympathetic to the Uyghurs’ plight staged diplomatic boycotts, to little avail. The UN report, much like the Olympic boycotts, will change few minds. What does it take to generate intergovernmental consensus around broad-scale human rights violations? Such convergence, even upon opposition to egregious human rights abuse, is rare and difficult to achieve. This is because violating governments are skilled at subverting international human rights norms and onlooking states have many reasons to avoid acting. Abusive practices might be reframed as responsible policy, or covered up. Meanwhile, supposedly compliant governments contend with a panoply of bilateral interests, some incompatible with international norms.
Topic:
Apartheid, Human Rights, Arab Spring, Color Revolutions, Soviet Union, and Consensus
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Iceland

90. FOOD INSECURITY AND UNREST: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

Author:
Thomas S. Benson, Ore Koren, and Benjamin E. Bagozzi
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sparked fears that skyrocketing commodity prices—especially of wheat (Ukraine and Russia together account for about one-quarter of the world’s exports), oil, and gas—will cause a global wave of food protests. War, coupled with rapidly rising inflation—which has also been linked to bread riots—and more frequent climatic shocks suggest that concerns about food insecurity creating global unrest are timely and warrant further examination. At the same time, framing the complexities of sociopolitical environments as simple “kneejerk” reactions to rising food insecurity risks oversimplifying the situation and our ability to address it. Previous studies that identify a clear relationship between food prices and protests emphasize this risk.
Topic:
Food Security, Civil Unrest, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and Papua New Guinea

91. MANAGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RIVALS

Author:
Elizabeth Radziszewski and Jeremy Berkowitz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Sweden’s and Finland’s recent decisions to join NATO marked a historic moment for the two Nordic states known for their neutrality. The move not only reflects evolving security concerns about Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but marks a shift that is set to end decades of accommodation toward Russia. It also sheds light on a broader question about why some rival countries—or those that have a history of tensions—sustain policies of accommodation over the years, and what pushes them to abandon such policies. Why would Sweden and Finland refrain from alienating Russia for years only to break suddenly with this tradition with their unprecedented decision to apply for NATO membership?
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Asia, Spain, North Africa, Sweden, Morocco, and United States of America

92. Russia’s Partial Mobilization: Issues Pertaining Russian Migrants in Mongolia

Author:
Ariunbayar Bazarvaani
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The Kremlin recently announced a partial mobilization decree amid the continuing war between Russia and Ukraine. Along with the partial mobilization decree, the Kremlin also amended the Criminal Code that stipulates severe punishment for voluntary surrender and people who deserted from military service. While the Mongolian government holds an abstemious position towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, CEO of The Academy of Political Education, states that the non-governmental organizations in Mongolia are keeping an eye on the Russian migrants who had fled from Russia to evade mobilization. He also introduces a survey addressing Russian refugees` challenges and urges the Mongolian government to consider these issues and approach the crisis with an awareness of democracy, human rights, and freedom. Specifically, he argues that the Mongolian government should actively involve Mongolian NGOs to offer a favorable environment, including employment, and thus be recognized as a country that endorses democracy and human rights.
Topic:
Democracy, Migrants, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Mongolia, and Asia

93. Filling the Geopolitical Void in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A new era in foreign policy is starting for the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—in which the role of former colonial master Russia is significantly diminished as Moscow concentrates its attention and resources on the debacle it created when it started a war on Ukraine. China also has considerable influence in Central Asia, but China has not indicated it is willing to fill the vacuums Russia is leaving in Central Asia’s security, finances, or trade. The Central Asian states of necessity are seeking new partners, but it is possible that as the Central Asian states develop new foreign partnerships, they will create new divisions regionally, and the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is possibly an example of what is come for Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Finance, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, Asia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan

94. Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine

Author:
Saleem H. Ali
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
A key stumbling point in trying to chart a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine has been an inability of both sides to consider hybrid solutions that recognize resource interdependencies that could benefit either side. Such a pragmatic view would not undermine American or Western principles and lead to a more durable peace agreement. The peace process in the Russian-Georgian War and the governance mechanism set up for the autonomous region of Adjara provide useful examples in this regard. Science diplomacy, particularly in the Arctic, could be a useful “ice-breaker” between Russia and the West, and the climate crisis makes such interaction even more urgent.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Governance, Peace, Ecology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

95. America’s Great-Power Challenge: Managing Russia’s Decline and China’s Rise

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Geopolitics today is characterized by an evolving multipolar great-power competition between China, Russia, and the United States. The zero-sum nature of bipolar Cold War competition logic does not apply so relative losses in power by Russia could help the relative power position of China, and harm long-term American strategic interests, unless carefully managed in Washington. Washington should learn from past multi-state great-power competitions. Great Britain’s approach to Imperial Russia and Imperial Germany in the early 20th century is especially instructive. Like London in 1905, Washington today must stay attentive to the balance of power between itself and China as it manages Moscow’s relative power decline from the military debacle in Ukraine. The United States should defend its interests in Eastern Europe without so undermining Russia that a new period of instability spreads across Eurasia or that China aggrandizes strategically significant relative power gains from Moscow’s infirmity.
Topic:
Power Politics, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

96. Putin Is Doing Xi’s Dirty Work (and the West Is Helping Him)

Author:
William R. Spiegelberger
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Vladimir Putin’s diplomatic turn to China has been a disappointment for good reason: Beijing is more interested in advancing its own anti-Western interests than in helping Moscow. The more fruitful and natural partnership would be between Russia and the West, since both face a common threat from China and the infrastructure for mutual prosperity is already in place. The main impediment to improved Russian-Western relations is the continued rule of Putin, who is increasingly doing China’s bidding at Russia’s expense.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

97. Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting

Author:
Rajan Menon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
This explainer begins by recounting how an American-led NATO, a key element in U.S. global primacy, lived on despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat it was meant to deter—and, if necessary, defeat. The next section highlights the implicit bargain that has sustained NATO: U.S. preponderance in Europe, achieved by the American willingness to serve as the continent’s indispensable protector, in exchange for Europeans’ freedom to spend more on butter and less on guns. Next comes a set of proposals to move NATO from burden sharing, a perennial point of contention within the pact, to a more far-reaching change, burden shifting, an idea that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made even more feasible and prudent. The explainer concludes by assaying the prospects for burden shifting and challenging prominent counterarguments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

98. Paper Fairy Tales VS Steel Brotherhood – Media Portrayals of Serbia’s Alliances in the Age of Pandemic

Author:
Luka Steric and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
BCSP researchers Maja Bjeloš and Luka Šterić analyzed how media in Serbia reported about Chinese, Russian and EU help during the pandemics. Because the pandemic was used as a framework for an excessive pro-Chinese campaign, the research examines how pro-Chinese narratives in mainstream media during the pandemic were used to position China, displacing Russia as Serbia’s main non-Western partner, while simultaneously propelling the anti-EU narrative of incompetence and hypocrisy. The analysis was carried out for the period between 1 March 2020 and 31 March 2021 and focused on two key events – media coverage of the first shipments of medical supplies to Serbia and media reporting of the supply of vaccines. Media monitoring included data collection using social listening software from the online portals of most-watched televisions (TV Happy, TV Prva), the most visited news portals (Blic, Kurir, Politika, B92 and Nova.rs), and the most circulated online portals of tabloids (Informer and Alo). Chinese medical aid to Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic attracted unprecedented foreign media attention and much speculation about a shift in Serbia’s foreign policy. Many foreign and domestic policy experts have interpreted the enthusiastic acceptance of Chinese aid by Serbian politicians as a departure from Serbia’s proclaimed accession to the European Union. Since Serbia did not greet Russian assistance with the same enthusiasm, this sparked speculation that Serbia is replacing Russia with China as its preferred eastern partner. In Serbian media, the narrative of a ‘brotherhood’ has long been reserved for describing relations between Serbia and Russia. Serbia’s ruling political elite voluntarily promoted President Putin and Russia in the mainstream media to increase political support among pro-Russian votes and at the same time exaggerating Russia’s influence in Serbia as a bargaining chip with the West over its political goals. Due to the silent crisis of relations with Moscow, Belgrade officials saw the partnership with China as a stronger card to play ahead of the 2020 elections to convince voters that the government was capable of dealing with the COVID-19 crisis, as well as acquiring a new ally in the East to leverage in the West. Consequently, China emerged as a ‘savior of Serbs in trouble’ during the pandemic overshadowing roles of both Russia and the EU.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Media, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Serbia

99. Russians See Greater Reward than Risk in Closer Relations with China

Author:
Dina Smeltz, Brendan Helm, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
As Russia and China grow closer through economic ties, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship. With China and Russia on the outs with the United States, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have broadened bilateral economic and military cooperation over the last few years. Recent cooperation has included energy and infrastructure projects, and even a little bit of panda diplomacy. While some observers warn about the potential risk that Russia may grow too dependent on Beijing, a joint Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Levada Analytical Center survey finds that the Russian public sees little downside to the growing bilateral relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Asia

100. Russia’s domestic politics have become part of the West’s Russia policy: The stakes are rising when Navalny returns to Russia

Author:
Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Among the most signifcant events in Russia in 2020 were the Covid-19 pandemic, reactions to the protests in Belarus, and the poisoning of top opposition politician Aleksey Navalny. Te frst two were clearly events of international signifcance, but so was the medical treatment given to Navalny, frst in Omsk and then in Berlin, after he suffered from symptoms of poisoning dur- ing a flight from Tomsk in Siberia to Moscow in August. In December, a joint study by the investigative journalist groups Bellingcat and The Insider, along with CNN, Der Spiegel and Naval- ny’s FBK Foundation, showed that it was difficult to find more con- clusive evidence of the Kremlin’s involvement in the assassination attempt by a chemical weapons- related poisoning group under the FSB that had been following Na- valny for years. This kind of op- eration would hardly have been possible without the blessing of high-level intelligence. Te ques- tion of whether the FSB leader- ship was proactive in resolving the “Navalny problem” or whether the order came from the Kremlin is irrelevant. Te revealed pattern confrms the long-standing trend of the strengthened role of the se- curity services, especially the FSB, in Russian politics. It is consistent with Putin’s approach to political processes being increasingly seen as issues of national security. Navalny’s self-confidence and style in the revelation videos related to the investigation, receiving ap- proximately 45 million views in less than a month, underscore the extent to which the FSB failed. The target did not die or become paralyzed, but recovered relatively quickly and bounced back, playing for higher and more radical stakes than before. Navalny’s role and reputation as the Kremlin’s most prominent critic has been based on the political pressure on the Kremlin generated by expos- ing elite corruption. While the will- ingness of citizens to see Navalny as an alternative to Putin varies consid- erably – with the majority indifer- ent to politics as a whole – Navalny’s numerous revelations have created an alternative to Russia’s ofcial re- ality, the political potential of which the regime obviously fears.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regionalism, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe