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1. The Devastating Impact of Lebanon’s Environmental Failures

Author:
Peter S. Germanos and Samara Azzi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
For decades, Lebanon has suffered under a systematic and intentional mismanagement of country resources and capital, with devastating repercussions. Poverty rates in Lebanon have skyrocketed, and the healthcare and education systems have crumbled, leaving millions vulnerable. Less discussed but no less dangerous is the environmental degradation that the country’s elite have allowed to occur. Lebanon’s deteriorating environment adds another layer of tragedy to the widespread economic crisis; sewage contaminates drinking water, generators spew toxic fumes, excessive groundwater usage renders it saline, and irrigation with sewage water contaminates agricultural produce. The price for Lebanese is becoming increasingly well documented. Cancer cases have surged, and the Lebanese people can expect to continue to suffer in the future as well. This situation was not, however, a foregone conclusion, or due solely to global climate change outside of Lebanese control. Rather, Lebanon’s significant environmental degradation is due in large part to systemic corruption and a total lack of effective regulation. Understanding the scope of this issue is vital to realizing what the people of Lebanon are facing, along with developing a plan to address some of these interconnected environmental and governance challenges.
Topic:
Corruption, Environment, International Cooperation, Pollution, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

2. Jordan’s Escalating Border Threats Amid Regional Upheaval

Author:
Abdullah Hayek and Ahmad Sharawi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On January 8, the Royal Jordanian Air Force conducted strikes against suspected drug dealers and warehouses in Syria, their fourth such operation in recent months. The strikes occurred amid military reports of increased smuggling attempts—primarily involving drugs, but also weapons—across the kingdom’s northern border. Between January and August 2023 alone, a total of 194 smuggling and infiltration attempts were recorded, 88 of them involving drones. Some cross-border incidents have resulted in clashes with Jordanian security personnel, including three recent episodes: a December 12 clash in which one soldier was killed; a December 18 battle that lasted more than ten hours and marked the first seizure of antitank weaponry on the border; and a January 6 clash in which five smugglers were killed and fifteen arrested. Jordanian military officials attribute each of these attempts to pro-Iran proxy groups in Syria. Moreover, the increasingly advanced arms that smugglers are using—including rocket-propelled grenades, mines, and drones—have led Jordanian officials to conclude that these criminal endeavors pose a wider threat to national security. Greater U.S. assistance would reinforce the kingdom’s efforts to address this threat at a time of wider regional crisis.
Topic:
National Security, Border Control, Syrian War, Borders, Drug Trafficking, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

3. The Red-Hot Blue Line

Author:
Assaf Orion
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The first weekend of 2024 saw one of the fiercest exchanges of fire between Hezbollah and Israel since the 2006 war. On January 6, the group launched antitank guided missiles, attack drones, and no less than sixty-two rockets against Israel’s northern air control unit in Mount Meron, causing some damage. Hezbollah described the salvo as an “initial response” to the targeted killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut days earlier. In response, the Israel Defense Forces struck Hezbollah military compounds, a surface-to-air missile unit, and other targets at seven sites in south Lebanon. On January 8, an IDF strike killed Wissam al-Tawil, a senior commander in the group’s Radwan special forces. The next day, Hezbollah drones attacked the IDF’s northern command headquarters, while Israel killed the head of the group’s southern aerial unit and three of his team. In all, Hezbollah has claimed ten new “martyrs” since Saturday. Amid the fighting, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has restated Israel’s “resolve to return the northern communities home, diplomatically if possible; otherwise, by other means.” Similarly, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant told U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, “We prefer the path of an agreed-upon diplomatic settlement, but we are getting close to the point where the hourglass will turn over.” Senior U.S. and European officials are now shuttling between Beirut and Jerusalem in a bid to stop the escalation. What exactly will it take to prevent a war in Lebanon and possibly beyond?
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Diplomacy, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

4. Domestic Disagreements Limit Netanyahu’s Options with Washington

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the Hamas-Israel war enters a new phase, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is finding it increasingly difficult to balance relationships inside his government and with the White House. On the military front, Israel has taken most of northern Gaza, though an estimated 5,000-6,000 Hamas fighters remain active in various tunnel networks. Major combat operations have largely shifted to central and southern Gaza, while the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have released most of the 360,000 reservists mobilized at the beginning of the war and withdrawn some forces for retraining. Yet the situation is murkier on the diplomatic and political fronts. Earlier today, Netanyahu and President Biden spoke with each other for the first time in almost four weeks, and the prime minister is fundamentally at odds with Benny Gantz’s centrist National Unity party. When Gantz joined the government shortly after the October 7 attacks, he helped dilute the influence of the far-right parties led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir while focusing the cabinet on the mutual goal of driving Hamas from power in Gaza. Yet their policy differences have become more salient since then, and Netanyahu seems convinced that Gantz—who is riding high in the polls—will soon leave the government to capitalize on the prime minister’s wartime unpopularity in potential early elections. This has made Netanyahu more dependent on his far-right ministers, much to the consternation of the White House.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, Conflict, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

5. Hamas’s Narrative of 7 October and the Impossibility of Ignoring It

Author:
Menachem Klein
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Hamas’ barbaric attack on 7 October and Israel’s ruthless retaliation against Hamas and Gaza Strip residents are unprecedented shocking events in their severity, repercussions and impact on both peoples’ collective memory. Only few of those Israelis who agreed that Hamas underwent a political change since 2017[1] – when it issued its Document of General Principles and Policies[2] – still maintain that view. Similarly, Western government officials who engaged in direct or indirect dialogue with Hamas claim that the crimes it committed on 7 October were driven by its adherence to a fundamentalist Islamic ideology inspired by ISIS.
Topic:
Hamas, Narrative, Collective Memory, and October 7
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

6. Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. Yet, it turned out to be the last major gasp of the aerial war between Riyadh and the Sanaa-based government that had started in 2015. A few days later, on 2 April, a United Nations (UN)-mediated truce came into effect, which lasted until 2 October and, as of the time of writing, has effectively terminated Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi and Emirati territories. In the current situation of relative stability, Saudi-Houthi talks are ongoing to renew and expand the truce.
Topic:
Deterrence, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

7. Does the Present Interpretation of the UN Principles Cause Harm in Syria and Yemen?

Author:
Tayseer Alkarim
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This policy brief takes a comparative examination of how the United Nations has adopted a paradoxical interpretation of its guiding principles to address the complex humanitarian crises in Syria and Yemen. It offers approaches that could change the course of international humanitarian operations and protect them from further politicization, weaponization, and diversion. The consequences of the February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria extend far beyond physical destruction and loss of life, particularly in northwestern Syria (NWS). Immediately after the earthquake, extensive debates erupted within the local and international humanitarian community, criticizing the United Nations (UN) for its inadequate response. These debates quickly broadened to include concerns that UN humanitarian assistance had become a powerful tool for the Assad regime in its strategy to make political and military gains in war-torn Syria. The dilemma of international humanitarian assistance in Syria is not just a matter of timing or funding but, more importantly, of delivery mechanisms. Syria’s endless humanitarian nightmare revolves around the controversial interpretation of the guiding principles of the UN.
Topic:
United Nations, Humanitarian Crisis, and Aid Effectiveness
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

8. Devastating Earthquakes in Turkey Could Fundamentally Alter the Political Landscape

Author:
James Ryan
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Twin earthquakes of 7.4 and 7.8 magnitude devastated southeastern Turkey and northern Syria on February 6. Over 22,000 people are known to have died, and tens of thousands more remain wounded and displaced. Lax construction standards in a rapidly urbanizing region contributed to the high death toll, raising questions about Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party’s aggressive approach to construction and development. Opposition figures have made pointed accusations that state aid has been doled out on a partisan basis, raising the stakes of scheduled general elections on May 14.
Topic:
Development, Natural Disasters, Elections, Domestic Politics, Earthquake, and Construction
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

9. Jordan: Another Peak in a Multi-Year Crisis

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Jordan recently saw violent protests over high fuel prices stemming from IMF-mandated austerity measures. These highlighted domestic malaise, driven by economic crisis, repressive government measures in recent years, and widespread despair of the possibility of near-time improvement of the economic and political situation. While the regime has presented a long-range plan for political reform leading to parliamentary government in a decade, this has met with apathy and lack of belief. This domestic crisis dovetails with a low intensity “hot war” on the northern border against the smuggling of Captagon (Fenethylline, a synthetic amphetamine widely used in the region) with Syrian official connivance; and a new Israeli government seemingly intent on pursuing policies in Jerusalem and the West Bank which threaten Jordan’s interests. This is not the first time, and will not be the last time, that Jordan faces domestic pressures and external challenges. However, the conflation of various challenges and crises, makes the current moment one of elevated, though not acute, concern.
Topic:
Reform, Protests, Crisis Management, Austerity, and Captagon
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

10. Democracy Promotion After the Iraq War

Author:
Sarah Bush
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Iraq War has justifiably left Americans skeptical about democracy promotion. Despite its flaws, US democracy promotion is still needed to advance political rights globally. Supporting women’s rights has become an important facet of US democracy promotion. Although autocracies can manipulate women’s rights for their own ends, real and valuable progress has also been made.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Legacy of the Iraq War

Author:
Sean Yom
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Iraq War destroyed America’s credibility as a promoter of democracy and liberalism in the Middle East. Revolutionary uprisings for democratic change continue to roil the Middle East, but none desire official sponsorship or support from the United States given its bloodstained legacy in Iraq.
Topic:
Hegemony, Democracy, Liberalism, Iraq War, and Uprising
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

12. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Learning Lessons from a Lost War

Author:
Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
American-led efforts to state and nation-build in Iraq all but failed, resulting in the deaths of 4,431 US troops, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi fatalities, and mixed-at-best results in creating a viable state. Despite these failed efforts in Iraq, the United States will most likely need to work with allies, partners, and the Ukrainian people to reconstruct their country in the wake of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Therefore, learning lessons from the war in Iraq is critical for future efforts at state stabilization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, Iraq War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. The Shah’s Son and the Future of Iranian Opposition

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the Iranian opposition movement to be viable, it has to offer a clear vision for Iran that can unite most Iranians. Those opposed to the Islamic Republic of Iran must keep in mind the people in Iran, including those who have not yet shown any support for the opposition, and let them know what their future would look like if the opposition prevails. Any movement that would try to rely on sentiments favoring the Iranian monarchy is doomed to fail. The Iranian people will not get behind replacing one autocratic leader for another. This is one of the reasons for despair among many Iranians of the middle generation. The Iranian opposition’s vision for the country should include the role of those who are now employed or involved in the state apparatus.
Topic:
History, Domestic Politics, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

14. Erdoğan’s Syria Policy: Continuation of the Status Quo?

Author:
Sinem Adar
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Erdoğan’s victory was driven by rhetoric stoking further conflict with Kurdish actors in Turkey and Syria. He is unlikely to back down from this position in the future. Turkey will seek to balance its “forever war” with the PKK against desires to repatriate Syrian refugees in potential negotiations with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Refugees, Syrian War, Kurds, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

15. The Long Game: Saudi Arabia and Professional Golf

Author:
Sean L. Yom
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The alliance between the PGA Tour and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (which is chaired by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and includes the LIV Golf league) is a strategic victory for Saudi Arabia, which has sought a more integrated presence in global and Western institutions. The merger opens up serious commercial leverage for Saudi Arabia, including control over the PGA Tour’s lucrative licensing operation. The deal has resolved a year-long legal dispute between the two organizations, but questions will be raised about the PGA Tour’s nonprofit status as well as monopoly issues that are being investigated by the US Congress.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sports, Soft Power, and Golf
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

16. Water and Climate Change Will Shape Iraq-Turkey Relations

Author:
Mohammed A. Salih
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Water and climate change will be at the center of Iraq-Turkish relations for years to come. There is a mismatch of priorities on the Turkish and Iraqi sides, with security constituting the most urgent element for Turkey and water/environment for Iraq. Iraq lacks effective pressure cards against Turkey, while Ankara can successfully weaponize water against Iraq, particularly in the short and medium run. A holistic approach that integrates the questions of trade, energy, security, and water can best help assuage Iraq’s water needs in dealing with Turkey.
Topic:
Climate Change, Bilateral Relations, and Water
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

17. Autonomy Curbed? Kurdish Oil Exports Hit Snags from Turkey and Baghdad

Author:
Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the past three months, the Kurdish region in northern Iraq and its government, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have been facing one of the most serious challenges in the two decades of its formal existence. The pipeline through which it exports some 400,000 barrels of oil a day (b/d) – 10 percent of the overall Iraqi exports and 0.5 percent of global production – has been closed since March 25, at an estimated cost of close to a billion dollars a month (approximately $30 million daily). The KRG has depended on income from oil exports for some 80 percent of its budget. The stoppage came after a decade-long arbitration between the Government of Iraq (GOI) and Turkey by the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce was decided in March in Iraq’s favor. Turkey was ordered to cease loading Kurdish oil without GOI supervision, and to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in owed fees (Baghdad had demanded $30 billion). Baghdad had claimed that use of the pipeline from northern Iraq to the port of Ceyhan in Turkey by the Kurds without GOI consent was in violation of a bilateral agreement between the two countries from 1973, the annex of which states Turkey would only buy oil from Iraq’s state-owned oil marketer.
Topic:
Oil, Economy, Exports, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

18. Biden’s Middle East Balancing Act: Iran’s Nuclear Program and Saudi-Israeli Ties

Author:
Leon Hadar
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This summer, the Biden administration decided to negotiate a temporary deal with Iran involving the release of American prisoners held by the Islamic Republic in exchange for the release of some of the funds that were held by the United States as part of the economic sanctions on Tehran. The White House expects that this package deal will open the road to talks with Iran on its nuclear program. The outline of a deal would include a pause in the accumulation of enriched uranium and an Iranian pledge not to produce weapons-grade fissile material, in exchange for the removal of US economic sanctions. But any diplomatic deal between Washington and Tehran raises fears among two of America’s allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel, that regard Iran as an existential threat. From that perspective, a US-led process of normalizing the relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem could help contain Iran and reinforce the American pledge to strengthen the alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Negotiation, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

19. Iran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ Vastly Improved Hamas’s Operational Capabilities

Author:
Colin P. Clarke
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Iran has provided training, equipment, and financing to Hamas over the years, vastly improving the terrorist organization’s capabilities, evidenced by the cross-border attack into Israel on October 7 that resulted in more than 1,400 killed. The unification of Iran’s network of proxies under the purview of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani has been a force multiplier and cemented Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy as the most effective means of encircling Israel. Israel has declared its intention to destroy Hamas completely, but any attempt to do so will come at an extremely high cost and could spur other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah to join the fray, prolonging the conflict and increasing the likelihood of a region-wide conflagration.
Topic:
Terrorism, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Proxy Groups, and Axis of Resistance
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

20. Between Swords of Iron and the Al Aqsa Deluge: The Regional Politics of the Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Brandon Friedman and Joshua Krasna
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Hamas-Israel war has derailed but not destroyed the trend towards regional de-escalation and integration. Hamas’ “success” has revived fears in the region of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence and led aspiring regional powers to compete to steer the Muslim world’s attitudes and responses to the crisis . Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s peace partners, face particular domestic challenges that both constrain and incentivize engagement in the crisis. Egypt’s strategic interests have led to a discreet, but more active role, while Jordan’s domestic pressures have led it to keep the crisis at arm’s length. The United Arab Emirates and other conservative Arab states emphasize the need to prevent escalation, to limit civilian deaths, and to implement an immediate ceasefire, and at least publicly, minimize the relevance of “who started” the war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, Hamas, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

21. Saudi-Houthi Talks Sow Cracks in Coalition – The Yemen Review, January & February 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Ongoing bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the armed Houthi movement have renewed optimism that a negotiated political settlement in Yemen might yet be possible. But the talks are an exclusively Saudi initiative and threaten to serve only the narrow interests of their current participants. To date, their primary effect has been the easing of restrictions on imports to Hudaydah, a development quickly weaponized by the Houthis, who have sought to coerce traders to use the port exclusively, which would deprive the internationally recognized government of much-needed customs revenue. Importantly, the talks include neither the government, whose sidelining does little for its popular legitimacy, nor Saudi Arabia’s primary coalition partner, the UAE. On the heels of its massive military reengagement in Yemen over the last eighteen months, the UAE has so far rejected Houthi overtures. The divergent interests of the coalition have come to the fore in Hadramawt, where the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council has sought to extend its influence by agitating against forces affiliated with the Islamist Islah party. This has come up against resistance from local tribal groups, increasingly supported by Saudi Arabia, who are now recruiting thousands of local fighters and protesting outside interference. Increased Saudi involvement in Hadramawt is a blow to the aspirations of the STC and has been compounded by the formation of the new Nation’s Shield forces under President Rashad Al-Alimi. Paid directly by Saudi Arabia, the force could go some way toward enshrining Alimi’s administration; unlike most other members of the council, he previously had no military forces of his own.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

22. Saudi-Houthi Talks Move Toward Ceasefire – The Yemen Review, March 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks regained traction over the course of March, and the announcement of a ceasefire is expected as Riyadh looks to wind down its direct military involvement in Yemen. At month’s end, Presidential Leadership Council chief Rashad al-Alimi and his government were summoned to the Saudi capital to be briefed on the negotiations. Despite the flurry of activity, there has been little information given on how the Saudis intend to resolve some of the longstanding issues that have bedeviled earlier rounds of talks. The negotiations have not forestalled continued fighting, with clashes escalating clashes across multiple frontlines. The Houthis made gains in southern Marib and along the Al-Bayda-Shabwa border, and heavy fighting took place in Al-Dhalea and southern Hudaydah. Taiz Governor Nabil Shamsan, Minister of Defense Mohsen al-Daeri, and Chief of Staff Saghir bin Aziz survived separate assassination attempts in Taiz governorate believed to have been undertaken by Houthi forces. The Houthi-controlled parliament in Sana’a has banned the payment of interest as a “usurious transaction,” in an attempt to Islamicize the financial sector. Implementation could have disastrous effects on Yemen’s faltering economy, contributing to its isolation and discouraging international investment. The law could rapidly limit the ability to finance basic imports and cut off access to foreign financing.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

23. Saudis Visit Sana’a as Warring Parties Conduct Prisoner Exchange

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Saudi-Houthi talks in Sana’a during Ramadan failed to produce a final agreement on a roadmap for final status peace talks and a permanent ceasefire. Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) leaders in Riyadh were left out of the loop although the Saudis continued to insist that the Houthis co-sign any deal with the internationally recognized government. A major prisoner exchange took place in mid-April following a deal reached in March in which the government and Houthis agreed to the release of 973 detainees. Included among the prisoners released were former defense minister Mahmoud al-Subaihi, Nasser Mansour Hadi, the brother of former president Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and Samira Marish, a woman accused of planning several bombings and assassinations on behalf of the Houthi movement. A senior government military commander, Faisal Rajab, was released in a separate deal following a mediation in Sana’a between an Abyan tribal delegation and Houthi officials. Fighting continued on several frontlines, most significantly in Marib governorate, where Houthi forces are trying to capitalize on their gains in March. On the economic front, the government-held port of Aden received a commercial ship without it being subject to inspection in Jeddah, and more than 500 types of goods were removed from a list of banned products, including fertilizers and batteries. The government is still struggling to cover the cost of public sector salaries after losing oil revenues following Houthi drone attacks late last year and Houthi pressure on importers to redirect shipments from Aden to Hudaydah, while the Houthi authorities drew in revenue from various informal taxes and duties imposed during Ramadan.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, Ceasefire, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

24. A Southern Reshuffle – The Yemen Review, May 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Political news in May was dominated by the reorganization and resurgence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Seemingly sidelined by the Saudi-Houthi talks and the Kingdom’s support of Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) chief Rashad al-Alimi, the Emirati-backed group extended its influence through the recruitment of powerful politicians, an internal reorganization, and a conference resulting in a new ‘Southern National Charter.’ Saudi-Houthi negotiations appear to have stalled over disagreement on a number of long-standing issues, but the recent involvement of China could bring additional resources and leverage to the table. The STC’s revived fortunes have led to renewed political and military mobilization in Hadramawt. The Nation’s Shield forces, paid for and supplied by Saudi Arabia, but under the nominal control of President Al-Alimi, increased their presence in the governorate, and were visited by the Saudi coalition commander before assuming control of an important border crossing. For their part, STC-affiliated forces took up positions on the strategic Ataq-Al-Abr road linking Hadramawt and Shabwa, including a key stretch used by Islah-affiliated forces. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula also stepped up its activity, conducting at least two drone strikes in Shabwa as it publicly condemned the easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Houthis launched their latest offensive in the economic war, banning the sale of domestically produced cooking gas in favor of imports. Imported gas is more expensive, but the brunt of the impact will be felt by the internationally recognized government and its production facilities in Marib. Having shut down the government’s oil exports and rerouted trade to deprive it of customs fees, the sanction will further cripple the government’s finances. It is already having trouble purchasing sufficient fuel to keep the lights on – May saw an extension of rolling blackouts in Aden as a Saudi grant has expired without extension. Summer sees the highest demand for electricity, but a number of generators in the interim capital have already shut down due to the shortage.
Topic:
Economy, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Gulf Nations

25. Temperatures, Tensions Roil Government – The Yemen Review, June & July 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Summer has been dominated by rising tensions among the Saudi-led coalition, as competition between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates continues to undermine the internationally recognized government. The current phase of the rivalry is centered on Hadramawt, the vast eastern governorate bordering Saudi Arabia that has seen repeated bouts of political and military agitation. Saudi talks with the Houthi group (Ansar Allah) are currently on hold, hung up on now-familiar disagreements over the kingdom’s belligerent status and payment of public sector salaries. Perhaps stung by its lack of progress in the negotiations, Saudi Arabia announced new support for the government, totaling some US$1.2 billion. The funding rescued a government in financial crisis: battered by an effective Houthi blockade of oil and gas exports, it could not even afford to keep the lights on. Lengthening blackouts during the hottest months of the year and the cratering value of the Yemeni rial led to protests and political recriminations as the situation grew more desperate. But the faltering peace talks may also augur new rounds of violence. Houthi forces have deployed in increasing numbers outside Marib, and may yet renew their aspirations to capture the city and nearby oilfields. Foreign observers and senior Houthi military commanders have been on hand at maneuvers in the governorate. Tensions are also building on the Red Sea Coast, where the Houthis are mobilizing naval forces on islands near international shipping lanes. Pro-government forces have also moved to the sea, competing to occupy bases near the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait.
Topic:
Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

26. Saudi-Houthi Talks Resume – The Yemen Review, August 2023

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The strategic city of Marib saw an increase in fighting on several fronts. The Houthis have been reinforcing their positions in the area, which they attempted to seize in a massive and costly offensive two years ago. Should negotiations break down, Marib is seen as a likely area of renewed contestation due to its oil and gas resources. A new counterterrorist campaign was launched in Abyan to target Al-Qaeda forces in the governorate. Named ‘Swords of Haws’, the operation is being conducted by an array of STC and pro-government forces. The campaign reported it had succeeded in securing the Rafd and Jenin Valleys, but had faced strong resistance from Al-Qaeda forces in Mudiya district. Frontline fighting on the border of Al-Bayda and Lahj rose significantly in August, including a particularly large Houthi assault on STC positions on August 26-27 that resulted in dozens of casualties. Two Doctors Without Borders employees were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in Marib as they traveled from Seyoun. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the incident. An officer investigating last month’s killing of World Food Programme Moayad Hameidi was assassinated. The officer, a member of the Taiz Political Security department, had received death threats and demanded he halt the investigation. Five UN employees were released on August 11, after being held captive by Al-Qaeda for more than 18 months. The group was reportedly released after lengthy Omani mediation and the payment of a ransom, though the UN has disputed these claims. Houthi forces continue to besiege villages of the Bani Nawf tribe in Al-Jawf following the killing of a prominent local Houthi commander. A number of tribes have responded by calling for united action, others have sided with the Houthis.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Negotiation, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

27. Petroleum and Progress in Iran: An Interview with Gregory Brew

Author:
Mirek Tobiáš Hošman and Gregory Brew
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Toynbee Prize Foundation
Abstract:
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, Iran developed into the world’s first petro-state. In the recently published Petroleum and Progress in Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War (2022, Cambridge University Press), author Gregory Brew argues that Pahlavi petro-state emerged from a confluence of global and local forces in the context of the Cold War, the global oil economy, and the nascent practice and discourse of international development assistance. The Toynbee Prize Foundation interviewed Gregory Brew on the main arguments and events of his book. Next to providing a brief chronology of the political and economic development of Iran in post-WW2 decades – including the episode of the failed attempt to nationalize Iranian oil industry in the early 1950s followed by the coup d’état in 1953 – Brew explained the concept of dual integration introduced in his book, which tries to account for both local and global integration of the Iranian oil industry. He also highlighted the role of the international development actors, including the World Bank, American developmentalists and development economists in shaping the Pahlavi regime and the Iranian development project.
Topic:
Development, Oil, History, and Industry
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

28. Reset U.S.-Syria Policy

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
After 12 years of civil war, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has consolidated its power and defeated credible threats to its rule. The anti-Assad armed opposition, which once controlled half of Syria, is relegated to the northwestern province of Idlib. While the Biden administration recognizes that Assad will likely remain in office, U.S. policy remains punitive, maintaining comprehensive sanctions on Syria until Assad negotiates political reforms with his opponents and agrees to free and fair elections. This policy will not produce the desired results. Assad is firmly entrenched, benefits from the help of security partners in Iran and Russia, who prefer that he stays in power, and remains highly unlikely to comply with U.S. demands. The status quo amounts to collective punishment of the Syrian population. Approximately 900 U.S. troops remain in eastern Syria, allegedly to train and advise the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS. But ISIS lost its territorial caliphate more than four years ago. The risk of keeping U.S. forces there in perpetuity which includes sporadic attacks on U.S. positions and escalation risks with various actors, outweighs any rewards. Neither the sanctions nor the occupation of eastern Syria serves U.S. security interests. The former does no good, and the latter risks embroiling the United States in a mission without an end date. The United States should withdraw its remaining forces and offload what is left of the counter-ISIS mission to local actors. The United States should also reduce if not end its failing sanctions regime.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Armed Forces, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

29. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-IRAN DEAL FOR YEMEN

Author:
Marta Furlan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
In 2014, the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia armed group from the Sa’ada region of northern Yemen, aligned with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been removed following the Arab Spring uprisings. Together, they defeated the government led by President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, and established control over the Yemeni capital of Sana’a and the entirety of northern Yemen. At that time, Iran began to progressively increase its support for the Houthis, seeing partnership with the group as an opportunity to advance its revisionist agenda in the region and establish its influence in the southern Red Sea, an area of immense strategic significance. Threatened by aggressive Iranian expansionism at its doorstep, in March 2015, Saudi Arabia entered the war alongside Hadi. As Iran sided with the Houthis and Saudi Arabia sided with Hadi, Yemen became the battlefield of both a domestic competition for power between different local factions and a regional competition for influence between Teheran and Riyadh.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, Houthis, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Syria

30. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

31. Anti-Government Demonstrations in Iran: A Long-Term Challenge for the Islamic Republic

Author:
Dana Sammy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Iran was rocked by mass demonstrations triggered by the September 2022 death of Mahsa Amini — a young Kurdish woman — while in the custody of the Guidance Patrol (also known as the ‘morality police’) for allegedly violating the hijab dress code. Protests over the mandatory hijab rule soon coalesced around a wide range of grievances with the regime, with participants demanding protections for civil, political, and human rights and calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. Although street demonstrations have subsided for the time being, how the protest movement will evolve — and how it will impact the stability of the Islamic Republic — remains an open question. This report explores potential answers to this question by examining notable trends and implications of the wave of demonstrations that unfolded in the country between September and December 2022. It argues that several emerging aspects of the nationwide movement may pose a long-term challenge to the regime. The demonstrations following Amini’s death were not only unique in regard to their geographical spread and longevity, but also in the way they brought together different segments of society with both distinct and overlapping grievances. Moreover, amid a harsh crackdown by Iranian authorities, engagement in violence by demonstrators has trended upward: between mid-September and December 2022, ACLED records the highest number of violent demonstration events for any round of nationwide demonstrations in Iran since the beginning of data collection in 2016. The increased use of Molotov cocktails and the killing of dozens of security personnel are among the most significant trends in demonstration violence observed in the latest round of events. The demonstrations did not reach a critical mass necessary to pose an immediate threat to the survival of the regime. Yet, this latest round in a sequence of increasingly violent demonstrations is indicative of growing resentment in Iranian society against the ruling elites and a willingness to express it forcefully despite severe repression. As the regime refuses to reform, the growing frequency and intensity of demonstrations suggests that the government will find itself in an increasingly unstable domestic position and increasingly isolated in the international arena.
Topic:
Government, Human Rights, Women, State Violence, and Protests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

32. Turkey’s 2023 General Elections and the Kurdish Question

Author:
Ameneh Mehvar and Berk Özlü
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The most consequential elections in Turkey’s recent history are set to be held on 14 May, when Turkish citizens will elect a new president alongside a new parliament. An ideologically disparate coalition of six opposition parties, ranging from secularists, to Islamic conservatives, and Turkish nationalists, have joined forces under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu to unseat Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan has been in power for 20 years, initially as prime minister and then as president since 2014.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Minorities, Elections, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

33. The Muqawama and Its Enemies: Shifting Patterns in Iran-Backed Shiite Militia Activity in Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola and Miran Feyli
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The post-2003 security landscape in Iraq has seen the proliferation of dozens of militias identifying with Shiite Islam. Many of these actors are integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) – a paramilitary group established in 2014 to counter the Islamic State and later incorporated into the Iraqi state forces – and have strong relations with the Iranian regime and its security apparatus.1 These Iran-backed groups include prominent militias such as Kataib Hizbullah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and Haraka Hizbullah al-Nujaba (HHN), as well as a number of recently formed ‘facade groups’ like Ashab al-Kahf and Qasim al-Jabarin. Such facade groups are generally assumed to operate on behalf of KH, AAH, and HHN (see graph below). These groups are notable for portraying themselves as the Muqawama, or the ‘resistance’ against the United States and other foreign forces.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

34. The United States Is Rapidly Losing Arab Hearts and Minds Through Gaza War, While Competitors Benefit

Author:
Munqith Dagher and Karl Kaltenthaler
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Throughout the fifteen years that following the 2011 withdrawal from Iraq, each American presidential administration has experienced domestic calls to leave the Middle East. However, each time these voices grew louder, a new regional variable emerged that compelled the American administration to return to its traditional role dictated by urgent strategic security and economic interests. After the withdrawal from Iraq, a strategic vacuum led to the emergence of and fight against ISIS, with the deaths of thousands both locally and internationally, and millions from the region displaced. The U.S. military was forced to return to the region to contribute to the efforts to eliminate ISIS. When this goal was declared completed, new regional threats emerged in the form of Iran and its weapons, which threatened not only America’s allies but also the free flow of global oil supplies. While the Biden administration thought this problem could be resolved through a package of incentives and agreements with Iran, the war in Gaza has emerged to confirm once again the error of U.S. assessments that contend that this region is no longer important to America’s strategic interests. According to the third section of the U.S. National Security Strategy document signed by President Biden in October 2022, America's top priority on the global stage is to surpass China, followed by limiting Russia's influence. The national security priorities also include combating terrorism in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

35. Why China Is Taking Sides Against Israel—and Why It Will Likely Backfire

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When news broke of the Hamas attack on Israel last month, the silence from Beijing was conspicuous amid the din of international statements. When the government finally addressed the conflict at a press conference the day after, its words were remarkable for being unremarkable. An unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson expressed “deep concern,” called on “relevant parties to remain calm, exercise restraint, and immediately end the hostilities,” and lamented the “protracted standstill of the peace process”—a diplomatic endeavor in which Beijing has never shown more than a passing interest. The wording was nearly identical to China’s reactions during past Gaza conflicts, despite the fact that the circumstances were radically different. Because the brief remarks failed to condemn Hamas or even recognize the scale of the horrors that occurred on October 7, Israeli commentators interpreted them not as neutral, but as hostile. Beijing soon confirmed that interpretation. On October 14, Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Israel’s actions went “beyond the scope of self-defense” and demanded that it stop imposing “group punishment” on Palestinians, while still refusing to condemn Hamas. (For a full listing of Beijing’s official statements on the conflict, see The Washington Institute’s statement tracker.) Chinese media have likewise presented the war as one of Israeli aggression—despite being heavily censored, their early reports were rife with anti-Semitic, anti-Israel commentary claiming that Hamas was defending the two-state solution, even though the group’s past and present actions are patently bent on destroying the Israeli state. Notably, the strident tone in online Chinese commentary moderated in the run-up to President Xi Jinping’s November 15 meeting with President Biden, underscoring the government’s well-established influence over such messaging. This approach is a stark departure from Beijing’s past impassivity toward Middle East conflicts, in which Chinese officials had usually sought to avoid entanglement. Rather, it reflects the government’s new inclination to use far-flung conflicts as opportunities to undermine the United States and score points in the “Global South.” Yet it could also hold longer-term consequences for China, particularly regarding the government’s three-decade effort to improve relations with Israel. In addition, using the current crisis to take potshots at Washington may constrain Beijing’s ability to project impartiality in other regional conflicts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Palestinians
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, and Gaza

36. Making Sense of Iraq’s Politicized Supreme Court Rulings

Author:
Selin Uysal
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On November 14, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court (FSC) made waves by ruling on a complaint against Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi, ultimately deciding to revoke his membership in the legislature. In the absence of any appeal mechanism, Halbousi will have to step down from the speakership he has held since 2018—a development that will have ripple effects on the provincial elections scheduled for December 18.
Topic:
Politics, Supreme Court, and Judiciary
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

37. Nonviolent Protest Movement in Suweida Continues to Resurrect Calls from the Syrian Revolution

Author:
Ishtar Al Shami
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On December 8, residents of Suweida city and the surrounding areas came out to protest the Assad regime yet again. Days later, as the movement entered its sixteenth week, a long line of protesters appeared in the town of Salkhad in the south of Suweida province. On these streets, waves of protesters chant “the people want the downfall of the regime,” echoing cries of the Arab Spring that has in the past sparked swift military backlash from the Syrian Regime. Syrian opposition flags are common, along with the Druze flag—the community to which the large majority of Suweida’s inhabitants belong. Meanwhile, several residents of Salkhad and nearby Shahbaa city broke into their local Baath party offices to either close down or take documents from an already closed building. These offices joined the fate of other Baath party offices throughout the province that have been shut down in towns including Melh, Arman, al-Qurayya, and Sama al-Bardan. In videos posted to social media, these protesters tore up pictures of Bashar al-Assad in a clear challenge and explicit rejection of the regime’s legitimacy, demanding its departure. In the events of this one week, Syrians following the protests could see a microcosm of the larger Suweida protest movement, now over a hundred days in and with no signs of stopping. Although the peaceful demonstrations in Suweida are no longer in the international spotlight since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the movement is remarkable for its longevity and continued open articulation of so many of the ideas that initially motivated Syrians to take to the streets in 2011, and that the Syrian regime has tried so desperately to repress in the intervening years. These protests are the means through which the demonstrators communicate with the world, and have become a symbol for many Syrians both within the country and outside of it. When they began in mid-August 2023, their unprecedented scope meant that they were almost immediately hailed as a second wave of the Syrian revolution. At the time, many wondered: Will Suweida be the turning point? Will this movement be able to oust the Assad regime and usher in a democratic political process that could make reconstruction possible, allowing the return of refugees and the displaced? While protesters in Suweida have not yet accomplished these admittedly audacious goals, neither have they been silenced or forced into submission in the intervening months. This in itself should be seen as a victory; the Suweida movement has become the longest, most organized, widespread, and participatory movement since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, a mixed-gender civilian movement with broad and influential participation from all segments of Suweida’s society.
Topic:
Reform, Democracy, Protests, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Suwayda

38. New Poll Sheds Light on Saudi Views of Israel-Hamas War

Author:
Catherine Cleveland and David Pollock
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
AWashington Institute poll conducted from November 14 to December 6, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 Saudi citizens measured how Saudi attitudes have shifted due to the Israel-Hamas war. According to responses, the Saudi popular attitude towards the outcome of the war is clear: the overwhelming majority (91%) express agreement with the statement that “despite the destruction and loss of life, this war in Gaza is a win for the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims.” And as for the role of the broader Arab world, almost all (96%) agree with the proposal that “Arab countries should immediately break all diplomatic, political, economic, and any other contacts with Israel, in protest against its military action in Gaza.” Polling during a war is likely to produce more volatile results as circumstances shift quickly on the ground—during the current polling period, for instance, the Israel-Hamas war had several major shifts, including a temporary ceasefire from November 24-30 and the subsequent expansion of Israel’s incursions into southern Gaza. However, comparisons with Saudi polling fielded in August can help provide a barometer as to just how sharply this conflict has, at least temporarily, shifted certain attitudes, and how little it has moved others. While Hamas as a movement remains unpopular among the majority of Saudis—in contrast to a new trend of widespread popular support in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt—just 16% of Saudis say that “Hamas should stop calling for the destruction of Israel, and instead accept a permanent two-state solution to the conflict based on the 1967 borders.” Nor do most believe that Hamas’s attack on October 7 targeted Israeli civilians—the overwhelming majority of Saudis (95%) responded that Hamas did not actually kill civilians when asked about whether they believed the Hamas killing of civilians was against Islam. This view is widespread across the eight countries polled by TWI, and similar results appear in a recently released poll of Palestinians from PSR. There, the overwhelming majority reported that they had not seen any videos of Hamas members committing atrocities, and only 10% of Palestinians (17% of Gazans and 5% of West Bankers) stated that they believed that Hamas committed war crimes in the current war, in comparison to 95% who say the same about Israel. While the majority of Saudis continue to express a negative opinion of Hamas, the Israel-Hamas war has generated a significant boost in its popularity. There has been a thirty point shift in positive attitudes towards Hamas, from just 10% in August to 40% in November/December. Responses in the most recent poll, alongside those in 2014 and 2021, demonstrate the increased popularity Hamas achieves among some Saudis during or in the immediate aftermath of conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with its likely disappearance over time. In the aftermath of the 2021 Hamas-Israel conflict, for instance, five years of steadily decreasing popularity in Saudi Arabia suddenly reversed, though just to a quarter (23%) of the total population.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Conflict, Hamas, and Polls
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Gulf Nations

39. What Does the War in Gaza Mean for Jordan's National Security?

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As the war between Israel and Hamas continues, focus is turned towards the Gaza Strip and Israel proper. Although the ongoing hostilities will eventually die down or cease altogether, the lasting impacts of the war on the broader region are still unknown. Nowhere is this truer than in neighboring Jordan. When Hamas launched its attack on October 7, it had an immediate impact on the Jordanian street and the country’s national security. Despite the chaotic and passionate outpouring of emotion among the public, bilateral cooperation between Jordan and the United States can contribute to assisting the conflicting parties in ultimately achieving peace and security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Jordan

40. Egypt’s Economic Freefall Provides an Opening for U.S. Assistance—and Leverage

Author:
Ben Fishman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As Secretary of State Antony Blinken prepares to visit Cairo on January 29-30, Egypt’s economy has been busy plummeting to new lows. Part of the blame can be laid on the twin shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, which disproportionately affected the country due to its heavy reliance on threatened resources such as wheat and tourism revenue from Russia and Ukraine. Yet the bulk of its struggles can be attributed to Cairo’s broad economic mismanagement under President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, which has included everything from currency manipulation to misplaced spending priorities, wasteful megaprojects, and undue state and military control over the economy. Since March 2022, Egypt’s currency has lost half its value and now stands at 30 pounds to the U.S. dollar—a drop spurred by the flight of dollars and the IMF’s requirement to adopt a flexible exchange rate. As a result, official inflation reached nearly 22% in December, fifteen points higher than it was at the end of 2021. Shortages are now frequent, and prices for basic goods have soared by nearly 40%. The rising cost of essential bread in particular will be difficult to maintain much longer. Meanwhile, the debt-to-GDP ratio has risen to 95%, with a record $100 billion in loan payments due over the next four years. Egypt’s 2022-23 budget allocates over 50% to debt servicing and loan repayments, and this sky-high figure will only increase further over time because the loans are dollar-denominated.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Foreign Aid, Reform, and Economy
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, Egypt, and United States of America

41. Earthquake in Syria and Turkey: U.S. Policy Implications

Author:
Can Selcuki, Amany Qaddour, Soner Cagaptay, and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A panel of experts offers on-the-ground insights from the disaster zone and discusses the political and policy consequences of the still-unfolding humanitarian crisis.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Natural Disasters, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

42. To Prevent the PA from Unraveling, Address Internal Reform

Author:
Ghaith al-Omari
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Last year was one of the bloodiest in the West Bank since the second Palestinian intifada two decades ago, and 2023 is already on track to surpass it. Worse yet, the latest surge of violence comes at a time of exceptional fragility within the Palestinian Authority. Much of this fragility can be attributed to Israeli actions that chip away at the PA’s credibility and effectiveness—a fact driven home by Israel’s deadly February 22 raid in Nablus (see below). Yet the PA’s poor governance and political ossification are key contributors as well, as leaders in Ramallah steadily lose control over parts of the West Bank in a vicious cycle of instability and ever-eroding legitimacy. If this trajectory continues, the PA might even run the risk of unraveling altogether. As the United States seeks diplomatic ways to restore calm and curb escalatory policies on both sides, it should pay closer attention to domestic Palestinian factors that contribute to these damaging trends.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Diplomacy, Reform, Democracy, and Palestinian Authority
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

43. Can Federalism Work in Lebanon?

Author:
Robert Rabil
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As Lebanon’s economic and socio-political conditions have spiraled downward since the rise and fractionalization of the 2019 popular protests—known as the October 17 Revolution—various proposals have emerged as to how to remedy the bankrupt and virtually failed state. All agree that the current outlook is grim; today, the Lebanese currency has lost almost all its value and the presidential seat is contested and remains vacant. Political elites are at loggerheads and blamed for robbing the state, society is polarized across intra- and inter-confessional lines, and poverty has reached a popular level not seen since the Great Famine of World War I. Among the proposed suggestions is the federal option, put as an alternative to the country’s confessional system. Such ideas are not new; in fact, the federal option had been championed and the subject of debate among mainly Christian politicians and parties prior to and during Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990). President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) offered a detailed plan for a federal Lebanon; the Lebanese Front, representing mainly Maronite aspirations, likewise presented a federal project during the Lebanon National Dialogue in Lausanne in 1984; and president-elect Bashir Gemayel, assassinated in 1982, toyed with the idea of federalism. However, Lebanon’s civil war ended when the antagonistic parties signed the Document of National Reconciliation of 1989, also known as the Taif Agreement, which introduced administrative decentralization instead of federalism. And while the agreement ended the civil war, it subsequently ushered in an era of Lebanese politics marked by the Syrian occupation of Beirut until 2005 and the rise of the Islamist Shia party Hezbollah, effectively building a state within a state and commanding a militia more or less better equipped than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Meanwhile, Lebanon’s political elites entered into a Faustian pact with Hezbollah under which they legitimized the ‘Party of God’ in exchange for turning a blind eye to their theft of the state. It is this bargain that has brought Lebanon to its almost total collapse as a state and a nation.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Reform, Shia, and Federalism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

44. The Lebanon Human Rights Report: Punting on Accountability?

Author:
David Schenker
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
When the U.S. State Department issued its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices last week, the document’s assessment of Lebanon’s track record in 2022 stood out for its significant elisions. Although the comprehensive nature of these reports generally makes them a valuable tool for accountability, their diplomatically sensitive content is sometimes colored by an administration’s perceived exigencies regarding a given bilateral relationship. The fact that Lebanon’s report largely avoids some of the country’s more controversial human rights issues therefore seems more than coincidental. Whatever the case, the omissions are a missed opportunity for facilitating just the type of accountability Lebanon needs to pry itself out of its current morass.
Topic:
Human Rights, Armed Forces, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

45. Drug Addiction in Syria: A Decades-Long Disease

Author:
Emad Bouzo
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Numerous articles have recently appeared in international media about confiscated shipments of Captagon coming from Syria into various countries in the Middle East. Recent research has examined how Syria turned into a regional center for drug trafficking. Yet media interest appears comparatively silent about the spread of drug abuse inside Syria itself. According to available reports, domestic drug abuse has reached dangerous levels. While such a crisis has no doubt increased, the roots of this issue are decades old. Through my work as a doctor in Damascus from 1980 until September 2011, I witnessed how drug abuse spread during this period. My private clinic was located in one of the most significantly affected neighborhoods, and some of my personal observations from my time as a clinician may help shed light on the deeper origins of Syria’s current drug crisis and perhaps shed light on potential avenues to address it. Initially, the Lebanese civil war served as the main factor in the spread of drugs. Several militias exploited the collapse of state institutions in Lebanon to carry out drug cultivation, manufacturing, and drug trafficking within its borders. The Syrian military intervention in Lebanon in the mid-seventies and the establishment of partnerships between the leaders of these militias and Syrian officers that secured the drug trade with more protection allowed its revitalization and prosperity, as documented in a Washington Post article from that period. Tons of heroin were produced annually in Lebanon, and Syrian officers subsequently trafficked large quantities into Syria. This new ease of access captured the attention of numerous Syrian youth, who began using these highly addictive drugs. Their interest in drugs was often initially driven by being forced to leave education to enter the labor market at an early age and experiencing a sense of a bleak future. And whereas Syrian teenagers used to rebel by smoking or consuming alcohol, peer use of opioids—such as the proximal “dextropopoxyphene” that became popular globally in the sixties—opened the door to growing usage due to the drug’s quick tolerance. Some patients moved rapidly from two capsules to the entire envelope of ten capsules in order to obtain the same sense of euphoria, ultimately leading the user to try other drugs to experience the same high. Young Syrians also took to abusing codeine-containing cough syrup.
Topic:
Public Health, Drug Trafficking, Addiction, and Captagon
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

46. Countering “ISIS at Large” in Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In U.S. Central Command’s 2022 “year in review” statement on the current status of the fight against the Islamic State, commanding general Michael Kurilla highlighted three categories: (1) “ISIS in detention,” meaning the thousands of men and boys affiliated with the group and held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons; (2) the “potential next generation of ISIS,” meaning the approximately 55,000 women and minors held in camps; and (3) “ISIS at large,” meaning the leaders and operatives that the United States and its partners “are currently fighting in Iraq and Syria.” Although Gen. Kurilla praised the ongoing effort to militarily degrade ISIS, he also noted that the group’s ideology persists, and that “partnered operations” are needed to keep up the pressure. This view aligns with the pivot in U.S. strategy in Syria over the past year and a half, from a military mission to “advising, assisting, and enabling” local partners. At the same time, however, U.S. forces have continued launching unilateral strikes against ISIS leaders in Syria as recently as this month.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

47. Preserving U.S. Military Advantages in the Middle East

Author:
Nathan P. Olsen
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) calls on the U.S. military to sustain enduring advantages and build new ones for the future fight. According to the NDS, building and maintaining advantages to advance U.S. national interests will allow the military to deter attacks against the United States and its allies and partners, while fostering a resilient military force and defense ecosystem. In the Middle East, this challenge is especially relevant. The United States has several enduring advantages that could eventually disappear if the U.S. government does not make significant changes in how it operates in this part of the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

48. The Future of Repatriation from Northeast Syria

Author:
Devorah Margolin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) recently announced that due to the international community’s slow response to the repatriation of thousands of individuals affiliated with the Islamic State (IS), it will begin to hold “fair and transparent trials in accordance with international and local laws related to terrorism.” The announcement comes after representatives from more than eighty countries gathered in Saudi Arabia on June 8 for a ministerial meeting convened by the Global Coalition Against Daesh, where U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reminded attendees, “We know that repatriation is the only durable solution.” His statement stood out in this context because citizens from many coalition states are still being detained indefinitely in northeast Syria. While the United States has proactively advocated for repatriation across two administrations, most other countries around the world have been reluctant or slow to take such action. To date, approximately 5,500 Iraqis and 2,700 third-country nationals (i.e., not Syrian or Iraqi) have been repatriated from detention camps, and the international community is on track to repatriate more such individuals in 2023 than in years past. Although this is a step in the right direction, it means that more than 10,000 third-country nationals from almost 60 countries remain in detention in northeast Syria, including approximately 2,000 men and boys and 8,000 women and minors. These numbers do not include the more than 18,000 Syrians and 25,000 Iraqis who are also being held indefinitely. With numerous international conflicts dominating daily headlines, much of the international community is no doubt fatigued by the challenges emanating from the fight against IS and the repatriation of IS-affiliated individuals. Yet the AANES announcement and other developments show that these challenges will only proliferate without concerted attention from Washington and its coalition partners.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, Repatriation, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

49. Hakan Fidan and the New Turkish Diplomacy in Iraq

Author:
Firas Elias
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s victory in the Turkish general elections in May 2023, Turkish foreign policy in Iraq has the potential to evolve in a different direction under the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan. Though the management of Turkey’s affairs in Iraq has shifted between various Turkish institutions since 2003, President Erdoğan has consolidated decision-making into his own hands since 2017, and his recent appointment of Fidan—a former intelligence director and loyal ally of Erdoğan—signals a continuation of this process, especially vis-a-vis Iraq. As Director of National Intelligence, Fidan oversaw the most sensitive backchannels with various regional and international actors, and he played a leading role in formulating Turkish intelligence and security policy. Notably, Fidan also led Turkey's reconciliation efforts with a variety of adversaries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He has also been intimately involved in Turkish efforts to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), targeting many PKK leaders and allied factions in northern Iraq, particularly in Sinjar, Makhmur, and al-Kuwayr. In this regard, Fidan comes equipped with deep connections to Iraq’s bureaucratic circles, having already succeeded in building bridges between various Iraqi actors and institutions. In particular, Fidan has developed close ties with both Sunni and Kurdish political leaders and has good relations with Falih al-Fayyadh, chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces, whom he met during one of his secret trips to Iraq in September 2022. Fidan notably conducted such bridge-building efforts during the formation of the current Iraqi government led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. Given this background in Iraqi politics along with his experience in intelligence, Fidan is an important player through which Erdoğan can rethink Turkish involvement in Iraq on a number of different issues. Though Fidan’s appointment certainly indicates a shift toward more security-focused policies for Turkey, the new minister will also have to balance Turkey’s political ties, economic and energy interests, environmental concerns, and military operations in Iraq. Indeed, Erdoğan likely hopes that Fidan can both diversify Turkey’s relationship networks in Iraq and reestablish normalized energy negotiations with key partners while also curbing the threat of the PKK and Iranian-aligned militias operating in Turkey’s areas of involvement in Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Middle East

50. Sinjar: Challenges and Resilience Nine Years after Genocide

Author:
Izat Noah
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Nearly a decade later, many victims are still missing, and thousands now live in displacement camps in unstable, unsanitary conditions. This anniversary is an opportunity to reflect on the ongoing armed conflict in the Sinjar region and the profound influence on its inhabitants. It also serves as an opportunity to appreciate the resilience of the Yazidis, looking toward a future with new hope and new aspirations—a future where Yazidis can experience peace, stability, justice, and equitable opportunities to reconstruct their lives and their communities. Yazidi resilience is clearly evident in how they bore the burden of this genocide, how they have persevered in the face of ongoing persecution and genocide for centuries, and how they have been steadfast in maintaining their identity and heritage despite these adversities and the repeated campaigns to tarnish their image. Yet Yazidis still face significant challenges in Iraq today. Despite relative stability in the Sinjar region, there are concerns among the Yazidi population about the return of armed conflict between groups vying for influence. Even more troubling, the issue of expulsion and displacement remains unresolved despite the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS in 2015. Many Yazidis still live in displacement camps, where they are without their homes, their land, or their basic rights. These refugees have yet to be materially compensated for their losses.
Topic:
Genocide, Politics, Terrorism, and Yazidis
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Sinjar