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Begin New Search Political Geography Iran Content Type Commentary and Analysis Publication Year within 3 Years

21. Double Pressure: How water shortage impacts Iran’s internal and external crises?

Author:
Rania Makram
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iran’s water shortage crisis is neither new or surprising and was predicted by experts and officials several years ago. As far back as 2015, former Iranian agriculture minister, Isa Kalantari, warned that water scarcity would force 50 million Iranians to leave the country. Later, he claimed that a 'water war' might hit rural areas. However, this early warning has not triggered an effective policy to preempt or solve the crisis already hitting the country. More than 12,000 villages have run out of water and around 7,000 rely entirely on water deliveries by tankers, according to Hamid-Reza Mahbubfar, a member of Environmental Risks and Sustained Development. The ecologist explained that 90 percent of surface and underground water resources have been used up. The water crisis triggered a series of political upheavals due to its implications for the population in affected villages and towns. In recent weeks, protests broke out in several Iranian cities over water scarcity and the resulting environmental problems.
Topic:
Environment, Natural Resources, Water, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

22. Baku Parade Whispers Geopolitical Complexities in the South Caucasus

Author:
Rahim Rahimov
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended a military parade in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku on December 10 to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the war over the Karabakh region that ended with the Russia-brokered armistice on November 9-10. The Russian historian, Andrey Zubov, describes the Baku parade as an occasion “rather to celebrate the birth of a new geopolitical alliance than the victory over Armenia”1 . Following the parade, Russia imposed a ban on tomato imports from Azerbaijan in its flagship manner and Russian peacekeepers attempted to do something around the town of Shusha in Karabakh resembling what they have done in Georgia: “borderization”. Azerbaijani state TV, other media outlets and public figures widely and explicitly condemned such behavior of the Russian peacekeepers as a jealous response to the parade demonstration of Armenia’s Russian-made weapons and military equipment captured by the Azerbaijani armed forces or destroyed using Turkish-made Bayraktar drones . Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, watched Turkish soldiers march alongside with Azerbaijanis on the central streets of Baku to the joy of local residents who took to the streets despite the COVID-19 related restrictions in order to salute them. This scene shows a major Russian weakness vis-àvis Turkey in Azerbaijan. Unlike Moscow, whose perception in Azerbaijan is controversial, Ankara enjoys nation-wide support. Recently leaked Russian secret files reveal that it is much more difficult for Moscow to develop proRussian civil society organizations and soft power instruments in Azerbaijan than even in staunchly pro-Western Georgia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, Georgia, and South Caucasus

23. Disappointed in Rouhani, Iranians Seek a Different Sort of Leader in June Elections

Author:
Brendan Helm, Dina Smeltz, and Amir Farmanesh
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
New indirect talks between the United States and Iran on a return to the Iran deal could help the outlook for a moderate candidate in the next election. Iranian presidential elections are set for June 18. The current president, Hassan Rouhani, who earned initial praise in Iran after successful negotiations for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, is ineligible for reelection and has steadily lost public support after the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018. A joint survey of the Iranian public conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and IranPoll provides insights into how Iranians view this pivotal moment for Iran. Iranians view Rouhani’s policies quite negatively, especially his economic policies, and for their next leader they want someone who is critical of Rouhani. However, while Iranians did not feel the economic improvements from the JCPOA they expected, new indirect talks between the United States and Iran on a return to the agreement could help the outlook for a moderate candidate.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

24. President Biden: Try for a Double Play on Iran and Afghanistan

Author:
Jon Greenwald
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
Southwest Asia is increasingly dangerous. Negotiations about Iran’s nuclear program appear stuck near a breakpoint. With the Kabul government’s precipitous collapse, President Biden’s courageous decision to remove U.S. troops from Afghanistan has gone badly. Each situation threatens grave consequences for the administration. Together they suggest more deadly chaos looms from the Middle East to China’s borders. Iran is an important common factor, central to the first case, important in the second due to geography and potential leverage. The concurrence of threat – but also perhaps opportunity – justifies a new strategy for dealing with it that cuts across both situations. Joe Biden said before taking office that it was a priority to restore the nuclear deal that was working well until Donald Trump took the U.S. out. He pledged to conclude the endless war in Afghanistan. Today neither objective appears promising. Iran has more enriched and closer to weapons level uranium than when the original deal was signed. U.S. officials acknowledge that negotiating time is limited and, by implication, that military action may be required to keep the president’s pledge never to allow an Iranian bomb. As the Taliban takes over Afghanistan, Washington is focused as it should be on safely extracting U.S. citizens and the many thousands of Afghans whose lives are at risk for having helped the Americans over 20 years. Soon, however, there will be new proposals, including preparations for off-shore responses to what many anticipate will be a revival of the kind of civil war that ravaged Afghanistan in the 1990s. Any reasonable proposal should include at the least a significant diplomatic component in which Afghanistan’s neighbors, Iran prominent among them, apply their weight to persuade the Taliban to rule more moderately than it did its first time in power and in particular to keep out international terrorists. Most acknowledge that a key weakness of that approach is U.S. inability to work with Tehran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

25. WHY THE “TERRORIST” LABEL HELPS SOME GROUPS AND HURTS OTHERS

Author:
Rebecca Best
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Does adding a terrorist group to the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list reduce its violence? Since 1997, the US State Department has maintained a list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), or foreign organizations that use terrorism and threaten US nationals or US national security. The United States has designated a wide array of terrorist organizations and groups—including Hamas, FARC, and ISIL–Khorasan—but has refrained from using the designation for others. For example, the United States never designated the Taliban an FTO. Why not?
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, 9/11, Boko Haram, Hamas, Uyghurs, FARC, Haqqani Network, Khorasan Group, Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, and Tamil Tigers
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iran, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and United States of America

26. ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong:’ The Imposition of Islamic Morality in Iran, Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Religious repression is often targeted at individuals and groups that express religious behaviors or religious affiliation (Fox, 2016; Sarkissian, 26 May 2015). However, repressive acts can also be directed at imposing a coercer’s religious values regardless of the victim’s religious affiliation (or lack thereof). ACLED-Religion captures this type of religious repression under the ‘imposition’ religious context (ACLED-Religion Codebook, 2021). Critically, religious imposition does not delineate specific repression victims. Indeed, a perpetrator can impose their values on believers of a different religion, on “religiously unaffiliated” or non-practicing individuals (Pew Research Center, 18 December 2012), and on individuals practicing the perpetrator’s religion differently.
Topic:
Islam, Religion, Violence, and Repression
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, and Egypt

27. “Maximum Pressure” Harms Diplomacy and Increases Risks of War with Iran

Author:
Daniel Depetris
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
With an economy less than a third the size of the U.S. defense budget and a military ill-suited for offensive operations, Iran is at best a minor threat to the U.S., and one in a region of limited strategic importance. The U.S. need not obsess over Iran policy. While Iran does not threaten vital U.S. interests, U.S. policy does seek to moderate Iran’s behavior and restrict its nuclear weapons development. That is why the U.S. negotiated the JCPOA, an agreement with Iran, Europe’s major powers, Russia, and China to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities. The Trump administration abrogated the JCPOA and imposed a policy of “maximum pressure” designed to compel Iran to renegotiate on nuclear issues and moderate its foreign policy. Rather than capitulate to U.S. demands, Iran expanded its nuclear program and increased its aggression in the Middle East. U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and imposition of a maximum pressure strategy harmed diplomatic efforts with Iran and increased the prospects of direct conflict. The Biden administration has so far continued the policy it inherited from the Trump administration. With nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran predictably stalled, U.S. officials should abandon maximum pressure. Ongoing diplomacy is the best path to revive the JCPOA, and more importantly, lower the risks of war. Even if the JCPOA dissolves completely, U.S.-Iran diplomacy, including on nuclear issues, should continue. War with Iran is not worth the costs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East