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  • Author: Ching-Chang Chen, Denny Roy, Utpal Vyas
  • Publication Date: 04-2015
  • Content Type: Book
  • Institution: East-West Center
  • Abstract: The Kim Jong Un (KJU) regime, since its inception, has ratcheted up tension on the Korean Peninsula. His decision to dishonor what he had agreed to—a moratorium on nuclear tests and long-range missile launches as well as the return of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspectors to Yongbyon—at several rounds of bilateral talks with the United States in February 2012 confirmed the belief that North Korea is a historically unpredictable and unreliable actor. Because the new North Korean leadership needed to fulfill its promise that North Korea would enter an “era of being a strong and prosperous nation ( gangseongdaeguk ),” pursuing economic recovery by easing tension through reconciliation with the international community, including the United States, was of significance. North Korea could have obtained nutritional assistance including corn, soy beans, vegetable oils, and ready-to-eat therapeutic food, but instead it initiated a string of provocations and hostile threats, which brought China's patience to the limits, strengthened UN sanctions, and consolidated the US position not to engage with North Korea before Pyongyang shows concrete steps for denuclearization. Hence, for the international observers, North Korea's gamble seemed to be a grave mistake.
  • Topic: Economics
  • Political Geography: China, North Korea
  • Author: Hans Mouritzen (ed), Nanna Hvidt (ed)
  • Publication Date: 06-2013
  • Content Type: Book
  • Institution: Danish Institute for International Studies
  • Abstract: This year's volume presents the official outline of Denmark's foreign policy in 2012 by Claus Grube, Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Besides that Ravinder Kaur contributes with the first academic inquiry into the causes of the Danish-Indian diplomatic deadlock in the extradition case concerning Niels Holck (the prime accused in the Purulia arms drop case). Mette Skak addresses the role of the emerging BRICS powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Danish foreign policy and offers her policy recommendations. Hans Branner shifts to a diachronic perspective. In his article about Denmark 'between Venus and Mars' he stresses elements of continuity in Danish foreign policy history; activism is not solely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Derek Beach turns to the scene of the current European economic crisis, analysing and interpreting the Fiscal Compact agreed during the Danish EU Presidency.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Affairs, Financial Crisis
  • Political Geography: Russia, China, Europe, India, South Africa, Brazil, Denmark
  • Author: Felix Chang
  • Publication Date: 05-2012
  • Content Type: Book
  • Institution: Foreign Policy Research Institute
  • Abstract: This paper argues that to adequately defend its maritime claims, the Philippines should consider an external defense architecture designed around mobile coastal defense batteries equipped with long-range anti-ship missiles and protected by an integrated air defense umbrella. Such an architecture would provide the Philippines with an effective means to not only counter surface combatants and improve the survivability of its own forces against naval aviation or ballistic missiles, but also do so with lower procurement, maintenance, and operational readiness costs than a traditional force would require. The Philippine government’s new capabilities-based defense budgeting process offers the country an opportunity to study and adopt this sort of defense architecture, which has become increasingly necessary as rising powers, such as China, have begun to test Philippine maritime sovereignty at places like Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands.
  • Topic: Defense Policy, Emerging Markets, Political Economy, Maritime Commerce, Natural Resources
  • Political Geography: China, Philippines
  • Author: David C. Gompert, Phillip C. Saunders
  • Publication Date: 12-2011
  • Content Type: Book
  • Institution: Institute for National Strategic Studies
  • Abstract: The United States and China each have or will soon have the ability to inflict grave harm upon the other by nuclear attack, attacks on satellites, or attacks on computer networks. Paradoxically, despite each country's power, its strategic vulnerability is growing. Particularly since September 11, 2001, Americans have sensed this vulnerability. The extent to which the Chinese sense it is unclear. Vulnerability to nuclear attack is familiar to both countries. But the United States and China are also becoming exposed to damage in space and cyberspace because of their growing reliance on those domains for their prosperity and security, as well as each side's increasing antisatellite (ASAT) and cyber war capabilities. For China, economic integration, production, and commerce-and thus, sustained growth and perhaps political stability-depend vitally on data sharing, making networks and satellites as strategic as they are for the United States. All three strategic domains are "offense dominant"-technologically, economically, and operationally. Defenses against nuclear, ASAT, and cyber weapons are difficult and yield diminishing results against the offensive capabilities of large, advanced, and determined states such as the United States and China. Nuclear weapons are patently offense dominant because a single explosion can destroy a city. Moreover, it is easier and cheaper for China to improve the survivability of its strategic missile launchers, to multiply deliverable weapons, and to penetrate U.S. missile defenses than it is for the United States to maintain a nuclear first-strike capability. Though it has yet to admit it, the United States cannot deny the Chinese the second-strike nuclear deterrent they are determined to have. Satellites are inherently vulnerable: conspicuous, easy to track, and fragile. Destroying them or degrading their performance is easier than protecting them. ASAT interceptors are much cheaper than satellites. Likewise, defending computer networks becomes harder and more expensive as the scale and sophistication of the attacker increase. The woes of the cyber defender are compounded by integrated global markets and supply chains for digital components and equipment-in which U.S. and state-affiliated Chinese corporations are leading competitors-increasing the potential for strategic degradation of network infrastructure and disruption of services. In general, strategic offense dominance gives each country an incentive to invest in offense, which in turn spurs the other to keep pace. Apart from offense dominance, the advance of technology has slashed the costs in lives and treasure of strategic attack, as capabilities have graduated from mass invasion to heavy bombing to nuclear weapons to ASAT and cyber war. If one ignores possible deaths resulting from disruption of public services, ASAT and cyber war might even be considered "nonviolent." As the number of expected casualties from strategic attack options drops, so could international opprobrium and the inhibitions of decisionmakers. Absent deterrence, thresholds for war in space and cyberspace could become perilously low as offenses improve.
  • Topic: Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, Communism, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: United States, China, Asia
  • Author: James Cockayne (ed.)
  • Publication Date: 07-2009
  • Content Type: Book
  • Institution: International Peace Institute
  • Abstract: In late 2008, seventeen states, including the US, UK, China, Iraq, Afghanistan, and others, endorsed the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (2008). This provides important guidance to states in regulating private military and security companies (PMSCs). However, there is a need to do more, to provide increased guidance to the industry and ensure standards are enforced.
  • Topic: Conflict Prevention, Security, Markets
  • Political Geography: Afghanistan, United States, China, Iraq