Search

Begin New Search Publication Year within 5 Years

16181. Coronavirus, Mining and Latin America: A Baseless “Race to the Bottom”

Author:
Carlos Monge
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Mining companies are asking governments to make consultation and environmental procedures more flexible to mitigate production risks and attract new investments. However, there is no real reason to slacken regulations in order to promote mining in Latin America. Conversely, the region should strengthen these standards to prepare for a possible new mining cycle fueled by the transition to clean energy. In the event of a new mining cycle, governments should safeguard against overreliance on commodity exports and the use of fossil fuels. Instead, governments and companies should explore ways in which the mining sector can contribute to economic diversifications and energy transitions. Demand and prices for minerals produced in the region have fallen as a result of the global recession. Logistical issues resultant from pandemic-related lockdowns have slowed internal production. Consequently, mining taxes and royalties will likely fall this year. Prices have not fallen enough to threaten the commercial feasibility of current projects, the global investment budget remains robust, and the region is attractive to mining investors. Furthermore, the global transition to clean and sustainable energies will most probably increase the demand and prices for the critical minerals (copper, silver, lithium and others) produced in the region.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Commodities, Mining, Coronavirus, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Latin America

16182. A Race to the Bottom and Back to the Top: Taxing Oil and Gas During and After the Pandemic

Author:
David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Colin Fleming
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Earlier this year as people around the world responded to the coronavirus pandemic, their demand for oil tumbled. At the same time, OPEC and Russia initially failed to agree to coordinate supply cuts. Consequently, the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil fell from $60 in December 2019 to $20 in April 2020. As of this publication, the price is $43. If the price stays low, and if oil executives expect the price to remain low, companies may lobby governments to reduce taxes and other costly regulations. Payments to governments are often larger than costs for a company, so there is pressure on governments to reduce taxes to keep projects viable. This briefing considers the following key questions: Where will the oil price go next? What is the impact on currently operating projects, undeveloped projects, and those that are yet to be discovered? How should governments respond in changing oil and gas taxes? Will governments try to “race to the bottom,” but then lose a race back to the top? Key messages: There’s no certainty over future prices. Some rise is likely in the next few years, even if an energy transition results in a structural decline in the oil price in the longer-term. Governments must consider this uncertainty and probable rise when taxing oil and gas. Tax breaks on most currently operating projects are likely a waste of public money. Some governments may be pressured into reducing tax on projects awaiting development. But they must identify which projects would become viable with lower taxes, and which do not need a tax break. If in doubt, governments should consider whether a project that needs a tax incentive really will provide value for the country. For most countries, relative to total oil and gas produced, the production from projects that could be delayed or cancelled is small. But not so for the “new producer” countries like Senegal and Guyana. Changing taxes to make a country more attractive has the most impact before companies have invested – e.g., in attracting investment in licensing rounds. But setting low taxes now could force a government to raise taxes later if prices rise again. If a tax break is unavoidable, governments could use a “sunset clause” to limit the duration of the tax break. Ideally, governments should set progressive tax regimes that respond to changes in profit. But as many taxing authorities struggle to measure profit, governments could set simpler tax regimes based on sales revenue or prices – but must prepare to change tax rates in the future, and be prepared for the repercussion for a government’s credibility with investors. Governments should disclose contract terms detailing tax changes, tax exemptions, incentives and estimated break-even prices of projects to help government auditors, local think tanks, and the public check and support tax policy decisions.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Tax Systems, Commodities, Coronavirus, and Revenue Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16183. What next for NATO? Views from the North-East Flank on Alliance Adaptation

Author:
Michal Baranowski, Linas Kojala, Toms Rostoks, Kalev Stoicescu, and Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO leaders have invited Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to present proposals at their next Summit for measures to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role. To support his reflection process, the Secretary General has appointed a group of ten experts. Only one of these represents the 14 of 30 Allies who have joined NATO since 1999. In this policy paper we set out issues, concerns and expectations about NATO’s future adaptation from the perspective of the three Baltic states and Poland, based on a series of interviews with several senior officials and members of the expert community in each of the four states. While not identical, the views of our interviewees were close. They broadly agreed that while NATO faces a multitude of threats, Russia is by far the most serious. In response, NATO should prioritise—and enhance—its core task of collective defence. However, they recognised, it is essential for NATO to maintain a balance between the security interests of all Allies. They support the 360-degree approach and are ready to back and participate in efforts to deal with threats from other regions too. NATO should also retain its core tasks of crisis management and cooperative security. The Covid-19 pandemic suggests that NATO should re-calibrate the crisis management task to better reflect the need for collective support to the civilian authorities in large-scale efforts to deal with crises on Alliance territory. Our interviewees were generally cautious about otherwise expanding NATO’s roles and responsibilities, arguing that the Alliance should consider where it can add value, while avoiding overreach. They saw, for example, only a modest role for NATO in dealing with the challenge from China. They were, however, supportive of the Alliance developing further its global network of partnerships, both with states such as Australia, Japan and South Korea, and with other international organisations, notably the EU. NATO should also continue its cooperative security efforts with a focus on states in the immediate neighbourhood. And while further NATO enlargement is unlikely at present, the door should certainly remain open. Interviewees in all four states expressed concerns about the tensions within the Alliance and the lack of US leadership. While these tensions persist, it is probably unwise to consider drafting a new strategic concept. Nonetheless, the internal challenges might be eased if the Allies are prepared to use NATO to a greater extent as forum for consultation on a wide range of security issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Poland and Baltic States

16184. Volunteers in Estonia’s Security Sector: Opportunities for Enhancing Societal Resilience

Author:
Ramon Loik
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This policy paper assesses the involvement of volunteers acting in the public interest under Estonian law in the development of key characteristics of a broad security concept and reflects the main ongoing discussion points for widening their potential for ensuring collective security and public safety.
Topic:
Security, National Security, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Estonia

16185. Stabilising the Sahel. The Role of International Military Operations

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The key question of this analysis is whether EU and/or NATO allies, including Estonia, would be willing and able to continue to support international efforts in Sahel (including military operations and missions – MINUSMA, EUTM and Barkhane), in particular following the Covid-19 pandemic. It is addressed to civilian and military decision makers and experts, especially in the countries that contribute to international military operations and missions in the Sahel.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

16186. Nothing New Under the Sun? Continuity and Change in Russian Policy Towards Ukraine

Author:
James Sherr
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The aims of this report are to explain Ukraine’s consolidation, resilience and determination to make its own decisions despite great asymmetries of power and Russia’s exploitation of its vulnerabilities and divisions; to describe why President Volodymyr Zelensky represents an opportunity as well as a challenge to Russia; and to set out necessary and realistic goals for the West.
Topic:
Security, History, Resilience, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

16187. Between the Chinese Dragon and American Eagle: 5G Development in the Baltic States

Author:
Maya Guzdar and Tomas Jermalavicius
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the course of 2018-20, development of Fifth Generation (5G) communication networks has been increasingly influenced by the considerations of national security and geopolitics. The largest provider of 5G equipment, the Chinese mobile telecom giant Huawei, has come under fire from the U.S., Czechia, Poland, and other nations in recent years for attempted espionage, theft of intellectual property and other nefarious activities; in the past month, UK decided to ban Huawei technology from its networks. All this comes into sharp focus as the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Beijing reaches new heights. However, China is one of the EU’s largest trading partners and has worked to establish its economic, political, and cultural influence in various Member States. The EU and NATO have both released standards for member states must use when gauging the security of potential 5G networks. Yet, the EU in particular has not enacted a blanket ban or sweeping restrictions on the Chinese 5G equipment providers, leaving the tradeoffs between national security, technological progress and cost-efficiency to individual states. Although the Baltic states are well-versed in dealing with cybersecurity challenges, their road to 5G development is going to be complex. Whole-of-society awareness, political diligence, technical competence, regional cooperation, and resilience to Beijing’s influence operations are needed in forging a clear path to 5G that is aligned with their key geopolitical interest—maintaining their close strategic alliance with the United States. This brief aims to explore the geopolitical factors at play in determining the Baltic states’ 5G policy and regulations, with a particular focus on the EU, U.S., and China’s influence. It also provides a short of overview of the state of current 5G networks and regulations in the Baltic states while identifying challenges that the region will face in the coming years.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Science and Technology, European Union, Cybersecurity, Resilience, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Baltic States

16188. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict

Author:
Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
Topic:
Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia

16189. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia

Author:
Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States

16190. Democracy, ‘Alternative Reality’ and Estonia’s Resilience

Author:
Dmitri Teperik
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The brief explores reasons why the concerns, grievances and perceptions of all vulnerable societal groups should receive adequate attention if further harm inflicted by fact-free and/or fact-twisting ‘alternative realities’ is to be averted. As some intergroup differences fall notably along the lines related to age, levels of educational attainment, overall welfare and life satisfaction, perceptions of inclusion, and geography, the pervasiveness of misconceptions and social myths as well as their impact on the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviour of citizens can be considered as reliable indicators of societal resilience in Estonia.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Democracy, Resilience, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Estonia and Baltic States