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151. Multifaceted Challenges: The political dimension of the physicians’ crises in the region

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Although the difficulties’ health personnel face, are quite similar to those of workers in other fields, the political dimensions of physicians ’crises in the region have increased remarkably. Medical doctors are kidnapped in some hotbeds of several Arab armed conflicts to provide treatment for some Militia members, in addition to their indirect involvement in military confrontations in Northeastern Syria through Turkey. Moreover, there is a gap between the medical syndicate and the political authorities regarding the actual number of COVID-19 cases, which was quite evident in Turkey. Medical doctors in some states of the region suffer from delayed payment of their salaries as a result of the decline in oil prices as well as the decline in the financial budgets of their countries. This leads to what is known as the ‘brain drain’, in addition to their contracting diseases such as the coronavirus due to their presence on the front lines confronting the epidemic with short medical supplies. The lives of medical doctors in some countries are endangered, as they get exposed to repeated attacks by community members due to the absence of adequate security measures. The crises of medical doctors in the region are by no means a recent phenomenon, but their features evolve according to different regional conditions and the emergence of transnational epidemics. The Middle East reflects a variety of crises that physicians are exposed to, particularly in hotbeds of tension.
Topic:
Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Syria

152. The Perfect Conflict The Russian strategy in Yemen

Author:
Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria was perceived by the world community as a demonstration of strength, unveiling Moscow and the Kremlin's readiness to defend its interests in the Middle East by military means. It is not surprising that the Russian military presence in Syria has generated a lot of speculation about the possibility of a repetition of the Syrian ‘scenario’ in other hot spots in the region, such as Yemen. We believe that such generalizations are inaccurate and simplify the multifaceted situation. First of all, the Syrian case is rather an exception for Moscow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist ideology, Russia became more pragmatic, its policy got rid of the prefix ‘pro’, and, in principle, it is trying to serve its own interests. It is not surprising that the rejection of messianic ideas forced Russia to reconsider its attitude to conflicts, including ones in the Middle East. The best example of Russian pragmatism is the Kremlin's policy on the Yemeni crisis since its beginning in 2011 until now.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Yemen, and Syria

153. A new momentum for EU-Turkey cooperation on migration

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief considers how to move forward with the (financial element of the) EU-Turkey statement agreed in 2016, under which the first tranche of 3 billion euros will end mid-2021. In order not to reverse the progress achieved and to continue the work on improving the resilience of the 4.1 million refugees in Turkey, there is an urgent need for the European Union and Turkey to agree on a new financial framework. One that builds on the current, generally successful framework – the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) – but which would divide the burden between Turkey and the EU more equally. Both blocs would, moreover, do well to look into the possibilities of extending the area of cooperation to Idlib. In that area, which is currently under Turkey’s military control, almost three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently lack adequate shelter and essentials, which could potentially lead to various displacement scenarios. Neither of those decisions will be easy and will require serious support from all EU member states, but the fact is Turkey remains essential in pursuing the EU’s core interest: preventing another refugee flow into Europe.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

154. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

155. Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist: The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules. Based on our analysis, we anticipate a scenario of ‘muddling through’ in which unconditional support from the US will continue at current levels, combined with an abiding US military presence. This will provide the YPG/ PYD with a security umbrella against both regime forces and Turkey, continue the status quo of the YPG/ PYD ruling northeast Syria in authoritarian fashion, make the civil war more ethno-sectarian in nature and prolong the conflict. While such a scenario is arguably more attractive for northeast Syria than a return of the regime, it is also unlikely to improve the area’s current underdevelopment. It will keep other external actors, like the EU, away and allow the PKK to continue to take its share of the area’s revenues. The primary audience of the report are Western opinion-, policy- and decision-makers engaged with the Syrian civil war and we hope it will help them to craft policies and initiate interventions that are feasible and appropriate to the situation in northeast Syria.
Topic:
Conflict, Syrian War, and YPG
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and European Union

156. Fruitless cherry picking?: EU engagement with the Syrian opposition (Etilaf)

Author:
Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the EU’s engagement and relationship with Syria’s main political opposition umbrella, the Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), which was founded in late 2012. It discusses the EU’s engagement strategies with the Etilaf and their impact on its development in the context of the Syrian conflict. The brief highlights that the EU did not substantiate the international legitimacy it granted the organisation early on during the conflict with policies that would have allowed it to expand its domestic legitimacy and capabilities. This policy contributed to developments in which the Etilaf rapidly lost its original potential. While the Etilaf today faces a range of structural and operational challenges that need to be addressed, the brief nevertheless recommends EU institutions and Member States to increase their support for the Etilaf and the Interim Government linked with it, if a number of conditions can be met. Such support will help maintain and develop these bodies into a viable centre of political opposition to the Assad regime. Practically speaking, this objective can be pursued by piloting conditional EU support to areas of northwestern and northern Syria that are nominally under the control of the Interim Government. It also requires building a partnership with Turkey to jointly support local Syrian administration(s) in the same areas.
Topic:
Politics, European Union, Conflict, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria

157. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

158. Sustained Counterterrorism Efforts Remain Key to Preventing Attacks in Jordan

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat. Last year’s abnormally low terrorist activity in Jordan could be interpreted as an indication that the threat of ISIS in the country has diminished significantly. Unfortunately, this is not the case; while there are several explanations for the low occurrence of terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2020, none of them point to a future in which ISIS does not continue to pose a threat to Jordanian security. On the contrary, the decrease in ISIS activity in Jordan last year was primarily a result of effective counterterrorism efforts, not the special circumstances of the pandemic or any other factor. Accordingly, Jordanian anti-terror institutions should not relax their guard. Rather, they should capitalize on their successes, expanding cooperation with their partners and enhancing their resources in combatting extremism. Jordanian security forces should be especially concerned with activities along their borders. There have been several recent international and UN reports that confirmed the rising activities of terrorist groups in countries that border Jordan. Iraq in particular has seen a recent rise in terrorist attacks, including two suicide bombings in Baghdad on January 21, 2021 that killed 32 people and injured 110 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. In turn, ISIS's mounting activities in Iraq have led to increased terrorist activity in the Badia al-Sham region and the Jordanian Syrian-Iraqi border triangle, where terrorist militants move in small, highly mobile groups. This increase in activity has prompted Jordanian security forces to strengthen their presence on the borders with Iraq and Syria. Following a Russian air campaign in the Badia region in late February, in which Russian planes launched at least 130 air strikes in one day against terrorist groups in the area, Jordan started to strengthen and tightened its security presence on the borders to prevent infiltration of ISIS elements into Jordan. Russian strikes were especially targeted at ISIS, which extends between the governorates of Homs and Deir al-Zour at the border with Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

159. In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria

Author:
Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Observers of the decade-long Syria war understand the indispensable role Tehran has played in ensuring the Assad regime’s survival. But they may be less familiar with its stunning breadth—or its historical roots. The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s, when the shah was still in power in Iran and then president Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the marginalized Alawite sect, sought religious legitimacy to lead his majority-Muslim country. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Lately, Tehran’s relationship with Damascus can be described as one of strategic dominance. In this deeply researched Policy Note, analyst Oula Alrifai, a former Syrian asylee, lays bare the extent of Iranian infiltration of Syrian religious and socioeconomic life. She details the spread of Twelver Shia ideology through seminaries, congregation halls, and academic institutions, while demonstrating Iran’s massive economic clout in Syria through initiatives such as the Marota City housing project. For Washington, only a determined effort to blunt Iranian influence can help deliver much-deserved peace for the Syrian people and enduring stability for the region.
Topic:
Religion, History, Authoritarianism, Ideology, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

160. Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. After a decade of civil war in Syria, the core antagonist remains the Assad regime, which in 2011 ruthlessly suppressed peaceful protestors and has since tortured and executed tens of thousands of detainees. The regime also bears responsibility for fostering the growth of the Islamic State, in part by releasing Syrian jihadists at the start of the war. Yet even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on Assad’s culpability, they also face a highly complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. In this Policy Note, expert Aaron Zelin details how the world’s counterterrorism and Great Power challenges converge in Syria, and how they must be addressed holistically. To this end, he proposes policies on the diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, economic, and military fronts that can calm the fears of U.S. allies such as Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, and perhaps inspire a more robust opposition, backed by a diverse set of local and diaspora activists.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Syrian War, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

161. Kidnapping and Extortion in Regime-Controlled Syria

Author:
Kenneth R. Rosen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Interviews reveal how Syrian officials are extorting their people. It is sometimes difficult to conceptualize what the dire situation of Syria’s economy means for those who live there. Some 100 tankers of fuel flow across Lebanon’s border into Syria, but the persistent lack of gas limits families' ability to heat their homes, which, in regime-held areas, already face large-scale electricity blackouts that last for hours. Likewise, hot water is a commodity afforded only to those with financial means and connections, and it is a luxury to take a hot shower in many parts of Syria. Meanwhile, on Facebook, a UNHCR tarp is for sale and women are selling their hair to feed their families—just two examples of the type of entrepreneurship needed to weather abounding hardships in a country that has known only war for the last decade. Over the summer, the Syrian pound collapsed as U.S. sanctions continue to deter international support for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has likewise furthered the collapse of the country’s economic infrastructure. As Syrians search for means of generating income, officials employed by the regime have gained access to funds through extortion. A common form of this extortion is the forced detention of individuals whose families must then bribe officials for either visitation rights or the release of their loved ones. A report from January underscores the scale of such extortion operations, which have remained a staple in regime tactics for years, though they are especially prevalent now given the country’s ongoing war and collapsed economy. The report—produced by the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison—surveyed more than 1,200 prisoners and families. Respondents said that bribes rose as high as nearly $3 million at one jail, though the range varied. Visitation or release fees were usually a few thousand dollars or less, but bribes would be increased for families living outside of Syria, averaging about $30,000. The report underscored how these payments—far greater than the average public sector annual salary of roughly $150 per month, according to Qassioun, a Syrian newspaper —could feed the country’s security apparatus and the regime through guards, judges, military personnel, and middlemen who facilitate the negotiations. “The Syrian Arab Army is the primary party that is responsible for these types of arrests,” says to the report.
Topic:
Crime, Economy, Syrian War, and Abductions
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

162. Ten Years of the Syrian Conflict: Time for the EU to Reconsider Its Strategy?

Author:
Amer Al-Hussein
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Syrian conflict entered its eleventh year on 15 March 2021, bringing this “living nightmare” back to our minds.[1] This ominous anniversary should remind the world of the importance of addressing the bleak reality inside Syria. While the new US administration provides a glimmer of hope for a return to diplomacy, multilateralism and an end to the mercantilism of the past years, Europe would be wrong to simply wait for the US lead on Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, European Union, Institutions, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Mediterranean

163. Narrating Memories of the Homeland Paris Based Syrian Artists Reflect on the War

Author:
Vanessa Badre, Lyne Sneige, Kate Seelye, Denis Quenelle, Nagham Hodaifa, and Bady Dalloul
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Middle East Institute's Arts and Culture Center and The Cultural Services of the French Embassy are pleased to host a conversation with leading Syrian contemporary artists, Bady Dalloul and Nagham Hodaifa. The Paris-based artists will reflect on the past decade of conflict and trauma, its impact and influence on their work and their relationship to their homeland. They will be joined by Lyne Sneige, the Director of the Arts & Culture Center at the Middle East Institute. Dalloul grew up in France, the son of prominent Syrian artists. His work confronts the notion of what is real and imagined while challenging the process of writing history. Hodaifa, who left Syria in 2005 to pursue her studies, explores the human condition through the representation of the body. Both artists are in the current MEI Art Gallery exhibit In This Moonless Black Night: Syrian Art After the Uprising, featuring leading contemporary Syrian artists chronicling the hope, trauma, and pain of the past decade through their practice. The artists will be in conversation with Vanessa Badré, art historian, lawyer, and faculty fellow at American University.
Topic:
Arts, Culture, Conflict, Trauma, Syrian War, and Memory
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, France, and Syria

164. An Uncertain Future: Prospects for ISIS Detainees in Syria and Iraq

Author:
Charles Lister, Vera Mironova, Eric Oehlerich, Mick Mulroy, and Sara Kayyali
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Two years after the territorial defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, tens of thousands of fighters and associated civilians remain in various forms of detention, with little sign of any meaningful solution to their status. Until now, few Western governments have proven willing to repatriate their citizens, choosing instead to leave them in the region, where security is weak and humanitarian conditions are dire. Multilateral efforts to determine the prospects for localized judicial mechanisms have failed, leaving behind an unsustainable crisis that threatens long-term security. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel of experts in this timely and important discussion.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Prisons/Penal Systems, Citizenship, Islamic State, and Foreign Fighters
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

165. Ten Years After: Syrian Artists Reflect on the Anniversary of the Syrian Uprising

Author:
Lyne Sneige, Lara Haddad, Maymanah Farhat, and Kevork Mourad
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Marking the launch of the MEI Art Gallery exhibit, In This Moonless Black Night: Syrian Art After the Uprising, MEI is pleased to host a conversation exploring how Syrian artists in exile have addressed the hope, trauma and displacement of the past decade through their art. Among the 14 participating artists, US-based artists Lara Haddad, Essma Imady and Kevork Mourad, as well as curator and writer Maymanah Farhat, will reflect on their artistic practice and the personal experiences that influenced their work over the past 10 years. They'll also examine how the exhibit's diverse imagery and media helps shape our understanding of the magnitude and complexity of the past decade with beauty, grace and humanity. Lyne Sneige, director of MEI's Arts and Culture Center, will moderate the discussion followed by Q&A .
Topic:
Arts, Culture, Media, Syrian War, and Memory
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

166. Turkey and Iran: Parallel Islam imperialist ambitions for the Middle East

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Neither Ankara nor Tehran want a strong Iraq, or a strong Syria. On the contrary, the fragmentation of these countries suits both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Regional Cooperation, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

167. The Israel-Russia-Syria deal: Cost, beneficiaries and future deals

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Israel and Syria concluded a deal on the return of an Israeli woman from Syria, questions arise regarding the cost and what the future of such transactions with Russian mediation should be.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Hegemony, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

168. Time to Update Israeli Policy Toward Syria

Author:
Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

169. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:
Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

170. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:
Haytham Manna
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

171. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

172. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

173. Supporting Syrian Refugees amidst Lebanon’s Crises

Author:
Will Todman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Lebanon is in freefall amid numerous crises. The currency has collapsed, food prices have quadrupled in a year, and Covid-19 cases continue to rise after one of the strictest lockdowns in the world. More than half of Lebanese households now live below the poverty line and the government will soon be forced to end subsidies on basic goods. The country is approaching a national humanitarian emergency and widespread food insecurity. Syrian refugees are especially vulnerable because the Lebanese government has curtailed their rights and restricted international support for them. More than 90 percent of Syrians in Lebanon now live in extreme poverty. However, the prospect of any imminent, voluntary return of large numbers of refugees to Syria remains distant. Numerous surveys with refugees confirm that they do not feel able to return to Syria, despite worsening conditions in Lebanon. Lebanese are increasingly in need of economic support and feel ignored by the government and aid organisations. In this context, Lebanese leaders’ attempts to scapegoat refugees are gaining traction. Scapegoating refugees not only allows the political class to delay critical reforms but has also resulted in increasing inter-communal violence. As Lebanon’s freefall continues, the risk of more widespread violence increases. Donors face a dilemma in how best to respond to the crises. The Lebanese political elite have steadfastly refused to implement necessary economic reforms to avoid collapse and have proved to be unsuitable partners for aid operations. To circumvent the government, donors have increased their support to local leaders in the hope that it can help create a more permissive environment for refugees with channelled support through local NGOs. Humanitarians are now trying to meet the needs of vulnerable Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees, and migrant workers in different humanitarian responses. Aid coordination is becoming a gargantuan task. Shifting to a country-wide or “Whole of Lebanon” response would better streamline the humanitarian response and ensure refugees and vulnerable Lebanese are treated equitably. Donors have little appetite for such an approach, but it could soon be the only viable option. Interviews with international donors revealed a viewpoint that the United States is not capitalising on its potential influence on the refugee file in Lebanon. To maximise the United States’ potential to improve conditions for vulnerable Lebanese and Syrians, it must increase its participation in donor discussions in Beirut and devote more political capital to the issue. The United States and other donors should use this political capital to take advantage of new openings to build the foundations of sustainable development for all. The changing context has created a few, though limited, opportunities to push for programs that are primarily framed as aiding Lebanese yet include refugees.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Refugees, NGOs, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

174. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine

Author:
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

175. Post-Election Iran and Syria: Continuity or Change?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On June 18, conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election to succeed moderate President Hassan Rouhani. For many, his victory came amid public dissatisfaction with the dire economic and political situation, along with widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates, which significantly reduced voter turnout. Traditionally, lower turnout in Iranian elections means the victory of conservative or so-called ‘hardline’ figures and so Raisi’s victory was in many ways following a theme. However, even though the election and its outcome indicate a significant shift in Iran’s domestic politics toward more authoritarianism, its impacts on foreign policy, including Iran’s strategy in Syria, will be less tangible. Over the past several years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has almost completely dominated Iran’s regional policy. At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei openly seeks to limit the role of the president in foreign policy. Consequently, this means that Iran’s policy in Syria in the post-election period will be more about continuity than about change.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

176. Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022

Author:
Serhat Erkmen, Nicholas Heras, and Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Syria is a geographic entity divided into three main zones of control, each ruled by local actors with the strong and seemingly indefinite support of powerful foreign actors. These three zones are one zone in western, central, and eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian government, a second zone in northwest and northern Syria along the Syrian-Turkish border controlled by the Syrian opposition and supported by Turkey and a third zone in northeast Syria controlled by the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) and its military the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which is supported by the United States and several of its allies that are part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The common perception by observers of the Syrian conflict is that it is frozen; that Syria will be indefinitely divided into these different territorial zones of control. This assumption obscures the fact though that a significant amount of fluidity on the ground within Syria's three main zones of control is possible. Each of these zones has its own unique characteristics and local customs that must be understood to draw broader assessments on how the wider Syrian conflict might be resolved one day.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

177. The Political Economy of Syria’s Physical Fragmentation and Dependence

Author:
Samir Aita
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
It is difficult to imagine how the Syrian conflict could be resolved through a political process alone that does not directly involve the combating forces in Syria – namely the Syrian army and its associated militias linked to the power system in Damascus, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their Democratic Union Party (PYD) power system, as well as the “opposition” factions and their respective backers, i.e. Iran and Russia, the USA and Turkey. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine such a solution without addressing the political economy that has emerged and that now underpins these forces’ power, the warlords’ chaos-inducing advantages gained from the country’s physical fragmentation, the hidden or open bargains between these warlords and other powers, and the deterioration of Syrians’ living conditions to unbearable levels. The current situation, where the country’s physical fragmentation has reached relative stability, could persist for a long time at the people’s expense. However, several factors could reignite the conflict: growing competition over resources and rent-seeking activities, even within each area of influence; the ongoing decline in much-needed international aid; and the further deterioration of the situation expected in Lebanon and its consequences for Syria.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Politics, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

178. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

179. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

180. The Evolution of the Syrian Humanitarian NGOs and External Challenges

Author:
Mazen Alhousseiny and Emrah Atar
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Syrian humanitarian sector was limited to two types of NGOs till the Syrian conflict started; traditional charities composing of religious or ethnic focus NGOs, and the Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs) that were affiliated by governmental figures. They both failed to respond to the needs of civilians in non-governmental controlled areas. This has forced Syrians with limited or no previous experience in this sector to act immediately and independently. However, after the crisis erupted, the commitment to their case, availability of funds, and hospitality from the neighbouring countries evolved them very quickly to become the primarily organised responders in the non-governmental controlled territories. Those newly formed humanitarian groups tried to link humanitarian interventions with early recovery activities without losing the scope of being a voice advocating for the human rights of the innocents. The Syrian Humanitarian NGOs based in Turkey were delivering their assistance to the vulnerable communities inside Syria further than where they physically reach without even evaluating the risks that might affect their lives or their beloved families. In some cases, they were the only humanitarian actors in besieged areas as Rural Damascus or Eastern Aleppo and hard to reach locations as Rural Homs or Northern Hama. Those security threats are now less impactful on their existence compared with the political, economic, social, technological, legal and environmental external challenges that they are facing and can highly affect their presence. The external challenges that they are witnessing that might affect not only the way they are operating but their sustainability as well. Those external challenges were focusing on political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environmental to form the well-known PESTLE analysis that categorises these external threats and risks. As new Syrian NGOs have spread within countries nearby as well as in the diaspora, this article will only focus on those that were based mainly in Turkey due to several reasons explained in the article.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Conflict, NGOs, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria