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1. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

2. Arms-production Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Measuring Self-reliance

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Xiao Liang, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Ming Sun
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance. This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam. Overall, this report contributes to knowledge and debates on armament trends and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where tensions among neighbours are rising, it further contributes to transparency with regard to levels of self-reliance in domestic arms production, allowing for an independent assessment of the region’s respective arms industries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

3. Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change

Author:
Nicola Leveringhaus
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Dating back to the first test in 1964, the Chinese nuclear force modernization process is motivated by other nuclear powers’ modernization across the years, mostly from the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by domestic factors such as economic debates and tensions in the scientific community. China Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change Download 0.63 Mo At first, technical difficulties and a greater investment in conventional forces prevented the development of a ‘lean and effective arsenal’. However, the end of the Cold War and better economic conditions allowed China to improve its weapons toward a greater duality and mobility, thus reflecting the first tensions between the Chinese no-first-use doctrine and its growing technical capabilities and ambitions. Nowadays, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is bigger than ever, ranking third in size amongst nuclear global powers and with an estimated 1,000 warheads in 2030. The weapons’ efficiency is also reportedly higher, aiming at a fully functioning triad. Furthermore, doctrinal debates are still ongoing, with potential consequences on arms control and risk management.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

4. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

6. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

7. Exploring post-INF arms control in the Asia-Pacific: China’s role in the challenges ahead

Author:
Bates Gill
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
With the demise of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, much attention has focused on the Asia-Pacific as the locus for a new missile-fuelled arms competition, especially between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Much speculation has also centred on the prospects of avoiding the most dangerous elements of that competition through arms control or other risk-reduction measures. There are good reasons for these concerns. Since the 1990s China has invested enormous resources in the development and deployment of short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Today China fields one of the world’s largest and most diverse arrays of ballistic-missile systems, including both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. Critically, these missile systems have become an increasingly central feature in the strategic and operational thinking of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and will likely remain so for the decades ahead. At present, Beijing sees little to no value in reductions to these systems. On the contrary, they are valuable for the very reasons Washington and other regional capitals would like to see them limited: they pose a credible deterrent and warfighting threat in and around China’s periphery, not only against the United States, but also against US allies and others in the region such as India. For the United States, China’s steady missile build-up has been a long-standing concern. When the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the INF – citing Russia’s non-compliance with the treaty – it also cited China’s deployment of intermediate-range missile systems and their threats to US interests in the Asia-Pacific as an ancillary reason for quitting the agreement. Since 2019, the United States has initiated weapons-development programmes with an eye to deploying its own suite of intermediate missiles to the region in order to range Chinese targets, in addition to other offensive and defensive systems to counter Chinese missile threats. Coming in the larger context of deteriorating diplomatic, security and economic relations between Beijing and Washington, these developments are only a small part of an intensifying competition between the two powers.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Hegemony, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Defence diplomatic relations between Poland and China and how they can be improved

Author:
Lech Drab
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The main purpose of the article is to examine diplomatic relations between China (official name: the People’s Republic of China) and Poland with a special focus on defence. It also gives an overall assessment of the relations between the armed forces of the two countries and evaluates what has been achieved so far and possible involvements that the countries (especially Poland) should take. A comparative analysis and a historical approach were used whilst investigating the facts. Qualitative research, including participant observation, archival resources, analysis and selection of studies, reports and expertise were the methods employed for collecting research material. Comparative studies were used to analyse other countries’ relations with China to help come to a conclusion. Based on the research, the author recommends an intensification of defence diplomacy between Poland and China which would bring a number of defence and economic benefit to both Warsaw and Beijing. The latest changes in the global balance of power, especially economic, political and military, should be taken into account in the process of developing and implementing a comprehensive and long-term strategic programme in the field of defence diplomacy between Poland and China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

9. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

10. China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Although much has been said about the fusion of China’s civilian and military sectors, no detailed, unclassified analysis has been done of how Beijing’s “peaceful” nuclear efforts might be exploited to make more nuclear warheads. Even the U.S. Department of Energy’s own explanations of the export restrictions it imposed on “advanced” nuclear exports to China failed to discuss this. This volume is dedicated to clarifying just what the connection could be. Much of it focuses on China’s advanced fast breeder reactor program and its related plutonium recycling efforts. As explained in this volume’s first chapter, “How Many Nuclear Warheads China Might Acquire by 2030,” the least burdensome way for China to achieve nuclear weapons parity with the United States is simply to use the weaponsgrade plutonium that its planned “peaceful” fast breeder reactor and reprocessing programs will produce to make primaries for the two-stage thermonuclear weapons designs they already have perfected. By exploiting this weapons plutonium and the highly enriched uranium and tritium that China can easily access or make, Beijing by 2030 could conservatively assemble an arsenal of 1,270 warheads (nearly as many as the US currently has deployed on its intercontinental missiles).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
United States and China

11. Strategic Annual Report 2020

Author:
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The year 2020 was characterized by the intensification of US-China confrontation and strategic competition, which had been pointed out in the Strategic Annual Report 2019, in all areas from military and security affairs as well as dominance in advanced technologies and supply chains to narratives on coronavirus responses. Amid this confrontation, the rules-based international order faced even more severe challenges; the multilateral framework established after World War II with the United Nations at its core lost its US leadership and fell into serious dysfunction. While the international community is struggling to cope with the rapidly expanding outbreak of the novel coronavirus, China has been moving to expand its influence through increasingly authoritarian and assertive domestic and international policies on the rule of law and territorial issues, as well as through economic initiatives such as the existing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and its responses to the pandemic. The confrontation with the United States is becoming more and more pronounced, and the Indo-Pacific region is turning itself into divided and contested oceans. In this transforming strategic environment, expressions of support for the vision of a rulesbased “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that Japan has been promoting for the past several years, or announcements of similar visions have followed one after the other. The year 2020 also saw significant strengthening of the cooperative framework among four countries – Japan, the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD) – together with the enhancement of bilateral cooperation between countries in this group. At the same time, progress was also made in a regional cooperation framework that includes China with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement in East Asia. The Strategic Annual Report 2020 looks back at major international developments since last year’s Report through the end of 2020, focusing on the transformation of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the response of the international community.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, COVID-19, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Middle East, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach

Author:
James M. Acton, Thomas Macdonald, and Pranay Vaddi
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The governments of China, Russia, and the United States all express support for arms control. They disagree profoundly, however, about its purposes and preconditions. To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

13. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

14. South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Petr Topychkanov and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 research interviews conducted in 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. The publication also builds on the findings from a virtual workshop that SIPRI hosted on 8 and 9 December 2020 on ‘Nuclear challenges in South Asia: Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the USA’. These discussions revealed a variety of interlocking insights on such issues as no first use, lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement and emerging technologies that are shaping strategic stability. The publication consists of five country-focused sections that explore nuclear postures, strategic technologies and escalatory risks, as well as conclusions that offer building blocks for the next steps on engagement. This report was prepared in the framework of the SIPRI project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia, generously supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

15. Not In The Cards: U.S.-China Arms Control In The Era of MultiPolar Competition

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe and Dilan Ezgi Koc
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
The distribution of power at the international level and the intensity of the security rivalry can explain the trajectory of arms control between China and the United States. Washington and Beijing were able to work together during the second half of the Cold War and for much of unipolarity because the system was bipolar and the security competition was mild or non-existent. The advent of multipolarity and the ensuing intense security competition put an end to Sino-American cooperation on arms control. The current circumstances are not conducive to a resumption of exchanges.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks

Author:
Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
RESEARCH & REPORTS The debate concerning hypersonic weapons has gained increased attention in recent years as the United States has poured billions of dollars—and plans to pour billions more—into accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons and as China and Russia make headway in developing and deploying their own such weapons. The Pentagon is funding no less than eight prototype hypersonic weapons programs with the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least some of those by 2022. The U.S. rush to field hypersonic weapons merits a more critical examination by the Biden administration and Congress given the many unanswered questions about their rationale, technical viability, cost-effectiveness, and escalatory risks. It is past time for Congress to demand these answers before the military begins fielding the weapons in great numbers. This new report outlines the scope of the unanswered questions about the case for hypersonic weapons, details the underappreciated risks to stability posed by the weapons, assesses the viability of arms control as a tool to reduce these risks, and suggests recommended action items for Congress to better its understanding about the Pentagon’s plans for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in weapons capabilities, and mitigate stability risks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

17. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

18. Is It a Nuke?: Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Ambiguity about whether a weapon is nuclear-armed prior to its launch is an underappreciated, serious, and growing danger. Rising geopolitical tensions and the decay of arms control are exacerbating the risk that such pre-launch warhead ambiguity could lead to nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Recent developments in technology—as well as potential future advances, such as the development of ambiguous intercontinental missiles—further add to the danger. A first step toward reducing these risks is to enhance awareness among decisionmakers of the causes and potential consequences of ambiguity. Unilateral and cooperative risk-mitigation measures could further reduce the danger of escalation, including in conflicts between the United States and Russia or the United States and China.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

19. The Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump administration is sceptical about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START, NST), which is to expire in 2021. It wants to sign a new deal with Russia and China covering all kinds of nuclear weapons. It will not be possible, however, to negotiate such a complex agreement before NST expires. In effect, there is a growing risk of a collapse of U.S.-Russia strategic arms control, which would negatively affect NATO as well: it would deepen both the divisions over the future of deterrence policy within the Alliance and the differences in the U.S. Congress on the modernisation of America’s nuclear forces.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, United States of America, and North America

20. On the Value of Nuclear Dialogue with China

Author:
David Santoro and Robert Gromoll
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This material is based on research sponsored by DTRA and managed by the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), and Pacific Forum International under agreement number FA7000-19-2- 0012. The US Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The opinions, findings, views, conclusions or recommendations contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the USAFA, DTRA, or the US Government. This paper was written by Dr. David Santoro, Vice President and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Pacific Forum, and Dr. Robert Gromoll, former Director of the Office of Regional Affairs at the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Dr. Gromoll is now retired. Both Drs. Santoro and Gromoll participated in numerous dialogue rounds, and Dr. Santoro was a co-organizer. The paper is based primarily on the contents of the dialogue’s written reports, several of which were authored or co-authored by Dr. Santoro. By and large, the paper draws directly from these reports and reviews how the topics addressed in the dialogue were approached and discussed by the US and Chinese sides over time. (A list of these reports is included at the end of the paper; some have been published, others have not.) The paper is also based on the authors’ broader experience in participating in the Track-1.5 dialogue; the conversations they have had with US and Chinese participants on these issues over the years, both during the dialogue and on the margins; and their own personal research. This paper represents the views of the authors and not those of Pacific Forum or the US State Department.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
United States and China

21. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Global Focus

22. Mapping the International Presence of the World’s Largest Arms Companies

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Alexandra Marksteiner, Diego Lopes da Silva, Nan Tian, Alexandra Kuimova, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Arms companies have a presence that reaches far beyond the countries in which they are headquartered. This is the result of the international­ization of the arms industry. This paper uses a new data set to examine the results of this internationalization in terms of the international presence of major arms companies. It presents a mapping comprising 400 foreign entities linked to the world’s largest arms companies. The mapping shows that the international presence of major arms companies continues to be influenced by geopolitical divisions and ties, and generally mirrors the geographical locations of the world’s biggest arms import markets. It also reveals that the international presence of major Chinese arms companies and the one Russian company included in the study remains limited. Appendix A lists the 25 largest arms-producing and military services companies in the world, ranked by their arms sales in 2019.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Spending, and Manufacturing
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

23. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and Asia’s major power defiance

Author:
Marc Finaud and Gaurav Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Despite worldwide support of 130 states, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has failed to attract membership from countries in Asia, one of the largest arms importing regions. One set of explanations for this reluctance to join an international regime of conventional arms trade regulation is related to the fear of restrictions on the imports of weapons seen as necessary in a context of protracted conflicts and rising tensions among key states in Asia. Another argument is the interpretation of the ATT as not directly prohibiting arms transfers to non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. Another reason is the efforts of some Asian states to develop their own arms industry and exports to reduce dependency on external suppliers and project influence in the region. One of the main criticisms from the Asian states about the ATT relates to the criteria of export risk assessment (Article 7), which, in their view, gives undue advantages to exporting countries. It would be desirable to promote some dialogue between State Parties and Asian non-parties and signatories to assess the benefits from and the difficulties in implementing the Treaty and address the objections of nonparties. Amending the Treaty will be easier if Asian countries accede to it.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, Indonesia, India, Asia, and Southeast Asia

24. Tehran Meeting on JCPOA

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
On 23-24 June 2019 a delegation from Pugwash travelled to Iran to participate in a specially-arranged two-day meeting organized together with the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) in Tehran. The central focus of the discussions was the current status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more than one year after the United States withdrew from implementing it, and the ensuing program of ever-tightening sanctions imposed by the US on Iran that has dramatically increased tension in the Middle East. The meeting also put this into context by looking at the regional situation of arms control, as well as Iran’s relations with China, Russia, the EU, and its neighbours including Afghanistan.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

26. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:
Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

27. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China