Search

You searched for: Political Geography China Remove constraint Political Geography: China Publication Year within 10 Years Remove constraint Publication Year: within 10 Years Journal Fletcher Security Review Remove constraint Journal: Fletcher Security Review Topic Bilateral Relations Remove constraint Topic: Bilateral Relations
Number of results to display per page

Search Results

  • Author: Prakash Menon
  • Publication Date: 07-2019
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Fletcher Security Review
  • Institution: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  • Abstract: Technology often seduces potential adversaries through a promise of relief from security threats only to deceive through the inevitable action-reaction cycle. In the universe of security, technology is contestable both by technology itself and by doctrinal prescriptions and operational countermeasures. The advantage provided by new technology is mostly ephemeral in that provides the momentum for an endless cycle that is best described as chasing one’s own tail. Only political intervention through mutual understanding, doctrinal prudence, and regulating the search for operational supremacy holds potential to escape the stranglehold of the action-reaction cycle. The elusive search for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is a prime example. This paper seeks to interrogate the role of the technology-security dynamics in the context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship. ​ The context of the Sino-Indian nuclear weapon relationship is clouded by the enhancing reach of India’s missiles[1], the evolving Chinese reaction to U.S. nuclear modernization accompanied by a shift in nuclear posture, and a shared belief in the role of nuclear weapons that is signified by No First Use (NFU) doctrine. The latter point represents political intervention while the two former signify the action-reaction cycle which is primarily a product of technology. However, both China and India must contend with nuclear powers that espouse First Use. China in dealing with the United States and Russia who are quantitatively superior nuclear powers, while India deals with Pakistan whose claims of quantitative superiority are contested. ​ In technological terms, the rise of China and the U.S. reaction resulting in contemporary geopolitical flux at the global level has impacted the evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal. The most prominent illustration of this is China’s reaction to the United States’ withdrawal from the Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. Earlier China had eschewed development of BMD, but the United States’ quest to create BMD has caused China to attempt to develop its own BMD system as well as systems that can overcome BMD like multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and Hyper Glide Vehicles (HGVs). Similarly, India has reacted to developments in China and Pakistan by launching an indigenous BMD development program...
  • Topic: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Weapons
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, China, South Asia, India, Asia
  • Author: Rodelio Cruz Manacsa
  • Publication Date: 07-2017
  • Content Type: Journal Article
  • Journal: Fletcher Security Review
  • Institution: The Fletcher School, Tufts University
  • Abstract: The South China Sea is the locus of a tense political struggle for territorial control between an increasingly aggressive regional power and a host of small states and their own respective sets of allies. In such a scenario, we can expect that China, the hegemonic state, will attempt to steer the discussions towards bilateral negotiations since its power projection and military capabilities tend to carry greater leverage against weaker states when talks are conducted on a one-on-one basis. In an international system characterized by the absence of a global government, power bends the arc of contention towards the hegemon. On the other hand, small states in the region like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei have a plethora of strategies and tactics for dealing with regional powers.[1] Their menu of options ranges from direct military balancing on one end and appeasing and bandwagoning on the other.[2], [3] This analysis will focus on the strategy that was chosen by the Philippines against China, which will be characterized as “lawfare.” The paper will proceed as follows: First, it will seek to define the concept of “lawfare” as a strategy and then map out the conditions under which it can succeed and fail. Second, it will apply the framework that was developed in the initial section to the conflict between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. Finally, the consequences of lawfare use will be assessed, with the end goal of understanding how the Philippines’ victory in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) inexplicably led to reticence and bandwagoning, a case of historic success morphing into strategic retreat...
  • Topic: Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Law, Negotiation, Oceans and Seas
  • Political Geography: China, Vietnam, Philippines, South China, Brunei