Author: / Political Geography: Asia / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Military Strategy

1. Pakistan Security Report 2022

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. The number of terrorist attacks in the country also continued to rise for the second consecutive year. A total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings –claimed in all 419 lives and injured another 734 people. A 25 percent increase has been recorded in fatalities in the outgoing year as compared with 2021. Pak Institute for Peace Studies revealed these statistics in its annual “Pakistan Security Report 2022”. The report further noted that the proscribed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was becoming a major irritant in Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban government in Kabul as the militant group remained one of the major actors of violence in Pakistan in the year 2022. Other critical actors of violence in 2022 were Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Over 60 percent of total terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in the year were perpetrated by these three militant groups. Similarly, about 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and Asia

2. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:: C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:: China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

4. The Collapse of One China

Author:: Ivan Kanapathy
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

6. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:: Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

7. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. A Green Wave?

Author:: Jessica Drun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

9. “Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China

Author:: Jude Blanchette and Gerard Dipippo
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions. When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: An unofficial ceasefire has kept Rakhine State quiet compared to much of Myanmar following the 2021 coup. But friction is building between the military and ethnic Rakhine fighters. The parties should strike a formal deal to avert a return to war.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia and Myanmar

11. Bringing Russia Back in From the Cold

Author:: Nikolas Gvosdev and Damjan. Krnjevic Miskovic
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Our reasoning is straightforward: for better or worse, Ukraine will never be as important to the West as it is to Russia—and this would be true even if Ukraine was the only item on their respective stra- tegic agendas. But this last is very far from being the case today—cer- tainly for the United States, whose leadership of the West has again been reaffirmed thanks to the conflict over Ukraine. To main- tain and perhaps even strengthen that leadership against China—a country that Biden defines as being in “competition [with the United States] to win the twenty-first cen- tury”—America stands to benefit greatly from bringing Russia back in from the cold.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations in the Wake of the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Agil Rustamzade and Anar Valiyev
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The Second Karabakh War was more than a war between two belligerents; essentially, it represented a war between two strategic paradigms: one belonging to the twenty‑first century and the other a relic of twentieth‑century military thinking. Azerbaijan’s achievement of air supremacy with the help of drones was not only one of the crucial factors that decided the outcome of that particular war; it will almost certainly contribute to the further development of the military art in armed conflicts of various scopes across various theaters in the time ahead. At the same time, referring to this war as a “drone war” does not reflect reality. In this, as in much else, impressionable journalists got it wrong: this could be a proper designation only if the drones had fought also on the ground instead of soldiers. Certainly, the use of drones was decisive; but the laurels of victory in this war do not belong solely to this contingent of the Azerbaijani military: the mobile groups of special forces were also decisive. Each played a critical part in the country’s military achievement. We begin with an examination of the area of hostilities and the respective dispositions of the parties to the conflict before getting into a discussion about some relevant aspects of Operation Iron Fist—the official designation used by Azerbaijan for the Second Karabakh War. We conclude with remarks of a more geopolitical nature.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

13. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

14. China’s Antarctic Ambitions – and Their Implications for Australia

Author:: Yun Jiang
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In a new special report AIIA China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang argues that popular Australian concerns around the Antarctic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including possible territorial claims, militarisation, and mining, are overstated.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Conflict, Mining, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Australia

15. Ukraine and China: Russian Invasion and After

Author:: Vivienne Bath, Rowan Callick, Raffaello Pantucci, Bing Ling, and Jingdong Yuan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:: This Understanding China Brief results from a roundtable discussion organized by the China Studies Centre and the Centre for Asia and Pacific Law of Sydney University on 10 March 2022 to examine the legal, political, economic, and international relations issues surrounding China arising from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

16. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

17. The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations: The Restructuring of the Middle East Regional Security

Author:: Devrim Sahin and Ahmet Sözen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: This paper proposes a discussion of its core theoretical argument that the international order is more complex than the theories generated by traditionalist state-centric approaches and critical approaches, including the regional security complex approach. The complexity approach highlights the sensitive dependency of complex systems on the nonlinear feedback loops and dynamic interactions by which the longer term reactions to the behavior of actors could set off actions-reaction spirals. This path dependency is evident in the erosion of U.S.-Turkey relations which is a cause and a consequence of the realignment in the international system and the Middle East regional system.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:: Galia Lavi
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

19. Three Reasons Why CHIPS-plus is a Big Win for US National Security

Author:: Tom Klein
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: On August 9th, 2022, President Biden signed vital bipartisan legislation to compete with China. H.R. 4346, called the CHIPS and Science Act or “CHIPS-plus,” would pave the way for nearly $280 billion in incentives to boost US-based chip manufacturing, scientific research, technology standards setting, and STEM education. These initiatives directly protect our immediate security vulnerabilities in the US military and support our long-term national security competition with China by promoting democratic norms and spurring critical defense innovations.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and CHIPS
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. Rising Anti-China Sentiment in South Korea Offers Opportunities To Strengthen US-ROK Relations

Author:: Haneul Lee, Alan Yu, and Tobias Harris
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:: The Yoon administration’s posture toward China has important implications for the U.S.-ROK alliance and America’s strategic approach in the region
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

21. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:: Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

22. A US failure in Ukraine Crisis could lead to a conflagration in Middle East, Asia

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: China could learn that US determination is melting away, and its threats can be ignored. An attack on Taiwan could follow.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Japan’s Expanded Regional Security Role: The Challenge of China

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Japan’s steady build-up of its substantial military power is based on a realistic view of meeting current security challenges, especially those presented by China.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Japan, China, and Asia

24. Türkiye and the Russia-Ukraine War: Impact on the West, Central Asia, and the Caucasus

Author:: Matthew Bryza
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: During a recent webinar, I was asked to address the following question: what does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine mean for Türkiye’s approach to the Caucasus and Central Asia? At first, the question struck me as odd. Having worked on these issues since the late 1990s and now living in Istanbul, it seemed obvious to me that Türkiye’s goals in these regions have been enduring since the end of the Cold War and were not changing because of Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine. These goals, I said, were and remain to: secure westward exports of oil and natural gas produced in the Caspian Basin; promote stability in the South Caucasus; and strengthen Türkiye’s business and cultural ties with the Turkic populations of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Türkiye’s approach toward Russia in this context also remains what it has been since the Ottoman centuries: cooperate where possible but confront where necessary. Reflecting momentarily on this question, however, I realized how different Ankara’s goals appear from the perspectives of Washington, Paris, and Athens. In these and other NATO capitals, Turkish foreign policy seems to have shifted from its pursuit of “zero problems with neighbors” during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to one of “zero neighbors without problems.” Türkiye is thus viewed within the Atlantic Alliance as a belligerent outlier, bent on violating international law to pursue the extraction of Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons, enabling Azerbaijan to use military force during the Second Karabakh War, and aligning in Syria more with Russia than with its own treaty allies.
Topic:: Security, War, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe and Asia

25. How the Conflict Over Ukraine Affects Security in the South Caucasus

Author:: Nargiz Gafarova
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Against the background of the present stage of the conflict over Ukraine, the South Caucasus is experiencing perturbation. Three examples rise immediately to mind: elements of the 10 November 2020 tripartite between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia that ended the Second Karabakh War statement (and the arrangements that have derived from it) are being suboptimally implemented; the leaders of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia continue to hold out the possibility to conduct a referendum on “unification” with Russia; and the uncertain outcome of the talks in Vienna to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Such and similar examples have led all three South Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) to pursue variants of a policy some call “neutrality” and others “hedging” between the parties to the conflict over Ukraine. Located at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Greater Middle East—and thus constituting the western part of the Silk Road region, as defined by the Editorial Statement of Baku Dialogues—the South Caucasus is one of the most important and, at the same time, one of the most potentially explosive areas bordering the West. Over the past several decades, developments within all three South Caucasus states have contributed to a general sense of insecurity within the region. These include, most obviously, ethno‑political conflicts, civil wars, and color revolutions; the lackluster development of Western‑style governance institutions; and the widely‑held perception of ongoing high levels of corruption. Even the potentially positive strategic consequences of the outcome of the Second Karabakh War—namely, the prospect for the normalization of two sets of bilateral relationships (Armenia‑Azerbaijan and Armenia‑Türkiye) and the unblocking of all economic and transport connections in the region—have been overshadowed by the ongoing restructuring of world order, manifested by the increase of geopolitical volatility and ambiguity due to the major escalation of the conflict over Ukraine whose present phase began on 24 February 2022. The effects of the Western‑led sanctions and export restrictions regime against Russia have spilled over into the South Caucasus— notwithstanding the fact that none of the region’s states have formally aligned themselves with them. This essay provides an overview of the reverberations of the conflict over Ukraine towards the South Caucasus, with a focus on its impact on the region’s political, economic, and security environment.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: Europe, Caucasus, and Asia

26. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:: Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and South Korea

27. China and Russia: The Naval Projection of Land Powers

Author:: Paulo Fagundes Visentini
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The Russian Federation and China are large land States (the first and fourth, respectively), characterized by their configuration as land powers from a geopolitical perspective. Recently, through its development and extroversion of its economy, China has built a naval power with a world presence. Russia, on the other hand, which lost much of the naval and coastal power that the USSR had, is trying to rebuild its capacity for maritime defense and exploration of the new Arctic Route, but still with limited global projection. By analyzing the recent naval projection of these traditional land powers, the article seeks to discuss the extent to which traditional geopolitics is reaching its zenith and initiating its own overcoming
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Navy, Maritime, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

28. Achieving Full Resolution to the Karabakh Conflict

Author:: Steven J. Klein
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: Azerbaijan’s decisive defeat of Armenia in the Second Karabakh War is certainly cause for optimism that any remaining issues between the two countries can be resolved through diplomacy rather than military might. After all, Azerbaijan managed to recover all the territories outside the Karabakh enclave captured and occupied by Armenia since the 1990s—as well as parts of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh Autonomous Oblast itself—in addition to forcing Armenia to withdraw all its troops from sovereign Azerbaijani territory. However, past indisputable successes in other conflicts indicate that Azerbaijan must be careful not to overestimate its capabilities to translate the recent military triumph into full resolution of the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. While it is tempting to declare the conflict over and to talk strictly of post‑conflict construction and development, a handful of countries have painfully learned that such declarations can be premature. For instance, in August 1982 Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin predicted that the imminent defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon portended 40 years of peace; and in May 2003 U.S. President George W. Bush declared “Mission Accomplished” after ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Both of these declarations came back to haunt the respective countries that had believed they had put behind them the conflict at issue. The crucial element that both of the aforementioned leaders had missed was that they did not control completely the fate of the conflict they chose to treat as being resolved. In Israel’s case, the PLO relocated to Tunis, from where it was able to rebuild its power base and receive support from the Soviet Union, while Hezbollah—which didn’t even exist at the time of the defeat of the PLO in 1982—arose with the support of Iran to become a much more formidable and menacing force in southern Lebanon than the PLO had been. In the case of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the resulting power vacuum allowed numerous external forces to enter the picture and disrupt the plans of the United States. Moreover, corruption and disorganization within the governments established with American help contributed to the deterioration of stability in the region.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

29. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:: Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly transformed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with implications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the foreign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, populated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed independent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these territories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was inserted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orientation, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guarantee and deterrent against Azerbaijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:: Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

30. Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea

Author:: Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: What are China's intentions in the South China Sea? In The 2020-21 Wilson China Fellowship: Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications, Oriana Skylar Mastro uses a two-part analytical framework to outline why she believes China is trying to establish de facto control over the South China Sea. This means sovereignty over the disputed islands and the ability to dictate the rules of behavior in the surrounding waters. These intentions are detrimental to U.S. and allied interests. Mastro goes on to provide a list of recommended measures the United States can take to prevent Beijing from incrementally advancing its control over the South China Sea
Topic:: Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Territory
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

31. The Crisis After the Crisis: How Ladakh Will Shape India’s Competition with China

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: In May 2020, China launched several near-simultaneous incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, into territory hitherto controlled by India. Both sides reinforced their positions with tens of thousands of troops, engaged in a deadly skirmish, and reportedly came close to war. An agreement to disengage troops was announced in February 2021, but implementation has been halting. Regardless of how disengagement progresses, the crisis poses significant challenges for India’s long-term strategic competition with China. As a result of the Ladakh crisis, India faces a new strategic reality in which China is a clear and abiding adversary. For India, the political relationship is now defined by hostility and distrust, and the LAC will remain more heavily militarised and violence-prone. Given this new reality, India is likely to further defer military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean. In the face of unremitting Chinese naval expansion, India risks losing significant political and military leverage in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China appears to have escaped significant harm. Its better-resourced military could better absorb the material costs of the mobilisation. It may have been more concerned by the prospect of an increasingly hostile India, but the disengagement agreement has limited even those modest political costs. The central policy challenge for India is balancing the heightened Chinese military threat on the northern border with the rapidly growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. It can manage this challenge by focusing on military strategies of denial rather than punishment, focusing on imposing political rather than material costs on China, and accepting more risk at the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage in the Indian Ocean region. How India responds will shape not only its strategic competition with China, but also the interests of likeminded partners including Australia, which depend on an increasingly capable and active India.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

32. Mitigating the Risk of a China–India Conflict

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: The Ladakh crisis between China and India seems to have settled into a stalemate, marked by somewhat reduced tactical tensions and continuing fruitless talks on disengagement—but its trajectory could again turn suddenly, even flaring into a limited conventional war. Despite a limited disengagement, both sides continue to make military preparations near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to increase their readiness for potential conflict. While China proved its revisionist intent with its 2020 incursions, its specific goals and plans remain opaque. The broader political context is marked by distrust and hostility, and bilateral relations are at their lowest ebb in decades. War remains unlikely—both sides can ill-afford the distraction from higher national priorities and have demonstrated a recent keenness to step back from the brink. But, with growing capabilities and unclear intent, and with military operations no longer impaired by winter, the Ladakh crisis may still escalate to conflict. The crisis has been full of surprises. Despite observing major military maneuvers in China, India didn’t anticipate the multiple incursions across the LAC in May 2020. For weeks thereafter, the Indian Army leadership insisted the incursions were nothing out of the ordinary. After both sides agreed to an early disengagement plan, the crisis took a shocking turn with a deadly skirmish in June — the first loss of life on the LAC in 45 years. India also mustered its own surprises, deploying troops to occupy tactically valuable heights in late August, to gain some bargaining leverage. And the crisis also abated with a surprise, with the sudden announcement of disengagement from heavily militarised stand-off sites around Pangong Tso Lake in February 2021. Future surprises may yet occur. This paper argues that the risk of China–India conflict is significant because, even if its likelihood is low, its consequences may be considerable. A limited conventional war would be likely to impose significant costs on India, but, depending on the reactions of its partners, it may also reinforce latent Indian suspicions over the utility and reliability of its strategic partnerships. In that way, even a localized limited war on the LAC may have far-reaching implications, if it incidentally drives a wedge between India and its partners in the Quad. Mitigating that risk will require sound policy settings and astute diplomatic and public messaging from Canberra, Washington, Tokyo, and other like-minded capitals. The remainder of this paper is in three parts: first, why a border war is plausible; second, what costs it would impose on India and how it might stir distrust of India’s Quad partners; and, finally, a framework to mitigate those risks.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Risk, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

33. Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

Author:: Oriana Skylar Mastro
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro begins her paper by emphasizing that U.S. national defense strategy has characterized the US-China relationship as one of great power competition (GPC). Both the US and China have existing relationships in the Indo-Pacific region and are undergoing efforts to foster new relationships there as well. China’s efforts, however, conflict with US military efforts to promote peace, strategy, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, making them much harder to achieve. Mastro argues that it will be difficult to deter China’s efforts — perhaps even more difficult than it was to deter the Soviet Union’s efforts during the Cold War. She cites the geography of the Asia-Pacific (compared to that of Central Europe), the US’s ongoing struggle to establish a credible deterrent, China’s range of options for nonlethal but effective uses of force, and the lack of US willingness to grant China a parallel sphere of influence to that in which the Soviet Union was allowed to control as evidence to support her claim. Thus, Mastro recommends that the US must avoid relying on the same Cold War tools and competition strategies in its competition with China, despite their success in the past. Instead, the US needs to combat the threat posed by China through 1) convincing China that the costs of using force outweigh the benefits and 2) forging a counterbalancing coalition of allies and partners that are confident that the US will not only protect them from a military attack but other costly behaviors (e.g., economic coercion, diplomatic isolation) that China may leverage against them as well.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. Competition for High Politics in Cyberspace: Technological Conflicts Between China and the USA

Author:: Karina Veronica Val Sanchez and Nezir Akyeşilmen
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:: Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:: This paper highlighted the use of cyberspace as a conflict zone by the US and China, focusing on competition in various technological spheres, including cyberespionage, military technology, and Artificial Intelligence (AI). The main purpose of this study was to depict how great powers manipulate the cyber domain for their high political objectives through US-China rivalry. The research has been carried out mainly via literature review, discourse analysis, and relevant statistics. Consistent with previous literature and global public perception, the outcome has shown that both states are using cyberspace as a new domain for completion in trade, technology, and military purposes. Cyberespionage, the militarization of cyberspace, and AI have been the main conflict areas between these two global competitors in the last decade.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Russian Relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after U.S. Withdrawal

Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Join us for a meeting of the New York-Russia Public Policy Series, co-hosted by the Harriman Institute at Columbia University and the New York University Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia. In this second event of the academic year, our panelists will discuss the status of Russian relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. Moderated by Joshua Tucker (NYU Jordan Center) and Alexander Cooley (Harriman Institute). The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the dramatic collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Kabul has ushered in another period of Taliban rule. Regional powers and neighbors have been anticipating the U.S. exit for some time: Russia remains a critical player in the region and, even before the U.S. withdrawal, had demonstrated a pragmatic approach to engaging with the Taliban. What is Moscow’s plan for dealing with the new Afghan government and what are its overall priorities in the region? How will this affect Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states and China? And are there any prospects for renewed cooperation between Moscow and Washington on counterterrorism issues in this period of uncertainty and potential instability? Please join this distinguished group of academic experts who will explore the new complex dynamics of a post-American Afghanistan and Central Asia. This event is supported by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York. Speakers Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the Center of Euro-Asian Research and Senior Fellow with the Institute for International Studies, MGIMO Nargis Kassenova, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on Central Asia, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University Artemy Kalinovsky, Professor of Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet Studies, Temple University Ekaterina Stepanova, Director, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, National Research Institute of the World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO), Moderated by: Alexander Cooley, Director of the Harriman Institute, Columbia University Joshua Tucker, Director of the Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, New York University
Topic:: International Relations, Military Strategy, Governance, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. Russia's Redefined View on Strategic Stability: A Security Dilemma in Northern Europe?

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Te concept of strategic stability has traditionally been associated with a stable nuclear relationship between leading nuclear powers, the US and USSR/Russia. Teir last commonly agreed defnition of the concept in 1990 formed the basis of the START negotiations, defning strategic stability as a nuclear relationship, where neither side has an incentive to attempt a disarming strike. In 2016, Russia and China suggested replacing the concept of strategic stability with ‘global strategic stability’ by arguing that the conventional defnition of strategic stability as a military category concerning only nuclear weapons was outdated.1 Instead, they seek to redefne strategic stability as a concept con- cerning the state of great-power relations, with both political and military categories, the military category being the focus of analysis in this paper.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Stability, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

37. A Comparative Analysis of India and Pakistan’s Naval Strategy: (2001-2019)

Author:: Damiya Saghir and Khushboo Ejaz
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Pakistan and India have remained to be foes with a fixture and their competitiveness continues to grow within the Indian Ocean Region as well. This research paper focuses on comparing the Maritime Strategy of India and Pakistan in terms of their capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, threats, and challenges. Further in the paper with the help of literature review and interviews it is discussed how both the countries differ majorly and have more or less similar threats to face from each other whereas the ultimate goal of maritime strategy remains to be different for both. As the growing importance of sea is realized by the world leaders, Pakistan still faces a sea blindness in terms of resources and equipment. With this paper an analysis of budget, fleet and a comparison of objectives of both the navies is presented with a clear conclusion of who is winning the battle in the Indian Ocean. Robust and Multifaceted Pakistan Navy still has a long way to go to reach competitiveness able to be compared with India and should focus more on research, coordination, and planning.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Navy, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

38. Not In The Cards: U.S.-China Arms Control In The Era of MultiPolar Competition

Author:: Eliza Gheorghe and Dilan Ezgi Koc
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The distribution of power at the international level and the intensity of the security rivalry can explain the trajectory of arms control between China and the United States. Washington and Beijing were able to work together during the second half of the Cold War and for much of unipolarity because the system was bipolar and the security competition was mild or non-existent. The advent of multipolarity and the ensuing intense security competition put an end to Sino-American cooperation on arms control. The current circumstances are not conducive to a resumption of exchanges.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

39. NATO's China Problem

Author:: Blake Herzinger
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s strategic minds are increasingly occupied with how to handle the People’s Republic of China’s rise as a maritime power in Asia, but this focus is misguided. China is already a maritime power in the North Atlantic, and its influence is rapidly growing. This influence does not represent a crisis for the Alliance but does require addition of China to the Alliance’s strategic considerations within its area of responsibility. Additionally, the Alliance must account for extraregional competition between the U.S. and the PRC which could draw in alliance commitments in the event of escalation between the two powers.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and North America

40. Spotlight Turkey: A Pivotal Swing State in NATO

Author:: Tuba Eldem
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:: Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:: Turkey’s geostrategic location at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and its dual identity as both a European and Asian state is unique in the world. The country safeguards strategic waterways and offers NATO critical staging bases and logistical support to extend its reach in the Middle East. With its dual identity, multiaxial foreign policy and hybrid political regime, Turkey also emerges as a pivotal swing state in shaping the contours of a stronger Transatlantic Alliance in the emerging new global world order marked by growing power competition between Western liberal democracies and Eastern autocratic regimes.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Asia, and North America

41. Military Build-up in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea: How Relevant Are the Disputes with China?

Author:: Bruno Hendler and Andre Luiz Cancado Motta
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Contexto Internacional
Institution:: Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
Abstract:: The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the regions with the most dynamic and intense military activity in the world. This is largely due to commercial and political interests linked to the region, which is crucial for global maritime trade and rich in natural resources. China is the most interested party in the SCS, claiming 90% of its entire area, a portion referred to by Beijing as the “nine-dash line.” The present article seeks to analyse both quantitatively and qualitatively the influence of China on the military spending of four Southeast (SE) Asian countries that are also interested in the SCS: Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. For quantitative analysis, we used the data for military expenditure, armaments acquisition, the frequency and type of incidents involving national navies and/or civilians. For qualitative analysis, we retrieved information from hemerographic sources and official documents from the United States, China, SE Asian countries, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the World Bank (WB).
Topic:: Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

42. Book Talk. Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb by Togzhan Kassenova

Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Video
Institution:: The Harriman Institute
Abstract:: Please join the Harriman Institute for a discussion with author Togzhan Kassenova about her new book, Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2022). Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how the obscure country of Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the marginalized Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons—or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present. For Soviet officials, Kazakhstan's steppe was not an ecological marvel or beloved homeland, but an empty patch of dirt ideal for nuclear testing. Two-headed lambs were just the beginning of the resulting public health disaster for Kazakhstan—compounded, when the Soviet Union collapsed, by the daunting burden of becoming an overnight nuclear power. Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Kazakhstan and Asia

43. Taiwan, Cross-Strait Tension, and Security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Bryce Wakefield
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Tensions across the Taiwan Strait are rising and are potentially more serious than crises in the 1990s and even the 1950s. Military activity around Taiwan has increased, with China’s largest daily incursion into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone occurring in October 2021. Nevertheless, experts disagree as to whether such activity signals China’s intent to go to war over Taiwan or whether Beijing is posturing to a nervous international community. What is the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? Could accidents around the island spark all-out hostilities? How should states in the region, like Australia and Japan, react to the current situation? How is the increased tension perceived in Taipei?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

44. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

45. The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military-to-military cooperation in response to the global coronavirus pandemic signals a growing role for the military within China’s diplomatic activities. Historically, the PLA played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, in the wake of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA’s role in national diplomacy and security strategy has grown to serve both strategic and operational goals and has reached new heights in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Military-to-military COVID-19-related engagement has taken place within a larger context of Beijing’s expanded diplomatic efforts to improve China’s global reputation following its initial delayed and mishandled response at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Publicly available data shows that COVID-19 military diplomacy began in March 2020, when the PLA sent protective equipment and clothing to Iran. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. The PLA’s vaccine assistance to 13 countries globally fits within a wider vaccine-centric diplomatic effort by the Chinese government but so far has been far smaller in scale. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa. The focus on the BRI and South–South diplomacy also reflects China’s wider diplomatic narrative and foreign policy objectives. The PLA’s activities were usually framed within the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative that China sought to promote through its civilian aid diplomacy. It is likely that the PLA sought to cooperate with militaries wherever it could and focussed on countries with which it already enjoyed established friendly relations, rather than using the PLA’s military diplomacy to establish new strategic relations. The PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s instructions.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China and Asia

46. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities

Author:: Antoine Levesques
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: South Asia and Asia

47. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India

Author:: Manpreet Sethi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

48. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

49. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:: Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Asia

50. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

51. Japan on the Borderlines: Is Japan Still a Civilian Power?

Author:: Bahadir Pehlivanturk
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Uluslararasi Iliskiler
Institution:: International Relations Council of Turkey (UİK-IRCT)
Abstract:: The New Security Legislation (NSL) passed through the Japanese Diet in 2015 has created concerns among the public and some parts of the academia about whether Japan’s potentially unhindered actions will destabilize the region. By adopting a civilian power ontology within the neoliberal framework, this study analyzes the 2015 NSL and its implications through three hallmark civilian power credentials: internationalization; the scope of the use of force; and the autonomy of security policy. The analysis and empirical evidence suggest that even after allowing for collective self-defense through the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation and the ensuing expanded scope for international security activity, Japan can still be narrowly considered a civilian power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Legislation
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

52. Ottoman Campaigns in the First World War

Author:: Edward J. Erickson
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Unlike the British or the Americans, the Turks do not officially designate or name military campaigns in their official histories. This article presents the author’s appraisal of which operations might be considered as the Ottoman army’s campaigns in the First World War. The Ottomans fought a large number of operations and battles in the war but an analysis of these in terms of defining them at the operational level is absent from the extant historiography. The article also presents an appraisal of the various offensive and defensive campaigns that the Ottoman army conducted in the First World War as well as identifying a new vocabulary that distinguishes the army’s deliberate campaigns from its campaigns of opportunity and expediency.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and World War I
Political Geography:: Europe, Asia, and Ottoman Empire

53. Mobilizing Resources and Signaling Intentions: a Neoclassical Realist Analysis of Japan’s Domestic and International Instrumentalization of the Senkaku Islands Dispute and China’s Maritime Assertiveness

Author:: Alana Camoca Gonclaves de Oliveira
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:: Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:: Using a neoclassical realist model, this paper builds an analytical model to understand how countries are able to change or adjust their security and foreign policies. The article analyzes Japan’s foreign and security policies under the Shinzo Abe government, exploring how the Japanese government’s internal and international propaganda on Chinese maritime assertiveness and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue influenced the government’s capacity to mobilize resources in order to transform security policies and legitimize Japan’s military role in the Asia Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Political Theory, Military Strategy, and Propaganda
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

54. The Shape of Things to Come: Why the Pentagon Must Embrace Soft Power to Compete with China

Author:: Kyle J Wolfley
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:: As the COIVD-19 pandemic forced the United States to scale down its massive Defender exercise in Europe, the Chinese military continued its multinational exercise programs with Cambodia, Russia, and Pakistan, despite China’s strict domestic lockdowns. These exercises highlight how China is wielding a form of military power commonly overlooked in assessments of its rise. Today, states leverage their armed forces not only for warfighting or coercion, but also to manage international relationships. Military power includes not only the capacity to conquer and compel, but also the ability to create advantage through attraction and persuasion—a concept I call “shaping.” Unlike military strategies of warfighting or coercion, shaping relies less on force and more on the use of persuasion to change the characteristics of other militaries, build closer ties with other states, and influence the behavior of allies. China’s leaders increasingly understand the value of using their military to shape the international system in their favor. American policymakers, if they wish to compete effectively, ought to take shaping more seriously as well.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Congressional Perspectives on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arms Control Association
Abstract:: Addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons is one of the most significant and complex challenges facing the United States. Developing, implementing, and sustaining a verifiable diplomatic process that reduces risk and rolls back Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program requires a whole of government approach, including constructive contributions from members of the U.S. Congress. While crafting and implementing such an approach will be the prerogative of the Executive Branch, the role that Congress can play in supporting or hindering such a process should not be overlooked. Congress has used an array of tools to put in place conditions for negotiations, express its support or opposition to administration policy, and implement coercive measures toward North Korea designed to punish Pyongyang for its violations of international law and stymie its weapons development efforts. Using survey data and in-depth interviews from the late months of 2020, this report provides insight into how Congress views the North Korean nuclear threat and U.S. approaches to engaging with Pyongyang. More clarity into Congressional views and attitudes may lead to more effective policymaking.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

56. “The Montreux Petition” and Creeping Islamization of the Turkish Military

Author:: Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: A storm over a petition by retired naval officers once again has revealed longstanding tensions between the civilian Turkish government and the Turkish military, and Erdogan’s plans for advancing pro-regime Islamists in the military.
Topic:: Security, Religion, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

57. The U.S. Needs to Up Its Economic Game in Southeast Asia

Author:: Curtis Chin and Jose B. Collazo
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: It is important that disengagement from Afghanistan does not now foreshadow a lack of commitment to any nation in the Indo-Pacific that might be deemed by the U.S. President as not being of “vital national interest” to the U.S. With a focus on economic and trade engagement, China may well view nations differently than if it had a mindset shaped purely by military interests. Southeast Asia is at the dynamic heart of the Indo-Pacific. To America, we say, “Go Southeast, my friends.” The United States needs to up economic involvement in the region to make a sustainable and lasting presence in Southeast Asia. Then, President Biden and our U.S. Congress can say “we’re back” and “here to stay” with an all-in approach to Southeast Asia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

58. Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028”

Author:: Huba Wass de Czege
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Does The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 lack a clear theory of victory? A comparative analysis of the development of MDO and the historical concepts of Active Defense and AirLand Battle reveals the necessity of greater insight into sources of Russian and Chinese behavior and countering mechanisms, what constitutes effective deterrence, and greater clarity regarding the political will of Allies to assist in this deterrence.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Army
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. Senior Conference 55—The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions, and Decisions

Author:: Terry Babcock-Lumish, Tania Chacho, Tom Fox, and Zachary Griffiths
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: As the Indo-Pacific region enters a period of uncertainty, this monograph details the proceedings of West Point’s 2019 Senior Conference 55. Scholars and practitioners convened to discuss and debate strategic changes, and experts shared thoughts during keynote addresses and panels on economics, security, technology, and potential futures in this critically important region.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

60. Australia as a Rising Middle Power

Author:: Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: This paper examines the key drivers shaping Australia’s role as a middle power in an era of intensifying US-China strategic competition. These drivers include the influence of strategic geography; its historical legacy in international affairs; the impact of its economic relationships with states in the Indo-Pacific region; the changing demands of defence policy, including the potential offered by rapid technological change; and, the impact of climate change, resource constraints and demographic factors. The paper considers three possible scenarios that will shape Australia’s middle power policy choices – a US-China strategic equilibrium; a “China crash” scenario that promotes a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy; and a third “major power conflict” scenario where competition extends into military conflict. The paper concludes that Australia cannot maintain a delicate balance between its strategic alliance with the US and trading relationship with China. It argues there is a need for Australia to adopt a deeper strategic alliance with the US while promoting closer ties with its partners in the Indo-Pacific and supporting the growth of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance growing Chinese power. Australia needs to embrace an Indo-Pacific step up, and as a middle power, reduce the prospect of a Sino-centric regional order emerging.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

61. Iran’s foreign policy: Buying time until the US presidential elections

Author:: Mariette Hagglund
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: A key issue dominating Iran’s foreign policy agenda is the future of the Iran nuclear deal with regard to the next US president. Non-state armed groups mark the core of Iran’s leverage in the region, but Iran is currently looking into diversifying its means of influence. Although Iran considers its non-aligned position a strength, it is also a weakness. In an otherwise interconnected world, where other regional powers enjoy partnerships with other states and can rely on external security guarantors, Iran remains alone. By being more integrated into regional cooperation and acknowledged as a regional player, Iran could better pursue its interests, but US attempts to isolate the country complicate any such efforts. In the greater superpower competition between the US and China, Iran is unlikely to choose a side despite its current “look East” policy, but may take opportunistic decisions.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Elections
Political Geography:: United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

62. Is China preparing to invade Taiwan? The time may be opportune, but the overall situation is not

Author:: Jyrki Kallio
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Speculation is rife that China could take advantage of the potential confusion during the US presidential election and invade Taiwan. Although China has never relinquished the military option for resolving the Taiwan issue, there are sound reasons to downplay the risk of a military confrontation at the present time.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Elections, and Conflict
Political Geography:: United States, China, Taiwan, Asia, and North America

63. Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response

Author:: Aspen Strategy Group
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Aspen Institute
Abstract:: The Aspen Strategy Group recently released Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response bringing together preeminent experts to explore race, democracy, and political divisions on the American home front; the future of U.S.-China relations; the global economy; and U.S. foreign policy priorities for 2021. Contributors include: Madeleine K. Albright, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Zoë Baird, Robert D. Blackwill, Nicholas Burns, Kurt M. Campbell, Diana Farrell, Peter Feaver, Michael J. Green, Naima Green-Riley, Jane Harman, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Wolfgang Ischinger, Aditi Kumar, Anja Manuel, David McCormick, John McLaughlin, Shivshankar Menon, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David H. Petraeus, Tom Pritzker, Condoleezza Rice, Senator Tim Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Torrey Taussig, and Philip Zelikow.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Race, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

64. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:: The method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Nationalism, Religion, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. The Strategic Implications of Chinese-Iranian-Russian Naval Drills in the Indian Ocean

Author:: Syed Fazl-e Haider
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early December, Major General Shao Yuanming (邵元明), the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran for rare high-level military meetings. These meetings were held for the purpose of organizing a series of unprecedented joint naval drills between China, Iran, and Russia, which were held in the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman from December 27–29. The drills took place just as escalating tensions between the United States and Iran reached a crisis point at the end of 2019. The exercise also signified a deepening relationship between Iran and the PRC in economics, diplomacy, and security affairs. China and Russia have both increased military and economic cooperation with Iran in the year and a half since the U.S. government pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, while Iran’s government has repeatedly touted its deepening relations with China and Russia as a show of diplomatic strength, its allies have been less public about the growing relationship. In December, Iranian officials lauded the trilateral exercises—titled “Marine Security Belt”—as proof that Iran can outlast crippling sanctions with aid from its non-Western allies, and declared that the drills signaled a new triple alliance in the Middle East (Tasnim News, December 29, 2019). [1] By contrast, officials from Russia and the PRC were more restrained, framing the joint exercises as part of routine anti-piracy operations, highlighting their peacekeeping priorities and seeking to depoliticize the drills (South China Morning Post, September 23, 2019; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia), October 2, 2019).
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Navy, Maritime, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

66. New Wine Into New Wineskins: The Evolving Role of the PLA Navy Marine Corps in Amphibious Warfare and Other Mission Areas

Author:: Ying Yu Lin
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Historically, the Marine Corps was not a branch greatly valued by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The explanation for this had much to do with the PLA’s mission priorities: the PLA has looked to the Taiwan Strait as its main focus area for amphibious warfare, and the PLA Army (PLAA) has traditionally held the primary role in this functional area, with the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) operating in a secondary role. The former Nanjing Military Region—since reorganized as the Eastern Theater Command (China Brief, February 4, 2016)—has amphibious mechanized units that were subordinate to the PLAA 1st and 73rd Group Armies (now reorganized as the 72nd and 73rd Group Armies, respectively) (China Military, December 2, 2018). The amphibious mechanized units of the PLA Army feature heavier firepower and greater mobility than the PLAN Marine Corps (which originally consisted of only two brigades, the 1st and 164th, both subordinate to the South Sea Fleet). The PLAA amphibious forces focused on “big island” targets: these “big island” targets obviously included Taiwan, the PLA’s top priority scenario for resources and contingency planning. By contrast, the PLANMC was oriented largely towards the defense of islands or reefs in the South China and East China Seas. As the PLAN has become increasingly stronger in recent years, its efforts to field greater numbers of modern warships—and the deployments and training of these ships—have attracted ever-greater attention. In line with the expansion of its parent service, the PLAN Marine Corps has also grown, in terms of both numbers and missions, to align with China’s growing overseas interests. The two original brigades of the Marine Corps have been augmented in recent years by six more—four combined arms brigades, a special operations brigade, and elements of a shipborne helicopter aviation brigade—based in multiple locations along the length of China’s coastline (China Brief, February 1, 2019). Only in recent years has the PLA as a larger institution started to rethink the value and use of the Marine Corps—a change resulting from the PLAN’s improvements in capability, and China’s growing national power and increasing overseas interests. Recent training exercises provide some indication of likely future missions for the PLAN’s larger and more capable Marine Corps branch.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: China and Asia

67. Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All

Author:: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On December 7, 2019, infantry units of the Indian Army and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commenced the “Hand-in-Hand 2019” combined military exercise at Umroi in the northeastern Indian state of Meghalaya. The fortnight-long exercise ran through December 20, and focused on counter-terrorism operations in semi-urban terrain: to include training evolutions such as cross-training on small arms, hostage rescue, and recognizing improvised explosive device (IED) traps. Approximately 130 personnel from each country participated in the exercise, with the PLA contingent consisting of troops stationed in Tibet (Indian Ministry of Defense, December 2, 2019; Global Times, December 8, 2019; China Military Online, December 23, 2019). It was in January 2001 that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) first expressed interest in cooperating with India in combating terrorism (The Hindu, January 14, 2001). Since then Beijing and New Delhi have taken several steps to facilitate such cooperation: the two sides have set up a Counter-Terrorism Dialogue Mechanism, a Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, and a High-Level Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism and Security to facilitate such engagement. In addition to leadership-level discussions, officials are engaging in talks on a range of terrorism-related issues. In October 2018, the two sides signed an Internal Security Cooperation Agreement, which aims at strengthening cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, and narcotics control (Business Standard, October 22, 2018). The “Hand-in-Hand” exercises were first set in motion in 2007, and the December 2019 training in Meghalaya represented the eighth round of these counter-terrorism exercises. Such events—as well as the joint agreements between the two governments—present a picture of India and China as closely engaged on counter-terrorism issues. The truth is quite different, however—and the two sides are far from “hand-in-hand” in their understanding of terrorism.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: China, India, and Asia

68. The PRC’s Cautious Stance on the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

Author:: Yamazaki Amane
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In June 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a major new policy document, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which asserted that “Inter-state strategic competition, defined by geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions, is the primary concern for U.S. national security.” The document was clear as to which country it identified as the greatest source of strategic concern: “In particular, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, seeks to reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.” [1] This was followed by the U.S. State Department document A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision, issued in November 2019. This document stated that “Authoritarian revisionist powers seek to advance their parochial interests at others’ expense,” and that therefore “the United States is strengthening and deepening partnerships with countries that share our values.” [2] In using such language, the United States is not alone. Japanese Prime Minister (PM) Abe Shinzo has advocated Japan’s own “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” which he has discussed since 2016. This concept emphasizes economic development assistance and infrastructure construction, promotion of the rule of law, and freedom of trade. It particularly emphasizes maritime security and freedom of navigation—which connect directly to the territorial disputes that are a key point of ongoing contention between Japan and China. [3] The U.S. and its allies have advanced their cooperation on this new “Indo-Pacific Strategy” quietly but steadily: in one notable example, on February 4, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and its Japanese counterpart signed the “Memorandum of Cooperation [MOC] on Strengthening Energy and Infrastructure Finance and Market Building.” Brent McIntosh, Under Secretary for International Affairs in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, noted that the MOC is “a testament to our shared commitment to advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 4, 2020). Given that several regional governments—including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India (the so-called “QUAD” group), as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—have incorporated the term “Indo-Pacific” as a part of their official strategy or policy, the significance of this broad concept will continue to increase in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, China’s reaction to the Indo-Pacific Strategy has been restrained so far, although it is certain that Beijing is closely monitoring it. This article considers the narrative on Indo-Pacific-related affairs in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), by focusing primarily on how officials of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) have dealt with the concept, as well as how cooperation among regional states has developed since the latter part of 2017.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

69. Military Activity and Political Signaling in the Taiwan Strait in Early 2020

Author:: John Dotson
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On March 16, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force aircraft conducted a set of unusual nighttime sorties over the sea to the southwest of Taiwan. At least one KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEWC) aircraft and an undisclosed number of J-11 FLANKER-L jet fighters participated in the mission, and at one point crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which prompted a scramble by Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) F-16 fighters in response (Focus Taiwan, March 17; Taipei Times, March 18). Although the nature of the mission was unusual—this marked the first time that PLA aircraft flew in the vicinity of Taiwan at night—the incident was otherwise consistent with a pattern of increasingly provocative naval and military aviation operations conducted in the vicinity of Taiwan by PLA units in the first quarter of 2020. This uptick in tactical military activity has been accompanied by more assertive rhetoric from People’s Republic of China (PRC) media outlets and spokespersons since the landslide reelection of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) on January 11 (China Brief, January 17). These military operations (see further discussion below) have also taken place as PRC officials and citizens have scrambled to cope with the social, economic, and political impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic that first manifested in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in December (Jamestown, ongoing). This suggests that senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials wish to project the message that the crisis has not inhibited the PLA’s capabilities to defeat Taiwan “separatism”—and may further wish to use such operations to assert an image of strength in the face of the internal crisis produced by the pandemic.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

70. The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas

Author:: Roderick Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: In early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted the fifth iteration of its “ZHANLAN” far seas training series (Ministry of National Defense, February 2, 2019). [1] The PLAN established ZHANLAN in 2016 as an annual far seas training event, with each iteration growing in complexity (Ministry of National Defense, May 27, 2016). Live fire and combat training often draws the most attention during such PLA training events, but the critical highlight of ZHANLAN-2020A was the training focus on combat support, rather than kinetic operations. The key takeaway from this training event is that the PLAN is developing the proficiencies to sustain limited offensive strikes against U.S. forces—perhaps as far out as Hawaii. This article argues that the PLAN is close to being able to execute offensive naval operations outside of the first island chain (and perhaps beyond the second island chain) in a wartime environment. The PLA has long discussed the concept of conducting offensive naval operations beyond the first island chain, and by comparing observables from the ZHANLAN-2020A training event with the list of proficiencies necessary to conduct deep strike, the PLAN is likely close to operationalizing this concept. The ZHANLAN-2020A training task force consisted of four vessels: DONGDIAO-class AGI (AGI-857); FUYU class (Type 901) support ship CHAGAN HU (查干湖) (AOR-967); LUYANG III class (Type 052D) guided missile destroyer HOHHOT (DDG-161); and JIANGKAI II guided missile frigate XIANNING (FFG-500). A fifth vessel, the ocean-going tug NANTUO-195 (南拖-195), took part in a limited role during the task force’s return journey.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China and Asia

71. Mind the Trap: What Basing Rights in Djibouti and Sri Lanka Reveal About the Limitations of Debt as a Tool of Chinese Military Expansion

Author:: Scott Wingo
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: On November 24, 2019, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa told reporters during his first interview as president that he hoped to renegotiate the terms of the deal that gave a Chinese firm a 99-year lease over the Hambantota Port (Strategic News International, November 24, 2019). The port had been handed over as Sri Lanka struggled to make loan payments on the loss-making Chinese-built facility—thereby leading to debates as to whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had set a “debt trap” by intentionally lending Sri Lanka more than it could afford to repay, in hopes of eventually foreclosing on the port (China Brief, January 5, 2019). The subtext was that with a leasehold in hand, the PRC could use the port as a naval installation geared toward patrolling Indian Ocean shipping lanes. As can be observed by the Sri Lankan government’s desire to renegotiate, this has not happened. To the contrary, Sri Lankan security policy has trended against China since the debt-equity swap occurred. A comparison with Djibouti, where the PRC has established its only overseas military base to date, illuminates how this came to pass. In both Djibouti and Sri Lanka, Beijing has used infrastructure loans as a means to entice political leaders to allow naval access. However, three factors led to very different outcomes: 1) the recipient countries’ inherent willingness to host a base; 2) the degree of political competition faced by recipient leaders; and 3) the degree to which recipient leaders can diversify toward different sources of funding to reduce overreliance on China.
Topic:: Debt, Imperialism, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China and Asia

72. Responding to the Epidemic in Wuhan: Insights into Chinese Military Logistics

Author:: Joel Wuthnow
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has portrayed its response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in heroic terms: battling against an insidious enemy, PLA personnel courageously and tirelessly helped to mitigate the disaster in the epidemic-ravaged city. The PLA has even made the amazing (and highly improbable) claim that it accomplished this while suffering zero infections within its own ranks (China Military Online, March 3). Despite the hype, the crisis has provided an opportunity for the PLA’s newly reformed logistics system to test its ability to mobilize resources in exigent circumstances. The Joint Logistic Support Force (联勤保障部队, Lianqin Baozhang Budui) or JLSF, which was created in September 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s larger overhaul of the military, has been at the forefront of the PLA’s response. [1] The JLSF’s role in Wuhan illuminated several key strengths of the PLA logistics system—including centralized control, effective use of information technology, and civil-military coordination—while also suggesting potential deficiencies. At a minimum, the crisis likely resulted in “lessons learned” that could improve the JLSF’s role in supporting commanders during wartime.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: China and Asia

73. 2020 Country Brief: North Korea

Author:: Third Way
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: There may be no brutal dictator who has fared better under Trump than North Korea’s butcher, Kim Jong-un. There are two essential issues in the US-North Korea relationship: Ending the nuclear threat North Korea poses globally; and Ending the threat North Korea poses to its South Korean neighbors. To Donald Trump’s credit, he tried unorthodox methods to address both. To his detriment and that of the entire free world, he was so unprepared and outfoxed that North Korea won all the chips. To try mitigating North Korea’s nuclear threat, President Donald Trump held two summits with North Korean Chairman King Jong-un. At the first summit in Singapore, the agreement President Trump signed amounted to absolutely nothing. His own national security advisor, John Bolton, called it “badly flawed.”1And the North Korean tyrant, Kim Jong-un, got the legitimacy he craved. A second summit was equally as weak. While initial observers had high hopes for diplomacy with the North, Trump was simply unprepared and outplayed. North Korea changed nothing about its behavior. Two failed summits showed that the two sides will never be able to come to an agreement under President Trump to lift sanctions in exchange for denuclearization. In fact, as a result of the Trump Administration’s failures, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs, and has stated that diplomacy with President Trump has “faded into a nightmare.”2 Ultimately, negotiations with North Korea are the best way to reduce the threat the country's nuclear weapons pose to the United States and its allies in the long term. But, given past experience, negotiations must focus on producing specific, measurable, and verifiable reductions in North Korea’s nuclear capability before further accommodations are made. A smart and tough deal with North Korea would include: Specific and immediate steps to reduce and ultimately eliminate North Korea’s inventory of long-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting parts of the United States; A path to reducing and eliminating its arsenal of nuclear weapons; A verification regime to ensure North Korea does not undermine a deal by continuing its long history of violating nuclear agreements; and Security guarantees coordinated with US allies, especially South Korea and Japan. Past US presidents offered North Korea a choice: they can have either a nuclear weapon or an economy, but not both. Unlike past presidents, however, Trump gave Kim Jong-un the legitimacy he craved and received nothing in return. While repeatedly fawning over him, Trump elevated the tyrant Kim on the world stage, claimed a victory lap for signing a weak and vague agreement that does little to address the nuclear threat from North Korea, and then walked away with nothing after capitulating to Kim’s demand for a second summit. To further complicate matters, uncertainty around Kim’s health and the leadership structure in North Korea has exacerbated the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula and laid bare the need for tough negotiators who know how to draft a real agreement, not a press release.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Conflict, and Dictatorship
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

74. Space Militarization Race among China-Russia and USA: Implications for South Asia

Author:: Fazal Abbas Awan and Umbreen Javaid
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: The launch of Sputnik demarked the beginning of the space age and also the beginning of the militarization of the outer space. During the Cold War, the two strategic competitors exploited the outer space for their military purposes, which initiated an intense space race, lasted till the end of it. Due to intense competition in space, different satellites for photographic reconnaissance, surveillance, communication and intelligence were launched into the outer space and space became the area of conflict between the arch enemies. The major development in the militarization of space came under the President Reagan‘s period, when Strategic Defence Initiative was announced in 1983. This was the first step towards weaponizing the common heritage of the human being. The power trends in the militarization of outer space have also shown its implication on security of South Asia. China, under the consideration of security dilemma, has contributed its part in the militarization of space. As a result, India in collaboration with U.S is also crawling towards developing its space power, which has serious implications on the security of Pakistan. Therefore, the strategic competition among nations has resulted into their massive investment in the developing their space assets for military purposes and brought a paradigm shift in it. This research paper analyzes that space has become a fourth medium of warfare. The new plans from the major powers to utilize the outer space to dominate and to create their hegemony in the outer space will deteriorate the fragile peace in South Asia, as well as endanger the peace of the world. The design of present research is exploratory and for more empirical analysis, study also based on philosophical assumptions.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Space, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. Indo- US Strategic Objectives in Afghanistan: Security Calculus of Pakistan

Author:: Muhammed Tayyab Zia
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: South Asian Studies
Institution:: Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:: Washington and New Delhi have converged interests in Afghanistan. US aspires a greater Indian role in Afghanistan in the wake of its withdrawal from Afghanistan and India, in order to pose itself an international power, seeks in Afghanistan a deeper involvement. Although both of the states, India and the US, have devised a commonality of interests since 9/11, yet since the current US Administration bilateral ties have been intensified to the extent where Pakistan have severe implications. US President Trump‟s verdict of regionalization of Afghan issue has implied concerns for Islamabad. Pakistani authorities relate the terrorist activities in the country, particularly insurgency in Baluchistan with the role of various powers‟ role in Afghanistan. Strategic and security related objectives and concerns would be discussed in this article.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Middle East, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

76. Biden’s World? Views from the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union

Author:: Alexey Gromyko and Sven Biscop
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic prevented the annual joint seminars that since a few years the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations organise in Moscow and Brussels. But the coronavirus cannot interrupt academic exchange; a dialogue that is more than ever necessary in a world of increasing tensions between the great powers. We continue our collaboration through this joint publication, therefore, for which we have invited prominent scholars from Russia and the European Union as well as China and the United States to share their analysis of the impact of Joe Biden’s victory in the US presidential elections on international politics.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. Projecting Stability to the South: NATO’s other challenge

Author:: Chloe Berger
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In the spring of 2020, the Atlantic Alliance’s “large pe- riphery” to the South, which extends from the Sahel to the Asian borders of the Arabian Gulf, remains in a state of dangerous instability. The health and con- tainment measures taken by the authorities against the COVID-19 crisis have put popular claims to rest. The case of Lebanon shows, however, that the urgency of the pandemic has not made the demands of the pop- ulation disappear. Beyond managing the health crisis, there is no doubt that the future of the region’s lead- erships1 will largely depend on their ability to miti- gate both the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, as well as the political ones. In this “broader MENA” region, whose confines and internal cohesion are unstable, the challenges are ever more complex. Despite the relative consensus between NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Is- tanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners on the deep-rooted causes of the structural instability, the po- tential solutions are much debated. NATO’s “Project- ing Stability” concept raises as many questions with the partners, as it does within the Alliance, since a desired end-state has yet to be defined. While all efforts con- tributing to an increase in stability are a priori welcome, the Alliance and its partners must agree on the conditions of stability in order to identify and implement effective means suited to the local context.
Topic:: NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, North America, and Gulf Nations

78. Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

Author:: Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

79. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:: Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:: The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

80. Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies

Author:: Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Little is known about how China’s growing defence budget is allocated, particularly following recent structural reforms. In the absence of publicly available information and new research on Chinese defence economics, outside observers consider the official data to be incomplete. Publications addressing Chinese defence spending often claim that ‘it is widely believed’ official Chinese statistics exclude key categories of military-related spending. For instance, in 2003, one analyst wrote that ‘it is widely accepted that the official budget released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual defense spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure are believed to be missing from official figures.’ The methodologies employed by research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to estimate China’s total military spending date back to the late 1990s. Furthermore, existing estimates do not take into account China’s recent military reorganisation under President Xi Jingping’s direction, which began in 2015, and a wide range of defence reforms. For example, in 2018, the Chinese authorities integrated the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the maritime militias into the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) command structure. It is currently unclear how this restructuring has affected China’s defence spending. In addition, China’s defence spending could have been affected by the increasing fulfilment of weapons procurements by domestic firms. Therefore, a reassessment of China’s defence spending and the methodologies employed is required.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:: China and Asia

81. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Naval Integration and the Future of Naval Warfare

Author:: Michael Flynn, Andrew Rhodes, Michael F. Manning, Scott Erdelatz, Michael Kohler, John T. Kuehn, B. A. Friedman, Steven A. Yeadon, Matthew C. Ludlow, Terje Bruøygard, and Jørn Qviller
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:: Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:: In 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps released his planning guidance that laid out the strategic focus and future direction of the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger’s intent for the following four years concurred with the analysis of the previous Commandant and the necessary alignment of the Corps with the National Defense Strategy for the future needs of the Fleet by focusing on five areas: force design, warfighting, education and training, core values, and command and leadership. General Berger cogently noted that the coming decade will be characterized by conflict, crisis, and rapid change—just as every decade preceding it. And despite our best efforts, history demonstrates that we will fail to accurately predict every conflict; will be surprised by an unforeseen crisis; and may be late to fully grasp the implications of rapid change around us. Berger’s primary concern is that the Marine Corps is not fully prepared— equipped, trained, or organized—to support the naval force. To that end, force design became the priority for Marine Corps efforts to fulfill its role for the Fleet as prescribed by the U.S. Congress. The level of change required to integrate the Corps of the future with the naval forces of today would not happen overnight and certainly not without a great deal of growing pains to ensure the Corps is equipped and prepared for the future security environment. When Force Design 2030 was released in March 2020, the Marine Corps was prepared to make the force-wide changes necessary to partner with the Navy and serve as the country’s naval expeditionary force. Our current force design, optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations ashore, has persisted unchanged in its essential inspiration since the 1950s. It has changed in details of equipment and doctrine as technology has advanced toward greater range and lethality of weapon systems. In light of unrelenting increases in the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons; the rise of revisionist powers with the technical acumen and economic heft to integrate those weapons and other technologies for direct or indirect confrontation with the U.S.; and the persistence of rogue regimes possessing enough of those attributes to threaten United States interests, I am convinced that the defining attributes of our current force design are no longer what the nation requires of the Marine Corps. Berger’s plan pointed to specific areas of change required to make force design a reality: the size, capacity, and capability of the Corps. In an austere fiscal environment, the Marines must assess their current capabilities to achieve a smaller footprint with broader reach—do more with less. As the reality of COVID-19 and the 2020 U.S. presidential election have so poignantly reminded us all, these tasks cannot and should not rest on any single shoulder and any response should be well considered and intended to benefit the greater good. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies (JAMS) will address elements of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, particularly the concept of naval integration and what it means for the Services, especially the Marine Corps. Our authors look to the past for relevant examples of military successes and failures of integration, but they also discuss how future warfare will play out based on these concepts. The authors explore the topic from a variety of perspectives, including those for and against, and they offer analyses of past and current attempts and what naval integration may mean for the future of the Corps. The following articles present the capabilities that will be required to shift from a traditional power projection model to a persistent forward presence and how the Marine Corps can exploit its positional advantage while defending critical regions. Our first author, Dr. Matthew J. Flynn, presents a historical approach to the topic in his article “The Unity of the Operational Art: Napoleon and Naval Integration.” Flynn’s research calls for greater coordination between the sea and land domains to improve U.S. national security. His article draws parallels between Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat and the importance of naval integration for military success: “Napoleon’s fate reveals a great deal about naval integration and how it explains France’s defeat and, most importantly, that there is but one operational art—not one for land and one for sea.” Our second author, Andrew Rhodes, also relies on a historical example with his discussion of the salient lessons that can be learned from the Sino-Japanese War. Rhodes encourages professional military educators and planners who are developing future operational concepts to look beyond simply retelling history and consider how the legacy of this conflict might shape Chinese operational choices. He reinforces From the Editors 9 Vol. 11, No. 2 the concept that military history is not simply a resource for answering concerns about future conflict, but it encourages us to ask better questions about the role of the sea Services and how they can handle uncertainty when preparing for the future. Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Manning’s “Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative” offers a historical review of early twentieth century Japanese naval battles as a framework to model possible future contests for control of the maritime domain. Manning believes that control of the maritime domain is a prerequisite for assured access and sets the condition for successful Joint operations. Manning believes that “nations not only have to compete with their enemy’s major air and naval capabilities but must also defend against land-based airpower; missiles; torpedoes; short-range, antisurface warfare assets; and coastal mines.” Colonel Scott Erdelatz (Ret) and his team of coauthors focused on an old approach for a new era of naval integration that acknowledges the long-term threat posed by China but also considers how much of what we know as the Marine Corps should be retained to fulfill other missions. Erdelatz et al. also analyze how radical integration might incur significant risk for the Marine Corps if long-term force structure decisions are based on still-evolving concepts and unproven technologies. Major Michael Kohler’s article, “The Joint Force Maritime Component Command and the Marine Corps: Integrate to Win the Black Sea Fight,” discusses how most current Marine and Navy integration takes place at the Service-chief level and primarily focuses on the Pacific. Kohler, however, believes that naval integration is also an important component of a successful defense against Russian expansion in the Black Sea region. Dr. John T. Kuehn shifts the focus to carriers and amphibious operations with his article “Carriers and Amphibs: Shibboleths of Sea Power.” Dr. Kuehn argues that aircraft carriers and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit represent shibboleths of seapower that conflate a deeper understanding of where the U.S. Fleet belongs now and where it needs to go in the future to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. Major B. A. Friedman’s article, “First to Fight: Advanced Force Operations and the Future of the Marine Corps,” then circles back to the traditional Marine Corps stance as always first to fight and the need for advanced force operations in the Corps of the future. Steven A. Yeadon’s article, “The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious Assault,” rounds out the current perspective with a review of issues the Marine Corps has faced with amphibious assaults. Yeadon offers actionable information on current limitations and vulnerabilities of U.S. amphibious forces to chart a way forward for a robust forcible entry capability from the sea. The discussion closes with two articles looking to the future of naval in- 10 From the Editors Journal of Advanced Military Studies tegration and the Marine Corps. Major Matthew C. Ludlow’s article, “Losing the Initiative in the First Island Chain: How Organizational Inefficiencies Can Yield Mismatched Arsenals,” presents what may be considered a losing proposition of initiatives in China’s First Island Chain; however, strategic gaps in capabilities have emerged that could dramatically impact the ability to execute an island-defense strategy. The final article by Lieutenant Colonels Terje Bruøygard and Jørn Qviller, “Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and Implications for Allies and Partners: Case Norway,” offers a larger discussion of Force Design 2030 and its future implications for American allies with a case study on Norway. The authors encourage the Department of Defense to consider greater interoperability between and among Services and allies, including increased communication with allies on changes happening at the Service and national level of the U.S. armed forces. The remainder of the journal rounds out with a review essay and a selection of book reviews that continues our focus on naval integration, but it also highlights continuing challenges in national security and international relations. The coming year will be busy for the JAMS editors as we work to provide journal issues on a diverse range of topics relevant to the study of militaries and defense.
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, History, Military Strategy, Power Politics, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Norway, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Black Sea

83. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:: Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint

Author:: Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms.
Topic:: Economics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Port, and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, Djibouti, and East Africa

85. China Maritime Report No. 5: China's Dreadnought? The PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment

Author:: Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: China’s naval modernization, a process that has been underway in earnest for three decades, is now hitting its stride. The advent of the Type 055 cruiser firmly places the PLAN among the world’s very top naval services. This study, which draws upon a unique set of Chinese-language writings, offers the first comprehensive look at this new, large surface combatant. It reveals a ship that has a stealthy design, along with a potent and seemingly well-integrated sensor suite. With 112 VLS cells, moreover, China’s new cruiser represents a large magazine capacity increase over legacy surface combatants. Its lethality might also be augmented as new, cutting edge weaponry could later be added to the accommodating design. This vessel, therefore, provides very substantial naval capability to escort Chinese carrier groups, protect Beijing’s long sea lanes, and take Chinese naval diplomacy to an entirely new and daunting level. Even more significant perhaps, the Type 055 will markedly expand the range and firepower of the PLAN and this could substantially impact myriad potential conflict scenarios, from the Indian Ocean to the Korean Peninsula and many in between. This study of Type 055 development, moreover, does yield evidence that Chinese naval strategists are acutely aware of major dilemmas confronting the U.S. Navy surface fleet.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

86. Countering China’s Future Military Ambitions

Author:: David Hutchins
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: It should come as no surprise to those in the United States that China has some ambitious goals for the coming decades, but perhaps what is less known by Americans is what China seeks to achieve and the rate at which the country is determined to achieve it. China’s economic achievements and its increasing presence on the global stage are shifting the balance of power in this current era of great power competition. While China’s ascension seems all but certain, what remains to be seen is how the United States will respond to meet this challenge. To understand how the U.S. could weather the storm, one must first understand China’s ambitions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

87. The Declining Hegemony of the United States and the Growing Influence of China: A Critical Perspective on Power Transition Transition Theory in the 21st Century

Author:: Nasa'i Muhammad Gwadabe
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:: Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:: The apparent eroding in the hegemonic power of the United States and the sustained growth of China has triggered debate as to whether the rise of China will be peaceful or conflictual. Structural realism posits that the world is characterised by the anarchic ordering principle in which there is no central authority sitting above the states. Therefore, the absence of a “leviathan” on the international system automatically makes every state equal on the system which created an atmosphere of competition for the maximisation of power for survival. On a similar line of reasoning, the Power Transition theory as a variant theory within realism postulates that when the international system is structured based on the principle of hierarchy, peace will reign. It means that when international relations are regulated and influenced by a dominant power, the international system becomes stable. But the emergence of a dissatisfied powerful nation to challenge the hegemon usually ends up in war. Based on this assumption, Power Transition theorists argued that the rise of China to rival the dominance of the United States could not be peaceful. The Power Transition theory has influenced many academics to have the belief that the two nations will end up in “Thucydides’ Trap”. This belief has aggravated the matter beyond the reasonable level and has instilled panic in the mind of foreign policymakers which could jeopardise world peace and international cooperation. Hence, this paper aims to critically evaluate the deficiency of the Power Transition theory in the 21st century in explaining the current United States-China relations and the prospect of peace or war between the two nations using process tracing. Accordingly, in this paper, it is argued that in the 21st century, an armed confrontation between the United States and China is highly unlikely. Because in today’s world, nations (including the United States and China) are intertwined by the forces of globalisation which created inexorable economic interdependence. Additionally, there is rapid advancement in military technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction which came with the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Consequently, there is a need to revisit the Power Transition theory to accommodate contemporary factors. The inclusion of the current variables into the Theory will make it applicable and adequately fit in the discourse of international relations and global politics of the 21st-century international system.
Topic:: Globalization, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

88. China’s Private Military and Security Companies: “Chinese Muscle” and the Reasons for U.S. Engagement

Author:: Christopher Spearin
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: On 7 February 2019, General Thomas Waldhauser, then-Commander of United States Africa Command, stated the following during a hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee: “The Chinese bring the money and the Russians bring the muscle.” “Chinese money” is evident in the fact that since 2009, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner.
Topic:: Privatization, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

89. Is China Expansionist?

Author:: Kishore Mahbubani
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: PRISM
Institution:: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:: The Chinese soldier who pushed the Indian Colonel Santosh Babu (who tragically died) and thereby triggered the violent clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers in mid-June 2020 should be court-martialed. Both sides suffered casualties, the worst since 1975. This one push by one Chinese soldier has set back China-India relations severely, undermining all the good work that had been done over several years by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao, as well as by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping. Equally importantly, it has reinforced a growing belief, especially in the western world, that as China’s economy becomes stronger and stronger, China will abandon its “peaceful rise” and behave as a militarily expansionist power. This could well happen. It would be naive to believe otherwise. However, a deep study of Chinese history and culture would also show that the continuation of a peaceful rise is equally plausible.
Topic:: Imperialism, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Expansion
Political Geography:: China and Asia

90. A Most Significant Geopolitical Development: Strategic Benefits and Strategic Focus

Author:: Metthew Bryza
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: Baku Dialogues
Institution:: ADA University
Abstract:: The November 10th, 2020, trilateral agreement signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin could become the most significant geopolitical development in the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union—perhaps even more than the establishment of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and Baku-TbilisiErzurum natural gas pipelines. But it is not yet clear that key actors in the Transatlantic community appreciate this opportunity, especially Washington and Paris, who along with Moscow, comprise the Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the supposedly impartial mediating body of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The trilateral agreement defines a peace settlement in line with the framework unofficially agreed by the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan over a decade ago, and thus stands a good chance to hold. The so-called “Basic Principles” or “Madrid Principles” were originally tabled by the American Russian, and French Co-chairs of the Minsk Group in November 2007 at a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Madrid.
Topic:: Development, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and OSCE
Political Geography:: Europe, Eurasia, Asia, South Caucasus, and Nagorno-Karabakh

91. China’s Alternative Vision for Gulf Security

Author:: Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Trump’s Middle East peace plan and the recent Israel-Arab peace accords limit Chinese influence in the region. Countering this, China is advancing a collective security concept for the region based on the JCPOA. The US and Israel must stymie this Chinese gambit and reinforce the Abraham Accords.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Peace, and Regionalism
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

92. An EU response to Turkey’s increased aggressiveness

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Turkey’s ambitious and expansionist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has capitalized on the end of the Cold War and on US isolationist tendencies in enhancing Turkey’s international standing.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Asia

93. The Future of India-Israel Arms Trade

Author:: Alvite Singh Ningthoujam
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel’s state-of-the-art weapon systems and technological expertise are a mainstay of India’s drive for a self-reliant defense industry.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Arms Trade, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Middle East, India, Israel, and Asia

94. Erdogan’s Arc of Destabilization

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: From northwest Iraq to Tripoli on Libya’s African coast, Turkey is flexing its muscles – without the slightest nod to the supposedly ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-NATO’ orientation that Turkey’s Western apologists like to recall.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, and Destabilization
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

95. The Role of the Philippines in the World

Author:: Kyra Lüthi
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: First association most people have when they think about Asia are countries like China, Japan or India, as they are big countries, present for a long time on the world map. During the past decades, Hong Kong and Singapore have also gained a lot of attraction worldwide as business comprise the world’s most ancient civilizations. So regardless of a country’s geographical size and sustainability, each one is vital in playing a role in the global economic and political order. Unfortunately, more often than not, the South East Asian countries and most specifically and finical hubs of Asia. These are indeed the key players in Asia but the biggest continent in the world is not only composed of these few states. It is home to 48 countries and 4.5 billion people with different ethnicities and cultures that the Philippines, if not forgotten, is commonly underestimated in the contribution that it provides in the international arena due to the multiple misconceptions about the country’s general conditions. But in reality, the Philippines has always been in the global scheme from the earliest times up to today, therefore it is important and relevant to learn more about its history, involvement and influence on relations in Asia and globally.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong

96. The Russian Military in Contemporary Perspective

Author:: Stephen J. Blank
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:: Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This “war against the West” actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, War, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Asia, Syria, North America, and United States of America

97. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Energy-Security Dimensions

Author:: Frank Umbach
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is officially neither a Chinese “Marshall Plan” nor a geopolitical master strategy. At present, it involves 84 countries, rising from 65 countries in 2015, and 15 Chinese provinces. Over the last year, the number of countries being concerned or ambivalent about China’s motivations and strategic objectives behind the BRI have increased. Despite officially supporting China’s BRI, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also warned last April, that China is supporting unneeded and unsustainable projects in many countries, leading to heavy and unpayable debt burdens. In ASEAN, Chinese investments are welcomed but there are also misgivings about the BRI’s strategic objectives which may constrain ASEAN’s policy options. As China is presently and will remain the single most influential country in global energy markets in the next decades, it is not surprising that its infrastructure plans of building railways, highways and ports are often interlinked with China’s energy and raw materials projects abroad and its domestic energy policies. This paper analyses the energy dimensions of the BRI and its strategic implications for its wider economic, foreign and security policies in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, ASEAN, and IMF
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Asia, and Southeast Asia

98. A Guide to Japan’s Space Policy Formulation: Structures, Roles and Strategies of Ministries and Agencies for Space

Author:: Takuya Wakimoto
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The Japanese government’s organizational structure and policy processes for outer space programs have evolved over time, and now the government has completed its restructuring. Fifty years ago, the Japanese government restricted national space activities to “peaceful purposes,” which was interpreted as non-military activities. As a consequence, Japan’s space programs, including the government’s utilization of space systems, were rationalized on the basis of scientific purposes. Today, technological advancements and changes in both internal and external political circumstances led the government to accept and pursue a full-spectrum national space policy that includes military usage. The government codified these changes and created the first national law for space in 2008. The law established a Cabinet-level headquarters to develop and lead Japan’s space policy. In addition, organizational reforms in 2012 affected ministries’ and agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and national space policy processes. This paper is a resource for researchers of Japan’s space policy. It will allow them to easily and comprehensively understand how Japan’s national space policy is being formulated. The first section of this paper aims at clarifying the Japanese government’s current organizational structures, roles and strategies in space policy. The second section provides an overview of two national space policy pillars: national military space strategies and commercial space initiatives.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Space, and Space Force
Political Geography:: Japan and Asia

99. After Hanoi: Where do Trump and Kim Go from Here?

Author:: Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: The Ambassadors Review
Institution:: Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:: There were high expectations at the second meeting of American and North Korean leaders in Vietnam last month after the absence of progress on denuclearization commitments made at the first summit in Singapore last summer. Yet at Hanoi, not only were the two leaders unable to deliver an agreement with tangible steps on denuclearization, but they also dispensed with the joint statement signing, cancelled the ceremonial lunch and skipped the joint press conference. In a solo presser, President Donald Trump said that sometimes you “have to walk, and this was just one of those times.”[2] The President indeed may have avoided getting entrapped into a bad deal at Hanoi. What North Korea put on the table in terms of the Yongbyon nuclear complex addresses a fraction of its growing nuclear program that does not even break the surface of its underlying arsenal and stockpiles of fissile materials, not to mention missile bases and delivery systems. And what North Korea sought in return, in terms of major sanctions relief on five UN Security Council resolutions that target 90 percent of North Korea’s trade, would have removed one of the primary sources of leverage, albeit imperfect, on the regime. In this instance, no deal was better than a bad deal for the United States. Nevertheless, the Hanoi summit has left the United States with no clear diplomatic road ahead on this challenging security problem, a trail of puzzled allies in Asia and the promise of no more made-for-television summit meetings for the foreseeable future. The question remains, where do we go from here? When leaders’ summits fail to reach agreement, diplomacy by definition has reached the end of its rope. President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put on the best face they could in Hanoi, talking about closer understanding and continued good relations between the two sides as a result of the meetings, but the failed summit leaves a great deal of uncertainty going forward. South Koreans will frantically seek meetings with Washington and Pyongyang to pick up the pieces. The North Koreans already have sent an envoy to China to chart next steps. While I do not think this will mean a return to the “Fire and Fury” days of 2017 when armed conflict was possible, we have learned numerous lessons from Hanoi for going forward.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

100. China’s Military Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, and the New Revolution in Military Affairs

Author:: Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: China Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: China’s national strategy of military-civil fusion (军民融合, junmin ronghe) has highlighted biology as a priority. [1] It is hardly surprising that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is looking to leverage synergies among defense, scientific, and commercial developments in biological interdisciplinary (生物交叉, shengwu jiaocha) technologies. Chinese military scientists and strategists have consistently emphasized that biotechnology could become a “new strategic commanding heights of the future Revolution in Military Affairs” (军事革命, junshi geming) (PLA Daily, October 2015). Certainly, the PRC is not alone in recognizing the potential of biotechnology on the future battlefield, but the ways in which Chinese research is seeking to integrate developments among industry, academic institutions, and military-oriented programs—including through research collaborations and the procurement of dual-purpose commercial technologies—may prove striking. In particular, China is at the forefront of today’s breakthroughs in CRISPR-Cas, a new technique for gene editing that has demonstrated unique potential and precision despite its current limitations.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Weapons
Political Geography:: China and Asia

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS