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1. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

2. A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing transgressions and attempts at coercion in the border areas since 2008–2009 have put the boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship. The salience of this question has also increased because the geopolitical backlash to China’s actions in 2020 has been greater than in previous instances, and because India’s policymakers and strategic community are no longer willing to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt regarding its intentions and actions. This has prompted a comprehensive relook in India at the past, present, and future of the relationship. While much of this has focused on the relationship from the Indian perspective and on trying to understand India’s China policy, the current chill in ties has highlighted the necessity of understanding China’s India policy. Thus, using Chinese sources, this paper analyzes the drivers of that policy and the options available to Indian policymakers to engage with, adapt to, and mold it. This paper argues that from the time of Mao Zedong’s rise to the helm of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s India policy has been shaped by its view of the larger great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States. As this triangle has evolved, this has had a direct effect on the India-China relationship. For much of the past seventy years, China was the weakest corner of the triangle and therefore driven by goals of security and status. In that context, it saw India—another large, developing country in Asia—as a competitor for security and status alike. As a result, China always looked at India through the lens of its own relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not view India on its own merits, or credit it with agency, but as unequal as well as untrustworthy. China’s objective during the Cold War was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post–Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit through containment and coercion India’s capacity to harm China’s strategic goal of hegemony. This paper analyzes China’s India policy in three phases. In the first phase between 1949 and 1962, China viewed the United States as its primary adversary and its core objective was to keep India neutral and away from the U.S. camp on matters of concern to Beijing. Flowing from this was the secondary objective of utilizing India’s influence in the developing world to build “Asian solidarity” to stem U.S. inroads into Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

3. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

4. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

5. Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its Manufacturing Economy

Author:
Celo Hiratuka
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, economic relations between Brazil and China have grown significantly. The main driver of this process has been China’s enormous demand for agricultural, energy, and mineral commodities. On the one hand, Brazil’s strong competitiveness in these products has helped the country consolidate its role as an important supplier to China, increasing exports and turning China into the main destination for Brazilian exports since 2009.1 On the other hand, China, by virtue of its status as the “factory of the world,” has established itself as the main supplier of manufactured products to Brazil.2 Nonetheless, Brazilian scholars, think tanks, and private manufacturing firms have raised concerns. They have done so despite the great boost in bilateral trade flows; the favorable trade balance for Brazil; and the leveraging of businesses in several Brazilian sectors such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil. These concerns are related to the excessive concentration of Brazilian exports in a few products, the environmental impacts of these exporting activities, and the effects of strong Chinese manufacturing competition on Brazil’s domestic market. These worries have become more significant when one considers the growing importance of manufacturing changes with the diffusion of Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and the search for new renewable energy sources and environmental sustainability. For Brazil, this matter reflects a need to advance bilateral relations beyond existing export trade volumes and toward new drivers of more diversified economic growth that will help the country escape a specialization in commodities. The fortunes of the Chinese company BYD in Brazil are highly relevant to these trends. BYD is a company that has diversified from the production of batteries into different innovative industrial sectors, such as renewable energy and electric vehicles. BYD has also been expanding rapidly in international markets, and in that process it chose Brazil as an important market, where it has built factories to produce electric bus chassis, photovoltaic panels, and batteries for electric buses. BYD’s trajectory in Brazil certainly has not been smooth. On the contrary, the firm has had to adapt to market fluctuations and, above all, to changes in the Brazilian government’s economic policies, which have made the company’s experience in the country quite turbulent. Despite this, BYD survived its first years in Brazil and more recently has been showing signs of continuing to invest in the Brazilian market. Analysis of BYD’s experience in Brazil shows, on the one hand, that there are important possibilities for new economic relations with China that go beyond trade in commodities, with productive investments that can potentially help Brazil simultaneously incorporate more knowledge-intensive activities and drive positive environmental impacts by generating renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions. On the other hand, the story of BYD also shows that the transformation of these possibilities into effective benefits requires coordinated actions on the part of Brazilian policymakers to offer a long-term horizon for Chinese investments. In that spirit, Brazil must craft a long-term strategy for its economic relationship with China to increase the odds that bilateral engagement can advance in a new and more sustainable, mutually beneficial direction.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Economy, Investment, Manufacturing, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

6. How Do Indian Americans View India? Results From the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey

Author:
Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur, and Milan Vaishnav
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Indian Americans are now the second-largest immigrant group in the United States. Their growing political influence and the role the diaspora plays in Indian foreign policy therefore raises important questions—about how Indian Americans view India, the political changes underway there, and the course of U.S.-India relations. Since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made outreach to the far-flung Indian diaspora a signature element of his government’s foreign policy. Modi’s courtship of the diaspora has been especially notable in the United States, where the Indian American population has swelled to more than 4 million and has become the second-largest immigrant group in the United States.1 In two separate, large rallies on U.S. soil—in 2014 and 2019—Modi sought to highlight the achievements of the diaspora, outlining the many ways in which they can support India’s interests from afar while underscoring their increasingly substantial economic, political, and social influence in the United States. These high-octane gatherings, however, naturally lead to a series of questions: How do Indians in America regard India, and how do they remain connected to developments there? What are their attitudes toward Indian politics and changes underway in their ancestral homeland? And what role, if any, do they envision for the United States in engaging with India?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Immigration, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

7. The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China and India struggle to comprehend each other’s international ambitions. The misperceptions that follow lead to a lack of trust, border skirmishes, and potentially worse. On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl that left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. The clash is a part of a broader border standoff along the Galwan River between the two forces on the Line of Actual Control that is yet to be resolved. The Indian strategic community is broadly in agreement that this border dispute marks an implacable decline in India-China ties. They argue that the very basis of relations that emerged after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 has been shaken, if not destroyed. Yet, how did the two countries manage to reach this nadir in ties, and furthermore, what does the Galwan clash signify for the future of Sino-Indian relations? This paper argues that, long before the present border dispute occurred, Sino-Indian relations had been steadily declining due to rampant misperceptions of the other side, contributing to a lack of trust. The most fundamental misperception between the two countries is the inability to comprehend each other’s international ambitions, yielding the fear that their foreign policies are targeted against the other. This paper traces the impact and development of these misperceptions on Sino-Indian ties through three different phases before considering the future of the relationship after the Galwan dispute.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

8. How China and Pakistan Negotiate

Author:
Katharine Adeney and Filippo Boni
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since being officially launched in April 2015, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most watched set of projects under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having already injected around $25 billion into Pakistan, the CPEC not only has been dubbed the “flagship project” of the BRI, but it also holds a central role in Beijing’s global ambitions.1 While much has been said about the geopolitical implications of the CPEC, including for both India and the United States, less attention has been devoted to providing in-depth insights into the mechanics of how the BRI is unfolding on the ground in Pakistan. How do China and Pakistan negotiate the terms of CPEC deals? To what extent has Islamabad managed to exert agency in its dealings with Beijing? How does China adapt to the contexts it operates in? By now, the CPEC has been subject to much media, academic, and policy scrutiny, but these questions have not been answered. The power asymmetry between the two partners—coupled with the impression that the BRI represents a unidirectional Chinese endeavor, not just in Pakistan but also globally—has contributed to the erroneous representation that Beijing is merely imposing the CPEC on its all-weather partners in Islamabad. On the contrary, this study highlights China’s adaptive strategies in dealing with a host of Pakistani actors (including political parties, local communities, and the military) against the backdrop of Pakistan’s evolving political landscape and change in leadership following the country’s 2018 elections. In filling this gap, this paper foregrounds the importance of adopting a relational approach to studying how the BRI unfolds on the ground. This entails looking at how Pakistan and China have negotiated the CPEC’s energy, infrastructure, and industrial cooperation projects. The analysis is based on semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the two authors during three rounds of fieldwork in 2015, 2018, and 2020–2021 triangulated with a host of official reports, statements, and newspaper articles. Examining the domestic contours of the CPEC shows that Pakistani actors have wielded agency in important ways throughout the process, while Chinese actors at times have accommodated key Pakistani demands.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, South Asia, and Asia

9. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

10. A High-Tech Alliance: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Science and Technology Collaboration

Author:
James L. Schoff, Douglas E. Rake, and Joshua Levy
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In both Japan and the United States, there is a growing recognition that national security and alliance security involve more than just military concerns and extend to new technology areas and their economic effects. Looming over the two allies is a wide-ranging question of how to enable greater science and technology (S&T) research collaboration for commercial and defense purposes, involving such fields as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information science (QIS), cybersecurity, and space utilization. Competing domestic political and economic considerations in each country make this a particularly complex challenge for policymakers, who can be expected to treat the international sharing or sale of assorted technologies differently. Still, there is little doubt that it is in the mutual interest of Japan and the United States to harmonize their approaches and find acceptable ways to enable deeper and broader S&T collaboration—and to do so expeditiously.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

12. How China Learned to Harness Israel’s Media and Booming Tech Scene

Author:
Roie Yellinek
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Israel and China established full diplomatic relations only in 1992, making Israel almost the last Middle Eastern country to do so. Starting in the early 2000s, ties between the two countries began to blossom, mostly because the Chinese government started to view Israel as a global technology hub and began seeking to capitalize on Israel’s innovation capabilities to help meet its own developmental needs and strategic challenges. In addition, as China’s rivalry with Israel’s leading ally, the United States, has heated up, Beijing’s interest in Israel also has gotten stronger. In light of Israel’s status as a major technology hub and a leading U.S. ally, China has sought to deepen its influence in Israel through media engagement and other forms of outreach. As Chinese actors have pursued technological innovation and greater political influence in Israel, they have employed three basic approaches to court favor in and through Israeli media circles: direct messaging to the Israeli public in local Hebrew-language newspapers, the use of Chinese outlets (especially the Hebrew department of China Radio International) targeted at Israeli audiences, and efforts to leverage prominent public figures friendly toward China to amplify favorable messages delivered on these local Israeli and Chinese platforms. China’s messaging strategy in Israel has evolved in three stages. Early on, this strategy mainly included recycled talking points from the Chinese Communist Party that do not always translate well overseas. Between 2015 and 2018, this messaging from Chinese actors started to become more direct and tailored for the Israeli people. Since 2018, Chinese engagement has expanded to include a much wider variety of Israeli media outlets, which has meant even more direct access to ordinary Israelis. This strategy and other elements of China’s diplomatic outreach to Israel seem to be having an impact. According to 2019 polling from the Pew Research Center, Israeli respondents view China more positively than those in any other Western-oriented countries that took part in this survey did. These results are an outgrowth of China’s desire to build influence vis-à-vis Israeli society, especially in terms of Israelis’ views on China. Chinese government officials and other actors see this campaign toward the Israeli people as part of a broader and more important strategic campaign, as Beijing competes with Washington for worldwide influence. Israel has a clear national interest in carefully examining how and why Beijing deploys such strategic messaging and how Chinese actors have leveraged local conditions, language habits, and consumer preferences to advance their objectives. The new Israeli government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett must act prudently and keep these Chinese messaging activities in mind as it balances and advances Israel’s foreign policy interests, seeking to underscore that it does not see China as an enemy but that cooperation with Beijing needs to be pursued in the right way.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Media
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

13. U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030

Author:
Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does, even if it takes a decade. U.S.-Russian relations are at the lowest point since the Cold War. Almost all high-level dialogue between the two countries has been suspended. There are no signs that the relationship will improve in the near future. However, this situation is unlikely to last forever—even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a limited but meaningful dialogue; the two countries eventually will reengage, even if mostly to disagree, and new U.S. and Russian leaders could pursue less confrontational policies. What is the agenda that they will need to tackle then—perhaps as far in the future as 2030?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

14. The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Erik Brattberg and Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific are of paramount importance for the future of the rules-based international order. While the United States is redirecting strategic focus to the region as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe is also stepping up its role—leveraging a strong economic profile, long-standing bilateral ties, and active engagement in various regional multilateral forums. The European Union (EU) and its member states can make distinct contributions to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, though not necessarily always in lockstep with Washington. Though few European countries have formally acknowledged the new U.S. strategy, the concept’s emphasis on rules-based order and multilateralism bears many similarities to the EU’s own outlook. The EU and many of its member states are becoming more ambivalent about Chinese power and are seeking to counter certain problematic Chinese economic behaviors, and the Indo-Pacific offers opportunities for transatlantic cooperation, though U.S.-EU diplomatic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump are significantly strained. However, the U.S. administration’s fixation on short-term transactional diplomacy, lack of commitment to multilateralism, and strong emphasis on Chinese containment are putting a damper on such collaboration with EU members. Admittedly, Europe does not aspire to be a traditional hard power in Asia, lacks significant military capabilities in the region, and is reluctant to pick sides in the escalating U.S.-China competition. Only two European middle powers—France and the United Kingdom (UK)—can project serious military force in the region, as Europe has long underinvested in defense spending and needs to prioritize more immediate security threats. But Europe can amplify its political and security role in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the growing Franco-British presence and better utilizing the EU’s collective role. Key European countries have already expanded their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a more regular naval presence, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, arms sales, and various other forms of defense cooperation. Europe’s economic role is already considerable too, as the EU is a top trade and investment partner of most regional states. Washington should welcome greater European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. A greater European presence in the region advances the U.S. objective of promoting a tighter regional security architecture with vital partners like Japan and India. Similarly, the EU’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can help foster a more multilateral, cooperative Asian security architecture. As for economic and trade policy, U.S. and EU interests in the region largely overlap but do diverge in significant ways. While both Europe and the United States are keen on increasing trade flows and addressing unfair Chinese economic practices, the EU’s emphasis on free trade has allowed it to either complete trade agreements or launch new negotiations with regional partners like Australia, Japan, and Singapore. Despite the limitations constraining the transatlantic diplomatic agenda, meaningful joint and/or complementary European and U.S. action in the Indo-Pacific remains achievable, particularly between France, the UK, and the United States, though other European countries and the EU could get involved too. While the EU is not likely to formally endorse the U.S. slogan of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Europeans can still meaningfully advance its objectives, which are overwhelmingly consistent with the EU’s own interests and values. Washington should encourage this trend and simultaneously seek to do more to incorporate European players as key partners on the implementation of its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific