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  • Author: James M. Acton
  • Publication Date: 10-2012
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: The U.S. political parties are divided on nuclear weapons policy. Meanwhile, the United States and Russia have reached an arms control impasse and no new agreement is on the horizon. Confidence-building measures could help reduce nuclear risks between the United States and Russia, advancing the goals of both countries and both U.S. presidential candidates.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bilateral Relations
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States
  • Author: Adam Balcer, Nikolay Petrov
  • Publication Date: 02-2012
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and nuclear power remains a key player in Eurasia with a substantial leverage in the post Soviet space and, at the same time, the most important neighbour of the EU. However, in the coming decades Russia will face serious challenges to its internal prospects and international position. The further rise of China, negative demographic trends (shrinking population, emigration of well-educated people), substantial increase of the share of Muslim population, degradation of its infrastructure, unsustainability of the current economic model and rampant corruption are the most important factors which will impact on Russia's future and by default on the EU's. Certainly, Russia's democratization would substantially increase its ability to face these challenges and impact positively on EU-Russia relations.
  • Topic: International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power
  • Political Geography: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Soviet Union, United Nations
  • Author: Alexei Arbatov
  • Publication Date: 03-2011
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: The pursuit of nuclear arms control has enjoyed something of a renaissance recently, with the signing of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in spring 2010 in Prague. Whether that momentum will dissipate after New START or lead to further nuclear arms control agreements depends on several factors: The new U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. While there is always some distance between a state's declared policy and that policy's implementation, both documents show that, behind their more ambitious disarmament rhetoric, the United States and Russia maintain conservative nuclear policies that make radical nuclear disarmament unlikely—to say nothing of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The peculiarities of the recently signed and ratified New START agreement. Among these are the modest cuts stipulated by the treaty relative to its predecessors; the acrimonious ratification debates in both the U.S. and Russian legislatures; and the dim prospects for a follow-on agreement (in sharp contrast to the mood prevailing after past START agreements). The dynamics of obsolescence and modernization of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces. The United States should have little problem cutting its forces to get below New START's limits. Russia, however, will have problems, not in reducing its numbers, but in raising them to treaty ceilings, due to their removal of obsolete weapons from service and slow deployment of new systems. Either Russia can negotiate a New START follow-on treaty with even lower ceilings or it can accelerate the development and deployment of new systems. While the former is obviously a more attractive alternative, it would require the United States and Russia to resolve many thorny arms control issues, such as ballistic missile defense, conventional strategic weapons, and tactical nuclear weapons. Ballistic missile defense. President Obama's decision to modify the Bush administration's ballistic missile defense plans in Central Europe opened the way for New START and eased Russian concerns, even if they could never have been allayed entirely. Moscow believes that U.S. ballistic missile defense programs are ultimately designed to degrade Russia's nuclear deterrent, and it is far from clear that U.S. proposals to jointly develop such capabilities with Russia would allay those concerns—or that the idea even makes any sense. Russia's perceptions of U.S. conventional strategic weapons. Russian officials are especially concerned about the U.S. Prompt Global Strike concept and do not trust American assurances that such capabilities are only directed at terrorists and rogue states. There has already been some progress made in dealing with these weapons in negotiations, and future progress on this issue will likely depend on legal agreements and confidence-building measures to scale U.S. capabilities in ways that would threaten Russia's (or China's) strategic deterrent. Joint development of ballistic missile defenses with Russia. This issue could seriously complicate Washington's and Moscow's strategic relations with China and India. Officials on both sides would do well to start small and proceed step-by-step, using incremental successes to build the momentum necessary to work through more difficult issues. Non-strategic—that is, tactical—nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, the United States and Europe relied on tactical nuclear weapons to counterbalance Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in Europe; today, the situation is reversed, with Moscow relying on tactical nuclear weapons as a counterbalance not only to NATO conventional superiority but also to U.S. strategic nuclear superiority and long-range precision-guided weapons. No one now knows which weapons systems should be categorized as non-strategic, and how limits across regions could be accounted for and verified. In addition, reviving the moribund Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is essential to dealing with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, China, Europe, Washington, Moscow
  • Author: James M. Acton
  • Publication Date: 03-2011
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. This report offers a practical approach to reducing the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear armed states to no more than about half that number. This target would require Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals by a factor of ten.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Washington, Moscow
  • Author: Dmitri V. Trenin, Alexey Malashenko
  • Publication Date: 10-2010
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Iran's emergence as a rising power is straining its relations with Russia. While many outside observers assume the two countries enjoy a close relationship, in reality it is highly complex. Although Iran and Russia have strong economic and military ties, Moscow is increasingly wary of Tehran's growing ambitions.
  • Topic: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Power
  • Political Geography: Russia, Iran, Tehran, Moscow
  • Author: Martha Brill Olcott
  • Publication Date: 02-2009
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: With Washington's influence on the Caspian region at its lowest ebb in many years, the Obama administration could reverse this trend with a new approach that accepts Russia's presence and China's interest as historical and geographical givens and emphasizes short- and medium-term problem solving in multilateral and bilateral settings instead of long-term political and economic transformations. The United States can accomplish more in the Caspian region by focusing on military reform and building security capacity than on forming military alliances. The United States should switch from a multiple pipeline strategy to a policy that advances competition by promoting market pricing for energy producers, consumers, and transit states. The United States could facilitate the introduction of renewable sources of energy as a stimulus to economic recovery and a source of enhanced social security. The United States should develop a nuanced strategy that encourages political development through social and educational programs and local capacity building. The Obama administration should name a high-level official as a presidential envoy to this region.
  • Topic: Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, China, Washington, Central Asia
  • Author: Pierre Goldschmidt
  • Publication Date: 07-2008
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: There are presently clear indications that we are about to see a revival of nuclear energy worldwide. It is important to make this expansion of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and desalinated water as safe and secure as possible. In the coming decade, however, the rate of this expansion will be limited by several factors: in some recipient states, by the lack of an adequate industrial infrastructure, or an insufficient nuclear safety culture with a truly independent control organization; and in supplier states, by a limited capacity to produce certain types of nuclear equipment, such as reactor vessels.
  • Topic: International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Border Control, Nuclear Power
  • Political Geography: Russia
  • Author: Rose Gottemoeller
  • Publication Date: 02-2003
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Nuclear arms control is often considered not worth the effort now that the Cold War is over. But the nuclear threat is anything but over. Several thousand strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert in U.S. and Russian arsenals. Many more are insecurely stored. Though the arms control problem needs to be faced by both countries, neither one has the stomach for another Cold War–style, 500-page treaty like START I. The new model is the 2002 Moscow Treaty—a simple, three-page commitment to reduction. Such short treaties now make sense because both countries have many ways to know what is going on inside each other's nuclear arsenal. START I is still very important, but it is no longer the only tool in the box. Today, Washington and Moscow can relegate negotiated treaties to a few essential fronts and pursue exciting, innovative arms control efforts involving threat reduction and technical cooperation.
  • Topic: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Political Geography: Russia, Washington, Mexico
  • Author: Andrew Kuchins
  • Publication Date: 05-2002
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin have an important opportunity at their upcoming meeting to reach key agreements, remove major irritants in U.S.–Russian relations, and initiate a genuine partnership less burdened by Cold War legacies. In Europe last summer and in the United States last November, the two leaders established personal chemistry and trust—but the meetings lacked substance. Although Putin's leadership position will not be made or broken on his foreign policies, this time it will be important for his pro-Western orientation to produce a concrete payoff for Russia. As for President Bush, if the summit fails to produce results, then his vaunted Russia policy will be seen to be drifting. Thus both men require real outcomes such as a signed, legally binding nuclear arms reduction agreement and a new institutional relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Perhaps just as important, however, Putin and Bush each must explain to his own country why this partnership is important and what are its key elements.
  • Topic: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia
  • Author: Jon Wolfsthal, Joseph Cirincione
  • Publication Date: 04-2000
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Seven years after President's George Bush and Boris Yelstin signed it, the Russian Duma is on the verge of ratifying the START II arms reduction treaty. The agreement, ratified by the United States Senate on January 26, 1996, would cut the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000-3,500.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: Matthew Bunn
  • Publication Date: 03-2000
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: Todd Sechser
  • Publication Date: 12-1999
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: The United States has spent over $3 billion addressing the nuclear proliferation threat from Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Programs managed by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State have helped safeguard Russia's enormous stockpiles of nuclear material, dismantle nuclear-tipped missiles, and keep nuclear scientists employed in Russia and out of other nations' nuclear programs.
  • Topic: Security, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: Jon B. Wolfsthal
  • Publication Date: 10-1999
  • Content Type: Policy Brief
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: Russia's nuclear weapons complex is spread across 10 remote, closed and formerly secret “nuclear cities,” which employ almost 1 million scientists, engineers and technicians. Moscow's economic collapse has left these former “jewels” in the Russian nuclear crown struggling to survive, and workers with access to nuclear materials and expertise routinely go for months without getting paid. The U.S. Department of Energy, as part of the Clinton Administration's cooperative threat reduction efforts, has launched the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to reduce the proliferation risks created by the poor economic conditions in these closed cities. By promoting the development of private industry in these cities, NCI seeks to prevent a brain drain of Russian nuclear experts to would-be nuclear-weapon states.
  • Topic: Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Europe, Asia
  • Author: Brad Roberts, Richard Speier, Leonard Spector, James Steinberg, Hank Chiles, Rüdiger Hartmann, Harald Müller, Leonard Weiss, Ben Sanders, Valery Tsepkalo, Shai Feldman, Phebe Marr, Riaz Kokhar, Virginia Foran, Dennis Gormley, Michael Moodie, Gennady Pshakin, Wendy Frieman, Shah. Prakash, Munir Akram, Michael Krepon, Alexei Arbatov
  • Publication Date: 06-1997
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade." Each year, preparing the agenda for this meeting and preparing my opening remarks, provides me the opportunity to survey our field, to take stock of recent accomplishments and set backs, and to anticipate the challenges ahead. In many respects the news in our field has been good. Since we met last, in February 1996: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature. The South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has entered into force for the regional parties, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has been opened for signature. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been upgraded and the way opened for further enhancements, under the second part of the 93+2 program. In the area of export controls, multilateral regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have added several new members and refined their rules... and China has strengthened its non-proliferation commitments by pledging not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear installations. In addition, there have been no new stories of significant leaks of nuclear materials from Russia or the other Soviet successor states, and U.S. cooperative programs to enhance security over such materials have gained considerable momentum. Reinforcing the norm of non-proliferation, the two nuclear superpowers continue to dismantle nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and there are reasonable prospects for further reductions under the pending START II treaty and an anticipated START III accord. Looking at the threshold states... Pakistan is continuing its freeze on the production of fissile material, although Israel and India are apparently adding to their plutonium stockpiles. The North Korean nuclear weapons effort appears to remain frozen, as the result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework understanding with the United States. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons program, according to recent testimony by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has not progressed in the past two years, while Iraq's nuclear activities are being suppressed by UNSCOM, and Libya's nuclear program appears to be languishing.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Pakistan, Africa, Russia, United States, Iran
  • Author: Alexander Pikayev, Alexei Arbatov, Richard Speier, Rodney W. Jones, John Pike, Michael Nacht, Linton Brooks, Stephen Cambone, Seth Carus, Robert Einhorn, Ronald Lehman II, McCarthy Tim, Yuri Nazarkin, Keith Payne, Henry Sokolski, Mikhail Streltsov
  • Publication Date: 02-1996
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  • Abstract: The first panel focused on the U.S. and Russian stakes in strategic arms control, the prospects for START II ratification in Russia, the status of START III issues, and the possibilities for cooperative approaches to the issues of strategic offense-defense interaction. The Russian panelists, Ambassadors Yuri Nazarkin and Mikhail Streltsov, and State Duma member Alexei Arbatov, explained Russia's START II reservations, steps in the ratification process, and expected implementation problems in eliminating Russia's multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). On balance, they agreed that START II serves Russia's basic interests, in lower levels of strategic arms, eventual economic savings, and political and military parity with the United States. They acknowledged that the ball is now in Russia's court, and ventured that parliament's approval probably would occur eventually.
  • Topic: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States